Following a period of dual instruction the student was authorised to practice glide approaches. During the first of these approaches the aircraft bounced after touchdown. Several more bounces occurred and the nose gear leg collapsed. The aircraft slid to a halt 3 metres off the side of the runway. The aircraft was high on approach and touched down nosewheel first. The pilot stated that the rapid succession of bounces surprised her and no bounced landing recovery was attempted.

The aircraft was attempting a take off from Northam Airfield at the time of the accident. The student pilot was flying the aircraft and another student was acting as wingtip walker. The wingtip walker inadvertently held the left wing up against aileron control input from the pilot. When the wingtip walker released the wing, the aircraft rolled rapidly to the left. The wingtip, which was fitted with a combination metal tie-down point and skid, collided with the ground, the skid dug in and the aircraft ground looped. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

The helicopter was engaged in the transport of personnel for stream sampling operations. The pilot was to collect one of the samplers from a sloping area which had recently had trees cut down to facilitate the approach. To achieve the pick up, the helicopter was manoeuvred so that the left skid was resting on a slab of rock, and the right skid remained in the air, about 120 millimetres from a tree stump. As the passenger approached the aircraft, the pilot adjusted the position of the skid on the rock and the right skid contacted the stump. The helicopter then rapidly rolled onto its side. This accident was not the subject of an on scene investigation.

The pilot was conducting a solo circuit exercise. On the third landing of the exercise, the pilot stated that the aircraft touched down on all three wheels and bounced. The aircraft was then observed to land on the mainwheels then heavily on the nosewheel. The nosegear collapsed and the aircraft skidded for 33 metres on the lower engine cowl before coming to rest. After the aircraft bounced the pilot did not take any corrective action prior to the second touch down.

The pilot was taking part in a course designed to teach the techniques and practices of cross-country flying. He had been briefed to conduct a local soaring flight, but elected to carry out a cross-country exercise. An outlanding became necessary, however the pilot misjudged the approach to the selected paddock. The glider collided with trees and a power line at the upwind end of the paddock. The pilot had failed a previous cross-country check flight, and had been specifically briefed not to conduct flights away from the local area until he had received additional instruction. He declined to provide reasons for attempting the subject flight.

The aircraft was tracking direct from Brisbane to Coolangatta and reported over Jacobs Well at 0618 hours. The track from Jacobs Well to Coolangatta is 148 degrees magnetic and the Jacobs Well VOR (VHF Omni Range) is 26 nautical miles (47 kilometres) from Coolangatta. At 0622 hours the pilot was instructed by Coolangatta Tower to make a runway 14 VOR/DME approach (an instrument approach procedure). The weather conditions at Coolangatta were unsuitable for a visual approach with rainshowers, cloud at one thousand feet, and visibility reduced in rainshowers. As the pilot approached overhead Coolangatta he was advised that the conditions were now on the minima, which is a cloud ceiling of 629 feet and visibility of 3.5 kilometres. The pilot was then given instructions on the missed approach procedure, in the event that he may not have become visual by the minima. The pilot commenced the instrument procedure, but elected to not carry out the normal entry procedure due to the presence of heavy rain in the procedure turn area, and turned left to intercept the outbound track of 350 degrees magnetic. Brisbane Radar was observing this manoeuvre and advised Coolangatta Tower that the aircraft did not appear to be carrying out the normal procedure. The radar operator continued to observe the aircraft, and at about the time the aircraft return began to fade from his screen, he was of the the opinion that the aircraft was well west of the inbound radial (330 degrees magnetic) and may have been carrying out an incorrect procedure. Coolangatta Tower was immediately informed, and the tower operator, who could not visually sight the air ft, de cided that the saf est c ours e of action was t o have th e air craft aba ndon the appro ach. Acc ord ingl y, he gave i nstr uct ions to the pi lot to cli mb to 4 000 feet an d to trac k d irect to t he Co ol ang atta V OR. The p il ot a ck nowledg ed the instruc tion , a nd advised that h e was on the c orre ct i nboun d ra di al (3 30 degrees m agnetic) and c lim bing to 4000 fee t. Due t o the preva iling weather in the te rminal area the pilot decided to return to Brisbane rather than enter the holding pattern. The aircraft was then cleared to track from overhead Coolangatta to Brisbane via a left turn to intercept the outbound track. Brisbane radar observed the aircraft to make a right turn rather than a left turn as instructed. Subsequent examination of recorded radar returns showed that the aircraft had not carried out the normal entry procedure for the 14 VOR/DME approach. The aircraft track appeared to be as described by the pilot, and although a small divergence to the west of the inbound radial may have occurred during interception, there is no evidence to suggest that the aircraft was not tracking within tolerances on final approach. The pilot had decided not to carry out the normal entry procedure due to an engine consideration, which is a limitation imposed by the manufacturer on the operation of the engine in heavy precipitation. For the same reason, he had decided to make a right turn on his departure, but had unfortunately not advised air traffic control of his preference. The aircraft did not descend below published minimum altitudes during the instrument procedure. During the right turn, the aircraft remained above the minimum approach altitude, which is 3000 feet within a five nautical mile (nine kilometre) radius of Coolangatta. The aircraft was also above the lowest safe radar altitude, and was not likely to come in close proximity to terrain during the turn to intercept the outbound track.

Because the external load could not be released electrically, the pilot landed on snow to allow an assistant to release the load manually. After the load was released, the assistant had moved to the pilot's window to discuss the next load when the rear of the left skid began to sink into the snow. The pilot attempted to correct the situation but the main rotor struck the ground and the aircraft rolled over. The helicopter was not fitted with any load spreading devices for operations in snow. Although the pilot had tested the load bearing capacity of the snow, the technique did not provide sufficient indication that the snow could not support the aircraft. An intermittent electrical malfunction is believed to have caused the cargo hook failure.

On commencing the clean up run, the wire deflector on the aircraft struck a single power line. The top section of both the fin and rudder were severed from the aircraft which was subsequently landed at the DEPARTURE strip without further damage. The pilot had been briefed on the crop to be sprayed and on the location of power lines in and around the paddock. After cleaning up the other edges, the final run was commenced with the aircraft flying parallel to the main power lines. The pilot temporarily forgot the presence of the single wire running from the main line into the paddock.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was being used to deliver newspapers. On arrival and during the landing roll, the pilot noted that the air strip surface was soft. A rain shower had passed over the air strip about an hour earlier. The initial part of the subsequent take-off roll appeared to be normal, but after using about half of the 950 metre strip the pilot became concerned that the aircraft had not reached flying speed. At an airspeed of about 60 knots the aircraft became airborne briefly, before settling back onto the strip. At that point, the pilot elected to abandon the take-off, closed the throttles and mixture controls, and applied full braking. The aircraft skidded for about 300 metres, coming to rest about 50 metres beyond the end of the strip. During the overrun the left main landing gear collapsed.

Circumstances:

The pilot departed on a positioning flight with the helicopter fuelled to capacity. While cruising at 2500 feet and 60 knots the pilot heard and felt a buzzing sensation which lasted for about 3 seconds. The helicopter then suddenly yawed rapidly to the right and the engine RPM increased by 150 RPM. The pilot reduced the throttle setting to idle and entered an autorotation at 55 to 60 knots. Power was applied at 1000 feet to check on controllability, but the helicopter again yawed rapidly to the right, so the pilot again entered autorotation. As the pilot commenced to flare the helicopter directional control was again lost, so the pilot made a run-on landing avoiding the largest tees in the process. However, the area is heavily timbered, and the main rotors struck several smaller trees, prior to and after touchdown. The investigation established that the failure was initiated by excessive wear of the inner track of bearing PN47-620-929-1. The wear caused an increase in the centre distance between the ring gear and the pinion gear. This resulted in increased loading and wear on the crowns of the teeth of the output drive shaft gear because the drive was being transmitted by the crowns rather than the full length of the teeth. Drive to the tail rotor was lost when the crowns of the teeth were worn away. Secondary damage to the bearing inner track removed all of the original surface layer. This prevented further examination to determine what initiated the wear. There was no suitable terrain available for the pilot to make a successful autorotational landing.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Excessive wear of bearing PN47-620-929-1. It could not be established what initiated the excessive wear.
2. The drive to the tail rotor was lost when the crowns of the gear teeth were worn away.
3. The terrain was unsuitable for a forced landing.