The aircraft was stolen from the Elcom works compound. During the attempted takeoff the passenger jumped from the aircraft and was struck by the rotor blades as the helicopter fell onto its side. This accident was not the subject of a formal on scene investigation.

The aircraft was on charter to Australian Airlines operating as Flight Number AUS656. The aircraft was inbound to Sydney via the 07 Localiser. Approaching 7000 feet, on first contact with Sydney Approach South, the aircraft was instructed to descend to 4000 feet, not below the DME (Distance Measuring Equipment) steps. The DME Arrival Procedure indicates the aircraft should not descend below 5000 feet until 19 DME, to maintain separation from uncontrolled traffic below the DME steps. At 22 DME, the aircraft's altitude readout (on the Sydney Approach Radar) indicated, and was confirmed as, 4100 feet. There was no known traffic confliction. The DME Arrival Procedure for Sydney is not in accordance with ICAO Doc 8168- Ops/611 and may not be used by international operators. However, the aircraft was operating on a domestic flight plan, and only the three letter call sign and domestic flight number were on the flight progress strip held by the Sydney Approach Controller. Since this incident, the Civil Aviation Authority have issued an instruction that DME Arrival Procedures, which are not in accordance with ICAO standards, will not be issued as clearances to any aircraft, domestic or international.

After reaching a height of about 200 feet agl on a winch launch, the glider was observed to enter a shallow dive. The drogue parachute was seen to inflate above the inboard section of the left wing and then trail behind the glider with the tow wire draped over the top of the wing. The glider entered a left turn which developed into a spiral dive. Partial recovery was effected but the aircraft impacted the ground in a nose-down attitude. The pilot was relatively inexperienced and was performing his fourth solo winch launch. During the launch the aircraft exceeded the climb speed limit and the pilot atempted to signal this fact to the winch operator by the normal method, which involves lowering the nose of the aircraft prior to yawing it from side to side. However, the pitch change used was larger than normal, unloading the tow cable and resulting in a "back release". The length of cable between the attachment ring and the drogue parachute was considerably shorter than that recommended and increased the probability of an uncommanded release of the tow cable.

Circumstances:

The flight to Melbourne was planned via Canberra Corryong and Eildon Weir with a cruising level of 8000 feet. The weather forecast for the route included scattered cumulus cloud to 10000 feet and areas of broken strato cumulus cloud from 3000 to 7000 feet. The forecast freezing level was 6500 feet. The aircraft was not equipped with wing or propeller de-icing systems but had the standard pitot heater as well as a stall warning vane heater. The flight at an indicated airspeed of 150 knots proceeded uneventfully apart from some ice buildup on the windscreen and wings which seemed to clear when the aircraft exited from cloud. However shortly after passing Corryong the pilot felt a vibration through the aircraft. The autopilot was disengaged but the vibrations rapidly worsened and the aircraft suddenly rolled and began to lose height. At this stage, the airspeed was still indicating 150 knots, and the aircraft was turning right in a right wing low attitude. The pilot recalled applying left rudder and moving the yoke forward and sensing that the airspeed which was then indicating zero was increasing. Control of the aircraft was regained at about 5500 feet (Lowest Safe Altitude for the sector was 6700 feet). The pilot found later that the pitot heat circuit breaker had popped thus deactivating the pitot heater. This would have allowed the pitot head to become iced up and cause false airspeed indications. It was not until after the incident that the pilot thought to look at the No 2 Air Speed Indicator (ASI) on the right instrument panel. This instrument which operates independently of the ASI on the left instrument panel was operating normally. Normal operation of the pilot's ASI did not return until the aircraft was on descent to Melbourne.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The aircraft was operating at a height and in weather conditions conducive to airframe icing.

2. The pitot heat circuit breaker had popped allowing the pitot head to ice up and cause a false airspeed indication.

3. The pilot was not aware that the airspeed indication was incorrect.

4. The pilot lost control of the aircraft when it stalled because of an excessive buildup of airframe ice.

The pilot reported that prior to touchdown all gear down indications were normal. Shortly after touchdown the right gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest on the right wing tip, 6 metres from the edge of the runway. A subsequent inspection found that the right gear collapsed because it failed to lock overcentre. This was probably caused by the inadequate lubrication of the landing gear system.

Circumstances:

Prior to landing the pilot intended to carry out an inspection of the flight strip for possible obstructions. The inspection was to be performed at 500 feet above ground level, with ten degrees of flap selected. During the inspection, the aircraft suddenly began to "sink" rapidly. Thinking the engine had suffered a loss of power, the pilot selected full throttle and lowered full flap in preparation for an emergency landing. Although the engine accelerated to full power, the aircraft did not respond to other control inputs, and it continued to descend until it was less than 30 feet above the ground. By the time the pilot had regained full control of the aircraft, it was on a collision course with the roof of a large building. The left main and nosewheel were torn off, and sheets of roofing iron were left hanging from the right mainwheel and left wing. The pilot was able to maintain control and manoeuvred the aircraft for a landing on the flight strip, using a windrow on the side of the strip to support the fuselage in place of the missing mainwheel. The pilot's description of the sequence of events and the lack of suitable terrain which could cause a significant down-draft, indicated that the aircraft probably stalled whilst the pilot was concentrating on the airstrip inspection. The pilot's inexperience caused him to mis-identify the cause of the "sink" and he used an incorrect stall recovery technique.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Pilot relatively inexperienced.

2. Possible channelized attention as the pilot concentrated on the inspection.

3. The pilot probably failed to ensure that sufficient airspeed was maintained to prevent a stall.

4. Improper recovery actions.

Circumstances:

The pilot reported that on joining the circuit, he checked the windsock and elected to land on runway 29 into an estimated wind of 330 degrees at five knots. He recalled that he made a steeper than normal approach and then he levelled off too high. The aircraft then bounced twice and swung to the left, skipped several times and was on the gravel edge of the strip by the time the pilot applied full power for an attempted go-around. The aircraft lifted off the ground and flew along the alignment of a drainage ditch before it hit the edge of the ditch. The nose gear folded back, and the aircraft stopped abruptly. It tipped up on its nose before falling back into the ditch on its tailplane. Subsequent discussions with the pilot revealed that the apparent width of the runway upon which he landed was greater than the runway with which he is most familiar - Camden. In these circumstances, a runway that is wider than expected will present the same visual cues as if the pilot was lower than he should be, that is, he will level off at a greater height to compensate. The usual result of levelling off too high without some corrective action is a bounced landing. This eventuated in this case and the pilot then failed to take the correct action for recovery from the bounced landing.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Misleading visual cues. Wider runway than the pilot was used to gave perception of being too low.

2. Pilot levelled off too high.

3. Pilot did not take correct action to recover from a bounced landing.

After landing, a 180 degree turn to the right to backtrack along the runway was planned. As the aircraft was being slowed to taxi speed a gentle left turn to position the aircraft near the left side of the runway was commenced, but the right main gear collapsed. A gear down indication remained on after the aircraft came to a halt. The right main gear retraction push-pull tube bellcrank had developed a fatigue crack in the area of the bushing hole. The bellrcrank failed in overload at this crack causing insufficient downlock tension to be maintained on the extended main landing gear. The aircraft had flown 9336 hours at the time of the failure and the left bellcrank had previously been strengthened.

The student pilot had been authorized to carry out two solo circuits before proceeding to the training area to practise steep turns. Runway 16 was in use with a wind from the South South-West at about 12 kntos. On her first landing approach the student misjudged the flare. The aircraft ballooned and then landed heavily. It then became airborne for a short distance before again landing heavily, resulting in the nose gear collapsing. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

The aircraft was operating as Singapore Airlines flight SQ31A, enroute from Singapore to Melbourne, with an intermediate stop at Adelaide. On arrival in the Melbourne area the aircraft was vectored by Air Traffic Control (ATC) to a left base position for an approach to runway 34. At a point 5 nautical miles (9.2 kilometres) south of the airport, and 1 mile (1.7 kilometres) to the left of the extended centreline of the runway, the aircraft was instructed to turn left to take up a north-easterly heading. The crew reported at this time that "we have the field visual." The aircraft was then instructed to make a visual approach, and to turn further left for a direct approach to the runway. The crew acknowledged this instruction, but the aircraft was observed to pass through the extended centreline. ATC advised the aircraft that it was now to the right of the centreline, and instructed it to turn left onto a north-westerly heading to intercept this line. The aircraft landed without further incident. The Captain of the aircraft later advised that he was familiar with the Melbourne/Essendon area. Appropriate navigation aids had been selected to monitor the approach. The Captain reported that he had initially mistaken Essendon for Melbourne, because the latter had been obscured by rain and low clouds. However, the crew became suspicious when the navigation aids did not confirm the visual indications. They were in the process of correcting the situation when ATC instructed the aircraft to turn to the left as it had passed the extended centreline. The crew had then sighted the Melbourne runway complex and had proceeded visually. Recorded radar and communication data revealed that the aircraft had been instructed to turn towards the north-west 13 seconds after it had passed through the runway centreline. Less than one minute later the crew reported that the aircraft was intercepting the centreline. The maximum deviation from the centreline had been about 1.5 miles (2.8 kilometres). However, it was also apparent that ATC had given the instruction for the aircraft to make a visual approach at a point where it was almost inevitable that the aircraft would pass through the runway centreline. The minimum height reached by the aircraft during the excursion from the centreline was approximately 1000 feet above the ground. Conclusions. 1. The crew initially mis-identified Essendon Airport for Melbourne, because of cloud and rain in the area. 2. The tracking error was noted by ATC virtually as soon as the aircraft passed through the extended centreline of runway 34. Immediate corrective action was taken. 3. ATC had given tracking instructions such that the aircraft would have passed through the runway centreline regardlesss of the flight conditions. 4. The crew had realised the error in aerodrome identification at about the same time as ATC passed track correction instructions to the aircraft. 5. At no time was there a possibility of the aircraft landing at Essendon.