The pilot was conducting a charter flight to a property with a student pilot as passenger. The weather in the area of the destination was overcast with local rain showers and thunderstorms. Approaching the property the pilot made a long descent, under the cloud cover, to a low altitude to attract the attention of the property owner so that he would meet the aircraft on its arrival. At the bottom of the descent, as the pilot applied power for the go-around, the aircraft collided with powerlines. Slack in the long powerline span, and its separation from the support poles during the impact, allowed the aircraft to carry forward and land straight ahead on a road. During the landing roll the aircraft collided with heavy farm equipment parked at the side of the road causing severe damage to the tailplane and left hand flap. The pilot and passenger were wearing sunglasses in reduced light conditions which may have contributed to their failure to see the powerlines.

Circumstances:

The parachutist was completing his 39th jump, and his 5th jump using the particular type of rig. The jump sequence was planned as a free-fall from 9000 feet to 3500 feet, including work with another parachutist, followed by individual parachute deployment and landing. The jump sequence was part of the parachutist's training and there is evidence that he had had difficulty with his free-fall control on the 37th jump. The jump proceeded normally until the parachutists reached 3500 feet. At that point, the parachutist moved away from the other parachutist, as briefed, and commenced his deployment sequence. The parachutist was observed to enter an unstable descent condition, prior to parachute deployment, lying on his back with his legs trailing the trunk of his body. The parachutist's speed was estimated at 250 km/hr which was approximately 60 km/hr higher than normal. The reserve parachute deployed more rapidly then normal and, following deployment, it was observed to be out of shape as it descended in a rapid spiral. The parachutist died as a result of injuries that he received from either the opening shock or the impact with the ground. An inspection of the parachuting equipment did not disclose any pre-existing defect that may have contributed to the accident. The reserve parachute had suffered considerable damage. The drogue and bridle (the line between the drogue parachute and the parachute bag) had separated from the parachute bag, the parachute bag (a container which is part of the canopy deployment system) was torn, several of the risers (lines between the harness and canopy) had snapped or were damaged and the slider (a cloth panel which slides up and down the risers and acts to control the opening speed during the canopy deployment) was torn and had burn marks caused by the risers. There was no damage to the harness. The main parachute and drogue were still packed in their pockets, and the main parachute deployment handle was still attached to the Velcro on the harness. The main parachute cutaway handle and the reserve parachute deployment handle had been activated. The damage path and witness evidence indicated that the reserve drogue and bridle had deployed at an angle of 180 degrees to the normal deployment path (i.e. the drogue and bridle had exited the top of the harness, near the parachutists’ shoulders. It was then turned back by the airflow and travelled along the parachutists back, at a very fast speed from shoulders to legs, before appearing near the parachutists’ feet. The reserve parachute had opened unevenly with the risers looping back over the slider during the opening. The parachutist had been having difficulty with his free-fall control, and the equipment that he was using on the fatal jump was not his normal rig. He was observed descending in an unstable condition at high speed immediately prior to reserve parachute deployment. It has been determined that the parachute's opening shock, under the observed conditions, would greatly exceed the design limits of the parachute causing the damage that was observed. The damage to the parachute would account for the reported rapid spiral after the parachute deployed. It could not be determined why the parachutist did not deploy his main parachute. The rig that the parachutist was using was not his own and he had borrowed it to familiarise himself with it. It is possible that, under the stress of an unstable descent, the parachutist pulled what he thought was the main parachute deployment handle, but which was the main parachute cut-away handle. The main parachute cut-away handle, on the borrowed rig, was in a similar position to the main parachute deployment handle on his own rig. Once the parachutist had activated the main parachute cut-away he was left with no option but to deploy his reserve parachute.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The parachutist was unfamiliar with the equipment that he was using, and it is possible that this unfamiliarity led him to pull the deployment handles in the incorrect sequence.

2. The parachutist was unable to control his stability during the period immediately prior to release of the reserve parachute.

3. The parachutist's instability affected the opening sequence of the reserve parachute which, in turn, caused substantial damage to the parachute and this affected its operating capabilities.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was being used for dual circuit training. Following a normal touch down a loud bang was heard, the nose dropped, and the aircraft skidded to a halt with the nose gear collapsed. The nose landing gear strut had fractured at the base of the cylinder. Microscopic examination of the fracture surfaces found a single event overload failure by bending, with no evidence of any pre-existing defects. The failure mode suggests that the nosewheel was either cocked to the left or the aircraft was yawed to the left when the nosewheel contacted the runway.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The nose landing gear strut had failed at the base of the cylinder due to a single event overload.

2. The nosewheel was cocked to the left, or the aircraft yawed to the left when the nosewheel contacted the runway.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was being flown for a visual night circuit to runway 11 after completing an instrument approach. The wind was reported as 5 to 10 knots from the south-west. The pilot reported that after touchdown the aircraft commenced to veer to the right. Although left braking and steering was applied, the aircraft continued to veer until it lurched to the right and stopped, as though the right wheel had become bogged. After vacating the aircraft, the pilot found the right main gear oleo had broken away and the aircraft was resting on the right main gear mount, which had dug into the runway surface. A metallurgical examination of the landing gear showed that the inner oleo strut tube had failed as a result of the propagation of a fatigue crack to a critical length. No manufacturing fault was detected; however, the landing gear had a high total time in service history. No other failures of this type are contained in Civil Aviation Authority records, and it is considered that it may have been a "one-off" event.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The landing gear had a high total time in service.

2. Tensile failure of bronze filler in a fatigue and/or large loading environment.

3. Fatigue fracture of inner oleo strut tube.

Circumstances:

The pilot was conducting an Instrument Flight Rules flight. Because of a deterioration in the weather at the planned destination, the aircraft was returning to Bankstown. Area forecasts indicated extensive cloud cover with the freezing level in some areas below lowest safe altitude. While cruising at 8000 feet, above cloud, the left engine reduced to about idle power, with the fuel flow decreasing to about five gallons per hour. The pilot carried out a trouble check but was unable to rectify the problem. He was unable to maintain altitude and attempted to feather the left propeller but was unable to move the pitch lever to the feather position. Below lowest safe altitude and having difficulty controlling the aircraft in cloud and turbulence, the pilot decided to make a forced landing as soon as he could see the ground. The aircraft was descended through a hole in the cloud to below the cloud base at 300 - 400 feet above ground level. The pilot selected a small, cleared area for landing. On final approach, he was able to feather the left propeller and also shut down the right engine. During the landing roll, and due to the wet slippery grass, he was unable to prevent the aircraft striking a large rock with the left main gear. The left main gear was torn off by the impact. Subsequent inspection of the left engine revealed a loose connection of the pressure fuel line between the flow divider and injector. The connection was backed off approximately three quarters of a turn. During engine test running, the engine performed normally. However, when the line connector was backed off three quarters of a turn, a substantial spraying fuel leak developed, resulting in the RPM dropping to 1000 and fuel flow decreasing to five gallons per hour. The reason for the loose connection was not established. The propeller feathering function was also normal. It is possible that the fuel leak, which projected towards the pitch control cable in the engine compartment, caused a further lowering of the temperature, resulting in moisture freezing around the cable. When the fuel was turned off and the aircraft descended to a warmer air temperature, the ice thawed, freeing the cable and allowing the pilot to feather the propeller.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The engine lost power due to a loose fuel line connection.

2. The pilot was unable to feather the propeller and, as a consequence, the aircraft was unable to maintain altitude.

3. The pilot was unable to prevent the aircraft striking rocks during the landing run. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

Circumstances:

The pilot had planned a short local scenic flight for members of his family. The aircraft was thoroughly preflighted including a physical check of the contents of the fuel tanks. Enroute, the weather deteriorated, and the pilot turned back along his outbound track. He reportedly became stressed due to the weather conditions and with the added anxiety of carrying family members. Approaching the Murray Bridge airstrip, the engine began to run roughly, and the pilot assumed that it was running over rich. By this time, the aircraft was about 500 feet above ground level and just below the clouds. The pilot progressively completed a trouble check as he continued the return flight. In his stressed state, and with little familiarity with the position of the fuel selector, he forgot to include a check of the fuel tank selection and contents. The engine then coughed and stopped abruptly. With little altitude and time to select a forced landing site, the pilot chose the best field available. On final approach, the pilot selected mixture to idle cutoff and turned off the fuel. It was at this point, that the pilot discovered that he had forgotten to change fuel tanks and that the selected fuel tank had run dry. He elected to continue with the approach as he was close to landing. The aircraft landed among rocky outcrops, and the landing gear was torn off. The aircraft skidded about 40 metres before coming to rest.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The decision making of the pilot was effected by stress imposed by the weather conditions and the presence of family members on board.

2. Low total experience of the pilot and lack of familiarity with the aircraft type.

3. Pilot did not properly complete emergency drills in flight.

4. Improper decision to continue flight in adverse weather.

5. Forced landing on unsuitable terrain due to low altitude at which the engine failure occurred. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

The pilot was taking off to the west from a 620 metre agricultural airstrip with a load of 420 kilograms of urea. The strip was level and the grass was short. The wind was from the west-north-west at about 5 knots. The pilot used 15 degrees of flap for the takeoff. The engine produced full power. During the takeoff roll initial acceleration seemed normal but then it stagnated. The pilot began dumping the load at about two thirds of the way down the strip. At about 55 to 60 knots indicated airspeed the aircraft became airborne and was about one foot off the ground when it struck a fence. After the accident it was discovered that there was about 200 kilograms of urea still in the hopper despite the dump valve being open. Soon after the accident the company chief pilot inspected the airstrip and discovered that the surface was deceptive. It looked reasonably firm but had been affected by recent very heavy rains. In his opinion the surface would have retarded the takeoff performance about the same as long wet grass. He also believed that the pilot was slow in dumping the load. The Class 2 agricultural pilot was operating under indirect supervision at the time of the accident. This accident was not the subject of a formal on scene investigation.

The pilot made a faster than normal approach for a landing on Runway 28 into a strong, gusty, westerly wind. Just prior to the landing flare, the aircraft encountered windshear and the rate of descent increased rapidly. The aircraft touched down very firmly in a slightly nose low attitude and bounced into the air once before landing heavily on the nose wheel. The nose wheel assembly broke allowing the propeller to strike the ground. Except for three hours, the pilot had done all his flying in a Piper PA28-140 (serial number: 28-11018). One week before the accident the pilot had been endorsed on the PA28-235, which has different performance parameters. The pilot did not attempt a go-around because the windshear and rapid rate of descent occurred so close to the ground that he considered the application of engine power would further aggravate the situation. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was engaged on a navigational exercise from Bankstown to Dubbo via Bathurst and return. Due to unfavourable weather, it was decided at Bathurst to return to Bankstown. Approaching Katoomba at 4000 feet, deteriorating weather required a diversion south of track over Lake Burragorang and a descent to 3500 feet. Rich mixture was selected prior to the descent. When cruise power was reinstated at 3500 feet, the engine suffered a substantial loss of power. The instructor took control and carried out a trouble check, which included the selection of carburettor heat, but was unable to prevent a total loss of power. A glide approach was made towards the only cleared area, a road near the lake shore. During the glide, it became apparent the aircraft would not reach the road. The aircraft was ditched into the water, about 10 metres from the shore. All three occupants were able to evacuate the cabin and make their way to the shore. The reason for the engine failure could not be positively established. However, given the high relative humidity at 3500 feet and rich mixture setting, the loss of power was consistent with the effects of carburettor induction icing.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The aircraft was operating in conditions of high relative humidity.

2. The engine was operating at a rich mixture setting.

3. Complete loss of power in flight, probably due to carburettor induction icing.

4. Due to stress of weather, the aircraft was flown over terrain unsuitable for a forced landing.

This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

The pilot was assisting a ground party in mustering operations. He was pushing a group of bulls some 700 metres from the ground party when they saw the aircraft break away to the West, presumably to chase a breakaway bull. They then heard a dull thud and the noise from the engine of the helicopter stopped suddenly. The helicopter was found some 10 metres from the base of a six metre high dead tree. The pilot was seriously injured in the accident but he was later able to recall that there was, in his opinion, no fault with the aircraft and he had simply flown into the dead tree without seeing it. On site investigation confirmed the tree strike and showed that at the time of the collision, the aircarft was heading in a westerly direction into the low sun and dust . The tree struck by the helicopter was also disguised by another tree behind it. At the time of completing the report, the pilot was still in intensive care and unable to be interviewed.