The B737 was inbound to Coolangatta, heading 340 and on descent to 7,000 ft. This heading would take the aircraft across the extended centreline of runway 14. The SA226 had been cleared to climb to 5,000 ft on runway heading after take-off from runway 14. The B737 was subsequently cleared to 2,000 ft to join right downwind for runway 14. Shortly after the SA226 levelled at 5,000 ft, the B737 passed in the opposite direction approximately 1.5 NM east and 500 ft below the SA226. The separation standard required was 3 NM horizontal/1000 ft vertical separation.

The responsible controller was under a moderate to high workload in the period leading up to the incident. In addition to other departing and arriving traffic, there was traffic to the north of Coolangatta being handed off to Brisbane and a parachuting aircraft awaiting run-in for a drop near the aerodrome.

It appears that the high workload and other traffic considerations distracted the controller to the extent that he forgot about the SA226, at least temporarily. The appropriate technique would have been to provide separation assurance by way of the departure clearance. The controller indicated that he may have been suffering a degree of fatigue at the time of the incident, and this may have affected his performance.

The pilot reported that the approach and landing were normal with touchdown at 70 kts. Shortly after touchdown the aircraft began to yaw to the right. The pilot used full left rudder and some differential braking in an attempt to stop the yaw but was unsuccessful.

As the aircraft approached a runway marker (car tyre) the pilot applied full braking, raised the nose to clear the tyre and shut the engine down. The aircraft cleared the tyre but the nosewheel subsequently collided with a dip in the ground and collapsed. The left tyre blew out at the same time.

Subsequent inspection failed to disclose the reason for the yaw. The wind was light at the time of the landing.

The pilot reported that during the take-off run he became apprehensive about the runway distance remaining. The take-off was abandoned but the aircraft collided with a fence.

The pilot said that the runway surface was covered with small pebbles which appeared to reduce the braking efficiency. He steered the aircraft to the right to avoid a fence. The aircraft was almost stationary when it struck the fence.

Following take-off from runway 01 at Townsville, the military aircraft, Stallion 080, was instructed to turn right and climb to flight level (FL) 120. VH-TNX departed from the same runway and was instructed to turn left to intercept the track to Cairns. When Stallion 080 reported at FL120 the Townsville controller requested the level of VH-TNX. The pilot of that aircraft replied passing FL110 and was instructed to report leaving FL130, and to climb at the best rate of climb. The controller then asked Stallion 080 to report sighting VH-TNX, after a short delay the pilot reported that the aircraft was in sight and that he would maintain separation visually.

Subsequently, Stallion 080 passed VH-TNX on the left side at about the same level, approximately 200 metres away.

The method by which the Townsville controller attempted to maintain separation between the two aircraft was not correct for the situation. The Manual of Air Traffic Services does not allow for one aircraft to visually separate itself from another aircraft at the level the aircraft were operating. However, there were a number of other techniques, that could have been employed by the controller, to maintain the required separation between the two aircraft.

The pilot of Stallion 080 reported that he was unable to manoeuvre his aircraft to pass further from VH-TNX as this would have required abrupt action and may have resulted in injury to standing passengers in his aircraft.

The aircraft was being flown on an instructor standardisation flight which included the demonstration of a precautionary landing on a grass airstrip.

Prior to landing, the pilot in command who was also the chief flying instructor, carried out an inspection of the strip from a height of 500 feet above ground level (AGL). During the first run he noticed what appeared to be a series of ruts along the strip and decided to carry out a second run at a lower height. Before descending to 50 feet AGL, the pilot lowered the landing gear as a safety precaution. During the second run, he confirmed that the surface appeared suitable for a landing. The landing gear was retracted, and the aircraft was climbed back to 500 feet AGL for the landing circuit.

The pilot reported that he carried out the before landing checks on downwind but for reasons unknown, neglected to carry out a final approach check. When the throttle was closed during the flare, the landing gear warning horn sounded. The pilot applied full power to go round but then closed the throttle almost immediately when he felt the propeller strike the ground. The aircraft settled onto the strip and slid to a halt with the landing gear retracted.

Although the pilot in command had failed to lower the landing gear this went unnoticed by two other instructors who occupied the front right and rear right seats. It was reported that sunlight shining onto the landing gear indicator lights might have created the impression that the green lights were illuminated.

The DH114 was enroute Undara-Weipa, cruising at 10,000 ft and estimating abeam Cohen at 1505. The C402, Aurukun-Cairns was estimating Holroyd River at 1505, had planned at 9,000 ft but, approaching that level, the pilot advised climbing to 10,000 ft and requested traffic. The flight service operator mentally projected the track of the DH114 on the chart (the Aurukun-Cairns track had already been marked on the chart) and assessed that, based on the respective abeam Cohen and Holroyd River estimates, there would be no traffic confliction. Shortly after reporting abeam Cohen, the pilot of the DH114 advised that another aircraft had passed close by, in the opposite direction, and at the same level. This aircraft was later identified as the C402.

The flight service operator was working area 7 and area 5 combined. The level of activity in these areas had become very busy, but not unmanageably so, in the period leading up to the occurrence. The operator said, that when the pilot of the C402 requested traffic and he had assessed there would be no confliction, the track he had mentally plotted had been incorrect. One reason for this was that the track crossed two charts which were displayed at separate parts of his console. Another was that the position of Undara used by the operator was incorrect. The operator said that he had intended to plot the Undara-Weipa track on the chart to confirm his mental calculation but had forgotten to do this in the time available.

During recovery from a stick shaker exercise, as part of an endorsement sequence, the aircraft departed from controlled flight prior to the speed reducing to the published stick shaker speed. Recovery was reported to have taken approximately 1800 feet. The aircraft was returned to maintenance for investigation.

During the maintenance investigation, three minor leaks were found from butt straps on the left-wing leading edge. Advice from the manufacturer was that such leaks could definitely affect the stalling behaviour of the aircraft. The leaks were rectified and a subsequent test flight confirmed stalling characteristics were normal.

After completing a short flight to check water points on his farm the pilot returned to his 3000 ft landing strip and conducted a low-level inspection to identify any sheep near the strip and frighten away those he saw. This was his normal arrival practice when there were sheep in the home paddock. During the aircraft's landing flare, a single sheep bolted across the landing strip. This happened too quickly for the pilot to take avoiding action. The aircraft hit and killed the sheep whilst the aircraft was still rolling at about 40 knots.

Whilst in cruise at FL310 the cabin altitude commenced to rise. A check of the Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) showed the cabin was rising at 500ft/min, and all air-conditioning packs were off. The check list was actioned, but no packs were able to be reset. The system fault light remained on. At about 8000 feet cabin altitude, which was still climbing at 500ft/min with no packs on, the aircraft was descended to the lowest safe altitude and a diversion to Karachi initiated. A PAN call was made, and Tehran and Karachi were informed.

The Pack Temperature Controllers (PTC) were removed and inspected by the manufacturer who subsequently reported that a capacitor failure on the printed circuit board of the PTC in position 'A' caused all three pack flow control valves to close. The 'B' position PTC took control of the packs, as designed, but could not override the flow control valve closure commands from PTC 'A'. The manufacturer has instituted a modification program to the PTC to eliminate the problem.

The student was performing a dual practice forced landing on to an airfield. Strong winds and gusty conditions prevailed. It was the instructor's intention to allow the student to continue the practice forced landing to a low height for realism. The student forgot to lower the landing gear, and the instructor missed the oversight. On short final the aircraft encountered windshear. The instructor was late in nominating the go-around. The aircraft struck the ground wheels up.