Circumstances:

The pilot had hired the aircraft to fly some friends to the Birdsville races. His only previous experience on the PA-32-260 was a one hour check flight two days prior to the accident, carried out with an instructor from the hiring company. The pilot reported that during his preflight inspection on the day of the accident, he had found water in fuel samples from all four fuel tank drains. After submitting his flight plan, he carried out a further water drain check to ensure that no water remained in the tanks. After he was satisfied, the aircraft was boarded and a normal DEPARTURE from Archerfield was accomplished.

The aircraft was climbed to 4500 feet enroute to Charleville, where a refuelling stop was planned. The pilot stated that he had leaned the mixture during the climb, and after levelling off he noticed that the aircraft was not performing as well as he had expected. He also noticed that the engine temperature indications were at the high end of the normal range. Approaching north of Toowoomba, the pilot became increasingly concerned about the performance of the engine, and was contemplating a diversion to Oakey, which was visually ahead and on track.

The pilot stated that he had changed from the left main tank to the right main tank at about this time, and shortly afterwards the engine stopped. He carried out checks and attempted to restart the engine without success. During the subsequent forced landing in mountainous terrain, the aircraft struck a tree which tore off the left wing, and the aircraft overturned before coming to rest in a clear area. The engine was subsequently placed in a test rig, and with only minor preparation, the engine was started and ran normally.

The fuel system on this aircraft is fitted with an engine driven fuel pump, and two electric pumps connected in parallel. The electric pumps are controlled by a single switch and are used if the engine driven pump fails. The manufacturer also recommends their use during take-off, landing, and while making fuel tank selections to ensure constant fuel flow to the engine. One of the electric fuel pumps was found to be inoperative, but it is not considered that this would have contributed to the engine failure.

The fuel pump switch was found in the on position at the accident site, and the pilot does not recollect turning it off after DEPARTURE from Archerfield. It is therefore likely that at least one of the pumps was operating when the fuel selection was made, prior to the engine malfunction. It is not known when the electric fuel pump failure occurred. The engine manufacturer recommends that the engine should not be leaned below 5000 feet at power settings above 75 per cent power.

Leaning within this area increases engine operating temperatures. The high engine temperatures that the pilot observed may have led to fuel vaporisation. The incorporation of the electric fuel pumps is to assist in purging the fuel system in these circumstances, and the unserviceability of one of these pumps may have prolonged the restoration of normal fuel flow to the engine. The aircraft had not been flown prior to 30 August 1989 since 14 June 1989. On 30 August, the aircraft flew one hour on the check flight, on the left main tank and no fuel tank selections were made.

As far as is known, the next time the fuel selection was changed, was just prior to the engine failure. The possibility exists that air or water may have been present in the system when the pilot selected the right main tank. The pilot was not aware of the existence of the fuel sump drain, and as a result had not carried out the correct water drain procedure during his preflight inspection. No evidence of water was found in the fuel system after the accident, but the aircraft came to rest inverted, and any water present may have escaped.

The investigation did not reveal any defect with the engine or the airframe fuel system that may have contributed to the engine failure. From the available information, it is considered that a possible cause of the engine failure was fuel vaporisation and water or air contamination in the fuel system, which could not be purged in the time available before the aircraft struck the ground. The nature of the terrain, and the altitude of the aircraft when the engine failed, precluded the pilot from reaching a suitable forced landing area.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot had only limited experience on the aircraft type.
2. The engine failed due to reasons which could not be positively determined. The most likely cause was an interruption of normal fuel supply to the engine, and power was unable to be restored before the aircraft reached the ground.
3. The pilot was committed to a forced landing on unsuitable terrain.

The purpose of the flight was to despatch 60kg of Buffle seed and 50kg of Sorghum seed. When the aircraft returned to the strip, a light NE wind was blowing, favouring a landing on strip 07. The pilot intending to avoid a slightly damp area at the Eastern end of the strip, decided to land the aircraft at the threshold. The aircraft touched down several metres short of the threshold and the right maingear was torn out when the wheel struck a low windrow. The aircraft continued for some 260 metres along the 1000 metre strip and came to rest to the right of the strip close to a bordering spoon drain. The pilot in his endeavour to land at the threshold misjudged the touchdown point and struck rough ground short of his aiming point.

Circumstances:

A party of people comprising five pilots and the family of one of the pilots left Shepparton on Friday 9th November in two aircraft. They intended using their destination, Milparinka, as a base for further flying over the weekend. On Saturday and Sunday mornings, both aircraft were observed engaged in low flying activities. On Sunday afternoon, a discussion amongst a number of the pilots centred around streamer cutting and flour bombing activities. As a result, two of the pilots were keen to try their hand at flour bombing and packed four packs of flour for the exercise. The aircraft subsequently took off with one of the local residents occupying the front right seat and the other pilot in the rear seat directly behind the pilot-in-command. On the first bombing pass, the aircraft flew past the hotel at about 50 feet above ground level. One pack of flour was dropped from the pilot's storm window. The pack struck the ground some 70 metres beyond the hotel. Witnesses reported that on the second pass the aircraft was slow and even lower than on the previous pass. When the aircraft was in front of the hotel, they saw that the two pilots were trying to push a pack of flour out of the storm window, where it had apparently become jammed. The aircraft then pulled up and entered a steeply banked turn left. The left wing struck the roof of the courthouse which is located 100 metres beyond the hotel. The impact buckled the left wing tip and bent the outboard two metres of wing up at an angle of approximately ten degrees. The left bank gradually increased to in excess of 90 degrees, and the aircraft turned through 180 degrees before striking trees. It cartwheeled, crashed upside down in a dry riverbed and caught fire. The first people on the scene were unable to assist the occupants.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot exercised poor judgement in attempting a low-level flour bombing operation. The investigation into this accident was terminated when it became apparent that further work would not disclose any new safety enhancement information.

Circumstances:

For several days, the pilot had been giving flying instruction to the aircraft owner operating from an airstrip located in a valley on the owner's property. The strip was aligned in an east - west direction with a downhill slope to the west. Wind conditions had been such that take-offs were being made towards the west with right hand circuits to the north so as to operate over the lowest surrounding terrain. The pilot was aware of a power line running from east to west parallel to the airstrip situated on a ridge about 700 metres to the north which the aircraft could remain well clear of while flying parallel to it on the downwind leg of the circuit. On the day of the accident the pilot had arranged to take another person for a familiarisation flight. The wind had changed to an easterly at about 10 knots, so the take-off was conducted uphill. This required a longer climb out before the pilot could commence a left hand circuit to again operate north of the airstrip. He turned onto the downwind leg when about 120 -150 feet above ground level at approximately the same distance from the airstrip extended centre line as before. The circuit area was now displaced to the east where unbeknown to the pilot the power line changed direction by about 20 degrees to the south. After turning onto the downwind leg, the pilot noticed the power line converging towards him from his right. Although evasive action was taken it was too late to prevent the right hand wing from contacting the power line resulting in loss of control and the aircraft dived into the ground. The pilot reported that the aircraft had been operating normally before colliding with the power line. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot had not made himself familiar with the location of the power line.

2. The power line was obscured by trees to the east of the airstrip.

3. The pilot failed to see the power line in time to prevent a collision.

The Pilot-under-Instruction selected the left fuel tank during the pre-landing checks as the aircraft joined the circuit on left base leg. Approximately 20 seconds later, and after the aircraft had commenced descent for landing, the engine stopped. The selector lever was returned to the right hand tank position but the fuel boost pump was not turned on. The engine did not restart immediately and the Pilot-in-Command elected to concentrate his efforts on a forced landing. The aircraft touched down in an uncleared bush area and overturned when the nosegear collapsed. The subsequent investigation determined that the fuel selector panel had been fitted with a decal which indicated an incorrect position for the left tank. The decal had been modified some time prior to the accident, with a coloured pen, to show the correct position. The colouring had subsequently worn off, resulting in both correct and incorrect positions being visible. The fuel selector was also fitted with detents to help locate the correct selection positions. A build up of grease and wear on the detent combined to make the left tank detent less positive than normal. When the pilot had moved the selector, he had not noticed the detent, and had inadvertently shut off the fuel to the engine. During his pre-flight inspection, the Pilot-under-Instruction had noted that the selector was different from that discussed during a briefing given by the Pilot-in-Command on the aircraft systems. However, he had not alerted the Pilot-in-Command to the anomaly.

Circumstances:

The aircraft had been engaged in spraying operations and was about to take-off after refilling with water. During loading the aircraft had been positioned on a heading of about 30 degrees to the left of the take-off direction. The pilot turned the aircraft onto the take-off heading and commenced the take-off run. Shortly after the aircraft struck a concrete water trough positioned near the edge of the strip which had not been seen by the pilot. Substantial damage was caused to the propeller and left landing gear.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot diverted his attention from the operation of the aircraft.

Circumstances:

The pilot had completed spreading the third load of herbicide on a paddock and was setting course for his employer's home base when the engine lost power. After conducting emergency checks engine power was restored. The mixture was leaned and a climb initiated while continuing to return to the strip. While the aircraft was still some distance from home the engine stopped. The pilot conducted a landing, downwind and downhill, across a contour bank in a wheat paddock. Examination of the aircraft by the owner disclosed that the aircraft had run out of fuel. The pilot had been using higher power settings and richer mixture settings than anticipated by the owner, who was monitoring the pilot's performance. The pilot had not landed into wind, nor had he selected an appropriate landing area when faced with the need to conduct a forced landing.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not monitor the fuel state adequately.

2. The engine failed due to fuel exhaustion.

3. The pilot did not select a suitable area for the forced landing. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

The pilot reported that on returning from a local flight he made an approach to land in light wind conditions. He was not satisfied with this or the subsequent approach, and go arounds were carried out. The third approach was normal, although the aircraft floated for some distance before touching down. The pilot was unable to bring the aircraft to a halt within the confines of the strip, and it came to rest in a gully. He then observed that the wind had changed from a headwind to a tailwind of about 10 knots, and this had evidently affected the landing performance of the aircraft.

Circumstances:

About 45 minutes after DEPARTURE the radio communications, and radio navigation aid signals became weak, and a squeal was heard through the audio system. The pilot realised that he had an electrical problem, but he did not check the ammeter, or the positioning of the alternator switch believing that he had turned the switch on after start. Approaching Canberra, the pilot was given an airways clearance to maintain 4000 feet. All communications were then lost. He squawked code 7600, and proceeded as per the flight plan to Canberra, maintaining VMC as all his navaids had now ceased to operate. On arrival, the pilot observed that emergency services were being positioned along Runway 30. He commenced an approach from 4000 feet, (2112 feet above ground level), approximately 1000 feet above normal circuit height. The pilot now felt under a great deal of stress and was becoming task saturated. On downwind he placed the landing gear selector in the down position but failed to check if the gear had extended. Turning onto final approach he selected the flaps down, which failed to operate. He then noticed that the landing gear position lights were not illuminated, but he did not verify the landing gear position with the manual extension handle. The Tower directed a green light at the aircraft which convinced the pilot that his landing gear must be down. Shortly after touchdown the partially extended landing gear collapsed. The aircraft was found to have a completely discharged battery. The engine was started using ground power and the alternator operated normally, which recharged the battery. The electrical and radios systems were also found to function normally.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not notice that the alternator was not supplying charge to the battery.

2. The aircraft suffered a loss of electrical power in flight.

3. The pilot did not carry out appropriate trouble checks to determine the cause of the electrical problem.

4. The pilot became task saturated and failed to ensure that the landing gear was down and locked.

Circumstances:

The pilot intended to ferry the aircraft to another property. He reported that the engine started normally, and he immediately taxied the aircraft to the closest end of the airstrip and commenced to take-off without having given the engine sufficient time to warm up. He later informed his employer that he had carried out all the necessary pre-take-off checks, including checking the carburettor heat operation. Shortly after becoming airborne the engine failed and the pilot was forced to land in a rough paddock. Inspection of the engine revealed that the carburettor heat scat hose, from the exhaust muff to the carburettor, was detached. No other faults were found which might have caused the engine to fail. The weather was fine and calm, the temperature five degrees Celsius, and the relative humidity approximately 70 per cent. From the Carburettor Icing - Probability Chart, as published in the Aviation Safety Digest Number 108, these conditions were conducive to serious carburettor icing under any power setting. The most probable cause of the engine failure was carburettor icing, and as the carburettor heat scat hose was adrift there was no means of providing heat to the carburettor to clear any ice accumulation. The pilot, in his haste to depart, did not check for the change in engine note and rpm which would indicate that the carburettor heat was functioning when he operated the carburettor heat control during the pre-take-off checks. This occurrence was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not conduct adequate checks before take-off.
2. Carburettor heat system inoperative because of disconnected hose.
3. Engine failure, probably because of carburettor icing.
4. Pilot forced to land on unsuitable terrain.