After arriving overhead his destination the pilot selected the landing gear down, but received an indication that the nosegear had not locked down. When the emergency gear extension procedure failed to achieve a nosegear down and locked indication, the pilot diverted the aircraft to Roma. Following touchdown on the main wheels, the nose was lowered to the runway and the aircraft slid to a stop. The aircraft had undergone some routine maintenance at Brisbane before the flight. During this maintenance the Nose Gear Centering Spring Assembly had been changed. Examination of this assembly after the accident showed that an attach bolt, had been incorrectly installed and had fouled the nose gear door torque tube, causing the nose gear to "hang up". The correct installation of the bolt is critical, and is the subject of special mention in several Piper Service Documents and Australian Airworthiness Advisory Circular No. 143.

The aircraft was to spray a paddock of rice with a non-toxic herbicide. The pilot carried out an aerial survey of the area prior to commencing the spraying. During the survey he noted that a spur powerline ran to a pole at the north-eastern corner of the paddock, and mistakenly assumed that the line ended at the pole. No other information about the area to be treated was obtained. As the aircraft approached from the north to commence the first spray run it struck the continuation of the powerline which was strung above the northern boundary of the paddock. The aircraft remained airborne, dragging between 200 and 300 metres of powerline, and was subsequently landed in a wheat stubble paddock.

The pilot held the aircraft on the brakes and did his run up checks then commenced take off to the west with a ten knot crosswind from the left. As the tail lifted the aircraft commenced a swing to the left which the pilot was unable to control with full right brake and rudder. He closed the throttle, the aircraft swung sharply left and the right main leg and tail wheel leg collapsed. Inspection of the aircraft showed that the right brake torque plate was attached by welds, one of which failed due to poor quality and low penetration of the weld. This allowed a degree a movement of the torque plate but did not appear to impair the brake operation. One of the three left main wheel through bolts had failed, following 90 per cent progressive fracture in a manner typical of low stress high cycle fatigue cracking. This allowed the wheel halves to be forced slightly apart at this section, causing distortion of the brake disc and drag contact with the brake pads at each wheel rotation. With operation on the ground the effect would have been increased due to the weight of the aircraft and rolling contact with minor strip surface undulations. It was also established that the left brake could be applied normally but that sometimes when the brake was released the brake remained partly applied. The circumstances of the investigation were such that the reason for this was unable to be determined. The uncontrolled swing on take off most likely resulted from the combined effects of the cross wind, the failed wheel through bolt and unidentified defect which caused the left brake not to release fully after it had been applied.

After completing the first landing of the intended touch and go, the pilot readjusted the elevator trim, flap, and applied full power. As the speed increased to about 65 knots he attempted to select the climb attitude but found that the elevator control was jammed in the neutral position. The take-off was abandoned. However, the pilot was unable to stop the aircraft before it overran the strip and struck a levee bank. An inspection of the aircraft revealed that a small aerosol container had jammed the elevator control cables. Sometime prior to this flight the aerosol container had been left lying loose in the rear luggage compartment. It had rolled between the alloy mesh screen and the lower rear seat back into an area under the rear seat where it could foul control cables. When the take-off was abandoned very little braking was available, in the initial stages, because the aircraft was wheelbarrowing due to its speed and the jammed elevator.

After conducting a thorough pre-flight inspection, the pilot prepared to ferry the aircraft to a maintenance organisation which was to perform a scheduled inspection. The aircraft performed normally until it reached a height of about 200 feet after take-off. At this point the engine lost a substantial amount of power and the pilot was committed to a forced landing. During the landing roll the aircraft collided with a fence and came to rest in the adjacent paddock. Initial inspection revealed that there was a serious leakage of fuel past the fuel filter bowl seal, and it was likely that air had entered the fuel system. The stirrup/clamp which held the filter bowl in place had been subjected to an unauthorised repair, which had probably reduced its overall strength. Fuel had been observed leaking from the filter bowl area several days previously, and it was possible that during the attempts to stop the leak, the stirrup had been incorrectly positioned. The fuel leak had not been drawn to the attention of a licenced engineer.

Some time prior to the attempted flight problems had developed with the right wheel assembly. Another pilot had carried out maintenance on the assembly and had subsequently test flown the aircraft. A short time later the pilot concerned boarded the aircraft and prepared for take-off. During the latter stages of the take-off roll, the right wheel slewed sideways, directional control was lost, and the aircraft collided with a fence. The reason why the right wheel slewed sideways was not determined. This accident was not the subject of an on scene investigation.

The pilot reported that gusty and turbulent conditions existed as he made his landing approach. During the flare the aircraft ballooned to about 10 feet, and after the subsequent touchdown the aircraft veered to the left before coming to rest on its nose and left wing tip. The pilot had only limited experience in tailwheel type aircraft. At the time of the accident the wind was gusty, with the crosswind component fluctuating around the maximum for the aircraft type. It was likely that the aircraft was affected by a strong gust during the flare, and the pilot was subsequently unable to maintain directional control.

Upon arrival in the circuit, the pilot assessed the conditions and approached to land into wind on runway 04. When the nosewheel was lowered onto the runway, the aircraft veered to the right and did not respond to the application of left rudder. A go-around was initiated, but soon after becoming airborne, the aircraft rolled to the right until it reached a bank angle of about 60 degrees. The pilot attempted to counter the roll with the application of opposite aileron but the aircraft continued to roll right until the starboard wingtip touched the ground. The auxiliary wingtip tank ruptured and caught fire. The nose of the aircraft dropped and the aircraft struck the ground heavily in a wings level attitude. The aircraft ran along the ground for 18 metres before the nosegear collapsed. It then slid to a halt 250 metres beyond the runway markers with flames now emanating from the engine bay and right wing. The occupants evacuated the aircraft successfully. The pilot reported that after exiting the aircraft he sighted the windsock which indicated a wind direction of approximately 310 degrees and estimated the speed to have been 35 knots. During the early part of the landing roll the wind backed to a 35 knot crosswind from the left. This wind change was unforecast and unexpected by the pilot. It is probable that the wind change caused the left wind to lift and as a result the aircraft turned downwind. During the attempted go-around, in what was now a 35 knot tailwind, the aircraft stalled and the right wing struck the ground.

During the pull up at the end of a clean up run, a small note pad fell to the floor of the cockpit. The pilot leant forward to retrieve it but almost immediately the aircraft struck the ground. The note pad was used to record spraying details that were not critical to the operation of the aircraft.

The aircraft was operating as Qantas Flight QF36 and was approaching Melbourne at the end of a flight from Christchurch, New Zealand. Air Traffic Control of the aircraft was being exercised by Melbourne Approach, which was directing the aircraft for a landing on Runway 27 at Tullamarine. While the aircraft was on track from Wonthaggi towards a radio beacon at Epping, the controller gave vectors to shorten the distance to run to Tullamarine. This track shortening, using radar, is a standard technique, used to aid separation with other aircraft and to provide a smooth flow of traffic. The controller obtained approval from the Essendon controllers to vector QF36 through Essendon airspace. The aircraft was progressively descended and when clearing the aircraft to descend to 2000 feet the controller advised the crew that the aircraft was 4 miles to the left of the runway extended centre line. The crew advised that they had visual contact with the ground and were then cleared to continue a visual approach. Shortly afterwards, the crew sighted a runway and commenced a turn to the left, during which visibility reduced as the aircraft entered a rain shower. On passing through the shower, the crew immediately realised that they had turned towards Essendon, and a right turn was carried out to continue tracking towards Tullamarine. When the premature turn was commenced, it was observed on radar by the Approach controller and visually by both the Melbourne and Essendon Tower controllers. The Approach controller queried the aircraft intentions at about the same time as the crew commenced the turn back towards Tullamarine. A normal landing was carried out about 3 minutes later. During the excursion from the expected track, the aircraft descended to a height of about 1300 feet above the ground. There was no possibility of the aircraft landing at Essendon, as a transfer to Tower frequency had not been made and consequently no landing clearance had been provided. The elapsed time from the start of the left turn to the turn back to the right was about one minute. Safety of operation was not jeopardised at any stage, and the occurrence was not regarded as an air safety incident.