Agricultural operations had finished for the day and the pilot and his loader driver had filled the two inboard fuel tanks prior to the 30 minute ferry flight back to home base. For agricultural operations a full inboard tank equates to at least one hour's endurance. Approximately one hour elapsed between the time the aircraft was refuelled and when the engine was started for the ferry flight back to home base. During that time the aircraft was parked on a significant slope and unknown to the pilot, fuel had transferred from the high wing to the low wing, even though the pilot had positioned the fuel selector to prevent this occurring. Because of an unserviceable alternator and low battery power, the engine had to be started by the use of jumper leads. Approaching the destination, the engine failed due to fuel starvation. The pilot changed tanks and activated the high prime which probably did not work because of the state of the battery. The engine failed to restart, and the aircraft touched down just short of the strip that the pilot was intending to land on. It then ran through a fence and gorse hedge causing substantial damage to the stub wings. The pilot discovered after landing that the right inboard tank, which had been selected during refuelling and for the ferry flight, was empty. However, the left inboard tank was full and there was also a significant amount of fuel in the left outboard tank which had been empty at the time of refuelling. Tests conducted showed that the fuel selector was faulty, allowing fuel to transfer from the high inboard tank to the lower inboard tank. Non-return valves were not fitted in the fuel supply lines to the selector. Fuel transfer was also possible between the left inboard and outboard tanks via the fuel vent line between the two, with the aircraft parked laterally across a significant slope. It was also established that the pilot did not physically check the fuel in each tank before start-up, nor did he check the fuel indicators in flight. At the time of the engine failure he had not commenced prelanding checks.

The student was undertaking his fourth solo flight, and had been instructed to practice circuits with touch and go landings. After acknowledging a landing clearance, the pilot inadvertently dropped the microphone. He leant down to retrieve it, and shortly afterwards the aircraft touched down heavily about 200 metres in from the threshold. The aircraft bounced, the pilot applied forward elevator control, and a further heavy touchdown took place on the nosewheel and propeller. The nosegear folded back and the aircraft groundlooped to a halt on the flight strip. The student had become distracted from controlling the aircraft while attempting to retrieve the microphone. When he looked up again, he realised that the aircraft had deviated from the desired flight path, but he had persevered with the approach.

The pilot intended to conduct a short flight using Night VMC procedures. Shortly after take off from runway 29C, when the aircraft had reached a height of about 250 feet above the ground, the engine commenced to run roughly, with an associated loss of power. The pilot applied carburettor heat, but was unable to regain climbing power. A skidding left turn was carried out to position the aircraft for a downwind landing on the aerodrome. Touchdown occurred on a north-easterly heading near the eastern end of runway 29 on an unlit area. The aircraft bounced and power was applied to effect recovery. During the recovery the aircraft passed over a series of hangars before stalling at a low height and landing heavily on a sealed taxiway. An inspection of the engine revealed that the power loss was caused by a mechanical failure of the right magneto which affected the ignition timing.

The aircraft was being taxied on a confined apron when it collided with a concrete tie-down block. Earlier in the morning another aircraft was parked on the apron and tied to the block. That aircraft was subsequently moved into an adjacent hangar by aircraft maintenance personnel, but they neglected to remove the tie-down block. The pilot reported that he did not notice the tie-down block, which was similiarly coloured to the apron surface. His attention was apparently diverted to maintaining wingtip clearance from five other aircraft parked around the perimeter of the apron.

After touchdown the aircraft bounced back into the air and the pilot then raised the flap to the fully retracted position. The aircraft contacted the runway nosewheel first, bounced again and landed on its nosewheeel for the second time. The nosegear subsequently failed and the aircraft skidded straight ahead and came to rest on the runway. The pilot had been advised by an instructor, on the day he left on this trip, to use an approach speed of 80 knots. However, the Piper Operating Instructions for this aircraft recommends an approach speed of 66 knots. The aircraft was flared at 80 knots and ballooned. The pilot said that he was uncertain about landing at a major airport and apprehensive about this landing because of the possibility of wake turbulence from a Boeing 727, which had departed five minutes previously. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

Prior to the flight the pilot had an associate check that the strip was serviceable. On arrival overhead the airfield the pilot chose to land on the shorter of the two strips into a 30 knot wind. During the landing roll, as the aircraft crossed the other strip, the pilot observed that the strip had been recently hoed. The nosewheel sunk into the soft surface, the aircraft veered to the left and the nosegear leg folded rearwards. The associate did not check the condition of the strip but advised the pilot that the strip was "always okay". The pilot did not check with the owner of the strip to ascertain its status, which at the time of the accident was undergoing reconstruction. Although not required for an ALA, the owner had placed a white unserviceability cross adjacent to the windsock. The pilot reported that he did not see that marker. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

The pilot, who held a Class Four Instrument Rating, had planned the flight as currency training. At Narrogin, he set the aircraft up on a long final approach but reported that on several occasions during the approach he found that the aircraft became low and he needed to adjust the flight path. About midway along final, the pilot stated that he felt a thump on the left side of the aircraft but the aircraft continued to operate normally, so he continued with the approach and landing. After parking the aircraft the damage to the left wing was noticed. The pilot had a total of 15 hours night flying experience and this was the first time since obtaining his Class Four Instrument Rating, some 12 months previously, that he had landed an aircraft at night at any location other than Jandakot. The pilot stated that he had developed the habit of carrying out a flat approach to ensure he made good his nominated touchdown point. He believes he carried out the same procedure on this occasion. The tree struck by the aircraft was 15 metres high and situated about 500 metres before the strip threshold, it was below the required approach gradient.

During the take-off run the right gear leg failed. The aircraft had just passed through a soft patch of ground then run over a grass tussock. The severed section of the leg punctured the right wing and dented the tailplane as the aircraft slid to a halt. A subsequent metallurgical examination found that the leg fractured because of the growth to critical size of a fatigue crack. The fatigue had originated in small surface imperfections caused by corrosion pitting.

After a dual check the pilot's instructor briefed the pilot to carry out two circuits, each with a full stop landing. Following the first circuit and landing, the pilot applied power to commence the take-off without bringing the aircraft to a stop. The aircraft veered sharply to the left, became airborne momentarily, before settling back onto the ground outside the flight strip. Flaps were selected fully down and the aircraft continued under full power across a storm water drain for another 38 metres before coming to rest. This was the pilot's second solo exercise. Following the loss of directional control it appears that the pilot became confused and did not apply the correct control inputs to bring the aircraft to a stop.

The student had been practicing circuits with touch and go landings for about 75 minutes. An approach was then made for a full-stop landing. The aircraft was flared too high, and it subsequently touched down heavily and bounced. The instructor took control and landed the aircraft, but the left wing lowered until it touched the ground. After vacating the aircraft, the crew discovered that the left maingear torque bolt had failed, allowing the wheel and oleo assembly to fall clear of the strut during the bounce. The landings had been conducted in crosswind conditions, and at the time of the last approach the wind strength had increased. The aircraft had touched down heavily while drifting under the effect of the crosswind, and the resulting loads had caused the torque bolt to fail. It was likely that the pilot's performance had been affected by the onset of fatigue, as a result of the lengthy training period under difficult operating conditions.