The aircraft was taking off towards the north, into an estimated 8-10 knot headwind, from a strip surrounded by light scrub and trees. Shortly after lift-off the pilot said the aircraft began to sink, the stall warning horn sounded and the airspeed rapidly decreased by at least 10 knots. He said he considered the aircraft would not be able to outclimb trees ahead and therefore aborted the take-off. The aircraft was placed back onto the strip but could not be prevented from overrunning the end and colliding with small trees. The circumstances of the accident are considered to be consistent with the effects of low level windshear resulting from the shielding effect of the trees upwind of the strip. This accident was not the subject of a formal on scene investigation.

The pilot had been flight checked for solo flying in the morning prior to the accident. On the first solo circuit when on approach to land the pilot realised the glider was lined up too close to several gliders parked in line ahead on the airfield. The approach was made in a light cross wind from the left. The pilot corrected in the wrong direction for the misalignment, compounding the problem. As the airbrakes had not been deployed the glider was unable to be landed beyond the parked gliders. After touchdown, despite an attempt to avoid the raised right wing of the closest glider,the left wing of the landing glider struck the right wing tip of the parked glider, swinging the landing glider toward the next aircraft in line. The left wing of the landing glider struck the right wing of this second glider, resulting in substantial damage to both aircraft. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

The pilot was spraying a mature cotton crop adjacent to the company strip. After 20 minutes of flight, and shortly after commencing another spray run, the engine failed suddenly. The aircraft was manoeuvred towards an adjacent paddock with short soyabeans but it could not be aligned with the rows before landing. The wheels dug into the wet ground and the aircraft overturned. While skidding backwards the fibreglass back of the cockpit broke, allowing a large quantity of mud into the cockpit and making the pilot's exit difficult. He eventually used the fire extinguisher to smash a window to facilitate egress. Witnesses saw flame and black smoke emitting from the aircraft at the time of the engine failure. The aircraft operator found that the rear bearing of one magneto had become loose. This allowed the timing to advance and the engine backfired. An air inlet hose between the air filter and the carburettor was split and was sucked into the carburettor, thus stopping the engine. This occurrence was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

Circumstances:

The pilot carried out a daily and preflight inspection prior to boarding the aircraft for the first flight of the day in the self-launching glider. He started up, taxied to the end of the runway, and carried out a short run-up before taking off. At approximately 100 feet after take-off, the engine stopped and the aircraft was seen to enter a left hand spiral descent until it crashed on the edge of the sealed flight strip, approximately two thirds of the way along the strip.

The pilot was dead when the rescuers arrived at the aircraft. The fuel cock was found selected to the OFF position. With the fuel cock selected OFF fuel was still leaking through the lines. The effect of the fuel leaking past the fuel cock would have been to extend the period of time between start up and engine failure if the fuel cock was left in the OFF position. Previous experience with VH-GXM indicates that there is sufficient fuel in the system, when the fuel cock is selected OFF, to permit a start-up, DEPARTURE and climb out to approximately 500 feet.

On the accident flight the pilot taxied further than normal, and he carried out a short run-up. This could have accounted for the engine stoppage at a lower height than previous experience indicated. At the time of the engine stoppage there were two options open to the pilot. One was to land in the runway length remaining and the other was to turn left and land in the open paddock beside the strip. Either option would have been acceptable and the pilot, who was experienced, should have been able to glide to a safe landing.

The pilot's injuries were insufficient to cause death. The pilot did have extensive pre-existing cardiac damage. The factors which led to the loss of control could not be positively determined. It is possible that the pilot omitted to turn the fuel on prior to start up and the sudden loss of power at a critical point during the take-off caused a heart problem and subsequent loss of control.

No evidence was found which indicated that the pilot had suffered heart pain prior to the accident. The extended operation of the engine, with the unserviceable fuel cock selected OFF, could have lulled the pilot into a false belief that the aircraft was performing normally and that all checks had been completed correctly.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Inadequate pre-flight preparation - the fuel selector was not placed in the ON position.
2. Defective fuel cock.
3. Loss of control in flight, possibly due to physical incapacitation.

The aircraft was engaged in spreading gypsum on pasture. The pilot reported that during the third take-off run of the morning, the engine failed just prior to lift off. The fuel selector was positioned to the rear fuel tank and there was insufficient time to select the front fuel tank and restore fuel supply to the engine. The pilot was unable to stop the aircraft and it ran through a fence and a deep ditch beyond the end of the strip, causing damage to the right wing, right undercarriage and tailplane. The pilot reported that the aircraft had been refuelled the night before by other persons, but not to full tanks. The fuel gauges were inaccurate and the rear tank had actually been almost empty. In addition, the audible low fuel warning was not operational. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

Circumstances:

A ground witness heard the aircraft's engine power increase and observed the aircraft pull up, roll over and enter a spin to the right. He estimated the aircraft was about 3000 feet above the ground. The aircraft spun six to eight turns to the right and at about 600 feet above ground level the right spin ceased before the aircraft entered a spin to the left. The left spin stopped after about one turn and the aircraft appeared to be recovering from the dive when it hit the ground in a wings level, 45 degrees nose down attitude. The pilot-in-command, who occupied the rear seat, held a low-level aerobatic approval to operate down to 1000 feet above ground level. He had often spun the aircraft but is reported to have normally recovered after two turns. The other pilot who occupied the front seat, held an aerobatic endorsement but this was his first flight in a Zlin. It is not known which of the pilots was at the controls when the aircraft entered the right spin, however, the aircraft was normally commanded from the front cockpit. Injuries sustained by the pilot-in-command indicate that he was at the controls at the moment of ground impact. The normal technique prior to the entry of an intentional spin in the Zlin is to reduce power to idle. Considering the report that engine power was increased prior to the spin, it is possible that the spin entry was unintentional. It is the recommended practice in the Zlin to recover from a spin after two to three turns. Why the pilot(s) failed to recover from the right spin after two to three turns could not be determined. An examination of the wreckage and associated aircraft documentation did not reveal any fault that may have contributed to the accident. The prevailing weather was not considered a factor.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Entry to the right spin was possibly unintentional.

2. The pilot at the controls probably experienced some difficulty recovering from the initial spin to the right.

3. Recovery from the right spin was inadequately executed and the aircraft entered a spin to the left.

4. There was insufficient height for the aircraft to recover from the left spin.

The Private Pilot Licence holder was undergoing type endorsement training. During the third landing, on runway 29 Left, the aircraft commenced to swing to the right. The pilot in command reported that after checking that there were no obstructions he allowed the swing to continue. The student pilot was unable to stop the swing and as the aircraft turned through 40 degrees it began to skid, with the result that the landing gear folded. The aircraft is fitted with a tailskid but no brakes, and was unable to use the normal unsealed landing area as that area was wet and out of service. At the time of the landing the wind conditions resulted in a quartering tailwind from the right at five knots.

The pilot made a normal approach for a landing uphill with 10 to 15 knots of wind from the left rear. As the aircraft crossed a gully on short final it encountered a strong wind gust. The starboard wing dropped and the aircraft descended rapidly. It touched down heavily just short of the threshold. The pilot applied full power, executed a go-around and returned to Bairnsdale. Immediately after the flight the pilot noticed that the blade tips of both propellers had been bent aft. At a later date, less obvious distortion of the fuselage and the right wing was detected. It is highly probable that the aircraft encountered a strong windshear on short final.

The glider was being towed by a tug aircraft for launch. During the early part of the take-off roll, the wing-man released the left wing and the wing dropped to the ground. The pilot was unable to regain the wings level attitude due to the lack of control effectiveness at low airspeed. The glider veered to the left of the flight strip as the glider pilot released the tow from the tug. The pilot could not avoid a collision with a strainer post in the boundary fence.

The pilot and his four passengers had planned a trip to Sydney and return for the Anzac Day long weekend. In preparation for the trip the pilot obtained a flight check in a Beech Bonanza aircraft. On the morning of the accident the pilot obtained weather forecasts for the route to be flown, prepared a flight plan for the trip and submitted it to the Briefing Officer at Moorabbin Airport at 0755 hours. The flight plan indicated that the aircraft would proceed to the first nominated reporting point at Mangalore outside Melbourne Controlled Airspace and at an altitude below 5000 feet above mean sea level (amsl). When the pilot submitted the flight plan he was advised by the Briefing Officer that the route through the Kilmore Gap was not suitable for flight under visual meteorological conditions (VMC). The pilot agreed to delay his DEPARTURE until conditions improved in the Kilmore Gap. The pilot and passengers then proceeded to the aircraft and after loading, the aircraft was taxied for take-off. The DEPARTURE time from Moorabbin was reported by the pilot as 0900 hours. No request for any update of the weather situation in the Kilmore Gap area had been received from the pilot before DEPARTURE. Shortly after DEPARTURE the aircraft was identified on Melbourne radar after having inadvertently entered Melbourne Control Zone. The pilot was instructed to maintain the aircraft's present altitude and heading, until about four minutes later at 0908 hours when the pilot was cleared to resume his own navigation after reporting he had Yan Yean reservoir in sight. At about 0918 hours VH-DAJ was observed over Kilmore at an altitude of approximately 600 feet above ground level (agl), heading in a north-westerly direction. Shortly afterwards the pilot was asked by Melbourne Flight Service for his appreciation of the weather in the Kilmore Gap. In reply the pilot advised he was unsure of the aircraft's location and was going to carry out a 180 degree turn, he also requested the aircraft's bearing from Melbourne. The pilot was then advised that the aircraft was not within radar coverage and asked if the aircraft could be climbed to 4000 feet amsl and remain in VMC, to which the pilot replied that the aircraft was not in VMC at that time. The pilot was then advised that three minutes earlier his aircraft had been 30 nautical miles north of Melbourne and that if he turned to the south the aircraft would be expected to come within radar coverage shortly. Two minutes later Melbourne Flight Service asked the pilot the direction and the altitude at which the aircraft was flying. The pilot answered that the heading was "one two zero" and then that the aircraft's level was "two thousand", this was the last transmission received from the aircraft. Weather in the area at the time was reported as low cloud and rain. The search for the aircraft was hampered by the weather. The wreckage was finally located by a motor bike rider later in the afternoon. The initial impact had been in a slight right wing low attitude on a heading of approximately 135 degrees at a height of 2180 feet amsl on the slopes of Mt William, the top of which is 2639 feet amsl. After the initial impact the aircraft had rolled inverted before striking the ground again, 70 metres beyond the initial point of impact. Fire broke out and engulfed the wreckage. The investigation did not reveal any fault with the aircraft that would have contributed to the accident. Witnesses in the area reported that the position VH-DAJ struck the ground was shrouded by cloud at the time of the accident.