The pilot was engaged on his third solo flight and had been authorised to conduct a series of circuits and landings. During the first landing the aircraft bounced and subsequently struck the ground in a nose-low attitude. The nosegear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest on the grass to the left of the sealed runway.

The pilot had recently obtained a Commercial Helicopter Pilot Licence, and had been undergoing training for the issue of a cattle mustering endorsement. He had obtained permission from his employer to use the helicopter for a local flight. The approval was given on the understanding that operations were confined to normal procedures, and were not to include low flying. It was the pilot's intention to conduct two short flights, carrying two other persons on each occasion. The helicopter was given additional pre-flight inspections, following reports of vandalism to other helicopters in the area. No evidence of any vandalism was found and the pilot carried out a short solo flight to further verify the serviceability of the aircraft. The first two passengers then boarded the aircraft. About 30 minutes after DEPARTURE, the aircraft was observed operating, apparently normally, in a designated low flying area. It was then observed flying towards the south east at about 10 metres above the ground. The aircraft then entered a steep turn to the left, but after turning through some 200 degrees the main rotor blades struck the ground. The aircraft subsequently struck the ground heavily and cartwheeled around the rotor arc. A fierce fire broke out and engulfed the wreckage. A detailed technical investigation did not reveal any pre-impact defect or malfunction of the helicopter which might have contributed to the accident. There was also no evidence that the pilot had suffered any sudden illness or incapacity which might have affected his ability to control the aircraft. There was no known operational reason for the aircraft to be flown close to the ground, and it was possible that the pilot was demonstrating mustering techniques to his passengers. The wind at the time of the accident was from the south east at between 11 and 18 knots. The helicopter had been loaded near to the maximum allowable weight, and had not possessed sufficient performance to maintain level flight during the turn towards the downwind direction. The pilot had only limited experience in operations at high all-up-weight levels, and had evidently not realised the effect the increased weight had on the aircraft performance, particularly when turning downwind.

The student pilot was returning from her second solo flight to the training area. The aircraft bounced on touchdown and the pilot attempted to recover, but the aircraft bounced a second time and the nose gear failed. Wind was reported as nil. This accident was not the subject of an on scene investigation.

At his destination, the pilot reported a gear malfunction and use of the emergency gear extension system was unsuccessful. The pilot returned to Darwin and carried out a wheels up landing. Investigation revealed that the left hand nose steering cable had worn through the hydraulic gear extend line. This cable had been routed too close to the hydraulic line during the repair of damage from a prior occurrence.

The pilot was conducting a flight from Diamond Beach to Cooma. Approaching Hoskinstown the aircraft's rear engine suffered a loss of power and smoke appeared in the cabin. The pilot immediately shut down the rear engine and feathered the propeller. Because the symptoms indicated that a fire was burning in the rear engine compartment, the pilot decided to land as soon as possible, and prepared for an emergency landing into a paddock. During the approach the smoke disappeared from the cabin, so the pilot concluded that the fire had extinguished itself and discontinued the landing. He then diverted to Canberra, using the front engine only, where he landed safely. An examination of the rear engine compartment revealed that a large section of the left-hand exhaust stack had separated in flight. Hot exhaust gases, now directed into the rear engine compartment, burnt a hole through the lower cowl, distorted the firewall and burnt the insulation from electrical wires including the low tension ignition leads. The bare ignition leads then "shorted out" causing the engine to fail. The source of heat having been removed prevented the fire from becoming self-sustaining. Cracks of about 18 cm in length had occurred along either side of the lower welded seam from the muffler attachment flange. The forward crack propagated around the exhaust stack, through 180 degrees, and returned back to the muffler attachment flange, paralleling the lower seam. This allowed the section of exhaust stack to separate. Expert opinion suggests that the cracks should have been evident for a considerable period of time, having originated from normal thermal fatigue and exhaust gas flow erosion. The aircraft had been subject to a major inspection a short time prior to the flight. The organisation which performed this inspection advised that there had been no evidence of exhaust gas leakage, or cracks visible to the naked eye at that time.

The pilot reported "Leaving Flight Level 370 for Flight Level 350" when the aircraft was about 320 kilometres to the north of Perth. The aircraft had not been cleared by Air Traffic Control to leave Flight Level 370 on descent. Investigation indicated that the pilot was only requesting a clearance to descend and his use of non standard radio transmission terminology gave the impression that the aircraft had already commenced descent. The aircraft remained at Flight Level 370 until cleared to descend by Air Traffic Control. There was no DEPARTURE from standard operational practice. This occurrence was not considered to be an air safety incident.

The aircraft was engaged in operating a night freight flight from Brisbane to Gladstone and Rockhampton. The pilot departed Rockhampton as a passenger in another company aircraft at about 2100 hours the night before the accident and was flown to Caloundra. He then flew VH-DIL to Brisbane and after arriving submitted a flight plan for the return flight to Rockhampton giving an estimated time of DEPARTURE Brisbane of 0230 hours. Before DEPARTURE, however, the pilot was required to await the arrival of another aircraft so that freight could be transhipped to his aircraft. DEPARTURE from Brisbane was made at 0301 hours and at 0400 hours the pilot reported the aircraft's position over Gayndah, the pilot was instructed to call on another radio frequency at 0410 hours. No further transmissions were heard from the aircraft. The wreckage was located two days later in mountainous terrain. The aircraft had impacted the ground in a near vertical attitude. Subsequent investigation did not reveal any fault with the aircraft or its systems that could have contributed to the accident. The day before the accident the pilot rose at about 0730 hours after spending the previous night and day at a friends property near Rockhampton. He spent the day at leisure at the property before returning to Rockhampton in the afternoon. After dining at his parents home he proceeded to the airport for the flight to Caloundra. Before departing Brisbane to return to Rockhampton the only sleep the pilot would have had was about an hour on the flight to Caloundra and possibly another short period at Brisbane Airport while waiting for his aircraft to be loaded.

The pilot returned to Essendon at about 1700 hrs ESuT on 4 December after having operated for some time in Tasmania. On his arrival he refuelled the aircraft and completed a flight plan for the flight to Adelaide and Kalgoorlie the following morning. At about 0430 hours ESuT the next morning the pilot submitted the flight plan to Melbourne Briefing Office prior to obtaining a forecast of the upper winds for the route and terminal area forecasts for Adelaide and Kalgoorlie. To calculate the time intervals for the two legs of the proposed flight the pilot had assumed a headwind component of 50 Knots. However, the forecast given to the pilot indicated that the headwind component for the Essendon to Adelaide leg at the planned level, flight level 310, was about 90 knots, and for the Adelaide to Kalgoorlie leg at planned level, flight level 370, was about 100 knots. The flight plan also gave the fuel endurance of the aircraft as 200 minutes ex Essendon and 300 minutes ex Adelaide. The aircraft subsequently departed Essendon and arrived in Adelaide after an apparently uneventful flight. The pilot left a note to instruct the aircraft refuellers to refuel the aircraft to full tanks and proceeded to the Adelaide Briefing Office. At the Briefing Office the pilot obtained updated weather forecasts which indicated that Kalgoorlie required an alternate. The pilot then advised the Briefing Officer that he would nominate Perth as the alternate. When he was then told that the fuel endurance necessary to plan Perth as an alternate would be 302 minutes, the pilot changed the flight plan to indicate that the fuel endurance of the aircraft ex Adelaide was 320 minutes. At the flight levels planned a fuel endurance of 320 minutes could not be obtained. The pilot also decided to fly the leg at flight level 290 as the head winds at that level were less than at the higher level, although still almost twice the strength of the flight planned headwind. When the pilot returned to the aircraft he found that it had not been refuelled as requested. He then assisted the refuellers to refuel the aircraft by adding the anti-icing agent to the fuel during the operation. Because of the delay the normal fuelling procedure was not carried out and as a result the fuel tanks were not filled to capacity. About an hour after departing Adelaide the aircraft entered cloud and encountered icing conditions. The pilot switched on the engine anti-ice and the cruise was continued at flight level 290 for about 30 minutes before climbing to flight level 310, clear of cloud where anti-icing was turned off. Operating with engine anti-ice on increases the fuel consumption by 8 percent. As the aircraft approached the mid-point of the flight the pilot became concerned that he may not have sufficient fuel to continue the flight from Kalgoorlie to the alternate, Perth. He decided to continue the flight towards Kalgoorlie and if the alternate requirement was not lifted when he was at a point along track that was 30 minutes beyond Caiguna, he would return to and land at Caiguna. Shortly afterwards the alternate requirement was lifted on Kalgoorlie. When 185 kilometres east of Kalgoorlie the pilot commenced the descent and at flight level 250 the aircraft entered cloud and the engine anti-ice was again switched on. During the descent the fuel low level warning light illuminated and the left engine surged and flamed out at 10,000 feet. The pilot unsuccessfully attempted to restart the engine. As the aircraft broke clear of cloud at 1000 feet above ground level the right engine also flamed out. The pilot made a distress call and landed the aircraft, gear up, on a fire break. After touchdown the aircraft skidded 400 metres before coming to rest. The examination of the aircraft found that during the landing the left fuel tank had been breached, however no evidence was found of any significant fuel spillage. Approximately five litres of fuel was recovered from each of the left and right fuel tanks. The engine fuel filters and fuel lines provided only a small amount of residual fuel. The inspection of the remainder of the aircraft did not reveal any defects that could have contributed to the accident.

The pilot had been practising circuits and landings in light and variable wind conditions using the 170 degree grass strip. He made an approach for a practice short field landing with full flaps selected at an approach speed of 38 knots (stall speed in that configuration is 25 knots). The pilot said that as he approached the ground the rate of descent was high so he let the airspeed increase to 40 knots to initiate the flare. Rate of descent was still too high so he applied power. The aircraft landed in the three point attitude. The pilot described the landing as heavier than he would have liked. The aircraft did not bounce but ran straight and then started to sag on the right side. The right main gear diagonal brace had broken and the remainder of the structure gradually bent under the weight of the aircraft. The pilot steered the aircraft off the grass to the right and stopped. The broken diagonal brace was inspected and was found to have failed due to overload. The pilot advised that the main landing gear bungees were not the normal ones used on the Auster. They were in fact of a type that is fitted to the Piper Pawnee. The reason for this was that the correct ones for the Auster were not available at one stage so it was common practice to use the type fitted to the Pawnee. The effect was that the main landing gear was much stiffer. This was considered a possible factor in the failure of the diagonal brace. It was also determined that the pilot had not made any short field landings for some time. It was for that reason that he decided to practice a short field landing. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

At about 1000 hours local time on 19 June 1985, Garuda Boeing 747 aircraft PK-GSB, operating as Garuda Flight 898, was being radar vectored by Melbourne Air Traffic Control (ATC) for a landing on runway 34 at Tullamarine Airport. Shortly after the pilot acknowledged an instruction to call Melbourne Tower the aircraft was seen to turn and descend as though making an approach to runway 35 at Essendon Airport. The Melbourne Tower controller instructed the aircraft to climb to 3000 feet above mean sea level (amsl), and a few seconds later the aircraft was seen to be established in this climb. After further radar vectors were given,an uneventful landing was carried out at Melbourne. It was subsequently determined that the aircraft had descended to a minimum height of approximately 350 feet above the level of Essendon Airport, and was about 1.5 kilometres from the runway threshold before the climb was commenced.