Just after takeoff, at about 40 feet above ground level, the engine began to misfire and run roughly, then failed completely. The pilot dumped the load and commenced a steep turn to the left in an attempt to land on a track behind the aircraft. During the turn he realised that the aircraft would not make the chosen area and the aircraft was stalled into the tops of the trees. After the impact it descended steeply to the ground. The pilot escaped with scratches and some bruising. Subsequent inspection of the engine found that the left magneto had become detached from its mountings because of the loss of the retaining nuts. The mount bolts of both magnetos were fitted with spring washers rather than being lockwired. When the left magneto detached it pulled and broke the right magneto switch lead. It appears that the broken lead then contacted part of the engine and grounded the right magneto, depriving the engine of an ignition source.

The pilot was directing cattle through a gate when a cow turned and began to walk back towards the helicopter. It stopped in front of the aircraft before charging. The pilot applied back cyclic and up collective in an attempt to avoid the animal but the tail rotor struck the ground. The helicopter began to yaw and the pilot landed the aircraft immediately. It continued to yaw after the landing and the landing skid assembly was substantially damaged. The pilot was relatively inexperienced on the helicopter type, having the majority of his recent experience on more powerful and responsive types. On this occasion, the rate of cyclic application was too great and not compensated for by the collective input. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

On arrival in the circuit area, the pilot noted that the wind was varying in direction by about 60 degrees and was gusting from about 5 to 20 knots. The strip in use was 500 metres in length and full flap was extended during the approach. Touchdown was made about 150 metres beyond the aiming point, and a series of bounces of increasing intensity occurred. The nosewheel separated from the strut and the aircraft came to rest 60 metres before the end of the strip. The approach to the strip was made in moderately turbulent conditions. The pilot, who had relatively limited experience in operating into short strips, had attempted to force the aircraft onto the ground.

The pilot was conducting a series of solo circuits and landings into a wind of 10 to 20 knots, with occasional gusts to 25 knots. On the third approach, the aircraft had been flared for landing when it suddenly ballooned and a wing dropped. Full power was applied, but the aircraft sank heavily to the strip and the nosegear collapsed. The student pilot had reacted correctly when a sudden wind gust was encountered, however he had been unable to prevent a heavy touchdown. This accident was not the subject of an on scene investigation.

The pilot intended to land the helicopter near a water tank so that he could free sheep bogged in the muddy ground. When the aircraft was at about 80 feet agl on descent, the pilot applied power and raised the collective to reduce the rate of descent. He heard a bang, followed by a noise he described as clutch growl and the helicopter began to vibrate severely. The collective was lowered momentarily and power was reapplied, however, the clutch growl and vibration continued. The pilot lowered the collective but the helicopter struck the ground firmly at a low forward speed and the main rotor severed the tail boom. Subsequent investigation revealed that the clutch had suffered an overload failure, however the reason for the failure was not determined. The associated loss of power occurred at a height and speed combination which precluded the pilot from establishing an autorotative descent.

On his previous two refuelling stops the pilot filled both the main and auxiliary tanks. At his final refuelling stop the pilot filled the main tank only as he expected to be airborne for no more than a further 30 minutes. The pilot normally used elapsed time in conjunction with the fuel gauge indications to determine his safe endurance. He did not note the time following his last refuel. The final flight lasted considerably longer than expected and the pilot forgot to monitor the fuel usage. Shortly before the accident the pilot noted that the fuel gauge was reading between empty and one quarter full. At that point the pilot had less than his minimum fuel reserve on board the aircraft. He was aware that the low fuel warning system was unserviceable and he could have established radio contact with his home base to arrange for fuel. Suitable areas existed in the vicinty where a precautionary landing could have been carried out. He decided, however, to continue flying towards a stock yard where fuel was located. Approximately 5 minutes later the engine stopped, from fuel exhaustion, with the helicopter at a low height above the ground.

During the aero-tow launch the right wing of the glider contacted the ground and the glider began to veer to the right. After travelling about 40 metres in this manner the glider was seen to climb steeply, to about 15 feet above the strip, then roll to the left before impacting the ground nose first. An inspection of the glider did not reveal any faults that were likely to have contributed to the accident. It is probable that the pilot was slow to react to the loss of directional control following the wing drop, and delayed in releasing the tow rope. The pilot of the tug aircraft stated that shortly after his aircraft became airborne he felt it being pulled to the left of the strip. He immediately released the tow rope. There was long grass along the side of the strip and it is likely that once the wingtip entered this, the task of attempting to regain directional control was made more difficult for the glider pilot.

After take-off, the pilot was told by radio that the right main gearleg was hanging vertically (from its pivot point) beneath the belly of the aircraft. The pilot made two low passes so that an instructor could inspect the landing gear. The pilot made a normal approach, landed left wing low and endeavoured to hold the right wing up as long as possible. During the initial landing roll, the right main wheel was torn off. At about 20 knots, the right wing dropped and the exposed oleo leg scraped along the ground. The aircraft swung through 90 degrees and came to rest with the right wing-tip on the ground. Investigation revealed an apparent overload failure of the bronze weld securing the threaded collar to the lower right oleo cylinder. The weld had been defective at the time the aircraft was manufactured in 1958, however the aircraft had operated for 2100 hours before the weld had actually failed.

After take-off from a property strip near the Silvan Reservoir, the aircraft was flown at a low height above the calm, smooth surface of the water. A left turn was completed at low level, but shortly thereafter the aircraft struck the surface near the middle of the dam. On initial contact, water entered the front of the cabin and the engine ceased running. The aircraft then bounced back into the air and the pilot attempted, unsuccessfully, to re-start the engine. The aircraft lost height and skidded along the surface to a halt before the nose began to sink. The three occupants evacuated the aircraft but only one passenger succeeded in reaching the shoreline. The wreckage was recovered, and an examination revealed no evidence of any pre-impact defect or malfunction which might have accounted for the accident. Water impact damage sustained by the engine cowling indicated that the aircraft struck the water at a shallow angle of descent, with the wings level. Damage sustained by the propeller assembly and crankshaft indicated that substantial power was being developed at the time of impact. Impact speed was estimated to be about 100 knots. While flying at a low height above the expanse of calm water, the pilot had very few visual cues to gauge his clearance from the water. It was also determined that the pilot had a blood/alcohol level such that impairment of his visual acuity was possible.

During the landing at Leigh Creek the left main gear leg folded back. Investigation found that a bolt had withdrawn from the front of the left main gear attachment fitting, and its retaining nut was missing. The condition of the bolt thread suggested that the nut had been missing for some time. How the nut came to be missing was not determined.