The pilot had landed on the old Eyre Highway, on the south east side of and close to Wirrulla but, for take off, he decided to use a better section of the road about one half mile further to the east. Whilst taxying along the road to the take off position, in a ten knot crosswind, the pilot lost directional control of the aircraft, on a slippery muddy section and the starboard wing struck a small mallee tree on the southern verge of the road. The aircraft slewed clockwise through 180 degrees in the course of which the nosewheel and propeller dug into the earth bank at the road verge, followed in succession by the port mainwheel, port mainplane and port elevator and tailplane, all of which were substantially damaged.

At approximately 1419 hours CST on 6th July, 1969, a Piper PA32-300 aircraft, registered VH-PPV, and a Victa 100 aircraft, registered VH-BWT, collided in the air at a height at about 200 feet over the western end of strip 26 at Parafield Airport, South Australia. VH-PPV, which sustained no damage, continued in flight and landed safely at Parafield. VH-BWT which was substantially damaged remained in flight and also landed safely at Parafield. None of the seven occupants of VH-PPV and two occupants of VH-BWT was injured. After taking off VH-BWT climbed directly ahead and VH-PPV, which was already airborne, also commenced to climb but on a slightly convergent path, at a higher airspeed and with a lower rate of climb. The field of vision of the pilot of VH-PPV was such that VH-BWT should have been visible to him throughout the take-off and climb of both aircraft, but at a height of about 200 feet, over the western end of the strip, the pilot of VH-PPV saw VH-BWT apparently drifting across his path from left to right and slightly above him. He attempted to take evasive action, but the propeller of VH-PPV struck the starboard wing of VH-BWT and almost completely destroyed the aileron. Both aircraft remained in flight and were landed safely at Parafield.

The pilot was making his first flight in an ES60 Glider but had previously flown the KA6 type glider which has similar characteristics. On the day of the accident he completed two dual check flights in a Blanik glider and was then given a comprehensive briefing on the ES60. Shortly after taking off in the ES60, the pilot assumed the normal low tow position behind the tug aircraft until reaching some 500 feet below the planned release height of 2, 500 feet. At this point release occurred without the glider having taken up the normal line astern release position and subsequently a turn was made to the left, toward the aerodrome instead of to the right as is normal procedure. The glider then rapidly accelerated to a high speed in a very steep dive with the wings level and then recovered momentarily to level flight before entering a similar but steeper and faster dive. When the glider was below recovery height, the port wing separated from the fuselage which disintegrated on impact with the ground. No evidence was found of any structural defect or malfunction of the controls prior to the wing failure, nor were the weather conditions considered to be significant. The pilot had been adequately briefed on the use of dive brakes to limit the diving speed but the evidence is that they were not used. The pilot's medical history and a post-mortem examination provided no reason to suspect incapacitation.

The day prior to the accident the pilot, who was inexperienced in remote area navigation, flew the aircraft from Parafield to Ayers Rock where he and the passengers remained overnight. In the morning the aircraft was flown to Curtln Springs and refuelled. The pilot was unable to obtain the area weather forecast because of poor radio communication conditions. In clear weather he flew at 3000 feet and he established his position over the Hermansburg Mission aerodrome, some 30 miles to port of the planned track. Still being unable to obtain satisfactory two-way radio communication with Alice Springs he diverted to the south-east to avoid controlled airspace with the Intention of requesting a clearance when he Intercepted the Adelaide to Alice Springs road. Shortly afterwards he became disorientated and doubted his earlier navigational fix. Despite substantial fuel reserves and without judicious consideration of other alternatives he made a hurried decision to land on a road and ascertain his position. During the latter part of the approach the unsultabillty of the selected area became apparent, but the pilot persisted with the landing. After touching down the aircraft struck trees on the side of the road and finally came to rest off the right hand side of the road facing in the opposite direction to the landing run.

The pilot was trained on the Hughes 200 Model 269A and was issued with a commercial licence (Helicopters) on the 15th December, two days before the accident. The licence endorsement for the Hughes 269 covers both the Model 269A and 269B. Before flying the Model 269B solo, the pilot was accompanied on a local flight for about one hour by the owner of the helicopter. The aircraft was then flown solo by the pilot from Waratah to Strahan where the passenger was picked up. He then flew to Low Rocky Point, in good weather conditions, arriving to observe a wind of about 10 knots from the south. The helipad was a cleared area surrounded by 4 feet high scrub. Approaching to the hover on the northern end of the pad the aircraft began to roll to the right. The pilot stated he attempted to correct the roll with left-cyclic control and initially with some collective, but the aircraft continued to roll to the right even with full left cyclic control. The collective was lowered but the main rotor blades struck the scrub on the right of the aircraft, and the aircraft came to rest on its right hand side.

The pilot lodged a flight plan at Parafield for a return flight to Ceduna and the aircraft departed shortly after first light. It was raining on arrival Ceduna and the weather conditions further deteriorated during the day to frequent periods of light to moderate drizzle and rain from overcast middle level cloud and the development of low stratus cloud. The pilot decided to return to Parafield, as planned, after being briefed that the weather conditions at Ceduna were marginal for flight under Visual Flight Rules and that similar conditions could be expected along the route.

The aircraft had been delivered to the operator on 20 November, 1969 and a demonstration of its acrobatic capability was given at that time by the delivery pilot.

During the two ensuing days the aircraft was mainly flown for demonstration purposes by the pilot concerned in the accident. The pilot was endorsed on the aircraft type but there is evidence that he was inexperienced in acrobatic flight.

The weather was fine with a wind of 5 knots, a little cloud at 4,000 feet and good visibility when the aircraft took off on its last flight. After takeoff the aircraft climbed steeply and then completed a circuit of the aerodrome before making a fast, low approach at high power. This run was made along the general alignment of the runway towards the south east at a height of some 20 to 30 feet above the ground.

When two thirds of the way along the runway, the aircraft entered a very steep climb to a height of approximately 200 feet. At the top of this climb, the aircraft made a stall turn type of manoeuvre to the left, which resulted In the aircraft entering an almost vertical dive on a reciprocal heading to the approach. The pitch attitude of the aircraft progressively changed during the dive, but the height available was Insufficient for complete recovery.

The aircraft struck the ground in a slightly nose down attitude at a comparatively low forward speed, but with an extremely high rate of descent. The undercarriage collapsed and the aircraft bounced and skidded on the grass surface for a distance of 234 feet before coming to rest. There was no fire.

The aircraft was operating from a strip aligned north and south and located in flat, open, grass covered terrain. The approaches to the strip were good but 1350 feet south of the southern threshold a power tine 30 feet high and supported on wooden poles ran at right angles to the approach path. After completing the spraying of an oat crop which was situated about one mile to the south west of the strip, the pilot was approaching from the south for his third and last landing for the day. The aircraft was observed to be flying at a low level for a considerable distance before the undercarriage legs struck the power line, some 70 feet to the left of one of the supporting poles. The lines stretched, retarding the aircraft which pitched down until one wire snapped and the second slipped clear of the undercarriage. The aircraft struck the ground in a vertical nose down attitude 105 feet beyond the point of impact with the wire, then fell on to its back and slid inverted for 25 feet. On impact with the ground the forward fuselage collapsed and burst into flames which spread rapidly. The pilot was trapped in the cockpit for several minutes until the nearest witnesses, who were one half mile away were able to reach the scene. The aircraft tail had to be physically lifted and the pilot's harness released before he could be dragged clear of the wreck.

At the time of take-off the weather conditions in the area were a 5/8th cloud coverage with a base of 3, 000 feet; the wind was from the south-west at 10-15 knots and the visibility was 20 miles, reducing to 5 miles in scattered areas of light rain. The pilot, who was restricted to operating in the local training area with which he was familiar, had been briefed to watch for weather deterioration. About half an hour after the aircraft departed, an instructor noticed a squall, 5-6 miles wide, rapidly advancing from the south-west. He made a radio call to the pilot who advised he was three miles north-east of the aerodrome and returning, but he was not seen. A short time later the pilot advised he was heading for the Healesville area to avoid the storm. At about 1100 hours the instructor took off intending to guide the pilot back to the aerodrome but he encountered heavy rain, hail, snow and severe turbulence beneath a cloud base of 700-800 feet. The Musketeer pilot then reported that he was five miles north east at 1, 500 feet and he had "zero visibility" whereupon he was advised to descend on a southerly heading to 1, 000 feet over lowering terrain to where the weather had begun to clear. At about 1125 hours the pilot advised he was heading 120 degrees at 1, 300 feet, which corrected for aerodrome height, is 1, 560 feet AMSL. Nothing further was heard from the aircraft and it was found a fortnight later on a thickly wooded hillside. There was no evidence to show the aircraft was other than airworthy at the time of the accident.

Prior to commencing a charter flight from Launceston to Flinders Island the pilot made a visual check of the fuel tanks and assessed that they were full. He was not aware that since the aircraft had been refuelled it had made a flight of 1 hour 45 minutes duration. On the return flight, approaching Launceston, the pilot was given landing instructions and when the aircraft was established on a visual descent, the engine failed. As he was only 1, 000 feet above unsuitable terrain, he turned towards the only suitable field in the area and attempted to restart the engine. Being unable to do so the pilot gave his attention to the forced landing and requested a wind velocity from Launceston Tower. Because of his position and altitude he elected to land downwind in the 15 knot wind, in the field previously selected. The aircraft touched down and rolled for a considerable distance before the pilot began a ground loop to avoid striking a fence across his path. This manoeuvre was only partly successful because of the damp grass and the aircraft struck a fence post and damaged the tail plane and rear fuselage.