International

Abstract

On 29 May 2006, an Australian registered and operated Boeing Co. 747-400 was taxiing at New York, John F Kennedy (JFK) Airport. During the aircraft's final turn into its allocated parking bay, the right wingtip contacted a blast fence, resulting in damage to the outboard end of the right wing. An investigation was conducted by the US Federal Aviation Administration in conjunction with the US National Transportation Safety Board and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

The ATSB has completed its technical analysis report of the flight recorder data from the Boeing Co. 737-204, registration PK-YTH, on behalf of the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC). The aircraft was operating a flight from Banjarmarsin to Balikpapan, Indonesia when it was involved in an incident during the landing at Sepinggan Airport at Balikpapan.

The National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of Indonesia is responsible for investigating this occurrence. The NTSC requested assistance from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) in the recovery and analysis of information from the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder. In accordance with clause 5.23 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the ATSB appointed an Accredited Representative to assist the NTSC and initiated an investigation under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

The ATSB's Technical Analysis Report has been sent to the NTSC to assist its ongoing investigation. The NTSC is responsible for releasing a final investigation report regarding this occurrence.

National Transportation Safety Committee 
Ministry Of Transportation Republic Of Indonesia 
Transportation Building 3^rd Floor
Jalan Medan Merdeka Timur No. 5
Jakarta Pusat 10110
Indonesia

Phone  :  +62 21 384 7601
Email    :  knkt@dephub.go.id

Website: http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm

On 4 March 2006, McDonnell Douglas Corporation MD-82, registered PK-LMW, was operating a flight from Denpasar to Surabaya, Indonesia. The aircraft was cleared to land on runway 10 with the reported wind calm and the runway wet. During the landing roll, the aircraft veered to the right resulting in a runway excursion.

The National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of Indonesia was responsible for investigating this occurrence. On 8 March 2006 the NTSC requested assistance from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) in the recovery and analysis of information from the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder.

In accordance with clause 5.23 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the ATSB appointed an Accredited Representative to assist the NTSC and initiated an investigation under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

The NTSC is responsible for releasing the final investigation report regarding this occurrence.

National Transportation Safety Committee
Ministry Of Transportation Republic Of Indonesia
Transportation Building 3^rd Floor
Jalan Medan Merdeka Timur No. 5
Jakarta Pusat 10110
Indonesia

Phone  :  +62 21 384 7601
Email    :  knkt@dephub.go.id

Website: http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm

The ATSB has completed its technical analysis report of the flight recorder data from the Boeing Co. 737-329, registration PK-KKE on behalf of the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee. The aircraft was operating a flight from Jakarta to Makassar, Indonesia when it was involved in a serious (navigation related) incident while enroute. The crew landed safely at Tambolaka in Sumba.

The National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of Indonesia is responsible for investigating this occurrence. The NTSC requested assistance from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) in the recovery and analysis of information from the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder. In accordance with clause 5.23 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the ATSB appointed an Accredited Representative to assist the NTSC and initiated an investigation under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

The ATSB's Technical Analysis Report has been sent to the NTSC to assist its ongoing investigation. The NTSC is responsible for releasing a final investigation report regarding this occurrence.

National Transportation Safety Committee 
Ministry Of Transportation Republic Of Indonesia 
Transportation Building 3^rd Floor
Jalan Medan Merdeka Timur No. 5
Jakarta Pusat 10110
Indonesia

Phone  :  +62 21 384 7601
Email    :  knkt@dephub.go.id

Website: http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm

On 18 January 2006, McDonnell Douglas Corporation MD-82, registered PK-LMJ, was operating a flight from Ambon to Makassar, Indonesia. The aircraft was cleared to land on runway 31 and the reported wind direction was 260 degrees at 20 kts. Heavy rain was reported, and the runway was wet. During the landing roll the aircraft veered to the left resulting in a runway excursion.

The National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of Indonesia was responsible for investigating this occurrence. On 27 January 2006, the NTSC requested assistance from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) in the recovery and analysis of information from the flight data recorder (FDR). The Executive Director of the ATSB approved the request.

In accordance with clause 5.23 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the ATSB appointed an Accredited Representative to assist the NTSC and initiated an investigation under the Transport Safety Investigation (TSI) Act 2003.

The NTSC is responsible for publishing a final investigation report regarding this occurrence.

National Transportation Safety Committee 
Ministry Of Transportation Republic of Indonesia 
Transportation Building 3^rd Floor
Jalan Medan Merdeka Timur No. 5
Jakarta Pusat 10110
Indonesia

Phone  :  +62 21 384 7601
Email    :  knkt@dephub.go.id

Website: http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm

Abstract

At 1230 on 9 February 2008, the Chinese registered bulk carrier Jin Hui berthed in Geelong, Australia. The ship's master had previously informed Australian authorities that there had been a fire in the ship's number three cargo hold. As a result, the emergency services were on standby when the ship arrived in Geelong.

When the number three cargo hold was opened, it was apparent that only two small areas of the cargo (palm kernel expeller) had been affected. These small areas of cargo were still smouldering, so they were sprayed with water and then discharged onto the wharf.

At 1530, the local fire authority declared the fire extinguished. The ship's normal cargo discharge was then allowed to begin.

Abstract

At about 1640 on 8 August 2007, an able seaman died on board the bulk carrier Oceanic Angel as a result of a fall from the forward ladder in the ship's number three cargo hold. The seaman had been part of a team preparing the hold for an upcoming cargo and had just finished work for the day.

Abstract

On 16 June 2006, during Kota Pahlawan's voyage from Singapore to Australia, a foul odour was noted coming from two containers on board the ship. The containers were packed with xanthates, dangerous goods which produce carbon disulphide vapours and can spontaneously combust.

Later that day, the master informed the ship's charterer of the 'incident' and that the odour indicated that the packaging of the xanthates was not 'gas-tight', in accordance with international rules. He also asked for the containers to be discharged at Brisbane, the ship's next port of call.

At 0411 on 18 June, the master reported the incident as a defect to the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA). At 0720, the ship embarked a coastal pilot and started its transit of the Great Barrier Reef.

At 0907 on 19 June, AMSA issued a defect report and started collecting information about the incident. At 1252, the pilot disembarked from the ship after it had completed its transit of the northern part of the Great Barrier Reef Inner Route.

The ship berthed in Brisbane on 22 June after an 'emergency' was declared in the port. All eight xanthates containers on board the ship were discharged and purged with nitrogen gas to mitigate the risks posed by the foul smelling, highly flammable and toxic carbon disulphide vapours. On 24 June, the master was asked to reload the containers. He agreed on the condition that AMSA provide a written acceptance of the proposal with regard to 'compliance' with international rules.

By 0400 on 25 June, the xanthates containers had been reloaded onto the ship before it sailed from Brisbane. On 6 July, the ship discharged the last of the xanthates containers in Fremantle.

The report identifies several safety issues and the safety actions to address them.

Summary

At about 0400 on 27 January 2005, a crew member on board the French Antarctic support vessel L'Astrolabe went missing prior to going on watch. At the time, the vessel was in the Southern Ocean, 235 nautical miles south of the Tasmanian port of Hobart. The vessel was returning to Hobart from the French Antarctic research base of Dumont D'Urville. After a search of the vessel and sea, the crew member was found in the ocean near the position of the vessel at the time he was last seen on board. When found, he was deceased.

In the subsequent operation to recover the deceased crew member, the second engineer suffered a severe laceration to his right hand, almost severing the thumb, when it became caught between the lifeboat fall block and the hook assembly on the after end of the lifeboat.

L'Astrolabe continued its voyage to Hobart where it berthed on the morning of 28 January. The deceased crew member was taken ashore by local authorities. The second engineer was admitted to hospital and underwent bone graft surgery that evening to reattach his thumb.

The report concludes that the crew member jumped or fell overboard after a period of time during which he was exhibiting signs of being depressed. Neither the fall block nor the suspension ring had 'hand holds' attached to them, necessitating the crew in the lifeboat to manhandle the blocks and rings directly.

It is also considered that, while L'Astrolabe was not required to have foul weather recovery strops on board, their presence would have removed the danger swinging fall blocks presented to the lifeboat crew.

On 5 September 2005, at 1004 local time, a Boeing Co 737-200 aircraft, registration PK-RIM, crashed into an urban residential area after take-off from runway 23 of the Medan-Pollonia Airport, Medan, Sumatra, Indonesia. There were 5 crew and 112 passengers on board. The crew and 96 passengers, along with 44 persons on the ground, were fatally injured; 16 passengers survived.

The occurrence is being investigated by the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of the Ministry of Transportation, Republic of Indonesia. On 10 February 2006, the NTSC requested specialist assistance from the ATSB with the examination of cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information. In accordance with clause 5.231 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the ATSB appointed an Accredited Representative to assist the Indonesian authority.

PK-RIM was fitted with both a flight data recorder and a CVR. Both units were recovered from the aircraft wreckage.

The ATSB initiated an investigation under the Transport Safety Investigation (TSI) Act 2003. Section 48 of the TSI Act, defines CVR information as an on board recording and is afforded appropriate protection.

A detailed examination of the CVR information was made under the supervision of NTSC investigators during the week beginning 17 July 2006.

The NTSC is the independent Indonesian government entity responsible for the investigation of accidents and incidents involving Indonesian registered and operated aircraft. The ATSB Accredited Representative's role in the investigation has been to provide the NTSC investigators with assistance in examining CVR information. A report regarding the examination of the CVR information was prepared and forwarded to the NTSC Investigator in Charge for his consideration.

The NTSC is responsible for the final investigation report regarding this occurrence.

1. Any State which on request provides information, facilities or experts to the State conducting the investigation shall be entitled to appoint an accredited representative to participate in the investigation.