The pilot was undergoing a check flight with an instructor. The strip in use was positioned at the top of a ridge, with landings being made into a 20 knot wind. The approach to the strip passed over powerlines, which were some 200 metres prior to the normal touchdown point. The aircraft was positioned on final approach with dive brakes fully extended. However, the pilot allowed the airspeed to decay and, despite repeated instructions from the instructor to increase the airspeed, he failed to respond. The aircraft sank below the required approach path. The instructor attempted to correct the undershoot by closing the dive brakes, but was too late to prevent the aircraft entering a downdraft created by the wind curling over the ridge. The aircraft struck the powerlines with the left wing and canopy, which shattered on impact. The pilot received an electric shock and burns to the head. The aircraft then fell to the ground and came to rest adjacent to the powerlines.

The pilot was conducting the last run of a spraying operation. Because of the wind conditions the aircraft was displaced over the boundary fence line to achieve the desired spray coverage. The pilot was distracted by a radio call and the right mainwheel struck a fence post. Although the gear leg was torn off the pilot retained control of the aircraft and subsequently carried out a successful emergency landing at his normal base of operations.

Circumstances:

Witnesses reported that the glider appeared to undershoot on the approach to land and the right wingtip struck a bush about 100 metres short of the threshold. The aircraft ground looped through 180 degrees. A member of the Gliding Federation of Australia National Executive reported that this was one of a series of undershoot incidents at the same club and considers that the type of circuit flown at the field could contribute to the undershoots. He considered that the quality of supervision of the Club's operations is therefore probably a contributing factor.

The pilot advised that when he selected the landing gear down, aerodynamic noises were normal and the main gear green light illuminated. When he closed the throttles the warning horn did not sound, however during the landing roll the left gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest on the grass adjacent to the landing runway. The left gear uplock had failed to release at the appropriate stage of the extension cycle, possibly due to the incorrect fitment of the uplock release cable attachment bolt. This would have resulted in misalignment of the uplock assembly when the gear was in the up position. When the pilot selected the gear down the actuating rod became bent and prevented the gear from fully extending. However, the visual and aural warning systems for the gear are triggered by a microswitch on the actuator assembly, and if this has moved through its full travel the position of an individual gear leg is not necessarily accurately reflected.

Shortly after take-off during a spreading operation the engine suddenly lost power. The pilot dumped the load and operated the fuel boost pump, however after a short burst of power the engine failed completely. The pilot was committed to a downwind landing and towards the end of the landing roll the aircraft ran into a gully and collided with tree stumps. The engine had failed from fuel exhaustion. The pilot was not aware of the amount of fuel added to the tanks at the previous refuelling and he had subsequently relied on the fuel gauge readings to assess the remaining endurance.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was engaged on a livestock charter flight, having departed Honolulu with an endurance of about 90 minutes in excess of the planned flight time. Sydney also had an operational requirement for 30 minutes traffic holding for arriving aircraft. At 0030 hours UTC the aircraft reported at UNSUS with an endurance of 2 hours, although the fuel margin for arrival at Sydney was now reduced to a total of 20 minutes. No concern was raised by the flight crew. The Operational Flight Controller at the Sydney Operations Centre, who was also responsible for monitoring the progress of the flight, did not recognise the situation and alert the Senior Operations Controller (SOC). At 0128 hours the aircraft called Sydney Control and reported being low on fuel and requested an approach for landing on runway 16. At 0130 the aircraft, reported 45 minutes fuel remaining. The estimated arrival time Sydney was now 0212 hours. The SOC immediately took control of the situation and offered a diversion to Williamtown which would save about 70 track miles. This was accepted by the crew. Radar vectors were provided direct to Williamtown, which was reporting weather conditions as, wind 140 degrees/20-30, cloud 5/8 2000, visibility plus 10 kilometres reducing in rain showers. On final approach for runway 12 the aircraft was approved to carry out a left orbit to lose excessive height after which it was cleared to land. After landing the aircraft was unable to taxy off the runway due to total fuel exhaustion. The crew subsequently reported that both outboard engines had stopped on short finals, and the inboard engines stopped during the landing roll. At no stage of the flight did the crew declare an emergency. The aircraft had earlier passed near Nandi, Tontouta and Brisbane where suitable refuelling facilities were available.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilot-in-command did not adequately plan the flight.

2. The pilot-in-command did not carry out a diversion during the flight when it should have been obvious the aircraft would be critically short of fuel on arrival at Sydney.

3. The Operations Flight Controller did not adequately monitor the progress of the flight. This incident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

The aircraft was cruising at flight level 170 in clear conditions at night. Although no thunderstorms had been forecast, the crew observed some electrical activity on the intended track. The weather radar was reported to have been functioning normally and detected scattered cells. The pilot under check elected to divert to the right of the track to remain clear of those cells and also activated the seatbelt warning chimes twice to alert the nursing sister seated in the cabin. The Captain reported that, although it was dark, ground lights and the weather radar indicated that there were no cloud build-ups ahead of the aircraft after the diversion. Shortly after, the aircraft encountered an area of severe turbulence associated with wispy cloud. During that encounter, one of two stretcher patients sustained minor facial injuries after striking nearby equipment. Both stretcher patients had been restrained at the time of the occurrence.

The pilot was making night spraying runs over a cotton crop. During the third run at about 50 feet above ground level, the engine suddenly lost all power. The pilot attempted a landing at slow speed in a flooded cotton field. Almost immediately after touchdown, the aircraft nosed over and sank into the soft muddy surface. The pilot was able to extricate himself from the partly water-filled cockpit. The subsequent examination of the engine revealed massive internal damage. It was likely that one connecting rod had failed, and this led to similar failures in three other cylinders. The reason for the initial failure was not determined. The pilot had selected the most suitable area available for the forced landing. When the aircraft overturned, the fibreglass roof of the cockpit failed, and cut into the top of the pilot's helmet. Had the pilot not been wearing this protection, it was likely he would have suffered head injuries and probably drowned.

The pilot had booked the aircraft for an endorsement two days prior to the proposed flight. However, due to other commitments the aircraft did not become available until 1900 hours. This was unacceptable to the pilot and he was forced to arrange an endorsement with another training organisation on the following day. This arrangement meant that the pilot's preparation for the proposed flight became somewhat rushed. Additionally, the pilot had studied the pilot's notes for the Partenavia, but it was a different model which had a different fuel system to the aircraft which he subsequently flew. The flight proceeded in instrument meteorological conditions for most of the time. The pilot reported that the fuel gauges indicated just over half full as he passed Oodnadatta. However, from that position on, the fuel gauge indications started to decrease fairly rapidly and because of the worsening fuel situation, the pilot decided to inform Alice Springs Flight Service in order to expedite his arrival. The fuel quantity indications then began to drop at an alarming rate and the pilot decided to make a precautionary landing before the fuel supply was exhausted. After descending to lowest safe altitude, the pilot was able to see the ground through a hole in the cloud cover. He descended through the hole and landed on a flat piece of ground. During the landing run the nose gear collapsed just before the aircraft came to a stop. Due to weight consideration the pilot departed with full main fuel tanks only. He was under the mistaken belief that the total endurance with full main fuel tanks was 470 minutes and had this been so there would have been sufficient fuel to meet all requirements for the flight. However, total endurance with full mains (392 litres) is 314 minutes. Some fuel remained in the outboard fuel tanks but the pilot was probably not aware of this. The pilot calculated that a total endurance of 433 minutes was required for the planned flight. This figure is well in excess of the fuel carried on the flight. As the flight progressed strong headwinds were encountered and the pilot had been airborne for approximately 303 minutes when he made the precautionary landing 94 Km south-south-east of his destination. It was calculated that between 12 to 29 litres of usable fuel remained in the aircraft's tanks on landing. The pilot reported that fuel was being consumed at a faster rate from one fuel tank than the other and that he cross fed to balance the fuel in each main tank. When the aircraft's tanks were dipped after the accident they were found to contain approximately 80 litres of usable fuel, 70 litres in the right main and 11 litres in the right outboard fuel tank. It was later ascertained that the right fuel quantity indicator under read at lower readings and this misled the pilot into thinking that fuel was being used at a faster rate from the right hand fuel tank. It also misled the pilot into thinking that he was almost out of fuel where in fact he had sufficient fuel to fly to his destination, although not with the required fuel reserves. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

While the aircraft was on base leg the pilot saw a powered aircraft which had been conducting circuits throughout the day on final approach. He considered that he would land too close behind the other aircraft so elected to land on the grass strip beside the runway. During the landing the long grass impeded the left wing slightly. The pilot corrected but the right wing struck the ground and a ground loop ensued. Examination of the tyre marks indicated that the pilot had actually landed outside the strip markers in an area of long grass and rough ground. Witnesses observed that the powered aircraft had conducted a touch and go landing and was airborne again before the glider crossed the threshold boundary fence.