Summary

At 2100 on Monday, 6 August, the small general cargo vessel ANL Purpose was at the position 18 23.6' S, 152 54.3' E making good 11 knots on a course of 174 (T) on passage from Lae, New Guinea, to Melbourne. The weather was fine. The nearest land was Marion Reef, 45 nautical miles to the southwest and Lihou Reef, some 76 nautical miles to the northwest. The master was on watch on the bridge and the chief engineer was in his cabin, when an engine alarm annunciated.

Upon investigating, the chief engineer heard loud noises coming from the main engine, which he promptly stopped. After opening the port crankcase door on no. 4 unit, he saw that both the piston and the cylinder liner had shattered into numerous small pieces and the engine sump was full of debris. There was also significant damage to the engine block. The chief engineer realised that it would not be possible for the ship's staff to carry out repairs sufficient to restart the main engine, even on five cylinders and, at 2215, he advised the Master accordingly.

The master informed the vessel's owner and AusSAR (the Australian Search and Rescue Co-ordination Centre) of the vessel's predicament. ANL Purpose was drifting, in a mainly north-westerly direction, at a speed of approximately 1.3 knots. It was, however, in no immediate danger.

At 1654 on 8 August, the Townsville-based tug Giru made a rendezvous with ANL Purpose which had, by that time, drifted to a position of 1759.1' S, 15215.1' E, and passed a tow to the ship. The tow, at a speed of 7 to 71/2knots, proceeded towards Brisbane in good weather with light south-easterly winds.

On 10 August, in the shelter of Saumarez Reef, the tow was taken over by the Brisbane-based tug Bulimba. The good weather held for the remainder of the tow to Brisbane and, on 12 August, ANL Purpose arrived at the repair wharf of Forgacs Cairncross shipyard in the Brisbane River.

The investigation concluded that:

• The proximate cause of the failure was the partial seizure and consequent break-up of the piston in no. 4 unit. The partial seizure was brought on by an obstruction to piston cooling oil flow caused by the axial movement of the bottom-end bearing shells, which may have been incorrectly fitted.
• The piston in no.4 unit was suffering from significant fatigue cracking, as were those in nos.1 and 2 units, and the additional loading from the partial seizure was sufficient to cause the break-up of the piston.
• The pistons were those originally fitted sixteen years earlier and there was no evidence that they had ever been replaced or crack-detected during that time. The engine manufacturers had issued service bulletins relating to the maintenance and crack detecting of the later two-piece type of pistons, but not for the original, one-piece type.
• The standard of maintenance records kept aboard the vessel was less than adequate.

The report recommends that the engine manufacturer consider issuing a service bulletin covering the crack-detecting of any of the earlier, one-piece, pistons which may still be in service.

Conclusions

• The ANL Purpose main engine failure occurred due to the partial seizure and consequent fracture and break-up of the piston from the number-four cylinder assembly.
• First indication of engine failure was the detection of elevated crankcase oil mist levels due to increased friction within the cylinder.
• The presence of pre-existing fatigue cracking within the body of the number-four piston had contributed to the failure.
• Two other pistons from the engine were also cracked in a similar manner.
• In-service cracking of the pistons was a known design issue and the engine manufacturer had published enhanced inspection requirements for pistons that have accrued more that 24,000 operating hours. A later service letter published service time limits for the main components of the VASA 32 engines. At the time of the failure, the pistons from the ANL Purpose had a service time well in excess of the published limits for piston replacement.
• The connecting rod big end bearing shells had migrated forward of their normal positions and had sustained damage as a result of contact with the crankshaft journal radius.
• Movement of the bearing shells had partially obstructed the oil flow pathway between crankshaft and connecting rod / piston. At a constant feed pressure, this would reduce the total volume of oil flowing through the number-four assembly.
• Control of the piston crown operating temperatures requires that a positive flow of oil be maintained. Any reduction of oil flow volume would be expected to result in an increase in piston temperatures.
• An increase in piston temperatures will result in the physical expansion of the piston body, reducing the bore clearances and increasing the risk of binding and seizure. Evidence of binding and partial seizure was found on fragments of the piston skirt and cylinder bore from the failed engine, although it could not be ascertained at what stage of the failure the damage was sustained.
• Binding within the cylinder bores will elevate the loads being transmitted through the piston body. Under these conditions, the presence of cracking or other defects may predispose the component to failure in the manner observed within the main engine of ANL Purpose.

Summary

At 1100 on 7 August 2001, the Hong Kong flag container vessel Maersk Tacoma departed Melbourne en route to Brisbane. The ship was loaded with containers and had a mean departure draught of 11.10 m. By 1524, the ship had cleared Port Phillip Bay, and was running at sea speed heading eastward through Bass Strait.

Between 1608 and 2200 on 7 August, the main engine was stopped four times in response to low Lubricating Oil (L.O.) alarms. After the stoppage at 2200, the engineers inspected the main engine crankcase and found that number twelve bottom end bearing had failed. The fuel to number twelve cylinder was turned off and the main engine was restarted at 0114 on 8 August. The intention was to proceed at reduced speed to a safe anchorage where the damage to the main engine could be better assessed.

At 0152 the main engine was stopped again after another low L.O. pressure alarm. The chief engineer found that he was having difficulty maintaining the lube pressure and informed the master that he could not use the main engine. The master then contacted the ship's managers in Hong Kong to inform them of the situation. Maersk Tacoma was approximately 13 nautical miles west of Rodondo Island and, with the wind from the north-west at force five, started drifting southeast at 2.5 knots.

By 0500 the weather had deteriorated with the wind force seven from the northwest and the vessel's rate of drift had increased to 3.0 knots in an easterly direction.

During the next four hours the weather continued to deteriorate as the ship drifted towards Cutter Rock which has a charted depth of 7.4 m. By 0900 the distance to Cutter Rock had closed to 1.8 miles on a bearing of approximately 135(T). The master was very concerned that the ship would ground on Cutter Rock and asked the chief engineer if he could have the main engine again for what ever time was possible. At 0910 the main engine was started dead slow ahead with one of the engineers controlling the main engine from the engine side control stand as the remote control system was unserviceable. At 0928 the main engine was stopped again after another low L.O. pressure alarm but in the 18 minutes that the engine had run the ship had tracked far enough north to clear Cutter Rock by 0.8 miles.

At 0946, the Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) in Canberra was contacted by the ship's charterers who reported Maersk Tacoma's situation.

At 1026 the starboard anchor was lowered in an attempt to slow the ship's rate of drift. A short time later it was apparent that Maersk Tacoma's drift had slowed to 2.5 knots but the ship was now drifting east-north-east towards the Hogan group of islands some 16 miles away. The master was now concerned about the possibility that the ship would ground on one of the Hogan islands. Two attempts by the crew to raise the anchor after this time were unsuccessful.

Maersk Tacoma was contacted by Swire Pacific Offshore at 1225. They indicated that the salvage vessel Pacific Conqueror had departed from Barry Beach and would take approximately four hours to arrive at the ship's position. The master was still concerned that Maersk Tacoma would ground on one of the Hogan islands before Pacific Conqueror arrived to take the ship under tow. The RCC was also concerned and made arrangements for two helicopters to stand-by on Hogan Island if it became necessary to evacuate the ship's crew.

At 1505 Maersk Tacoma was six miles from Hogan Island when the main engine was started again in an attempt to save the ship despite the certain knowledge that the main engine would be damaged further. At 1618 the engine was stopped with Maersk Tacoma 4.3 miles north-west of Hogan Island and out of immediate danger.

Pacific Conqueror was sighted on the starboard beam by the crew of Maersk Tacoma at 1646 and was alongside the ship by 1706. By 1822 Pacific Conqueror had taken the ship in tow by hooking the ship's anchor cable using a 'J' hook. The tow then proceeded without significant incident until 1300 on 9 August when the two vessels arrived at a safe anchorage off Sealers Cove on the eastern side of Wilson's Promontory.

By 12 August the weather had moderated sufficiently to allow Maersk Tacoma to be towed to Melbourne. On 14 August, the ship arrived at Swanson Dock where it remained until 17 October 2001 while damage to the main engine was repaired.

The report's conclusions include:

• The ship's main engine was disabled when number twelve bottom end bearing failed.
• It is likely that the bottom end bearing failure was the result of its pre-existing condition in combination with reduced L.O. flow.
• Maersk Tacoma's engineers placed themselves in significant danger by running the damaged main engine to save the ship on two occasions when it was at risk of grounding on both Cutter Rock and the Hogan group of islands.
• Maersk Tacoma's crew were unnecessarily imperilled by the failure to notify Australian authorities of the vessel's situation for some eight hours after the main engine was found to be effectively unserviceable.
• The delay in notifying the Australian authorities of the breakdown and the potential risk to the environment, together with the time taken to organise a tow indicates significant deficiencies in the ship manager's emergency planning.

The report recommends that:

Ship owners and operators include procedures in their vessel's safety management systems which stipulate that local rescue coordination centres must be notified promptly if the ship becomes disabled.

Summary

On 27 June 2001, the multi-purpose cargo vessel Mirande berthed at Geelong to load a cargo of barley. Whilst alongside, an AMSA surveyor on board for an inspection, formed the opinion that the master and chief engineer were under the influence of alcohol and formally advised them to cease drinking so that they would be fit at sailing time.

When the pilot boarded for departure, the ship's chief engineer came to the bridge and whilst not claiming to be the master, he did not deny it when addressed as 'captain'.

During the outward passage, as the ship passed to the south of beacon 12 in the South Channel, the ship's steering gear suffered a telemotor system failure. None of the bridge team, however, attempted to change to the other system or attempted to use the non-follow-up (NFU) steering controls. The ship's momentum and the proximity of the edge of the channel, however, resulted in the ship grounding within a few minutes.

After the grounding, the pilot asked for the master to return to the bridge but to no avail. Eventually the pilot was told that the master was 'drunk'. The water police were called and arrived on board at 0020 on 29 June 2001. They performed preliminary breath tests on the pilot and the first, second and third mates. The results of all these tests were negative. The police officer then went below and tested the master and chief engineer. The master's alcohol reading was 0.29 g/100 ml and that of the chief engineer was 0.13 g/100 ml.

The report conclusions include:

• Two fuses in the primary side of the transformer supplying power to the port telemotor system blew, causing failure of the hand steering in use at the time.
• The mate and third mate had inadequate knowledge of the bridge equipment, particularly the emergency steering change-over procedures.
• The helmsman had received no training in emergency steering procedures.
• Intoxication of the master resulted in his absence from the bridge at the time of the steering failure and hence in a lack of proper leadership, experience and knowledge at a time when it was particularly needed.

The report makes recommendations to:

• The Australian Maritime Safety Authority should seek legislation to allow suitably trained AMSA marine surveyors, where there are reasonable grounds to do so, to measure blood alcohol levels of ship's crews using breath analysis equipment. A positive test of a master or key operational crew should provide grounds for detaining the vessel. AMSA should also advise the relevant harbour master or marine authority of the situation.
• Ship's officers should ensure that they (and any appropriate seamen) are familiar with the emergency operation of all ship's equipment.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular individual or organisation.

Based on the evidence available, the following factors are considered to have contributed to the grounding:

1. For a reason which could not be determined, two fuses in the primary side of the transformer supplying power to the port telemotor system blew, causing failure of the hand steering in use at the time.
2. Fuses of the 'instantaneous' rather than the 'slow blow' type had been fitted.
3. The mate and third mate had inadequate knowledge of the bridge equipment, particularly the emergency steering change-over procedures.
4. The helmsman had received no training in emergency steering procedures.

Additionally, but not directly:

1. Intoxication of the master resulted in his absence from the bridge at the time of the steering failure and hence in a lack of proper leadership, experience and knowledge at a time when it was particularly needed.
2. The pilot was licensed only to 9.5 m maximum draught; however the draught was 10.05 m and he had obtained a verbal exemption from his managing director to undertake this passage. He had been advised that the sailing draught would be 9.5 m by the ship's agent.

Summary

The British flag passenger ship Regal Princess arrived off the Queensland port of Cairns at about 0530 on 15 March 2001 and embarked a pilot to conduct the vessel for the inward passage. The weather was clear with a wind from the south-east at 15 to 20 knots at the pilot boarding ground.

Some difficulties were experienced with the handling of the vessel during the inward pilotage due to the windage of the ship and its manoeuvring characteristics. The ship swung in the turning basin and made fast port-side-to its assigned berth at about 0645. There was some minor damage sustained by the harbour tug through contact with Regal Princess during the berthing operation.

Sailing time was set as 1700 the same day.

At 1500 that day, a meeting was convened between the harbour master, the pilot, duty pilot, the ship's agent and the master of Regal Princess to discuss the departure. The pilot who conducted the inward pilotage was also assigned for the outward pilotage. He was concerned about both the height and ebb of the tide at the scheduled departure time of 1700. Together with a strong wind warning, these would combine to increase the difficulties in handling the ship.

The outcome of the meeting was that the sailing time was amended from 1700 to 0200 the next morning, 16 March 2001. At that time the wind was expected to have abated, the tide would be flooding and there would be a greater under keel clearance (UKC).

At 0200 the vessel left her berth and proceeded outward. The wind was still from the south-east, at about 8 knots at the berth, increasing to 15 knots outside. The departure proceeded as expected until the ship reached the vicinity of beacon C14, when a series of pronounced yaws developed, culminating in the vessel grounding and coming to a stop at 0240 on the eastern side of the channel, with its starboard shoulder between beacons C14 and C12. The ship was aground for about 4 minutes. The ship was then manoeuvred off the bank and proceeded out to the anchorage.

Nobody was hurt as a result of the grounding and there was no pollution. The ship was checked internally for damage and found to be sound and seaworthy. As the sea state and current in Cairns prevented an inspection by divers at that time, the ship was released to proceed onward to Darwin. The underwater inspection in Darwin, the next port, revealed minor hull damage with a small area of the bottom plating having been set up under the bulbous bow, which was likely to be partly the result of an earlier grounding in the Carribean.

Summary

At about 2330 on 20 April 2001, a licensed pilot boarded the Russian flag container ship Maksim Mikhaylov in the port of Brisbane. The pilot exchanged the necessary pilotage information with the master. He then set up his electronic charting system (ECS) and differential global positioning system (DGPS) display on a bridge front window sill to the port side of the centre line in the wheelhouse. The vessel sailed from Fisherman Islands container berth at 0015 on 21 April.

The vessel cleared the berth without incident. The pilot noticed at this stage that, as the tugs took minimum weight on their lines, the vessel heeled 3 or 4 indicating that the ship had reduced residual stability, that is the ship appeared to be tender. Once established in the Bar Cutting, the pilot requested that the ship's speed should be increased to full sea speed for the outward passage via East Channel. At about this time, the second mate took over as officer of the watch and a new helmsman took over the steering. The master remained on the bridge, mostly on the starboard bridge wing. The night was fine and clear with excellent visibility, there was little wind and a calm sea. The tide was on the last of the ebb.

Clear of the Bar Cutting, the pilot ordered an alteration of course to 060 true. Ahead, the beacons marking East Channel could clearly be seen. The pilot alternated between the radar and his ECS display. The second mate fixed the ships position at five-minute intervals and the master remained on the starboard bridge wing. The helmsman steered a straight course and demonstrated that he understood helm orders.

At about 0114, the pilot ordered five degrees of port rudder to enter the East Channel. The ships swing started to accelerate, and the rudder was ordered to amidships. Maksim Mikhaylov contacted Beacon E5 at about 0115:30.

Other than superficial paint damage Maksim Mikhaylov sustained no damage, but the beacon suffered substantial damage. The pilot reported the incident at 0125.

The ship continued on passage, anchoring off Point Cartwright where the master and pilot provided a statement to an official of Queensland Transport and a preliminary assessment of any damage to the ship was made.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular individual or organisation.

1. After the initial turn was established, the turn to port was maintained by mistaken application of port rudder as a result of either the pilot giving the wrong order, or the helmsman applying the wheel to port rather than starboard. The rate of turn was exacerbated by the ship's low level of reserve stability.
2. The lack of proper monitoring of either the pilot or the helmsman by the master and officer of the watch contributed to the contact with beacon E5.
3. The lack of proper monitoring of the helmsman by the pilot, whilst he was giving commands and they were being executed, contributed to the contact with beacon E5.
4. There was a demonstrated lack of Bridge Resource Management.
   - There was a lack of communication between the master and pilot. There was also a lack of oversight of the pilot by the master during the passage.
   - There was no 'shared mental model' with defined limits which could be challenged if exceeded. The ship followed closely neither the pilot's nor the ship's planned route. The ship was on the 'wrong' side of the pilot's proposed route, and this was not challenged by the Officer of the Watch.
5. The pilot was affected by a measurable degree of fatigue. The volume of shipping at that time put an extra demand on pilotage services, resulting in shorter than normal breaks between duty periods. The pilot was at the end of his rostered-on period.

Although not contributing factors it is also considered that:

• The pilot gave the order to turn from the heading of about 060 to enter East Channel at the position he originally planned. The order was given neither too early nor too late.
• Language and a proper understanding of the orders given by the pilot were not causative issues in the contact with beacon E5.

Summary

At 1950 on 20 April 2001, the Indian flag bulk carrier Devprayag, after completing discharge of a cargo of fertiliser at the Victorian port of Portland, anchored off the port to prepare its hatches for a cargo of grain to be loaded at Geelong.

The anchorage at Portland is exposed to the south and east and, at the time of anchoring, the wind was southerly, force 3. It increased the next morning to force 5, then to force 6 later that afternoon.

At 1600 on 21 April, the master, concerned that the vessel was yawing excessively, had ordered the engine room to be on five minutes notice. Later that evening, the anchor dragged almost half a mile to the northwest before holding once more, but no action was taken by the ship's officers or the master.

By 2000 the wind was force 6/7. At 2230, the officer of the watch observed that the anchor was dragging again and he alerted the master and the engine room. The master sent the mate forward to weigh the anchor, intending to anchor again at the original position.

While the anchor was being weighed, the ship was set northwest towards Minerva Reef, along the Portland foreshore and, at about 2320, it grounded on the reef.

No one was injured as a result of the grounding and no oil or other pollutant escaped from the ship. The ship was checked for damage and no breach of the hull was found.

The vessel was detained by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) because of the possibility of hull damage and pollution. Four days after the grounding, the ship was refloated with tug assistance. It was inspected by divers at Portland and was released to continue its voyage after being issued with a condition of class.

This report concludes that, among other factors contributing to the incident:

• The master, after anchoring on a lee shore, permitted the vessel to remain at the exposed anchorage in deteriorating weather;
• The master had not noted the warning in the Sailing Directions that the anchorage was not recommended in strong E and SE weather and;
• Priority was given to the task of preparation of the hatches for cargo rather than to the safety of the ship.

This report recommends that:

• Mariners note the importance of using Sailing Directions when planning passages, when entering or leaving a port or anchoring in or near a port and;
• That they be fully aware of weather conditions as well as the fact that inclement weather can alter a relatively safe anchorage into one that is unsafe.

Summary

At 1800 on 23 February 2001, the Australian flag roll on-roll off passenger ferry Spirit of Tasmania departed Station Pier in Melbourne bound for Devonport in Tasmania. On board the ship were 967 passengers, 112 crew and 10 staff from licensed businesses. The weather was good with wind from the south-south-west at 17-21 knots and a low swell. The ship was averaging a speed of approximately 17 knots.

At 0114 the second mate on the bridge received a fire 'pre-warning' from a detector he identified as being in 'The Ship's Photographer' shop on 'E' deck. Approximately one minute later the detector initiated a fire alarm followed shortly after by the second detector located in the shop. He immediately contacted the two night security stewards and asked them to investigate the alarms. The stewards called back a short time later confirming that there was a fire, which appeared to be in the store at the rear of the photography shop. The two men could see into the shop through the locked glass front door but could not enter as they did not have the key. The second mate then called the master and started the muster signal in the crew accommodation.

The master arrived quickly on the bridge and, after assessing the situation including further confirmation that the fire was serious, initiated the muster signal throughout the passenger accommodation. The time was 0120.

By this time members of the attack and back-up emergency parties had started to arrive outside the photography shop with fire fighting equipment. The mate who was leading the attack party, nominated two integrated ratings to don breathing apparatus to enter the shop and extinguish the fire.

As smoke was spreading from the shop throughout the ship's accommodation, the mate called the bridge and requested that the fire doors throughout the ship be closed remotely. The time was 0125.

The shop door key was obtained from the shop manager and the two nominated IRs entered the photography shop, initially with hand held extinguishers. Although the smoke was very thick, they located the fire in the store area at the rear. They attempted to extinguish the fire with the hand held extinguishers but found that the fire kept re-igniting. The lead IR realised that the only option was to cool the area with a fire hose. Both men retreated from the shop. A fire hose was quickly charged, both men reentered the shop and, after five minutes, the fire was extinguished using salt water. After the shop area was thoroughly checked, the fire was declared out at 0144.

While the fire was being extinguished, the passenger muster was proceeding relatively smoothly. By 0152 all passengers had been mustered at their designated muster areas by the ship s crew. The crew dealt with a number of problems during the muster including the need to move one group away from a smoke filled muster area, one passenger with a suspected heart attack and two others who had experienced asthma attacks. All passengers were kept at their muster areas for the next hour while the smoke in the accommodation was cleared and the area of the fire monitored for any signs of re-ignition.

At 0255 it was decided that the smoke in the accommodation had cleared sufficiently for the passengers to be escorted back to their cabins. The rest of the voyage was completed without incident with Spirit of Tasmania arriving at Devonport on schedule on the morning of 24 February.

Summary

On 20 January 2001, the Maltese flag, panamax bulk cargo carrier Alianthos arrived at the anchorage in Corio Bay, Geelong, after an uneventful voyage from Shanghai, China. The ship was in ballast and intending to load a full cargo of grain at the Geelong grain loader.

On 23 January, the master made the decision to conduct an 'abandon ship' drill while the vessel was at anchor waiting to berth. The drill commenced at 1018 and was completed by 1140. The master was not satisfied with some aspects of the crew's performance during the drill. He ordered that all crew were to receive further instruction, and complete another 'abandon ship' drill, the following day.

The 'abandon ship' drill commenced at 1700 the following day. Both port and starboard lifeboats were prepared, lowered to the water and taken away from the ship by crews who had not been in one of the boats the previous day. The third mate was assigned as the officer in charge of the port lifeboat.

When the port lifeboat returned to the ship, there was some delay in reconnecting the falls to the boat's on-load release hooks. After some time, the third mate gave the order to raise the boat from the water. The crew then disembarked at the embarkation deck and the boat was raised and secured at the head of the davit.

At the master's request, the mate continued to instruct members of the ship's catering and engineering staff who were not conversant with some aspects of the operation of the lifeboats. Once the mate had finished instructing the crew, they prepared the empty port lifeboat for lowering to the embarkation deck.

At 1742, one of the motormen was instructed to operate the davit winch to lower the port lifeboat. The motorman, who had not operated the davit before, lifted the winch brake handle and started to lower the boat. The boat moved more quickly than usual down from the housed position, resulting in the davit cradles coming to an abrupt stop as they reached deck level.

When the davit cradles hit their stops, the boat was seen to jerk sharply. At this instant, the after fall released from its on-load release hook. The stern of the lifeboat fell, swinging on the remaining forward fall. As the weight of the whole boat came onto the forward davit cradle it buckled and the boat made hard contact with the side of the ship. The starboard side of the lifeboat was cracked and holed by the contact. The forward fall and hook continued to hold the weight of the lifeboat, which had come to rest with its stern above the port gangway. There were no crew inside the lifeboat and consequently no injuries as a result of the incident.

After assessing the damage to the lifeboat and its davit, the master instructed the crew to use the after stores crane to raise the stern of the lifeboat and secure it alongside the ship. Alianthos berthed on the morning of 26 January with the lifeboat still suspended in this fashion.

It was likely that the Aztec pilot became distracted while attempting to identify the engine problem and did not maintain the aircraft's track clear of the control zone. The pilot's ability to navigate was probably constrained by the fluctuating in-flight visibility, his unfamiliarity with the Aztec's systems and stress due to the situation.

The proximity of the Sydney and Bankstown control zones required pilots of aircraft operating at the latter airport to be particularly attentive to maintaining track and altitude to reduce the possibility of inadvertently entering the Sydney control. The operation of the aircraft's transponder and radar surveillance of the control zone by the Sydney controllers were active defences for the airspace system.

Summary

At 0300 on the morning of 18 January 2001, the Hong Kong flag geared bulk carrier Handymariner was 26 miles¹ off the coast of Western Australia, enroute to Bunbury to load a cargo of alumina. The ship was on a course of 156 (T) at a speed of 14 knots. The wind was from the south-south-east at force six with a rough sea of 1.5'2 m on a low swell. The visibility was estimated at 10 miles with a partly cloudy sky.

The same morning, a 15.65 m timber rock lobster fishing vessel, Lipari, left Port Bouvard at around 0310 to check its lobster pots which were set some 36 miles in a south-westerly direction from the port. On board Lipari were the skipper and two deckhands. Shortly after leaving port, the two deckhands went below to sleep. The skipper stayed on the vessel's fly bridge for the first six miles steering a course of 235 at 15 knots and then went down to the wheelhouse and engaged the autopilot. He remained in the wheelhouse listening to some music.

At 0410 the mate on watch on Handymariner detected Lipari ahead, and to port, of his ship and commenced tracking the fishing vessel on radar. The ARPA equipped radar indicated that Lipari's range at its closest point of approach was going to be small, so the mate attempted to call the fishing vessel on VHF channel 16. Despite several radio calls he received no response as, unknown to him, Lipari's VHF radio was not working. The mate then attempted to warn the fishing boat using an aldis lamp and the ship's forward whistle, but still received no response. Lipari maintained a steady course and speed.

When Lipari had closed to within four miles, the mate disengaged the ship's auto pilot and ordered the look-out onto the helm in preparation for a course alteration. Lipari continued to close with the ship on a steady course and speed, apparently unaware of the presence of the ship and unresponsive to Handymariner's radio calls, light and sound signals. With a collision now imminent the mate ordered a course alteration to starboard.

At about this time the skipper in Lipari's wheelhouse heard the ship's whistle. He made his way to the fly bridge where he identified the ship dead ahead. He turned the fishing vessel's helm hard to port but it responded slowly as the auto pilot was still engaged in the wheelhouse.

At approximately 0435 Lipari and Handymariner collided, the fishing vessel's starboard bow making contact with the ship's hull plating on the port side adjacent to number one hold. The ship sustained no damage and there were no injuries sustained by the crew of either vessel, but Lipari had been holed on the starboard bow above the waterline.

After the collision, Lipari's skipper inspected the damage and decided that the vessel was not safe to work. He followed Handymariner for approximately five minutes before turning north to Fremantle. Lipari arrived safely at a boat repair facility in Fremantle later in the morning.

Handymariner resumed its course to Bunbury and arrived at the anchorage at 0736 without further incident.

¹ Miles referred as nautical miles = 1 852 m.