The pilot's custom was to connect an earthing lead to the aircraft whilst it was parked on the pad. The earthing lead consisted of about five metres of flexible wire with a jack type connector fitted to one end and an alligator type clip on the other. The jack mated with a socket fitted in the aircraft just behind the rear cabin door about half way up the fuselage on the left hand side. The pilot's preflight inspection was interrupted by the arrival of his passengers. After seeing them aboard and stowing their gear he failed to disconnect the earthing lead entered the helicopter started up and lifted off. As the tension came on the earthing cable it could not pull the jack out of the socket because of the sideways load on the socket and so pulled the alligator clip off the ground earthing point. The cable and clip trailed back along the side of the aircraft as it went forwards through translation and in so doing the clip and cable entered the tail rotor arc and were severed. Only minor damage in the form of a gouge in the end of one tail rotor blade occurred. The pilot heard the noise of the cable being cut but thought it to be the passengers moving gear around in the back of the helicopter. He continued with the flight and noticed the tail rotor damage at the next stop (Garden Island 35 mins) saw the severed cable still hanging from the fuselage jack and then flew the aircraft to Jandakot (another 8 mins) for inspection. At Jandakot the tail rotor gearbox was found to be making a large quantity of metal and the gearbox and rotor system were removed for overhaul.

Circumstances:

While aerial spraying rice crops the pilot detected a change in the engine note accompanied by a vibration. He thought it sounded like a failure of one cylinder and decided to return to the airstrip from which he was conducting the operation. Some 15 seconds later the engine lost power and it was obvious that the aircraft would be unable to reach the airstrip. The pilot then dumped the load and continued straight ahead for a landing into a cultivated paddock. Ten seconds later the engine failed completely. With the aircraft now being unable to reach the selected paddock the pilot made a heavy landing just short of it in an attempt to bounce the aircraft over an irrigation channel into the adjoining paddock. The aircraft struck the far bank of the channel resulting in substantial damage. The engine had completed approximately 170 hours since overhaul and examination revealed that it had suffered a broken crankshaft. The reason for the failure was not positively determined but overseas reports indicate that other low time engines which are fitted to the same type of aircraft have experienced similar failures. This type of aircraft is fitted with a larger diameter propeller than others using the same engine. The larger propeller may result in a harmonic vibration being set up at a particular engine manifold pressure and rpm setting which ultimately leads to crankshaft failure. An experienced USA engine overhaul company suggests that to prevent this vibration from developing the operating engine speed for Ag Cat aircraft should be increased from 2000 rpm to 2100 rpm. This suggestion has been bought to the attention of the Civil Aviation Authority. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The engine failed due to a broken crankshaft.

2. The reason for the crankshaft failure could not be positively determined.

Circumstances:

The aircraft returned to the Bankstown circuit after a period of dual instruction in the training area. The instructor, who was flying the aircraft, landed on runway 11 centre. After touchdown, the right main gear leg separated from the wing; the aircraft swerved to the right and came to rest on the grassed area between runways centre and right. The investigation revealed the front attachment bolt of the right main gear leg had failed due to long term fatigue cracking. Corrosion of all attachment bolts was found which indicated moisture had entered the bolt holes. Degrading of bolt pre-load occurred as a result of corrosion beneath the bolt heads. The remaining two attachment bolts held the leg in place for approximately nine take-off and landing cycles before the final failure which led to the gear leg separating from the wing mounting. The organisation responsible for maintenance of the aircraft indicated periodic inspections were conducted in accordance with Civil Aviation Order 100.5.1. This order requires a visual inspection of the main landing gear components for condition and security. However, the aircraft manufacturer specifies in its periodic inspection schedule that main landing gear bolts are to be inspected for condition, torque and security, every 100 hours. Existing Civil Aviation Orders do not require maintenance organisations to comply with aircraft manufacturer's inspection schedules. Had the maintenance organisation complied with the manufacturer's inspection schedule, the failure of the front attachment bolt might have been prevented. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The front attachment bolt failed due to long term fatigue cracking.

2. The aircraft was not inspected in accordance with the aircraft manufacturer's period inspection schedule.

3. Civil Aviation Authority Orders do not require maintenance organizations to comply with aircraft manufacturer's schedules.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority consider amending the relevant Orders to ensure aircraft maintenance organisations comply with the recommended schedule of maintenance laid down by the aircraft manufacturer.

The aircraft was a single-seat, single-engined, ultralight monoplane. The mid-wing was supported by an over wing brace strut. It was being flown by an experienced ultralight pilot after having been purchased secondhand by another person. Following a normal takeoff the aircraft was observed to carry out a manoeuvre consistent with a deliberate stall and recovery. It was then seen to enter a level turn to the left, in which the angle of bank gradually increased to about 90 degrees, despite the aircraft being limited to an bank angle of 60 degrees. The turn continued through at least 360 degrees, during which the aircraft began to lose height. A witness said he then saw the aircraft roll out of the turn, still losing height, before it suddenly appeared to lose control and entered a steep spiral dive. The aircraft was seen to impact the ground heavily. An examination revealed that the welding of the attachment bracket, for the wing brace struts, had failed. This had allowed both wings to fold upwards and twist rearwards, resulting in an immediate loss of control. A laboratory evaluation of the failed weld indicated an extensive lack of fusion between the weld deposit and the bracket.

The pilot had failed to return from a flight in the local area. A search was organised, and the wreckage of the aircraft was located the following morning. It had crashed into a swampy area and the pilot, although still alive, was seriously injured and unconscious. Although he subsequently survived his injuries he has no recall whatever of the accident sequence. Inspection of the wreckage indicated that the aircraft had hit the swamp in a flat attitude at a high vertical velocity but with little forward speed. The propeller was undamaged and appeared to have been stopped at the time of impact. A subsequent check of the engine revealed a faulty magneto. The precise nature of the fault was not determined but the engine would not start or run until an alternative ignition system was fitted. The engine then ran perfectly and no other faults were found with it. This particular engine was fitted with a single ignition system, as permitted by existing regulations.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was observed to depart from a farm paddock, climb to approximately 300 feet above ground level and accelerate to cruising speed. Shortly afterwards the engine began to labour, there was a clattering noise a loud metallic bang and then silence. The aircraft was observed to pitch upside down and descend vertically until it collided with the ground. An inspection of the wreckage indicated that the labouring noise was caused when the hydraulic pump actuating cable became entangled in the propeller. The clattering noise was caused by the propeller blades striking the main rotor blades and the loud metallic bang was caused when the main rotor blades struck the rudder assembly. The hydraulic pump was part of a main rotor drive system used to increase main rotor rotational speed prior to take off. All noise ceased when the propeller made solid contact with the main rotor blades and the engine stalled. The main rotor strike on the rudder assembly caused the fibreglass rudder to break up in-flight and pieces of the rudder were found a significant distance downwind from the wreckage. A study of rotorcraft aerodynamics indicates that a sudden application of forward control input is required to create the circumstances which will significantly reverse the airflow through the rotor and cause the main rotor blade to make contact with the propeller and the rudder assembly. The pilot had completed a rotorcraft pilot's course and taken delivery of his aircraft the previous month. Shortly after the aircraft was delivered the pilot made a number of modifications to the hydraulic, fuel and the electrical systems. The pilot did not check any of his modifications with the manufacturer. The pilot had a contract which required the use of the rotorcraft, and he was in a hurry to complete preparations for the contract. During the modifications, the pilot re-routed an actuating cable running between a hand operated lever, mounted on the control stick, and a hydraulic pump mounted at the rear of the engine and immediately adjacent to the propeller hub. The manufacturer had routed and secured the cable so that there was no unnecessary slack. The re-routing increased the amount of slack in the cable by more than 200 mm, and this was sufficient under the right circumstances, to allow the cable to become entangled with the propeller. Marks and damage to the aircraft and its components indicate that when the aircraft reached its cruising speed, the slack cable at the rear of the aircraft was blown backwards until it was caught by a bolt shank which was part of the propeller hub. The cable became entangled in the propeller which in turn pulled the control stick back towards the pilot. The pilot's natural reaction would have been to apply force to the control stick to push it forward against the rearward force applied by the cable. As the propeller continued to turn with the cable attached, all slack was taken up and the cable failed at both the forward and rear attachment points. The rearwards force on the control stick would have ceased suddenly and the pilot's countering force would have pushed the control stick forward setting up the circumstances necessary to cause the main rotor blade to strike the propeller and rudder. The entire sequence would have taken no more than 2 to 3 seconds.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot made a number of modifications to his aircraft without checking whether or not they affected the safety of the aircraft. This probably occurred because the pilot was anxious to complete preparations for an impending contract.

2. The pilot failed to appreciate the significance of leaving additional slack in the actuating cable when he re-routed it.

3. The hydraulic actuating cable became entangled in the propeller and the ensuing unexpected control forces caused to pilot to lose control of the gyrocopter.

Recommendations:

1. It is recommended that the Sports Rotorcraft Association incorporate in their design standards, the requirement that only controls necessary for safe in-flight operations be attached to the control stick.

The pilot was approaching to land on an undulating 586 metre strip. A tow rope was connected to the aircraft, as the pilot intended to tow launch a glider from the strip. He aimed to touchdown well into the strip so that the trailing tow rope would not foul the strip boundary fence. The aircaft floated longer than the pilot expected and touched down at the commencement of the uphill sloping section of the strip. In an effort to stop the aircraft before reaching the glider parked at the end of the strip, the pilot applied braking before the tailwheel had settled on the ground. The aircraft subsequently nosed over and came to rest inverted on the strip. The pilot did not attempt to go-around, as he was concerned that the tow rope might foul a fence during the climb out. He had overlooked the tow rope quick release facility available to him. Neither the pilot nor the operator had ensured that the strip was suitable for the proposed operation.

The balloon approached for a landing into a large paddock in what was described as ideal conditions. The passengers were briefed and adopted the correct crouch position for the touchdown. The pilot just failed to achieve a stand-up landing and the balloon skipped once then dragged for about 12 metres before coming to rest. A passenger who was wearing high-heeled elastic sided boots then complained that his foot was hurting and later medical examination confirmed that he had suffered a broken ankle. The passenger advised that he changed the position of his foot after the first touchdown. He placed his foot in a corner of the basket and when the balloon touched down for the second time it contacted the ground on this corner of the basket. It is thought that the boots worn by the injured passenger were inappropriate due to the tapered styling of the heel.

The pilot was using his aircraft for agricultural operations on his own land. The aircraft had been performing normally during the day, however on this particular take-off the engine lost power when the aircraft had reached about 55 knots. There was insufficient strip length remaining for the pilot to stop the aircraft, which struck several fences before coming to rest in a ditch 50 metres beyond the end of the strip. Despite an extensive examination of the engine and associated systems, the reason for the power loss could not be determined. However, several months later the engine again failed during a take-off run. The fuel valve was dismantled, and it was found that rivets holding a teflon insert in place had corroded and fallen off. Corrosion products had then jammed the insert in a position where fuel flow was reduced by about 25 percent. A backing plate had also become dislodged and was free to move around the fuel valve. It was probable that this plate had blocked off the fuel supply to the engine during the attempted take-off.

Shortly after touchdown, the gear unsafe warning horn sounded and the red gear unsafe warning light began to flash. The right wing slowly lowered and the aircraft veered to the right of the strip before coming to rest. An inspection revealed that the right maingear had collapsed because of the fatigue failure of the maingear side brace attachment stud. The fatigue cracks on the stud initiated in rough machine tool marks in the radius between the shank and the lug.