Shortly after lift-off, both propeller blades separated from the aircraft, which then touched down and subsequently overturned. One of the propeller blades was located 80 metres to the left of the strip and the other, with hub and constant speed unit attached, was located 40 metres to the right of the strip. The propeller hub contained a fracture which was caused by the propagation of a fatigue crack originating at the root of the blade retention thread. The engine had been fitted with two fifth order crankshaft damper weights. This was contrary to the manufacturer's requirement, which was for one fifth order and one sixth order counterweight to be fitted. It is considered likely that fitment of the incorrect counterweights initiated and contributed to the propagation of the fatigue crack.

The aircraft was a tail-less homebuilt ultralight with a cantilever wing. It was reported that the pilot had made several flights during the day without apparent incident. On the subject flight the aircraft was observed to begin a gentle turn to the right, around a sports oval. The wings were seen to suddenly fold upwards, the right wing broke away and the remainder of the aircraft fell to the ground. It was determined that the wooden main spar of the wing had failed at the point where the right landing gear was bolted to the main spar caps. Tests on the wood revealed that it was not of aircraft quality, although the plans for the aircraft specified that aircraft quality spruce was required. The wood was not protected by paint or varnish from seasonal changes in temperature or moisture. The plans also called for the wing nose ribs to be constructed from styrafoam, however the investigation discovered that the material used was expanded polystyrene. This material is less rigid than styrafoam. The pilot had purchased the aircraft from interstate in a partially constructed condition, with the main spar and the nose ribs already completed. He was evidently unaware of the poor quality of the material used in the construction, which led to the failure of the structure under normal flight loads.

The pilot reported that he was making a landing approach in 10 knot crosswind conditions. After the first touchdown he experienced difficulty in maintaining directional control and elected to carry out a go-around. On the subsequent approach the aircraft touched down prematurely and bounced. While airborne the aircraft commenced to drift to the right, before touching down and bouncing again. A go-around was initiated but the aircraft drifted further to the right and struck a fence 64 metres from the runway centre-line. It was estimated that the wind was actually gusting up to about 20 knots across the runway and was therefore above the maximum crosswind limit for the aircraft type. The pilot had been unable to maintain directional control during the go around and the tailwheel had snagged on the fence.

Mme Doussaud was one of eighteen persons undergoing a two-day initial parachuting course at the Alice Springs Parachute Club. The first day consisted of intensive theoretical and practical training, and was followed by revision, further practical training and a written examination on the second day. Mme Doussaud answered all examination questions correctly and was reportedly looking forward to the static line (automatic parachute opening system) parachute descent which would complete the course. Before boarding the aircraft, Mme Doussaud and another student, who was to be the first of the pair to jump, again practised the correct exit procedure, which involved moving from the aircraft cabin and hanging onto the wing strut with both hands until the instructor gave the order to let go. After releasing, the technique was to arch backwards, count to six and check that the parachute had deployed. If the main parachute had not opened, the reserve was to be immediately activated by the parachutist. The first student made a normal exit and descent from 2500 feet above ground level. As Mme Doussaud then moved to grasp the wing strut she appeared to lose her grip. As she fell she did not adopt the correct arched position and the static line pulled the pilot parachute and main parachute around the left side of her body. She was observed to clutch the parachutes to her chest, thus preventing them from deploying. Witnesses observed that the pilot parachute and main parachute bag were released when the parachutist was about 1000 feet above the ground, however the main parachute failed to deploy. No apparent attempt was made to activate the reserve parachute. Subsequent investigation revealed that the main suspension lines had been extensively tangled by flapping and twisting in the airflow, and one of the lines had fouled the bridle holding the pilot parachute to the main parachute bag. This fouling had prevented the deployment of the main parachute. CONCLUSIONS 1. The parachutist had been adequately trained and briefed for the intended parachute descent. 2. She evidently lost her grip on the aircraft wing strut as she moved outside the cabin. 3. She did not adopt the correct position to allow normal deployment of her parachute. 4. As the pilot parachute was pulled around her body the parachutist probably panicked. 5. The parachutist did not follow either the standard or emergency procedures which she had been taught.

Whilst sheep spotting the passenger became visibly agitated and the pilot elected to land. During the landing roll the aircraft entered scrub but was not damaged. After the passenger disembarked the pilot attempted a flapless take-off using a clearing approximately 140 metres in length. The aircraft failed to become airborne and hit several trees before coming to a halt in soft sand. Prior to the attempted take-off the pilot did not measure the available length or refer to the flight manual "p" charts. He subsequently indicated that the take-off had been attempted so that the sheep spotting would not be delayed.

The aircraft initially touched down about halfway along the strip, became airborne again, then touched down 50 metres before the end of the strip. The pilot applied power to go-around. However after reassessing the situation he closed the throttle and attempted to steer the aircraft through a gate. The nose wheel dug into the ground and the aircraft tilted forward onto the propeller and left wing. The propeller spinner struck the gate and the aircraft stopped. The approach had been conducted in conditions of reduced visibility as a result of cloud cover and impending last light. The pilot had misjudged the approach and had used a higher than normal airspeed. The lack of visual cues evidently caused the pilot to delay initiating a go-around while such a manoeuvre could still have been safely accomplished.

The aircraft was engaged in the aerial spotting of sheep and relaying the information by radio to ground mustering parties. When the muster was completed in that area, the aircraft was abserved to climb away, but the pilot's intentions were unknown. The aircraft was not seen again that day and when it had not returned by night a search was commenced. The wreckage was located the following morning near the site where the aircraft had last been observed. The aircraft had struck the ground in a nose low, right wing low attitude with no apparent forward speed. No fault was found with the aircraft that could have contributed to the accident. It is probable that while operating at a low altitude the aircraft had stalled and that the pilot had been unable to effect a recovery in the height available.

Circumstances:

The pilot, who was conducting a VFR charter flight, advised that the destination conditions were fine with a north westerly wind of 15 to 20 knots. Runway 26, the runway in use, is 983 metres long with 0.5 percent downhill slope at the western end and has a loose gravel surface. During the approach, the pilot selected 10 degrees of flap, but further flap selections were unsuccessful. The approach was then continued using the 10 degree flap configuration crossing the runway threshold, 80-100 feet above ground level, at 80 knots. While flaring for the landing the pilot believed that the wind veered, to a tailwind component and caused the aircraft to float further than anticipated. The aircraft touched down well into the runway and the pilot applied maximum braking, but traction was poor. The pilot then pushed forward on the control column in the belief that this would prevent the aircraft from becoming airborne and improve the nosewheel steering. With the subsequent reduction of weight on the mainwheels, and assisted by a flap setting producing lift, the aircraft would have "wheelbarrowed" along the remainder of the airstrip, which was now downhill. With approximately 100-150 metres of runway remaining, the pilot realised that there was now insufficient runway length available in which to stop or attempt a go-around. The aircraft crossed the end of the runway at about 30 knots and entered a ditch, located approximately 50 metres further on, causing the nose leg to collapse. The aircraft came to rest 70 metres from the end of the runway on its propeller and left hand wingtip. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

The pilot reported that the aircraft became airborne after a ground roll of about 700 metres and initial climb was commenced at an indicated airspeed of 65 knots. Soon after lift off a lack of climb performance became noticeable and the airspeed reduced to 50 knots. Several gradual turns were made to avoid trees but the aircraft struck trees on rising terrain and impacted the ground. Examination of the engine revealed that the two front cylinders had been running over-rich. An incorrect model carburettor was found to have been fitted to the engine. However, it could not be determined if this had been the cause of the of the fuel mixture problem. Local aero club pilots reported that, in this aircraft, with the mixture control in the full rich position, the engine obtained about 200 RPM less than the optimum. It was well known to club pilots that the mixture control required leaning out by about three centimetres before take-off to achieve the correct engine performance. On the day of the accident, the pilot leaned the mixture slightly less than one centrimetre. It is likely that the loss of aircraft performance was the result of reduced engine performance caused by an over-rich mixture.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was to spread 600 Kilograms of nitrate on a local wheat crop. The weather was clear with a gusting 10 knot crosswind/tailwind from the left. Take-off from runway 04 was normal until as the tail was raised a swing developed to the left which could not be corrected by opposite rudder and braking. The aircraft veered off the runway the throttle was closed and the aircraft settled back on three wheels but continued to swing to the left. The pilot concerned he would collide with a levy bank to the left of the strip applied left brake in an attempt to ground loop the aircraft and stop. However, the right mainwheel sank into the soft surface resulting in damage to the right wing tailplane and tailwheel. The pilot later said that the gusting crosswind from the right plus the natural tendency of the aircraft to swing to the left could not be counteracted by opposite rudder and brake.