Circumstances:

The aircraft was on a flight from Bandana Station Authorised Landing Area (ALA) to Gunnedah in company with two Airtourer 150 aircraft. Landings were planned at Roma, St. George, and Moree. VH-MVL took off first into a moderate south-westerly wind. After a long take-off roll the aircraft became airborne and, at low altitude, maintained runway heading for some considerable distance. During the completion of a 90-degree left turn, the aircraft failed to climb then entered a steep descent and crashed two kilometres south-west of the strip. Impacting the ground in a level attitude, the aircraft was destroyed and the two occupants seriously injured. The pilot's head struck the instrument panel when his shoulder harness restraint failed. The Bandana ALA is 820 metres long, aligned 04/22, and slopes two percent down toward the south-west. The surface is uneven and covered with long grass. About 3.5 kilometres to the west is an escarpment, almost 2000 feet high. The escarpment forms part of the eastern edge of the Carnarvon Range. In conjunction with the escarpment, the fresh, cool, and stable south-westerly airstream produced appropriate conditions for significant leeside downdraughts or standing waves. The pilot was very familiar with VH-MVL, having logged most of his experience on type in that aircraft. He had recent experience in operating from ALAs and had expressed some concern about take-off performance from Bandana. He considered flying VH-MVL to nearby Ingelara to load his passenger and baggage and then depart from its 1250 metre grass strip. He subsequently decided to depart from Bandana. The aircraft had been refuelled to 108 litres (24 Imperial gallons) at Emerald before the 74-minute flight to Bandana. Combined with the weights of occupants and baggage, the aircraft was 33 kilograms over maximum gross for take-off. Even at the highest rate of fuel consumption, the weight of the remaining fuel was sufficient to result in the aircraft being marginally over maximum gross weight for take-off from Bandana. The aircraft had been operating from other airfields with the two occupants, the baggage and fuel loads up to 108 litres. It seems likely that the critical terrain and meteorological conditions requiring performance beyond the aircraft's capability were not encountered until this flight. With their additional power the two Airtourer 150s were able to climb safely in the prevailing meteorological conditions. Examination of the aircraft and engine failed to reveal any pre-existing mechanical abnormalities which could be considered as factors contributing to the accident. Examination of the failed shoulder harness restraint cable revealed that one third of its steel wire strands had been broken or partially fatigued before the accident. The broken strands had paint on the fracture surfaces, indicating that they were broken before or when the aircraft interior was last painted. The number of intact strands was insufficient to absorb the loads in the impact, causing failure of the cable and serious head injury to the pilot.

Significant Factors:

The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The aircraft, marginally above maximum gross weight, probably encountered downdraughts in the lee of the escarpment after take-off and was unable to establish a safe climb.

At the conclusion of a property inspection the pilot decided to practice a glide approach in 15 knot wind conditions, which gave a light crosswind on the selected strip. Initial touchdown was on the tailwheel and the aircraft bounced. After the next touchdown the aircraft commenced to run off the side of the strip. The pilot applied power to go-around but the propeller struck the ground and the aircraft came to rest on its nose in a paddock adjacent to the strip. When the aircraft bounced, the pilot had not maintained the control inputs required to compensate for the crosswind, and after the subsequent touchdown the aircraft had commenced to weather-cock. Having applied power to go-around, the pilot had progressively pushed forward on the control stick, in the belief that the tailwheel was still on the ground.

Circumstances:

When the survey aircraft failed to arrive at the destination, and on expiry of the SAR time, a search was commenced. Wreckage of the aircraft was subsequently found on the eastern slope of Mt Barren Jack, to the north west of the mouth of Carrolls Creek, and on the planned track for the survey operation. Observers at the Burrinjuck reservoir near the mouth of Carrolls Creek described the weather in the accident area at the time as black clouds spilling over and obscuring the mountain tops. The aircraft collided with trees on the side of the mountain, while banked steeply to the right and in a tail low attitude. The pilot was thrown from the aircraft during the impact sequence. Medical opinion held that there was no evidence of body trauma consistent with the seat belt being fastened at the time of impact. Because of the destruction of the aircraft by the ensuing fire the status of the seat belt assemblies were unable to be determined. The investigation revealed that both engines were operating at high power at the time of impact. No malfunction or defect could be found with the aircraft which could have contributed to the accident. The survey task required the pilot to adhere strictly to a particular track and the target height for the flight was 500 feet above ground level while maintaining visual contact with the ground at all times. The pilot was suitably qualified to act as pilot in command of survey operations down to a height of 200 feet above ground level. The investigation concluded that the aircraft was being operated at a height substantially lower that 500 feet above ground level prior to the accident. Impact marks, wreckage and mechanical evidence suggest that the aircraft impacted terrain at a time when the pilot was attempting to carry out an evasive manoeuvre to remain clear of terrain. The reason why the aircraft was being operated at such a height and why the pilot delayed turning away from the steeply rising terrain could not be determined.

Significant Factors:

1. The pilot continued the flight into adverse weather conditions.

2. The pilot flew the aircraft towards steeply rising terrain at a height substantially lower that 500 feet above ground level.

On completion of superphosphate spreading operations, the pilot had flown the aircraft to a new strip located 4 kms south of Michelago. The aircraft touched down 290 metres beyond the threshold and despite heavy application of brakes late in the landing roll, the pilot was unable to bring the aircraft to a full stop before it overturned at the end of the strip. Investigation revealed that the tailwind at the time of the landing was considerably stronger than estimated by the pilot, and the approach speed was higher than optimum for the weight. No defect was found with the aircraft which may have contributed to the accident. It is considered that the combined effects of the strong tailwind; the aircraft not being flown at optimum approach speed; the long landing; and the late application of braking, together contributed to the accident.

The pilot was employed as an aircraft salesman. He had previously been employed in the field of aircraft sales in the United Kingdom and the United States of America. During his time in the United Kingdom the pilot claimed to have performed flying displays at three air shows. After joining the company the pilot received training from another company aircraft salesman and was initially approved only to demonstrate aircraft to customers but not at airshows. When it became evident that several airshows were in the offing, the company had one of its experienced check and training pilots fly the planned airshow flying sequence with Mr Eberbach.

This check flight was completed to the check pilot's satisfaction on the afternoon of 4 February 1983 in VH-TBC. On 6/02/1983 the pilot completed the flying sequence at the Welshpool Air Show.The Maroondah Air Show was conducted at Lilydale on 13 February 1983 and 14-2-83. On 13 February 1983 after the completion of the air show briefing involving all participants, Mr Eberbach and another company pilot returned to the company caravan with the company's marketing manager. All three then conducted a detailed briefing on the sequence to be flown by Mr Eberbach, confirming heights and speeds for all manoeuvres to be flown. The display was then completed without any evident problems. On the morning of 14 February 1983 the pilot attended the air show briefing but as the same manoeuvres were to be flown as on the previous day no individual briefing was held. The weather conditions on the day were not ideal for display flying, with a temperature of 36 degrees Celsius and a northerly wind of about 10 knots with gusts up to 20 knots.

The turbulence was reported to have been moderate from the effect of thermals and trees on the airfield boundary. The pilot taxied VH-TBC to the holding point about ten minutes before his planned take-off time. After taking off, the display sequence was flown normally up until the final steep turn manoeuvres. The aircraft approached the airfield from the southwest at a height of approximately 200 feet above ground level and commenced a left turn at an angle of 60 degrees. The turn was continued through 360 degrees and then the aircraft was rolled into a turn to the right at a similar angle of bank. The aircraft appeared to climb slightly in the initial part of the turn to the right and after turning through 90 degrees the angle of bank increased to 100 degrees and the nose of the aircraft began to drop below the horizon. The aircraft then recovered to a wings level attitude, the nose of the aircraft was raised above the horizon, but the aircraft impacted the ground heavily on all three wheels. The wheels and right main plane broke off and as the aircraft slid forward the engine was torn from its mountings and lodged underneath the fuselage. The aircraft slid for a distance of 90 metres and turned through 180 degrees before coming to rest. Subsequent investigation did not disclose any fault with the aircraft that would have contributed to this accident.

The aircraft was to operate a passenger carrying flight to Townsville. Witness reports indicate that the aircraft was aligned on runway 14 in preparation for takeoff. Power was applied and the takeoff run commenced. At the beginning of the takeoff run the aircraft veered to the right and the right mainwheel ran off the sealed runway onto the grass. The aircraft then veered sharply to the left, crossed the runway and ran onto the grass beyond the gable markers. The aircraft then collided with a concrete culvert, crossed a roadway, and came to rest in trees 315 metres from the runway threshold. Comprehensive examination of the aircraft did not reveal any defect or failure that may have contributed to the development of the accident. The weather at the time of the accident was not contributory. The flight crew declined to make themselves available to the investigators for interview. The crew were issued with summonses but did not answer the summons, apparently under direction from their industrial association. This action by the crew hampered the investigation and resulted in no causal factors being determined.

Circumstances:

The Authorised Landing Area (ALA) at which the accident happened was the home field of the pilot. The ALA comprised two crossed grass runways the longer of which was judged by the pilot to be too bumpy for continued operations. On one end of the shorter runway there was a row of roadside trees. The pilot was in the habit of landing well into the shorter strip towards the trees and reportedly had no problems conducting safe landings. At the time of the accident the wind was reported as being calm and another aircraft was parked on the end of the runway near the trees. On landing the pilot touched down near her usual touchdown point but then felt the aircraft was not decelerating. Aware that there was an aircraft parked at the end of the runway the pilot became concerned that she might not complete the landing safely and initiated a go-around. In attempting to avoid the trees at the end of the runway the aircraft was banked to the left. However, the left wing struck a steel cattle yard and was torn off. The aircraft then crashed through the trees and came to rest in scrub on the other side of the road. Investigation on site showed that the pilot had touched down some 200 metres into the strip and had probably accepted a higher threshold speed than that recommended in the performance charts. In addition, the pilot had neither calculated the landing distance required nor measured the landing distance available. Consequently, she was not aware of the consequences of exceeding the parameters specified in the landing performance charts or the magnitude of the distance penalty that would accrue from such excursions. Post-accident calculations showed that there was sufficient runway length available for a safe landing to be achieved. At the point in the landing roll at which the pilot attempted a go-around a successful take-off could not be achieved within the runway distance remaining before the row of trees. There was much discussion generated during the analysis of the landing distance available and the use of the performance charts. It was discovered that Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) document AGA 6 is misleading, and the CAA have already undertaken to review it to provide better guidance for pilots. This situation was not judged as a causal factor in this accident as the pilot did not consult the subject reference or the performance charts.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not consult the performance charts for her intended operation.

2. The pilot was complacent about her aircraft operations.

3. The pilot delayed the decision to carry out a go-around.

Recommendations:

Recommendations concerning the amendment of AGA 6 have already been made to and actioned by the Civil Aviation Authority.

Circumstances:

The pilot was conducting spreading operations. On the 51st take-off for the day, at a speed of about 35 knots and about 100 metres from the commencement of the take-off run, the aircraft started to swing to the right. The pilot realised that he had no control over the swing, so he closed the throttle and applied maximum braking. The aircraft continued to swing to the right, left the confines of the strip, and collided with a cattle yard. Examination of the aircraft showed that the right main gear oleo rod end fitting had failed. This had allowed the oleo to swing under the stubwing, jamming the wheel, resulting in loss of directional control. Inspection also revealed that the left landing gear rod end fitting was cracked. Both fittings were then subjected to metallurgical examination. This determined that the rod ends were of inferior quality with a hardness and tensile strength approximately 60 of other rod ends previously examined. This would indicate that the rod ends were not of aircraft standard. The source of supply of these components was not determined. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The main landing gear oleo rod ends were not of an aircraft quality.

2. The right hand main landing gear rod end failed.

3. Directional control of the aircraft was lost.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) take appropriate measures to determine the source and distribution of the substandard landing gear oleo rod end fittings, to remove them from service and stock holdings. CAA Materials Evaluation Facility Lab Note No 813 refers.

Circumstances:

The student pilot was undergoing a period of dual circuit training at night as part of an initial multi engine aircraft endorsement. Another student pilot, who was also programmed for night circuit training, was on board the aircraft as an observer. Weather conditions were reported as suitable for night circuit training, although there was no visible horizon. There were no reports of turbulence. Night circuits were conducted to the east of the aerodrome due to high terrain on the western edge of the circuit area. The student pilot completed four circuits on runway 35, before the instructor took over control of the aircraft and demonstrated a circuit. After landing, the instructor selected flaps up, applied full power to both engines and handed over control to the student. After take-off the landing gear was retracted and the initial climb proceeded normally until the aircraft reached a height of about 190 feet above ground level (400 feet above sea level). As the aircraft was accelerating to a climb speed of 95 knots, the left engine, without any prior warning suffered a complete loss of power. The instructor immediately resumed control, identified the failed engine, and feathered the propellor. During this activity the aircraft descended to 340 feet above sea level. The airspeed was stabilised at the recommended single engine climb speed of 85 knots, and the aircraft was banked slightly towards the right engine. As the vertical speed indicator and altimeter indicated that the aircraft was not climbing, the instructor told the student to transmit a Mayday call. This was received by Sydney Flight Service who declared a Distress phase. The instructor, being aware of higher terrain to the north of the aerodrome, commenced a gentle turn to the right until the aircraft was heading approximately 150 degrees magnetic. Darkness prevented an off aerodrome forced landing being considered as a suitable option. Shortly after the completion of the turn, the right wing struck a pylon of a 330 KV Transmission line approximately 347 feet above sea level. The aircraft cartwheeled through the transmission lines and dived vertically to the ground. As the aircraft passed through the power lines the failed left engine, propeller, and cowling were severed from the wing. The aircraft came to rest in a slightly nose low, right wing down attitude. The right engine was partially buried in soft earth and torn away from the right wing. Although a fire broke out in the accessory section, it subsequently self-extinguished. A considerable amount of fuel escaped from broken fuel lines. All three occupants were seriously injured. The observer in the rear seat suffered two broken legs, but was able to vacate the cabin without assistance, although he subsequently had no recollection of how he did so. The student assisted the instructor from the aircraft then returned to the cockpit to switch off electrical power. Police and emergency services arrived at the scene with minimum delay. The occupants were given first aid then conveyed to hospital. A technical investigation, which included operating the left engine in a test bed, revealed the cause of the power loss to be air ingestion into the left engine fuel system. A loose connection was found where the left engine priming solenoid is located in the fuel line. This permitted the engine driven fuel pump to draw air instead of fuel and resulted in fuel starvation at the carburettor. Maintenance records indicated that no work had been carried out on the left engine primer solenoid since the aircraft arrived in Australia in late 1988. It was not possible to determine why the connector at the priming solenoid had loosened sufficiently to permit air ingestion. The reason for the inability of the aircraft to climb on one engine was not determined. Aircraft having a maximum take-off weight of less than 5700 kgs are not certificated to provide a minimum net single engine climb gradient following an engine failure after take-off. The carriage of the observer was considered to have had an adverse effect on the asymmetric performance of the aircraft. In addition, the general level of cockpit instrument illumination, particularly of the skid ball, may not have facilitated precise attitude control by the pilot.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Inadequate inspection/maintenance of fuel system.

2. Loose fuel line connection at left engine priming solenoid.

3. Sudden, total loss of left engine power at a critical stage of flight.

4. Inadequate asymmetric performance of the aircraft under the conditions existing at the time.

5. Darkness.

6. Pilot unable to see and avoid fixed obstruction.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority

1. Review the cockpit lighting of Grumman Cougar GA-7 aircraft, specifically to improve illumination of the turn and balance indicator.

2. Advise operators to consider the requirement that multi engine aircraft of less than 5700 kgs MTOW, engaged in night flying circuit training to be loaded in accordance with IFR Aerial Work limitations.

Circumstances:

The pilot was flying a right hand circuit for Runway 35 at a height of about 500 feet above ground level. The aircraft was observed at a base turn position to suddenly bank about 30 degrees to the right, and then to adopt a nose low attitude and begin rotating to the right. This rotation continued until the aircraft struck the ground. No fault was subsequently found with the aircraft which might have contributed to the accident. The pilot reported that he had reduced engine power on the downwind leg because the aircraft speed was too high. He recalled that after the aircraft began rotating, he had pulled the control column backwards, in an attempt to raise the nose of the aircraft and recover to normal flight, but this had no effect. The behaviour of the aircraft immediately prior to impact was consistent with its speed decreasing to the point where the wing(s) stalled and the aircraft entered a spin to the right. The pilot had completed an aerobatic endorsement (including spin entry and recovery) on the aircraft type some five months before the accident. However, he reportedly had only four opportunities to practice spin recovery since then. The attempt by the pilot to recover from the spin by moving the control stick backwards was incorrect and was probably a spontaneous action on his part triggered by the sudden onset of the spin and the low height above ground level at which it occurred.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not maintain sufficient airspeed for the conditions involved.

2. The aircraft stalled and entered a spin to the right.

3. In what was probably a spontaneous action on his part, the pilot applied an incorrect technique in attempting to recover from the spin.

Recommendations:

Examination of the cockpit areas of the aircraft showed that the left hand shoulder harness attachment point for the front seat safety harness had failed, possibly contributing to the injuries received by the passenger. The shoulder harness arrangement is that the shoulder straps are attached to a common end fitting which is equipped with a pulley. The pulley is free to move laterally on a traverse cable which is attached via lugs bolted to the left and right upper fuselage longerons. In this case, the lug on the left side had separated from its longeron when the rear of the two attaching bolts failed. The failed bolt was not recovered but probably failed due to a combination of tension, bending and shear loads. The recommendation is made that the Civil Aviation Authority consider requiring either modification of the lug to prevent deformation of its rear end, or replacement of the rear bolt with a larger diameter bolt to prevent local bending of the bolt.