After consultation with his passengers regarding the expected duration of the return survey flight, the pilot decided that he needed only one 200 litre drum to refuel. Just short of Karratha he advised the passengers that he would have to land due low fuel state. During the descent the engine stopped, due to fuel starvation, and the helicopter was substantially damaged in the resulting heavy landing on a dirt road, in fading light. The pilot was unfamiliar with the fuel system installed in the aircraft. The duration of the return flight was increased by a requirement to complete an extra task. However, when the pilot became aware that insufficient fuel remained to complete the flight with the required reserves, he elected to continue the flight to the planned destination. The landing was only attempted when the pilot became concerned that all the fuel would be exhausted before arrival at the destination. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation _

This aircraft had only recently been acquired by the company. It had a fuel system different to other aircraft of the same type in the fleet. On the other aircraft there were three detents for each fuel selector, On, Off, Crossfeed. On this aircraft there were four detents, Off, Outboard, Inboard, Crossfeed. The pilot had not previously flown this aircraft. After a flight time of about 110 minutes the pilot reported that both engines had stopped and he was unable to access fuel from the outboard tanks. When the wreckage was located no evidence of fuel was found in the inboard tanks. An inspection of the wreckage did not reveal any fault with the engines or fuel system which may have contributed to the occurrence. It was evident that the engines had stopped when the fuel from the inboard tanks was exhausted. A quantity of fuel remained in the outboard tanks. The day prior to this flight the pilot was briefed on the fuel system of VH-FDR by the company check pilot. The briefing was carried out with the use of the Pilots Operating Manual for the aircraft. Because VH-FDR was not available at the time, the pilot was not able to study the fuel management panel in daylight hours. It is not known if the pilot familiarised himself with the panel before commencing the flight. The aircraft is normally operated with the inboard tanks selected for takeoff. Evidence was obtained from flight documentation found in the wreckage which indicated that the pilot had changed the fuel selections from Inboard, about 30 minutes before he reported that the engines had stopped. However, the exhaustion of the fuel contained in the inboard tanks indicates that the selectors could not have been correctly positioned in the detents for the outboard tanks. Tests carried out found that if the selectors were positioned between the inboard and outboard detents, sufficient fuel, to allow the engines to be operated, would still be drawn from the inboard tanks. The reason the pilot was unable to access fuel from the outboard tanks could not be determined.

Having taken delivery of a new helicopter the previous day, the pilot was carrying relatives on short flights over their property. On the second flight, descending through 200 feet for landing, the rotor low rpm warning horn sounded. The pilot applied full throttle and lowered the collective pitch control but this did not restore rotor rpm. As the horn continued to sound he turned the aircraft into wind and attempted a landing in a clear area. The aircraft struck the ground with the heels of both skids and the tail rotor. The tail boom was severed by the main rotor, and the helicopter came to rest on its right side. The passenger suffered bruising as a result of contact with the emergency locator beacon which was mounted between the backrests of the two seats. No fault was found with the engine or airframe which might have contributed to the accident. However, atmospheric conditions existing at the time were such that moderate to serious carburettor icing was probable.

It was reported by a witness that the aircraft bounced several times on landing and ran off the strip, collapsing the maingear. The accident was not reported by the pilot. The wreckage was removed from the accident site, and neither it nor the pilot could be located for some five months. The pilot stated that he had been taxiing the aircraft to keep it serviceable. Whilst taxiing with the tail off the ground, the aircraft began to bounce uncontrollably. He said, that in the interests of safety, he applied full power, took off and flew a circuit. During the subsequent landing, the aircraft bounced, causing the landing gear to collapse. Following the accident he removed the wreckage to a farm for storage. This accident was not the subject of an on scene investigation.

Because of deteriorating lift conditions, the pilot was required to make an outlanding. A normal circuit and touchdown were carried out, but after a ground roll of about 20 metres the landing gear struck a large rock, which had been hidden in the long grass.

Circumstances:

On arrival over the agricultural airstrip the pilot observed that there were cattle on the strip which prevented a landing. He made several low passes over the cattle which moved them from the approach end of the airstrip into trees adjacent to the dump site at the other end. The pilot was concerned that the cattle might wander back onto the airstrip and elected to make an approach to land as close to the threshold as possible. Touchdown occurred several metres short of the threshold and the right hand landing gear struck a rocky outcrop. The aircraft veered to the right leaving the airstrip and continued for approximately 150 metres before coming to a stop. Inspection by the pilot indicated that the right hand landing gear wheel assembly and components had suffered substantial damage and the right hand tyre was ruptured. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot's attention was diverted by cattle on the airstrip.
2. The pilot misjudged distance and altitude during the approach.

The pilot was operating from an agricultural landing area. During the takeoff run the left mainwheel struck a vehicle tyre, that was being used as a strip marker. The tyre was flung into the air and struck the left stabilator causing it to jam in about the neutral position. As there was insufficient strip remaining to land the aircraft and bring it safely to a halt, the pilot decided to continue with the takeoff. The pilot subsequently landed the aircraft in a paddock three kilometres from the point of DEPARTURE. During the landing roll the aircraft struck a fence. The pilot had commenced the takeoff from the left side of the strip because the centre area was rough. The tyre struck by the aircraft was difficult to see as the white paint on it had worn off, and it was partly obscured by clumps of long grass.

On arrival in the circuit area, the pilot assessed the wind to be from the south-west at 10 knots. He elected to land downwind, as the strip sloped slightly uphill to the north-east. Touchdown occurred about halfway along the strip, and the pilot was unable to bring the aircraft to a stop in the distance remaining. The aircraft collided with a fence and came to rest 60 metres beyond the end of the strip. The strip was undulating, with the slope in the landing direction varying from 2 up to 1.5 down. The average upslope was in the order of 1 , and the pilot evidently misjudged the effect this slope would have on a landing in downwind conditions. The aircraft crossed the threshold slightly higher than the pilot desired, and it floated for a considerable distance under the influence of the tailwind. After touchdown, the pilot was reluctant to carry out a go-around because of the slope.

The pilot was conducting the last leg of a competition flight when he realised that an outlanding would probably be necessary. However, he was able to reach a point about 3 kilometres from the destination aerodrome, and while manoeuvring towards the selected paddock he considered he could in fact reach the aerodrome. The planned outlanding attempt was abandoned, but approaching the aerodrome boundary the pilot realised he was too low, and decided to land in a stubble paddock. During the turn onto final approach the left wing tip contacted the stubble and the glider struck the ground heavily. The pilot had delayed making an outlanding because of his desire to complete the competition. Wind conditions were calm, and the pilot could have conducted a straight-in approach to the stubble paddock, thus avoiding a turn at very low height above the ground. The pilot had been airborne for nearly 5 hours, and it was possible that he was affected by fatigue.

The pilot hired the aircraft privately from his employer to conduct a holiday flight during his leave. The journey commenced at Moorabbin on 25 August and the aircraft arrived at Cairns about midday 30 August, after stopovers at Coolangatta and Proserpine. The pilot and his passengers then spent the next three days at leisure in the Cairns area. On the day of the accident, the pilot attended the Cairns Briefing Office where he collected the relevant weather forecasts and submitted a flight plan. The flight plan indicated that the flight would be conducted in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules. It contained a deficiency in that no details were given for the first route segment from Cairns to Biboohra. It is apparent that the pilot had not noticed that the tracks to the west of Cairns, on the relevant enroute chart, emanate from Biboohra and not Cairns. There was no track line which joined Cairns and Biboohra. Such a line might have alerted the pilot at the time he planned the flight. The error in the flight plan was not detected when the plan was submitted. When the pilot was issued with an airways clearance prior to DEPARTURE it was apparent that he did not understand the terms of the clearance, which gave the initial tracking point as Biboohra. The location of this point was explained to the pilot and he subsequently accepted the clearance. He elected to depart using visual procedures, after being offered a choice of these or the published Standard Instrument DEPARTURE profile. A visual DEPARTURE from the particular runway in use allows an aircraft proceeding towards Biboorha to intercept the required track sooner than is possible with an instrument DEPARTURE. The aircraft was issued with takeoff instructions which included clearance for the pilot to make a right turn after takeoff. Witnesses observed that the aircraft complied with this clearance and headed in a south-westerly direction before turning to the north-west and subsequently entering cloud. The cloud base was estimated to be between 2000 and 2500 feet above mean sea level. No further communications were received from the aircraft and a search was commenced that afternoon. The search effort was hampered by the weather and the wreckage was not located until the following afternoon. Inspection of the wreckage indicated that the aircraft struck the the top of a ridge line, 250 metres south-west of the highest point of the Mt Williams area. At the time, the aircraft was on a west-north-westerly heading, flying wings level and climbing at a angle of about five degrees. No fault was found with the aircraft that could have contributed to the occurrence. At the time the aircraft entered cloud, the pilot should have reverted to Instrument Flight Rules procedures. To comply with these procedures a pilot is required, inter alia, to ensure that adequate terrain clearance is achieved during climb to the lowest safe altitude. The relevant altitude for the route segment Cairns to Biboohra is 4500 feet above mean sea level (amsl). As the aircraft was apparently under control at the time of impact with the ground at about 3250 feet amsl, it was likely that the pilot had overlooked the lowest safe altitude requirements.