During a pre-flight inspection it was discovered that the left wing of the aircraft had suffered permanent deformation. The subsequent investigation was unable to determine any details as to how and when this deformation had occurred. The damage was consistent with an overstress during a rolling pull-out.

On climbout from Tindal, the crew heard a loud bang and the gear Unsafe light came on. Speed was reduced to 180 knots indicated air speed and the gear cycled. On Down selection, the two maingear lights were green but the nosegear indicated Unsafe. On selecting Up, the Unsafe light remained on. The flight was continued to Darwin below 180 knots. On arrival, two flights past the tower were made. On the first flight with gear selected Up the nosegear was reported to be in the normal extended position. On the second flypast with gear selected Down, only the two maingear lights were green and the tower reported that the gear appeared to be extended normally. Procedures for the emergency extension of the gear did not obtain a safe indication for the nosegear leg, and the pilot did not apply inflight loads to the aircraft in an attempt to lock the nosegear down. The pilot carried out a normal circuit and landing and held the nosewheel off the runway for as long as possible. At approximately 80 knots the nosewheel was lowered gently onto the runway but it collapsed almost immediately. The aircraft remained on the runway centreline as it slid to a halt on its nose. Subsequent specialist investigation showed that the nosegear actuator rod end had failed due to fatigue and stress corrosion.

The aircraft was flown to Hoxton Park and a number of circuits and landings were carried out as part of an endorsement exercise. The pilot in command then elected to return to Bankstown in order to refuel the aircraft. During the approach the engine lost power and attempts to restart it were unsuccessful. A ditching was carried out in the Georges River and the pilots swam to the shore. The aircraft had been cross-hired and the instructor, who had not previously flown the aircraft, told the student to conduct a preflight check while he familiarized himself with the avionics. However, the student did not check the fuel contents because he could not reach the fuel caps and did not carry out a water check because he was unaware of the location of the fuel drain points. The instructor said that before the engine lost power he had selected the left fuel tank because the right tank gauge indicated empty. After recovery of the aircraft an examination revealed no prior fault with the engine or the fuel system. The fuel system was contaminated with river water and the right tank contained no usable fuel. However, the left tank contained 16 litres of usable fuel which would have been sufficient to provide engine power with the left tank selected while the aircraft was in level, co-ordinated flight. It is probable that the initial power loss was caused by fuel starvation resulting from uncovering of the left fuel tank outlet. The instructor's attempts to restart the aircraft were not in accordance with the manufacturer's checklist and included 5 movements of the fuel tank selector in quick succession following the loss of power.

Immediately after take-off the aircraft was seen to enter a steep climbing turn to the left. After turning through about 135 deg, and at an estimated height of 100 to 150 ft agl, the aircraft suddenly pitched nose down and lost height. The aircraft collided with a tree prior to impacting the ground in a nose-low left wing down attitude. The investigation did not reveal any mechanical faults with the aircraft that could have contributed to this accident. The pilot had been flying and working long hours and had been seen to hurry his circuit procedures in the past. On this occasion adequate flying speed was not maintained for the manoeuvre being attempted. The turn after take-off was made into the late afternoon sun and it is possible that the pilot`s vision was affected by sun-glare.

Shortly after lift-off, both propeller blades separated from the aircraft, which then touched down and subsequently overturned. One of the propeller blades was located 80 metres to the left of the strip and the other, with hub and constant speed unit attached, was located 40 metres to the right of the strip. The propeller hub contained a fracture which was caused by the propagation of a fatigue crack originating at the root of the blade retention thread. The engine had been fitted with two fifth order crankshaft damper weights. This was contrary to the manufacturer's requirement, which was for one fifth order and one sixth order counterweight to be fitted. It is considered likely that fitment of the incorrect counterweights initiated and contributed to the propagation of the fatigue crack.

The aircraft was a tail-less homebuilt ultralight with a cantilever wing. It was reported that the pilot had made several flights during the day without apparent incident. On the subject flight the aircraft was observed to begin a gentle turn to the right, around a sports oval. The wings were seen to suddenly fold upwards, the right wing broke away and the remainder of the aircraft fell to the ground. It was determined that the wooden main spar of the wing had failed at the point where the right landing gear was bolted to the main spar caps. Tests on the wood revealed that it was not of aircraft quality, although the plans for the aircraft specified that aircraft quality spruce was required. The wood was not protected by paint or varnish from seasonal changes in temperature or moisture. The plans also called for the wing nose ribs to be constructed from styrafoam, however the investigation discovered that the material used was expanded polystyrene. This material is less rigid than styrafoam. The pilot had purchased the aircraft from interstate in a partially constructed condition, with the main spar and the nose ribs already completed. He was evidently unaware of the poor quality of the material used in the construction, which led to the failure of the structure under normal flight loads.

The pilot reported that he was making a landing approach in 10 knot crosswind conditions. After the first touchdown he experienced difficulty in maintaining directional control and elected to carry out a go-around. On the subsequent approach the aircraft touched down prematurely and bounced. While airborne the aircraft commenced to drift to the right, before touching down and bouncing again. A go-around was initiated but the aircraft drifted further to the right and struck a fence 64 metres from the runway centre-line. It was estimated that the wind was actually gusting up to about 20 knots across the runway and was therefore above the maximum crosswind limit for the aircraft type. The pilot had been unable to maintain directional control during the go around and the tailwheel had snagged on the fence.

Mme Doussaud was one of eighteen persons undergoing a two-day initial parachuting course at the Alice Springs Parachute Club. The first day consisted of intensive theoretical and practical training, and was followed by revision, further practical training and a written examination on the second day. Mme Doussaud answered all examination questions correctly and was reportedly looking forward to the static line (automatic parachute opening system) parachute descent which would complete the course. Before boarding the aircraft, Mme Doussaud and another student, who was to be the first of the pair to jump, again practised the correct exit procedure, which involved moving from the aircraft cabin and hanging onto the wing strut with both hands until the instructor gave the order to let go. After releasing, the technique was to arch backwards, count to six and check that the parachute had deployed. If the main parachute had not opened, the reserve was to be immediately activated by the parachutist. The first student made a normal exit and descent from 2500 feet above ground level. As Mme Doussaud then moved to grasp the wing strut she appeared to lose her grip. As she fell she did not adopt the correct arched position and the static line pulled the pilot parachute and main parachute around the left side of her body. She was observed to clutch the parachutes to her chest, thus preventing them from deploying. Witnesses observed that the pilot parachute and main parachute bag were released when the parachutist was about 1000 feet above the ground, however the main parachute failed to deploy. No apparent attempt was made to activate the reserve parachute. Subsequent investigation revealed that the main suspension lines had been extensively tangled by flapping and twisting in the airflow, and one of the lines had fouled the bridle holding the pilot parachute to the main parachute bag. This fouling had prevented the deployment of the main parachute. CONCLUSIONS 1. The parachutist had been adequately trained and briefed for the intended parachute descent. 2. She evidently lost her grip on the aircraft wing strut as she moved outside the cabin. 3. She did not adopt the correct position to allow normal deployment of her parachute. 4. As the pilot parachute was pulled around her body the parachutist probably panicked. 5. The parachutist did not follow either the standard or emergency procedures which she had been taught.

Whilst sheep spotting the passenger became visibly agitated and the pilot elected to land. During the landing roll the aircraft entered scrub but was not damaged. After the passenger disembarked the pilot attempted a flapless take-off using a clearing approximately 140 metres in length. The aircraft failed to become airborne and hit several trees before coming to a halt in soft sand. Prior to the attempted take-off the pilot did not measure the available length or refer to the flight manual "p" charts. He subsequently indicated that the take-off had been attempted so that the sheep spotting would not be delayed.

The aircraft initially touched down about halfway along the strip, became airborne again, then touched down 50 metres before the end of the strip. The pilot applied power to go-around. However after reassessing the situation he closed the throttle and attempted to steer the aircraft through a gate. The nose wheel dug into the ground and the aircraft tilted forward onto the propeller and left wing. The propeller spinner struck the gate and the aircraft stopped. The approach had been conducted in conditions of reduced visibility as a result of cloud cover and impending last light. The pilot had misjudged the approach and had used a higher than normal airspeed. The lack of visual cues evidently caused the pilot to delay initiating a go-around while such a manoeuvre could still have been safely accomplished.