When the pilot selected the landing gear up after takeoff, the gear unsafe light remained on. Recycling the gear had no effect. The pilot continued to his planned destination, with the aircraft performing at about 10 knots below the expected speed. On arrival, a visual inspection confirmed that the right maingear was trailing. The pilot then carried out a successful emergency landing, during which the right flap and propeller sustained damage as the gear collapsed. Subsequent investigation disclosed that the right gear strut had failed on takeoff from Mudgee. Examination of the failure indicated that corrosion fatigue had initiated on the inner surface of the strut. The strut had not been subjected to corrosion prevention methods. An inspection cycle recommended by the manufacturer had not been followed.

The student had about 75 hours experience in ultralight aircraft, and was undergoing a training programme to enable him to become an instructor. At about 100 feet above the ground after takeoff, the instructor closed the throttle to simulate an engine failure. The student was slow to react, and the airspeed rapidly decayed. The instructor took control and applied full power, but was unable to prevent the aircraft from contacting the ground heavily. This contact resulted in the lower fuselage striking the ground, and the throttle control became jammed. The aircraft became airborne again with full power applied, and the instructor turned off the ignition system. A second heavy touchdown occurred before the aircraft came to rest.

The pilot had completed a soaring flight of some two and a half hours duration. The aircraft was seen to make an apparently normal approach, but during the landing flare the tail cone contacted the ground and the glider pitched nose down. The forward fuselage area then struck the ground heavily. The glider received only minor damage, however the pilot suffered serious back injuries. The pilot was using three additional soft foam cushions on top of the seat to elevate his position in the cockpit. It is probable that during the hard landing the resilient cushions compressed rapidly and the pilot continued downward after the aircraft had started to rebound and then stopped abruptly as he hit the seat pan. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

Intensive gliding activities were taking place as part of a course in glider flying. Two tug aircraft were employed in towing operations, and most flights in the gliders did not exceed about 20 minutes duration. The pilot of VH-PXT towed VH-GVZ to about 3000 feet before releasing and returning for the next glider. This aircraft was then towed to 3000 feet and released, following which the pilot of VH-PXT descended to join the traffic circuit on the downwind leg. VH-GVZ had by this time descended and was also on downwind for landing. The pilot of VH-PXT manoeuvred to join in the latter portion of this leg, and witnesses observed the aircraft converging with VH-GVZ from above and behind. The left wing of the aircraft struck the right side of the glider, and about 75 centimetres of the left wing was seen to be hanging vertically as the aircraft entered a spin to the right. This spin continued until impact with the ground occurred. The instructor in the glider was able to retain control of his aircraft, and carried out a safe landing. It was evident that the pilot had not seen the glider until shortly before the impact. Witnesses had observed the aircraft commence a steep turn to the right immediately before the left wing struck the side of the glider. Weather conditions were good at the time, and the reason the pilot had failed to see the glider earlier could not be established. Both aircraft were equipped with suitable radios, but in common with the various other aircraft in the area, were not broadcasting their positions in the circuit.

The pilot was conducting spreading operations on a flat paddock, but about 800 metres from one boundary the ground rose sharply by about 200 feet. At the end of a run towards the rising ground a procedure turn was commenced. During the turn, the pilot realised that the aircraft was closer to the rising ground than intended. Despite corrective measures, the pilot was unable to prevent a collision with a tree. The aircraft then struck the ground and came to rest in a further clump of trees. Weather conditions at the time of the accident were overcast, with rain showers and a strong gusty wind. On the runs towards the rising terrain the aircraft was subjected to a substantial tailwind component and possible downdrafts. As the pilot commenced a procedure turn at the end of the last run, the aircraft had drifted further downwind than expected, leaving insufficient margin to complete the turn safely.

The crew was conducting a series of circuits and landings. The check pilot was sitting in the right hand control seat and was holding the checklist. During the circuit in question, the check pilot spent a considerable amount of time discussing various aspects of the aircraft operation. There was further cockpit talk during the final approach, and neither pilot realised that the landing gear had not been lowered. The aircraft slid on its belly for some 360 metres after touchdown. No fault was subsequently found with the aircraft or its systems. The gear warning horn was serviceable, but had probably been deactivated by the pilot when power was reduced in the early stages of the circuit. To re-arm the warning system, the power levers have to be advanced to about 30 torque. The particular circuit was being flown with the flaps up, and was probably conducted at a power setting lower than that required to effect re-arming. The pilot in the left seat had experienced minor difficulties in handling the aircraft as precisely as desired, and the check pilot had assumed an instructional role. Under these circumstances, the normal two-pilot challenge and response method of conducting the various pre-landing checks had broken down.

Following a winch launch, the pilot spent 12 to 15 minutes gliding before returning for a landing. On the downwind leg he noted that the aircraft appeared to be lower than the height indicated on the altimeter. At about the base leg position the aircraft was very low, and witnesses expected the glider to land in one of several suitable paddocks. However, the pilot continued towards the strip and the glider touched down during the turn onto final approach. The tail section was broken off when it contacted long grass. The pilot had accumulated most of his gliding experience at the particular strip and was familiar with the area. The flight in question was to be the first made by the aircraft since returning from another aerodrome. During his pre-launch checks the pilot had forgotten to re-set the altimeter to read zero feet. As a result, the altimeter was over-reading by some 500 feet. The pilot had concentrated on the indicated height and had not visually assessed the approach profile. He was unable to explain why he had persisted with the approach when he became aware that the aircraft was abnormally low and there were suitable outlanding areas available.

The aircraft normally used by the pilot was unserviceable, and he had obtained the use of the PA 24, a type he had not flown for about 3 years. The initial leg of the flight was uneventful, but departure for the return journey had been delayed, and the aircraft arrived at the destination at about last light. When the gear was selected down, a complete electrical failure occurred. The pilot was unable to read the instructions for manual lowering of the gear, which were printed on a cover on the cockpit floor, because there was not a torch available. He therefore decided to land as soon as possible, as the grass strip selected was not lit. The landing was made about 10 minutes after last light, and the aircraft slid for about 60 metres before coming to rest on the strip. No defect was found to account for the electrical failure reported by the pilot. It was likely that when conducting the pre-landing checks, he had inadvertently operated the master switch in mistake for the fuel pump switch. Probably because of the pilot's concern of approaching darkness, and his lack of recent experience on the type, he had been unable to resolve the electrical problem in the time available.

The pilot decided to inspect a nearby private landing strip which was sometimes used by ultralight pilots. Prior to departure he had obtained details about the strip, which included some information on powerlines in its immediate vicinity. Upon arrival, the pilot carried out both an area, and a strip inspection to identify the hazards. He then descended to about 25 feet to carry out an inspection of the surface of the strip. About half way along the strip the aircraft struck a powerline and impacted the ground inverted. The pilot extricated himself from the wreckage just before the aircraft was consumed by fire. The area assumed by the pilot to be a strip, was in fact an access taxiway to the strip which was bisected by a powerline. During the high level observation, the pilot satisfied himself that he had identified the powerlines, however, the subject powerline escaped his attention. Although he obtained some information on the strip before departing, the pilot did not seek a detailed briefing considered necessary for flight at such a low height above an unfamiliar area.

After a lesson of simulated instrument flying and some stall revision, the student was carrying out a practice forced landing at Wallacia Airstrip. He did not hear the instruction to go around and the aircraft touched down. At this point, the instrument hood, which he was still wearing, fell down over his eyes. As he moved the hood, he displaced his headphones. He heard the instructor say "full power", so he retracted flap and then applied full power. The instructor, realising the aircraft was too far along the strip to successfully clear the trees on the climb out, took over, closed the throttle and applied full braking. The grass was wet and the aircraft overran the strip and struck a fence. The nosegear collapsed.