The instructor reported that he was conducting circuits and landings with a student. Several circuits had been completed satisfactorily but on this particular occasion the student delayed making the flare for landing. The instructor was unable to prevent a heavy touchdown which fractured the main skid.

Two photographers chartered the aircraft to fly them to a white tropical beach. Enroute to Hope Island, the passengers asked the pilot to land near a beach at the mouth of the Daintree River. After making a water landing on the river, the pilot found that he could not get his passengers and their photographic equipment to the shore because the hull of the aircraft grounded on a sandbank, some 50 Metres from the beach. A decision was then made to takeoff from the water and land on the beach. During the landing , the pilot lost control of the aircraft when one of the mainwheels ran through shallow water. The aircraft nosed over and came to rest inverted.

Circumstances:

The pilot was conducting cattle spotting operations, operating from an area of flood plain on the property. After take-off on the accident flight, a right turn was commenced when the aircraft reached about 250 feet above ground level. At the completion of the turn the nose dropped but the pilot was not initially concerned due to the prevailing turbulence. He soon found that he could not raise the nose by use of elevator control. Witnesses saw the aircraft commence to dive, and the attitude of the aircraft change until it was inverted. It remained in this attitude until ground impact. On this aircraft type, the horizontal stabiliser is attached to the fuselage beam by two 5/16-inch diameter rose joints mounted vertically. The all-flying stabiliser is operated by a push-pull rod from the control column. One of the rose joints apparently failed during the flight, causing the pilot to lose control of the horizontal stabiliser.

Circumstances:

The balloon was one of two launched from Sidonia. The operator's Senior Pilot, who was the pilot of the second balloon, obtained a general Area Forecast and a Melbourne Terminal Area forecast by telephone from the Melbourne Flight Service Centre prior to the accident flight. The forecasts, which indicated that conditions would be suitable until an upper ridge passed through the area, were passed to the pilot of VH-HUZ. Conditions were forecast to deteriorate gradually after 0700. The Senior Pilot also contacted a resident in the local area who reported that conditions were clear and there was no wind. A number of weather observation balloons were released and observed by the two pilots, and these confirmed their view that the weather was suitable for flight. The passengers were briefed on the flight including which landing positions to adopt however, some of the passengers have indicated that they were not clear about the contents of the briefing. Both balloons successfully completed one flight of approximately 40 minutes before landing. One of VH-HUZ's gas cylinders was changed and new passengers boarded for a second flight. After take-off, the balloon drifted slowly to the south west for approximately 10 kilometres. The pilot increased altitude to pick up an easterly drift in order to avoid flight over a forest and to drift in the general direction of suitable landing areas. At the completion of the manoeuvre the pilot noticed the ground speed had increased and the balloon was encountering turbulence. Some passengers noticed the trees below were "boiling". The pilot continued towards his selected landing site, which was the last suitable area prior to the balloon crossing thickly wooded countryside, and he advised the passengers to expect a hard landing. The pilot aimed to land beyond a fence line on the up slope of one of two clear hills. The landing area was acceptable and had been used on previous occasions. During the descent, the pilot was forced to change his approach technique because of a powerline in the area. Turbulence on the final approach caused the balloon to lose height more rapidly then expected and it touched down hard 90 metres short of the fence. The basket skipped up the hill as the pilot pulled the parachute vent rip cord in an attempt to spill hot air, deflate the envelope and bring the balloon to a stop. The balloon collided with a fence strainer post, and the pilot was knocked unconscious by the post before he could complete his task. The balloon continued up the hill, struck a second fence, continued down the lee side of the hill and stopped when it became entangled in a large tree approximately 787 metres beyond the initial touchdown point. The forecast wind speed at 2000 feet, at the time of the first flights, was 35 knots and subsequent observations indicate that the forecast was essentially correct. The weather observation balloons did not indicate a high upper wind speed to the pilot although one of the passengers observed a balloon "whip" away once it had reached 1500 to 2000 feet. A weather observation balloon was not released prior to the second take-off. When the passengers were advised by the pilot to prepare for a hard landing, they adopted a squat position rather than the correct position of standing with their knees flexed or bent. The pilot was carrying a portable radio which was thrown from the basket during the landing. There was a delay in activating rescue procedures when the radio could not be located.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The forecast change in the wind and turbulence occurred more rapidly than the pilot had anticipated. The pilot's incorrect expectations partly resulted from his using incomplete weather information. Additional information would have been available had the pilot or his representative contacted the Duty Forecaster and obtained an up-to-date weather assessment prior to the flight.

2. A weather observation balloon was not released prior to DEPARTURE of the second flight although the forecast indicated that significant changes would occur after that time. Had a weather balloon been launched it is possible that the pilot of VH-HUZ would have become aware of the changes and cancelled the flight.

3. During the final stage of the landing the balloon was affected by turbulence, and the pilot was unable to prevent a premature touchdown.

4. Although the passengers had been briefed on the correct landing position not all of them understood the briefing and in the rush of the landing, they adopted a squat position which research indicates can lead to more serious injury.

5. The pilot's attempt to complete the landing sequence was terminated when he was knocked unconscious by a post.

6. The balloon's landing continued unattended until it became entangled in a tree.

Recommendations:

1. The CAA should remind commercial balloon operators to ensure that their pilots take advantage of all the weather forecasting facilities that are available including a briefing from an officer of the Bureau of Meteorology prior to undertaking a commercial flight. Consideration should be given to launching additional weather observation balloons, between flights, if the forecast indicates that significant weather changes are likely to occur during the period of the next flight.

2. The CAA should remind commercial balloon operators to ensure that passengers have a clear understanding of the safety procedures covered during the briefing.

3. The CAA should examine the crashworthiness and survivability aspects of high-speed balloon landings with special emphasis on the positioning and stance of passengers in such a landing.

4. The CAA should examine the need to develop regulations to require radio transceivers carried as mandatory equipment on commercial balloon flights to be secured so as to ensure availability at all times.

A person who had previously held a Commercial Pilot Licence gained entry to the aircraft and was able to start the engines. The aircraft then apparently rolled forward and collided with a disused fuel tanker. At about 0710 hours in the morning the regular pilot arrived to find the aircraft embedded in the side of the tanker with the engines still operating at low power. The person was subsequently located, by police, asleep on the side of a nearby road.

The pilot was carrying out circuit practice in his aircraft. After about 15 minutes flying the engine stopped. Realising that the aircraft would not glide to the strip, the pilot attempted a forced landing in a grassed paddock just short of the property boundary fence. Just after touching down, the aircraft struck the trunk of a fallen tree and the landing gear was bent rearwards. An inspection of the wreckage found that a hose clamp holding the fuel line to the inlet side of the carburettor had failed and allowed fuel to siphon overboard. The failure of the clamp had resulted from the incorrect size clamp being used and the resultant size differential resulted in geometrical discontinuity and circumferential stress overload. The engine failed due to fuel exhaustion.

The pilot departed the property strip with the apparent intention of flying to a position near a town some 16 kilometres to the North. Witnesses in the town subsequently observed the aircraft as it arrived in the area. It was evidently performing normally as the pilot completed a level turn and took up a southerly heading. The aircraft then entered a descent, which was described as being similar to a landing approach except that the engine was operating at high power. The aircraft then disappeared from sight behind a hill and the wreckage was subsequently sighted by the pilot of another ultralight aircraft. It was determined that the aircraft had struck the ground in about a 20 degrees nose-down attitude. The pilot had been restrained by a lap-type seat harness and the flexing of his body during the impact had resulted in the stretching and dislocation of his thoracic spine. Specialist medical opinion indicated that the accident would probably have been survivable had the pilot been restrained by a full harness. The area where the accident occurred was not suitable for a normal landing. The investigation did not reveal any defect or malfunction with the aircraft, or any pre-existing medical condition with the pilot that might have accounted for the accident. The precise causes of the occurrence could not be determined.

Before commencing operations, the pilot had carried out a detailed survey of the area and noted that a power line crossed the particular paddock to be treated. On the second spraying run the pilot temporarily forgot the presence of the power line, and the gear legs collided with the wires. The aircraft subsequently struck the ground in a steep nose-down attitude and cartwheeled for 30 metres before coming to rest with only the cockpit area still intact.

As the aircraft touched down, the pilot felt the left maingear leg give way. He applied power, but the aircraft did not climb away and the pilot was unable to maintain directional control. To avoid colliding with trees outside the airfield boundary the pilot closed the throttle and landed the aircraft. The left maingear leg collapsed and the right wing was damaged when it struck a small bush. An inspection of the landing gear revealed that the aircraft had suffered a heavy landing. It was also found that the nut on the gear upper retaining bolt had been stripped. This nut was not the type specified by the Glasair Construction Manual.

Circumstances:

The student had completed a one-hour dual check flight and was authorised by the instructor for solo practice. The pilot was conducting circuits on runway 22 with a wind from the south west at 10 - 15 knots. On the first approach the student flared late, the aircraft bounced, and a go around was made. The next approach was stabilized but again the pilot flared late and bounced. Despite the application of power for a go around, the aircraft struck the runway heavily, resulting in damage to the nose leg and propeller tips.