Circumstances:

The aircraft was about to be flown to Maitland as part of a multi-stage charter flight. After boarding, the pilot attempted to start the left engine, but the starter was apparently not engaging the ring gear. He started the right engine and again unsuccessfully tried to start the left engine. The pilot said that he then left the aircraft, with the right engine running, and attempted to move the left propeller to enable the starter to engage. As he turned the propeller the engine fired and commenced to run, the propeller grazing his right hand. The aircraft started to move forward, although the parking brake was reported to have been on. The pilot said he tried to board the aircraft but was unable to prevent it continuing ahead about six metres into a wooden fence. Substantial damage was sustained to the left wing, left propeller, and nose cone. The three passengers on board were not injured. The front seat passenger had no aviation knowledge and is not believed to have contributed in any way to the accident. The pilot said he subsequently found the left engine magneto switches had been on when he moved the propeller.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. An apparent malfunction of left engine starting system.
2. The pilot left the aircraft unattended while one was engine running.
3. The pilot exercised poor judgement during his attempt to start the other engine.

The aircraft was cruising at 1500 feet above the ground when the engine began to vibrate and the RPM dropped from 2400 to 1900. Even with full power selected the aircraft could not maintain height. The pilot planned a forced landing on to a stretch of trotting track. On final approach he realized that the aircraft was overshooting the planned touchdown point. He used the available engine power and landed in a 250 metre wide paddock adjacent to the trotting track. Braking was not fully effective on the damp grass surface. In the latter part of the roll despite an attempt to veer the aircraft to the left the aircraft penetrated a stock fence at very low speed. The underside of the mid-section of the left wing was damaged as it contacted a fence post which swung the aircraft to the left. Number one cylinder was found to have no compression. About half of the head of the exhaust valve had broken free and been ejected through the exhaust port. The exhaust valve had achieved 603 hours time in service since installation as a new item. There may have been a flaw in the exhaust valve since manufacture. The valve failure was considered to be an isolated occurrence.

The pilot in command was a Training Captain and he occupied the right seat, operating the radios and navigation equipment. The other pilot was part way through his training for Captaincy on type and was flying the aircraft. After take off the crew were initially given radar headings by Melbourne Departures Control. At 0706 hours they were instructed to resume their own navigation. Some four minutes later while the Captain was making his normal public address announcement to the passengers concerning seat belts the Departures controller asked the crew to "-- just confirm tracking direct ---." The crew reaction to this was to ask themselves if they had made an error. The pilot in the right seat made a careful check of the navigation equipment, confirmed that all was in order and then advised the Controller of this. While nothing was found to be wrong this unexpected query from Departures Control remained in the minds of the crew. At 0710 the crew were instructed to change to frequency 128.5 MHz and call Melbourne Control. This instruction was acknowledged. No call was received from the aircraft crew and further calls directed to them on various frequencies did not obtain a response. The aircraft was tracked on radar continuously and when it was approximately 150 miles from Brisbane the crew contacted Brisbane Air Traffic Control and asked for a clearance to descend. Communications were normal for the remainder of the flight. Monitoring of the communications recording for the departure from Melbourne showed that the instruction to call on frequency 128.5 MHz tapered off so that the "five" was very difficult to hear. Advice from the crew was that they had tuned their equipment to 128.4 MHz. This was one of several Sydney Air Traffic Control frequencies and the crew heard periodic radio transmissions to and from other airraft, which indicated to them that all was normal. When the crew changed to 128.4 MHz they called on that frequency and thought they obtained a response. The aircraft was operating under full radar coverage which meant that the crew were not required to make any position reports to Air Traffic Control. The procedure under such an environment is for the crew to be told to change from one frequency to another. As this was a training flight considerable in flight time was devoted to training tasks, in particular cross checking of radio navigation aids against the aircraft's main navigation system. Attempts were also made to contact the crew on the emergency frequency of 121.5 MHz, without success. Monitoring of the Sydney frequency 128.4MHz did not reveal any calls from the aircraft, which was to be expected as it would have been beyond the range for two way communications with the aircraft at the time. However, it is possible that the crew heard part of a transmission from another enroute aircraft communicating with Sydney on this frequency. No calls were made to the aircraft on 128.4 MHz, which was not one of the frequencies that would have been used on that flight.

The pilot was practising circuits. The engine lost power at about 90 feet in the climb after the fourth take-off. Thinking his foot may have slipped off the throttle, the pilot lifted his foot and pressed down on the throttle again. The engine responded with full power. With the sudden increase in thrust the Trike adopted a steep nose high attitude. Two or three seconds later the engine stopped. The Trike stalled, rolled to the right and began to sideslip. The pilot tried unsuccessfully to recover from the stall. The engine failed because of fuel starvation. A plastic fuel funnel extension was later discovered in the fuel tank. The funnel extension had blocked off the fuel outlet from the tank. The funnel extension was completely unfamiliar to pilot. It is probable that the funnel extension entered the tank during refuelling by a previous owner of the Trike. It is likely that the funnel extension had been present in the fuel tank for a considerable time. This accident was not the subject of a formal on-site investigation.

The pilot reported that while cruising at about 350 feet above ground level, the engine began to run roughly to the extent that he was unable to maintain height. In the subsequent landing, the aircraft struck a tree, cartwheeled, and was extensively damaged. The spark plug in one of the engine's two cylinders was fouled by carbon deposits.

Circumstances:

The pilot reported that on arrival in the circuit area he noticed that the wind was from the north-east at 20 to 25 knots. As the wind was mostly crosswind he elected to land uphill on strip 28, which is 920 metres long. Shortly after landing the pilot became aware that the aircraft was not slowing down normally. Heavy braking was used to little effect. The engines were shut down, and the aircraft ran off the end of the runway. Some fallen logs caused the nose gear leg to collapse. The Cairns meteorological office estimated that the wind would have been 10 to 12 knots from the east to the south-east.

Significant Factors:

The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the accident:

The pilot landed with an excessive tailwind component.

The pilot was carrying out a series of aerobatic manoeuvres when the propeller separated from the airframe. A forced landing was carried out in a suitable paddock. The pilot then noted that one wing had sustained damage from the departing propeller. The evidence available indicates that the propeller fell from the aircraft when the remaining five of the six propeller retaining bolts failed as a result of fatigue cracking and overload. The sixth bolt was not found but lack of marks on the crankshaft flange indicate that it had fallen out prior to failure of the other five bolts. All bolts were in place and secured with lock wire prior to take off. CAA Airworthiness Directive AD/PEP/1 AMDT 2 addresses a known problem which relates to propeller wood shrinkage and loosening of the retaining bolts. The directive recommends special checks on the propeller bolt torque in certain circumstances. The propeller was fitted to the aircraft in Victoria, in a cool moist environment, and the aircraft was then transferred to Perth and operated in a warm dry environment. This change in environment is one of the circumstances set out in the airworthiness directive. No evidence was found to indicate recent compliance with the directive. It is probable that shrinkage of the propeller wood caused loosening of the propeller retaining bolts. The loose bolts were than able to "work" eventually resulting in the failure of the lock wire and loss of one bolt and the failure of the other five bolts.

The pilot was carrying out a "cleanup" swath run on a 50 acre potato crop which he had sprayed on the previous evening, but had not finished due to poor light. The cleanup run was conducted below a power line at right angles to the flight path and about eight metres above the crop. This power line was near another line which traversed the crop, and was at an angle of about 30 degrees to the flight path. The pilot was aware of the location of the second power line and had intended to fly over it after pulling up from the run under the first line. The run under the first line was completed, and when the pilot began to pull up, he noticed that the second line was closer than he had expected, and he decided to go under instead of over the line. During the manoeuvre, the right wing contacted the 3 strand 12 gauge steel wires, and the aircraft slid along the wires for some 200 metres before cartwheeling into the crop tail first. The aircraft then bounced upright and caught fire. The right wing had been severed by wire contact outboard of the wing strut supports prior to ground impact and the pilot had been sprayed with fuel. The pilot received burns to his right arm and left leg. He was wearing leather gloves, a short sleeved shirt and shorts under polyester and cotton overalls. He also wore a helmet. Despite the fact that the helmet was damaged during the accident sequence the pilot received no head injuries.

Until the day prior to the accident the pilot had not flown for over three months. He was carrying out a period of touch-and-go landings. On about the third or fourth landing the aircraft was apparently caught in an area of sink at the approach end of the strip, and touched down in a flat attitude and bounced slightly. The aircraft was recovered and touched down again in a normal attitude. The pilot lowered the nosewheel onto the strip, then applied power to go-around. The aircraft was observed to become light on the mainwheels and commence a swing to the left. As the swing increased the right wingtip hit the ground and the nosegear leg broke off. The aircraft slid to a halt on the mainwheels to the left of the flight strip.

During mustering operations, the helicopter was landed near a fence which had to be opened to allow cattle through. The stockman who was to open the fence required a pair of pliers from the helicopter. As the pilot threw the pliers, one handle caught in his coat sleeve, deflecting them upwards towards the main rotor. Despite the application of left cyclic control, the pilot was unable to prevent the pliers being struck by, and causing substantial damage to, both main rotor blades. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation. The relevant information was provided by the pilot of the aircraft.