Summary

At about 0110 on 21 June 2000, off Evans Head, New South Wales, the skipper of the prawn trawler Sue M and the deckhand were sorting their catch on the after deck. The trawler, on autopilot, was heading east to another fishing ground, when it was struck on the port side by a southbound ship. The skipper ran into the wheelhouse to attempt to take control of the trawler as it rolled over to starboard before capsizing.

The deckhand climbed over the side of the trawler as it capsized and jumped clear before it sank. He eventually climbed into the trawler's fibreglass dinghy which, although badly damaged, had surfaced after breaking loose from the wheelhouse roof. He was rescued the next night by another trawler.

The ship, the Panama flag bulk carrier Star Sea Bridge, had sailed from Brisbane on the morning of 20 June bound for Melbourne. At the time of the collision, the officer of the watch, the second mate, had been manoeuvring to avoid a northbound container ship. As the bulk carrier was resuming its original course, the second mate saw a white light, close by, to starboard. He ordered full port rudder, but the ship made contact with the white light, roughly amidships on the ship's side as its stern swung to starboard. The master of Star Sea Bridge was called to the bridge and the ship was turned about to search the area where the collision had occurred. After searching and finding nothing, the ship resumed its voyage south.

At Melbourne, Star Sea Bridge was boarded by agents of the Australian Federal Police who initiated an investigation and, subsequently, criminal proceedings against the master and the second mate. A concurrent, but separate, safety investigation was undertaken by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) under the provisions of the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations.

An extensive air and sea search was unable to locate the skipper of Sue M. On 22 June 2001, the wreck of Sue M was located by another trawler. A week later, divers from the NSW Water Police recovered the body of the skipper from its wheelhouse.

This report concludes that:

• The fishing vessel Sue M sank, with the loss of its skipper, after colliding with the bulk carrier Star Sea Bridge;
• The second mate and lookout of Star Sea Bridge were not keeping a proper lookout;
• The skipper and the deckhand on the fishing vessel, who had been busy sorting their catch under bright deck lights, were not keeping a proper lookout; and,
• The bulk carrier's navigation lights were probably not on at the time of the collision.

The report recommends that:

• Ships' masters and skippers of fishing vessels should ensure that a proper lookout is maintained at all times;
• Ships' masters, watchkeepers, fishing vessel skippers and crews take note of the limitations of radar;
• Owners, operators and skippers of fishing vessels consider the use of appropriate equipment to improve the radar detectability of their vessels.

Summary

On the afternoon of 30 April 2000, the Kuwaiti flag product tanker Al Deerah arrived off the Tamar River. The tanker was carrying a cargo of gas oil, heating oil and unleaded petrol from Kwinana in Western Australia for discharge at Bell Bay and other Australian ports.

At 1600 a pilot embarked to conduct the ship to the oil berth in Bell Bay. On the bridge with the pilot were the master, the mate and a helmsman on the wheel. The tide was flooding at an estimated two knots. Shortly after boarding, the pilot ordered full ahead manoeuvring speed.

The passage through the entrance of the Tamar River is narrow and there are seven significant alterations of course within a distance of 5.51 miles. As the vessel entered the Tamar River and made the initial course alterations, the pilot found that the ship was sluggish to respond to the rudder. Later, on the Stone Quarry leads, significant angles of counter rudder were required to steady the vessel on course.

At about 1637 the vessel steadied on the Stone Quarry leads, approaching the wheelover position to alter towards the south off Garden Island. At about 1639 the pilot ordered starboard rudder to bring the ship to the next heading. As the vessel altered course to starboard the pilot realised that it was turning too quickly. He ordered the rudder amidships, then to port. However, the vessel continued swinging to starboard, making contact with the bottom off the southeast edge of Garden Island. It heeled to port, then returned upright before listing to starboard.

Al Deerah's cargo tanks are protected by ballast tanks and a check revealed that nos. 2 and 3 starboard combined bottom and side ballast tanks were filling with water. The master ordered that the port ballast tanks be filled to counteract the list.

At 1745, the vessel anchored in Bell Bay. The harbour master boarded the vessel to discuss the situation with the master and the pilot. He disembarked after deciding that it was safe to berth the vessel and Al Deerah was secured at its berth at 2215 without further incident.

Nobody was hurt as a result of the grounding, nor did any oil or other pollutant escape from the ship.

The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) detained the vessel at 2240 on 30 April. The detention was lifted at 2100 on 1 May to permit the vessel to sail to Burnie after a classification society surveyor had viewed video footage of an underwater examination of the hull and had issued the vessel with a condition of class. The interim certificate from the class society stated that the vessel was to discharge its cargo at Burnie and Port Botany, then proceed directly to dry dock for repairs.

After discharging its cargo at Bell Bay, Al Deerah left the berth and anchored at Bell Bay at 0034 on 2 May, before sailing for Burnie at 0908 the same day.

Summary

On the morning of 10 April 2000, the 64 957 tonne, Maltese flag, panamax bulk carrier Amarantos was inbound to the port of Wallaroo at the eastern side of the Spencer Gulf, South Australia. The vessel was in ballast and intending to load 20 000 tonnes of wheat for export to Iraq.

The main engine was prepared for the arrival stand-by and tested astern at 0510; the chief engineer was conducting engine manoeuvring from the control room.

A Ports Corp South Australia pilot boarded the vessel outside the Wallaroo entrance channel. At 0612, after the pilot had made his way to the bridge, a pilot/master information exchange took place. The pilot took charge of the navigation and brought the ship on to an easterly heading to enter the port south of the shipping channel.

At 0645, Amarantos was met by the two harbour tugs, Kalanbi and Ungarra, south of the number 11 channel beacons. Kalanbi, the marginally smaller of the two tugs was 'made fast' to the ship's bow and Ungarra to the stern.

Amarantos continued a 'normal' approach to the Wallaroo jetty and, at 0708, the master of the vessel noted the ship's speed at 3 knots ahead with the ship approximately 500 m north-east of the berth. The pilot was turning the ship, at this time, onto a southerly heading to approach the berth nearly at right angles. Off the berth he intended using the tugs and the effect of the transverse thrust of the propeller with the engine going astern, to berth 'port-side-to'.

Despite putting the engine astern and the tugs attempting to turn Amarantos, the ship maintained a nearly steady course. Initially this did not concern the pilot, but with the bow 30 m from the wharf, he ordered all personnel to be cleared from the jetty, as contact seemed inevitable.

At a time logged by the ship's crew as 0720, Amarantos made contact with the Wallaroo jetty causing substantial damage to the jetty deck timbers, piles, and the grain loader and its supporting superstructure mounted on the jetty. The vessel struck the jetty almost at right angles and continued on into the jetty for a distance of 3.5-4 m. The ship sustained only minor non-structural damage in the incident.

Amarantos moved clear of the jetty immediately after the contact and was subsequently berthed by the pilot alongside the number 2 north berth with all lines ashore at 0820.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.

On 10 April, 2000 the bulk carrier Amarantos stuck the Wallaroo jetty within 15 of the perpendicular as a result of:

1. The pilot misjudged the speed of approach to the jetty.

2. The angle of approach at right angles to the jetty allowed only a minimal margin for error; a more oblique angle would have reduced the risk.

3. The tugs lacked both the manoeuvrability and power to either; arrest the ship's forward momentum and/or swing the ship off the jetty in time to avert the incident.

The following factors are seen as contributing to the incident:

4. The limited under keel clearance, combined with the ship's speed, negated the transverse thrust of the propeller.

5. The propeller was operating with diminished efficiency as a result of incomplete immersion at the ship's aft arrival draught.

6. No formal risk assessment had been completed for the berthing and unberthing of panamax size ships in the port of Wallaroo prior to the incident.

7. There was a lack of proper bridge resource management in that: the master, for the initial period of the pilotage, was more interested in listening to the radio; the pilot neither asked for, nor was told, the ship's speed from the GPS; communications between the master and the pilot were minimal.

Also:

8. The lack of objective evidence and sloppy record-keeping on board Amarantos complicated and extended the investigation.

Summary

On the morning of 25 March 2000, the 39 015 tonnes deadweight, Liberian flag, geared bulk carrier Silver Bin was heading south to Townsville via the inner route of the Great Barrier Reef. An Australian Reef Pilot, who had boarded the vessel at Booby Island the previous evening, was conducting the navigation of the ship. The sea was slight, with an easterly breeze of less than 10 knots, and no swell. The ship was making headway at just under 12 knots. During the morning, visibility had been reduced by an occasional rain squall. On the bridge with the pilot were the master, third mate and a quartermaster who was hand-steering the vessel.

At 1145, 5 miles north of Chapman Island, the pilot had a radio conversation with a yacht in the area. This conversation was overheard by the skipper of Chinderah Star, a prawn trawler, approximately 3.6 miles south of Chapman Island, heading north at 9.2 knots in the shipping channel. The skipper, in the wheelhouse of the trawler, identified the ship on his radar and visually, but did not make radio contact. His two deck hands were asleep in the cabin below.

At 1157 the pilot altered Silver Bin's course to 174° (T) to pass 0.5 miles west of the Chapman Island light. This alteration brought the vessel onto an end-on collision course with Chinderah Star now 4.2 miles away. The bridge team on the ship had not seen the north-bound trawler either visually or on their radars.

After the course change, a rain squall moved into the shipping channel from east of Chapman Island, and enveloped Silver Bin in heavy rain. The crew of the ship estimated the range of visibility in the heavy rain at 160 m. Chinderah Star was also enveloped by the squall and the skipper lost sight of Silver Bin both visually and on radar as a result of rain clutter. The crew on Silver Bin's bridge were still unaware of the northbound trawler in the channel despite their visual and radar watch. Neither vessel altered speed or course. Silver Bin and Chinderah Star collided at 1209, 0.5 miles west of the Chapman Island light, the fishing trawler's starboard side making contact with the ship's starboard shoulder under the flare of the bow. The fishing vessel sustained significant damage to the wheelhouse, the starboard trawl boom and along its starboard side. There were no injuries as a result of the collision.

After the collision, radio contact was established between the two vessels and assistance was offered to the fishing vessel by the ship. This was declined and the ship continued on to Townsville. After retrieving the trawl gear that had been left in the water after the collision, Chinderah Star's skipper contacted the trawler's owner. The decision was made to return to Cairns to repair the collision damage. Both Chinderah Star and Silver Bin arrived at their respective destinations in the early hours of 27 March 2000.

Summary

At about midnight on 18 March 2000, the recreational craft Chester, a half cabin cruiser with the owner and a deckhand on board, was at anchor about 28 miles east of Mooloolaba. No lookout was being maintained on the craft.

Shortly after midnight, when both crew members were asleep, Chester was struck by a ship. After the collision, the skipper found that there was minor damage to the bow and a handrail. The anchor had been lost, but the hull was intact and he anchored once more, using a spare anchor. About an hour later, he weighed anchor and returned to Mooloolaba, then to Brisbane by road with the craft on a trailer, where the deckhand reported the incident to the water police.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) interviewed the crew of Chester at Brisbane and obtained samples of paint, deposited as a result of the collision, from the starboard rail of the vessel.

The ATSB obtained a surface plot of ships in the area of the collision from AusSAR, the Australian search and rescue organisation. A number of ships on the plot were asked for their positions at the time of the collision and the bulk carrier Hai Teng provided a position close to that of the collision.

Hai Teng had been on a voyage from Newcastle to China at that time. When the vessel returned to Newcastle on 21 April 2000, interviews were conducted by the ATSB with the master, the 2^nd and 3^rd mates and the able-bodied seaman (AB) who had been on watch with the 2^nd mate. The 2^nd mate and AB denied any knowledge of the incident stating that they had not seen any craft near the ship at the time reported for the collision.

The ATSB also obtained paint samples from Hai Teng. The Criminalistics Team, Forensic Services, of the Australian Federal Police at Canberra analysed the paint samples from both vessels concluding, in their report, that there was strong evidence to support the proposition that the Hai Teng and Chester had come into contact.

Sources of Information

Owner and deckhand of Chester

Master, 2^nd and 3^rd mates and lookout, Hai Teng

AusSAR (Australian Search and Rescue)

AMSA (Australian Maritime Safety Authority)

Acknowledgement

Portion of chart Aus 365 reproduced by permission of the Hydrographic Office, RAN

The Criminalisitics Team, Forensic Services, Australian Federal Police

Narrative

The ship

Hai Teng is a Chinese flag bulk carrier of 37 871 tonnes deadweight at a summer draught of 10.763 m. The vessel has an overall length of 187.73 m, a moulded breadth of 28.4 m, and a moulded depth of 15.3 m.

The vessel was built in April 1977 by Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries at Aioi in Japan. It was named Adrianople and then Radiant Venture before it was purchased by its present owners, Guangdong Ocean Shipping Co of Guangzhou, China, who re-named it Hai Teng. Hai Teng is classed with the China Classification Society.

Hai Teng has five cargo holds and is equipped with four deck cranes. The bridge, engine room and accommodation are located aft.

The vessel is powered by a single, 6-cylinder Sulzer diesel engine of 7 282 kW and has a service speed of 12 knots. The engine room is manned whilst the vessel is at sea.

Hai Teng had the normal range of navigation equipment, including three radars, of which two were in use. One radar, 3 cm, was manufactured by Tokyo Keiki in 1977 and was fitted with a JRC, JAS - 800 M II, ARPA. A second Japanese radar was not in use. The third radar, fitted in 1998, was a Kelvin Hughes, Nucleus 6000A, 10cm radar with ARPA.

All officers and crew were from China and the officers held appropriate certificates of competency issued by the Chinese Maritime Authority.

The master held a master's certificate as well as radar and ARPA licences. He had been at sea since 1980, as ordinary seaman (OS) and able-bodied seaman (AB) before sailing as 3^rd mate from 1985 until 1989. He was 2^nd mate on bulk carriers, general cargo and container ships from 1989 until 1993 and was chief officer on similar ships from 1993 until 1997. In 1998 he was promoted to master of a bulk carrier and he joined Hai Teng as master on 12 October 1999.

The 2^nd mate had a 2^nd mate's certificate and licences for radar and ARPA. He had been at sea since 1992 as a cadet, then AB and assistant officer, before sailing as 3^rd mate in 1995. He had been a 2^nd mate since 1998 and this was his second trip on Hai Teng. He had earlier sailed on Hai Teng from December 1997 until November 1998 and re-joined the ship in May 1999.

The 3^rd mate had a 3^rd mate's certificate and licences for radar and ARPA. He had been at sea since 1996 as a cadet, OS and AB before he was promoted to 3^rd mate in March 2000.

The AB on watch with the 2^nd mate had been at sea since 1985 as a cadet and OS. He had been sailing as AB for the last ten years.

The three mates maintained 4 on, 8 off sea watches, with an AB assigned to each watch for lookout duties.

The recreational craft

The recreational craft Chester, a half cabin cruiser built in 1986 and registered with Queensland Transport is operated out of Mooloolaba, Queensland.

The vessel has a registered length of 7.4 m, a beam of 2.5 m and a depth of 1 m. The hull and upperworks are of aluminium, painted white.

Chester is fitted with a 175 hp outboard engine driving a single screw. The vessel has a raked stem and a transom stern. There is a wheelhouse and the sleeping quarters are forward of, and below, the wheelhouse. The fishing deck is aft, illuminated at night by two strip lights just above the well-deck level. A white all round light is fitted above the forward end of the cabin.

Navigation equipment included a magnetic compass, GPS, a fish finder/echo sounder and two marine radios. The craft was equipped with an EPIRB.

The owner of Chester has a power boat licence and a licence to operate 27 MHz radio. He was a recreational fisherman and had been fishing for about 20 years, from his father's boat initially, then from his own boat which he bought in 1988. He had not had any previous accidents before this collision.

The deckhand, a recreational fisherman, had no licences. He had worked on charter craft for a few years and had fished with the owner of Chester for about 4 years.

The Incident

Hai Teng

Hai Teng had berthed at Newcastle at 1030 on 16 March 2000 to load a cargo of coal for China. After loading 36 912 tonnes of coal, the vessel sailed at 1144 on 17 March 2000. The draft at sailing was 10.55 m forward, 11.00 m aft.

After departing from Newcastle and disembarking the pilot, normal sea watches were maintained with the autopilot in use. The course recorder, which the master normally used when entering or leaving a port, was switched off after the pilot's departure.

The voyage proceeded without incident.

The 3^rd mate took over the watch at 2000 on 18 March and he and the AB on duty maintained a lookout. The 10 cm radar was in use. At 2020 the 3^rd mate retarded clocks 20 minutes to UTC (Universal Coordinated Time) + 10h 40m.

The ship recorded the following GPS positions,

• at 2200: 27 02.9' S, 153 37.1' E.
• at 2300: 26 51.2' S, 153 36.8' E and,
• at midnight: 26 39.5' S, 153 36.4' E.

The watch was uneventful. When the 3^rd mate handed over to the 2^nd mate, there were no ships or other craft visible at the time. The visibility was in excess of 11 miles and the wind was from the southeast at force 4. There was a slight southeast sea running. There was no rain although the skies were partly cloudy.

The 2^nd mate went to the bridge at 2345 on 18 March, fifteen minutes before the start of his watch as was normal. He and the AB were rested and, when they took the watch, the AB kept a lookout, moving from side to side of the bridge so that there would be no interference with the view ahead. The 2^nd mate used the 10 cm radar to assist with keeping a lookout.

The AB did not see any other vessel ahead of Hai Teng throughout the watch. The 2^nd mate, who was also keeping a lookout, did not recall seeing any other vessel ahead of Hai Teng at the time of the collision as reported by Chester.

At 0047, the 2^nd mate retarded clocks by 20 minutes to UTC +10h 20m. At 0200 he logged a position by GPS, 26 08.5' S, 153 34.9' E and he logged two other GPS positions at 0300 and 0400. Nothing untoward was reported to have occurred during the 2^nd mate's watch.

Chester

Chester sailed from Mooloolaba at about 0700 on 18 March 2000 with the owner and a deckhand on board. When the vessel arrived at the fishing ground at about 0900, the owner used the fish finder to find the best spot to fish. He anchored Chester at about 0930 about 28 nautical miles north east of Mooloolaba Harbour.

While Chester lay at anchor, heading towards the east, in about 78 metres of water, the owner and deckhand fished using rods and lines.

The weather forecast was for showers. There was some rain at about 1600, otherwise the weather was good with about 3/8 cloud cover and good visibility. The wind was mostly from the east, though the owner thought that it might have backed to the northeast during the afternoon.

The anchor light was switched on about an hour after sunset. One of the two low-wattage strip lights on the port side in the well-deck aft was also switched on. At about 2100, the owner went to sleep in the cabin forward of, and below, the wheelhouse.

At that time, the vessel was lying to an easterly wind. There were four other craft in the vicinity that night, one of them a commercial fishing vessel about 3 miles south. There was a boat due north, on the horizon, displaying a white light. There were two other craft, to the southwest and west of Chester.

When the deckhand went to sleep at about 2300, the forward hatch to the cabin was left open for ventilation.

The owner and the deckhand were both asleep when the craft was struck by a ship at about midnight. The sound of the impact was so loud that the owner thought that the fuel tanks might have exploded. He first looked towards the stern but saw nothing, then looked out of the forward hatch and saw the hull of a large ship less than a metre away from the bow of Chester. The ship's hull appeared to be dark grey or black and he thought that he could see draught marks on the side of the ship as it went past, heading north. Contact seemed to have taken place at the ship's port quarter.

The owner was concerned that the anchor rope would be caught in the ship's propeller, pulling his craft into the side of the ship, but the ship passed clear. He checked to see if they were taking on water, lifting hatches set into the deck forward and at the stern, but there were no apparent leaks.

He checked the craft for damage and saw that the fairlead for the moorings and anchor rope was bent though it was still serviceable. There was also a smear of black paint on the starboard rail of the craft.

The deckhand, awakened by the collision and thinking that Chester might have been sinking, went to the wheelhouse where he picked up the handset for the 27 MHz radio. However, he noticed that the owner seemed calm as he checked the craft for damage, so he turned the radio on but did not use it.

When the deckhand learned that there was not much damage to the craft, he went forward to have a look at the ship, but all he could see was its sternlight.

Chester's anchor rope had parted and the craft was drifting. The skipper, after manoeuvring Chester back to the original anchor position, anchored again using a spare anchor.

After a while the owner weighed anchor having decided to return to Mooloolaba. He did not make radio contact with any state authority or attempt to contact any vessels that might have been in the area. At Mooloolaba, the deckhand and he loaded the boat onto a trailer and returned to Brisbane where the deckhand reported the incident to the water police.

Summary

At 0630 on the morning of 9 February 2000, two men launched the 4.5 m fibreglass pleasure craft Sea Wasp, at the Kyeemagh boat ramp in Botany Bay, and headed out to sea for a morning's fishing. The owner of the boat was acting as coxswain with his friend as passenger. Their destination was a fishing place called The Peak approximately 6 miles offshore. The weather was good with north to north-easterly winds at 10-15 knots and a 1-1.5 m swell. The day was also clear with excellent visibility. By approximately 0800 Sea Wasp had arrived at The Peak and the two men were fishing with the boat drifting south. The men had streamed a sea anchor, and the bow of the boat was pointing in a westerly direction. Both men were fishing over the starboard side.

The same morning the crude oil tanker Barents Sea was northbound off the central coast of New South Wales. The vessel was bound for the Shell oil terminal at Gore Bay in Port Jackson. The third mate and master were the only crew on the bridge. They were conducting the navigation and keeping a look-out, the vessel was averaging a speed of 14-15 knots. Both of the vessel's radars were on and set to 6 mile¹ range.

At 0929, Barents Sea altered course, in a position east of Botany Bay, from 015° to 000°. This was the final course alteration approaching the pilot boarding ground off Sydney heads some 10 miles to the north.

At 0934^3/4, Sea Wasp's coxswain was using the boat's 27 MHz radio to contact the local Australian Volunteer Coast Guard radio station to 'check in'. While using the radio he looked up and saw a large ship 50 m away on a collision course. He managed to send a quick 'mayday' signal, at the same time starting the boat's outboard motor. The coxswain turned Sea Wasp to port but, with the sea anchor still streaming, the boat was slow to respond. With the ship 10 m away, and a collision imminent, both men dived out of the boat and into the water.

At 0935, the ship's starboard bow struck Sea Wasp causing structural damage to the starboard side of the boat's cabin, and damage to the windscreen and depth sounder.

The two men surfaced to find themselves on the starboard side of the ship with Sea Wasp still afloat 10 m away and the outboard motor stopped. The men swam to Sea Wasp and re-boarded over the stern. Neither man had sustained injury. They rang 000 on a mobile telephone to request assistance and, during this conversation, identified Barents Sea as the ship they had collided with. The ship had not stopped, and the coxswain used his camera to take some photographs as it steamed away. They then let off an orange smoke flare. Sea Wasp's motor was restarted, and the two fishermen made their way back towards Botany Bay. A Sydney Water Police rescue boat met Sea Wasp 2 miles out from Botany Bay and escorted the boat back to their base at Sans Souci where the coxswain and his friend made statements. The coxswain was breathalysed and found to have a zero-blood alcohol reading.

By 1312, Barents Sea was all fast alongside at Gore Bay. The first indication the crew had of the collision was when the ship's agent arrived on board. They reported that they had seen neither Sea Wasp nor the flare and the ship was found to have sustained no damage.

* Miles referred as nautical mile = 1852 m

Conclusions

Certain aspects of this investigation are unsatisfactory. The fact that there was no match in the paint samples and that a sighting of the flare was not reported by any other vessel or anybody on the land six miles away, must lead to some doubt as to the account of the men on Sea Wasp. However, considering the damage to the boat, the radar, telephone and radio records, the coxswain's photographs and the initial accounts and evidence collected by the Police, the inspector is satisfied that the account offered by the coxswain and his friend is substantially accurate and the collision did occur.

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.

The factors contributing to the collision between the pleasure craft Sea Wasp and the tanker Barents Sea on the morning of 9 February 2000 off Sydney include but are not limited to:

1. There was a lack of an effective visual look-out being maintained by both vessels in the 30 minutes prior to the collision as required by the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.
2. Sea Wasp presented as a poor radar target and was consequently not detected on Barents Sea's radar displays by the third mate or master.
3. After Barents Sea changed course at 0929 any radar echo from Sea Wasp would have been at least partially obscured on the ship's radar displays by the electronic heading lines.
4. In the prevailing weather conditions, Sea Wasp's white topsides would have made its visual detection more difficult.
5. The ability of the men aboard Sea Wasp to maintain an effective look-out was hindered listening to the radio.
6. The sea anchor streaming from Sea Wasp's bow limited the manoeuvrability of the boat and the coxswain's ability to take evasive action immediately prior to the collision.

Summary

On the morning of 24 January 2000, the British flag, twin screw, container vessel Ariake was inbound to number 1 berth at Fisherman Islands container terminal, in the Brisbane River. A pilot was conducting the navigation of the vessel. The passage through Moreton Bay was routine and the conditions were good with very little wind.

At 0616 the vessel passed the Entrance Beacons and proceeded into the river, passing the Inner Bar Beacons at 0647. During this passage the pilot was advised by Port Control that there would be a delay berthing Ariake as another vessel, MSC China, was still on number 1 berth and would not be clear until 0730.

Ariake's engines had been reduced to dead slow ahead by the time the Inner Bar was passed and at 0650 two Brisbane tugs, Austral Salvor and Redcliffe were made fast to Ariake's port shoulder and port quarter respectively. From 0652 to 0655 the pilot put Ariake's engines dead slow astern to stop the vessel off number 6 berth and allow the inbound dredge Sir Thomas Hilley, to pass down the starboard side.

At approximately 0654, with Ariake making slight headway, and both main engines going astern, the tug Redcliffe was washed in under Ariake's stern counter. The tug's fire curtain piping, on the starboard forward side of the deckhouse, made contact with the ship's shell plating. The stern of the tug also started to drift to port and away from the ship's side. The tug master responded to the contact by moving the tug's 'Uni-Lever' joystick control to provide astern/starboard thrust. His intention was to bring the tug's bow away from the side of the ship.

The tug responded rapidly to the 'Uni-Lever' command and moved astern with its stern swinging to starboard. The movement astern continued until tension came on the short towline. The tug's bow was then pulled into the ship's side. At this point Redcliffe's crucifix bollards located on the starboard shoulder, made contact with Ariake's shell plating adjacent to the transom. With its bow tethered by the towline, the tug pivoted on the crucifix bollards which tore a hole in Ariake's shell plating approximately 3 m above the waterline. At the same time, the short towline parted allowing Redcliffe to move clear of Ariake.

Redcliffe's master contacted Ariake to say that he had parted his line and that there was damage to both Ariake and Redcliffe. The tug crew hastily rigged another towline and Redcliffe was re-secured to Ariake's port quarter at 0704. Ariake was subsequently swung and berthed starboard side to number 1 berth with the two tugs finally being slipped at 0759. The remainder of the berthing operation was completed without incident.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.

The collision between the Brisbane tug Redcliffe and the container ship Ariake on 24 January 2000 was a result of a number of factors which include but are not limited to:

1. The tug was initially 'washed in' under the ship's stern counter as a result of the astern movement on the ship's port main engine between 0652 and 0655.
2. The tug master misjudged his response to the initial impact of the spray curtain pipework which resulted in the second impact when most of the damage to the tug and ship occurred.
3. The short, strong, towline may have contributed to the severity of the second collision.
4. The tug master was probably experiencing some effects of fatigue at the end of a reasonably busy night shift. This fatigue may have affected his perception, judgement and response when handling the tug at close quarters with the ship.
5. The tug master did not use the emergency options that were available to him, which may have mitigated the severity of the second collision, chiefly, the forward winch 'quick release' control.
6. The tug's fendering system was rendered ineffective as a result of the ship's stern design, arrival draught and the tug's port quarter towing position.
7. There are still some apparent 'human factors' issues with the control of the large 'Duckpeller' tugs in Brisbane and further training is indicated for tug masters in emergency procedures.

Local safety action

As a result of the occurrence, the Directorate of Flying Safety - Australian Defence Force, advised that all East Sale and Longford-based crews were briefed on the incident. The briefing drew attention to the following:

1. terrain shielding exists between Longford and East Sale;
2. a need for clarity in MBZ broadcasts. Crews should not assume that previously made transmissions were received and thus make the information in each transmission appropriate; and
3. an enduring requirement for vigilance in lookout, even if an assessment of no conflict exists.

The operator of the S-76C issued instructions to its crews regarding procedures to be followed for instrument training flights at East Sale when the MBZ was active. These included specific procedures for:

1. departing Longford for the runway 22 ILS approach at East Sale;
2. departing Longford for the West Sale NDB approach;
3. departing Longford for the East Sale and West Sale Global Positioning System non-precision approaches; and
4. crew co-ordination duties between pilot flying and non-flying pilot.