The pilot reported that the takeoff was being conducted in a crosswind which he estimated was from the left at 10-15 knots. The surface of the 10 metre wide strip was covered in loose gravel. At the beginning of the takeoff roll, the aircraft began to weathercock to the left. The pilot continued, believing that directional control would improve as aircraft speed increased. However, this did not occur and the aircraft ground-looped, striking an embankment at the edge of the strip. The pilot reported that the aircraft was equipped with a small tailwheel which had limited effectiveness on the soft loose surface. Also, the aircraft was a late model Thruster aircraft which had a greater keel surface than earlier models because of its enclosed fuselage. This was the first time the pilot had operated the aircraft in crosswind conditions. The operating manual for the aircraft indicates a demonstrated crosswind capability of 15 knots. This accident was not the subject of a formal on scene investigation.

The pilot reported that he rolled the aircraft out of a turn at 4000 feet and then the engine spluttered and stopped. Trouble checks including advice from the base station failed to restore engine power. In the ensuing forced landing, the aircraft was apparently flared too high and it bounced heavily twice resulting in the collapse of the nosegear. An engine run and inspection of components failed to detect the cause of the loss of power but a detailed laboratory inspection of the ignition switch confirmed the cause of the engine failure. This inspection detected an intermittency in the ignition/magneto switch internal wiring when subject to vibration. The ignition key had a heavy metal clip attached to it and it is believed that the inertia of this clip on rollout from the turn was sufficient to interrupt the electrical continuity within the magneto switch and cause the engine failure.

It was reported that the pilot lost control of the glider and landed heavily while operating in winds of 25-30 knots.

The instructor pilot was being checked by the club chief flying instructor (CFI). After completing some work in the local training area the aircraft was returned to the circuit area where the CFI took over the controls so that the instructor-under-check could demonstrate his instructional technique. As the aircraft approached the ground for the first landing the instructor told the CFI to "round out and hold the aircraft off". The CFI pulled back on the control column but the rate of descent was not fully arrested and the aircraft touched down heavily and bounced. The CFI pushed the control forward and the aircraft touched down again and bounced. The control column was again pushed forward and the aircraft again bounced after touching down. The aircraft then landed in a nose-down attitude and the left landing gear leg failed. The aircraft slid about 10 metres before coming to rest. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

The aircraft was running low on fuel so the pilot elected to land in a paddock close to a town. The wind at the time was west-north-westerly with a strength of about 30 knots. Just before touchdown the pilot felt a gust of wind from the south-west and attempted to correct for the drift. The right landing gear struck a ridge and was torn from the aircraft. This accident was not the subject of a formal on scene investigation.

The aircraft was taking off from a one-way agricultural strip during spreading operations. As the aircraft became airborne it suffered a complete loss of engine power. The pilot dumped the load and landed the aircraft on the strip remaining. During the landing roll the pilot was forced to swerve the aircraft onto an adjacent cleared area to avoid a gully beyond the strip end. At a low forward speed, the right main landing gear struck a stump. The aircraft groundlooped, collapsing the left main gear and damaging the outer left wing. No mechanical defect of the engine was found. Although vapour lock was suspected, the cause of the loss of power was not determined.

Circumstances:

As part of their commercial pilot training scheme, the flying school sent five trainees supervised by two instructors, in two aircraft to further their experience by operating from a remote aerodrome. The two aircraft arrived at Longreach Aerodrome before noon on the day of the accident. The instructor in charge of the operation had apparently decided to take two trainees flying in the local area. The flight was authorised for radio navigation aid training. The aircraft was later seen over a period of time, flying at heights judged as 100 feet and lower over the flooded Thomson River. Later, some two kilometres north-west of the Thomson River, two stockmen saw the aircraft flying parallel to the Winton Road towards Longreach township when suddenly the wings separated from the fuselage which then crashed to the ground. The aircraft had flown into a subsidiary powerline strung across the main road. Two steel wires had struck the windscreen and had sliced both wings and centre support section away from the fuselage. The span of the wire struck was 239 metres. The point of impact was 8.2 metres above ground level and 67 metres from the main feeder powerline which parallels the far side of the main road. At the time of the accident, the wind was calm, the sky was clear of cloud, and the sun was directly behind the aircraft. Although the visibility was excellent, tests conducted exactly 24 hours after the accident revealed that the wires would not have been visible to the pilots in time to avoid a collision.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilots were engaged in an unnecessarily hazardous operation - low flying.

2. The pilots were unfamiliar with the local area.

3. The pilots did not see the subsidiary power line in time to take collision avoidance action.

Circumstances:

The pilot reported that shortly after take-off on the seventh parachuting flight for the day the left engine fuel low pressure warning light illuminated. Activation of the auxiliary pump did not rectify the problem and the engine stopped. Following completion of the left engine shutdown drills and an apparent inability to outclimb the rising terrain, the pilot elected to shut down the right engine and land in a paddock. Landing gear extension had just commenced when the aircraft impacted the ground. The aircraft ground looped to the left in the landing slide. As the parachuting operation involved climbing to 12000 feet, to enhance climb performance and minimise sortie time, minimum fuel was carried. The pilot and the operator considered that the regulations relating to fuel reserve requirements did not apply to parachuting operations. The planned fuel for the flight was therefore substantially less than statutory requirements. A complete fuel drain and quantity check revealed only 19.5 lbs (11 litres) of fuel remained in the left tank and 231 lbs (130 litres) in the right. The amount of fuel burned since the last refuel was 24 lbs (13.5 litres). The inspection of the aircraft fuel system revealed that the fuel quantity indication system was defective. The left outer fuel quantity sender unit was unserviceable and showed a reading on the left outer fuel gauge of 100 lbs and empty on the left inboard gauge when both the inboard and outboard fuel tanks were completely empty. The pilot was unaware of the significance of this fuel gauge indication anomaly. All fuel pumps were serviceable and both engines were found to be capable of operating throughout the design power range. The wind at the time was south-easterly at 10 knots gusting to 15 knots. The into-wind take-off was over rising terrain with a 5-7 knot crosswind from the left. It is considered that during the initial climb phase of the flight insufficient fuel remained to cover the left fuel pumps and outlet ports, effectively starving the left engine of fuel. No reason could be found for the inability of the aircraft to outclimb the terrain on the remaining engine. Performance tests revealed that, at worst, the aircraft would have been capable of maintaining level flight following the failure of the left engine. It is probable that the visual illusion caused by the rising ground on the initial climb track induced the pilot to assume that the aircraft was descending.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot's knowledge of the aircraft systems was inadequate.

2. The fuel quantity in the left fuel tanks was inadequate to ensure continued operation of the left engine.

3. The left engine failed due to fuel starvation.

4. It is probable that a visual illusion caused the pilot to believe the aircraft was descending, and consequently, to abandon the take-off.

The pilot was assisting stockmen to move cattle through a gate when one animal broke away. While manoeuvring to cut off the escaping animal, the helicopter struck a single wire power line which traversed the area. The power line was approximately 11 metres above ground level at the point where the collision occurred. The impact caused the main rotor to sever the tailboom and the helicopter fell to the ground and caught fire. The pilot was aware of the location of the power line and had been working in close proximity to it prior to the accident. This occurrence was not the subject of an on-site investigation. The information was provided by witnesses to the accident.

The pilot was operating the aircraft from the top of a gently sloping ridge in light and variable wind conditions. He lifted the aircraft into a hover one metre above ground level and began to accelerate forward. At about translational lift speed, the helicopter lost height and the tail rotor struck the ground. The pilot was able to land the aircraft straight ahead. Damage was sustained to the tail rotor drive, gearbox, and blades. The pilot had started work at 0445 hours on the day of the accident. He had flown 4.5 hours and had sprayed five chemical loads prior to the accident. This was the first concentrated period of flying he had undertaken in more than three weeks. Also, it was his first early morning start in that time. Both these aspects could have led to the pilot suffering a degree of transient fatigue. This might have been sufficient to cause a slight degradation in his performance sufficient for him not to compensate fully for the nose-up pitch as the helicopter passed through translational lift. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.