On entering the circuit, the pilot attempted to cancel his sarwatch but could not contact flight service on the aircraft's VHF radio. He attempted to relay the request through another aircraft, but this was also unsuccessful. The pilot then transferred to HF radio and was able to cancel sarwatch. During this period, the pilot was also communicating with other circuit traffic. These distractions led to him forgetting to extend the landing gear and the aircraft landed wheels-up.

Two heavy, international passenger aircraft were approaching Australia from the North West. Whilst they were in airspace under the control of the Perth Sector 2 Air Traffic Controller, communication with the aircraft was being provided by a Flight Service Officer manning the Perth Flight Information Service International 1 position. The lead aircraft requested a climb and was cleared to Flight Level 310. The following aircraft also requested a climb and the Air Traffic Controller passed a clearance to the International Flight Service Officer indicating that the aircraft was cleared to Flight Level 290. Shortly after the following aircraft commenced climbing, the lead aircraft advised that the TCAS system had indicated that there was an aircraft behind and below presenting a confliction.

The Flight Service Officer had incorrectly passed a clearance to the following aircraft for a climb to Flight Level 310 instead of Flight Level 290, and the following aircraft was detected and reported by the lead aircraft. The following aircraft descended to Flight Level 290.

The Flight Service Officer had written the correct clearance on the flight strips but had passed the incorrect level to the aircraft. The officer could not explain this, however the investigation identified some preconditions which may have contributed to the occurrence

a. The incident occurred during the last five minutes of the Flight Service Officer's ten hour shift which was due to conclude at 2300 hours. The Flight Service Officer had spent the entire shift, with appropriate breaks, working on the same operating position. Normal procedure is to attempt to rotate staff through different positions.

b. The workload, which had been light earlier in the shift, peaked just prior to the incident and was heavy and complex at the time of the incident.

c. The Shift Supervisor's workload monitoring process did not detect that the Flight Service Officer's workload had become complex and heavy and that he may have been in need of assistance.

d. The Air Traffic Controller working Sector 2 did not note the incorrect clearance, given by the Flight Service Officer, although the information was available through a Flight Service monitoring facility (part of the safety net) available to and used extensively by him prior to the incident. It is probable that the Air Traffic Controller's workload had also reached a point where he was unable to provide a monitoring service.

e. A number of environmental and organisational issues were reported as having developed from the uncertainty of the continued operation of the Flight Service organisation following the Civil Aviation Authority's airspace review. Areas such as inadequate working conditions and low staff morale were reported as major issues.

Safety Action

The Civil Aviation Authority are planning to resolve rostering and supervision issues by implementing the "team" concept for staffing within Flight Service centres. They are also employing contract staff in an attempt to reduce the load on their permanent staff.

F-ODGX planned Melbourne to Sydney via Strathbogie, designated route W32, Cullerin, Bindook and Oakdale to Sydney. Due to limitations, the computer aided strip printing system (CASPS) did not recognise waypoint Oakdale in the flight plan as valid and consequently could not print the strips.

An airways data system officer (ADSO) in the Melbourne area approach control centre (AACC) amended the plan which was then re-run with errors and omissions such as speed, flight level and route.

As a consequence, the Melbourne sector 2 and 7 enroute flight progress strips then incorrectly indicated that the flight was tracking via Strathbogie, W32, waypoint Cullerin to Sydney. Coincidently, the Sydney AACC advised non receipt of plan details on F-ODGX. The flight plan forwarded was the incorrect amended version.

F-ODGX's airways clearance was to track via Strathbogie to Sydney. On departure, the clearance was amended to track direct to Cullerin. The amended clearance was accepted by the pilot because it was on the flight planned route. At 130 NM from Melbourne, the aircraft was given a Rivet 1 arrival by Melbourne Sector 2. The pilot's readback of the clearance was unintelligible. At 160 NM from Sydney the aircraft was given an instruction to enter the holding pattern at 70 NM Sydney, with the requirement to reach flight level (FL) 210 by 70 NM from Sydney. This holding pattern is published on the Standard Instrument Arrival (STAR) plates and is located on the 230 radial, 70 NM from Sydney. On the route which the pilot followed, from Cullerin to Bindook, there is no published holding pattern at 70 NM Sydney. The pilot did not query the holding instruction reference the direction of the turn or the inbound radials.

Due to Sydney arrival sector also working from incorrect flight progress strip information, the flight planning error was not detected until the arrivals radar controller observed the aircraft making a left turn towards Bindook instead of a right turn towards Rivet.

At the time of this incident, another aircraft was tracking from Wagga Wagga to Bindook at FL210. Had the arrivals controller not observed and adjusted the incorrect turn by F-ODGX, a loss of separation standards may have occurred.

The incorrect routing of F-ODGX would have been rectified at the clearance delivery stage if the correct flight plan had been presented to the controllers handling the flight.

Significant Factors

1. The CASPS waypoint data was not compatible with the current air route structure.

2. The ADSO incorrectly amended the original flight plan.

3. The Melbourne sector controller did not obtain a valid readback of the STAR clearance.

4. The pilot did not query the inconsistent holding instruction.

Safety Actions

The Civil Aviation Authority Air Traffic Services has initiated new procedures regarding the method and circumstances in which filed flight plans may be re-run through the CASPS equipment.

The instructor was embarking on an introductory flight with a prospective student. The wind on the duty runway was outside the aircraft limits so the instructor elected to use a different runway where the crosswind was within the aircraft limits. As the tail was raised off the ground the student applied incorrect aileron input for the crosswind and the right wing lifted, causing the aircraft to ground loop off the runway. Before the instructor could regain control, the aircraft hit trees at the edge of the airport boundary.

Before spraying a field cultivated with tomatoes, the pilot made a ground inspection to note the position of powerlines and other obstacles. Not long before departing on the spraying job, he was asked to spray an additional block in the same vicinity.

He completed spraying the first paddock without incident and moved onto the next block where he conducted an aerial inspection for obstacles. He noted that the same powerline crossed this block as well as the previous cultivation. He did not notice that one of the three wires was hanging lower than the other two. During his last spray run, which co-incided with the centre of a span, the helicopter collided with the lower wire and plunged into the ground.

The helicopter was dropping incendiary bombs, from 100 feet above ground level, as part of a controlled bush burn. Prior to take-off the pilot had placed his flying jacket between the rear of the pilot's seat and the incendiary delivery machine.

During an incendiary dispatch run the exit chute became detached from the incendiary machine body allowing ignited bombs to fall inside the aircraft. One of these bombs set fire to the pilot's jacket and this along, with the burning incendiaries, filled the cabin with dense black smoke.

Despite the fact that the passengers opened their doors the dense smoke prevented the pilot from seeing anything either inside or outside the helicopter. He elected to land the aircraft immediately so the crew could extinguish the fire.

During the unsighted landing in dense scrub the helicopter collided with a number of trees.

It was reported that the clamp attaching the exit chute to the machine body had been secured normally prior to departure. The clamp design relied on friction only, to keep the chute in place. It is probable that natural helicopter vibration was sufficient to overcome the friction allowing the chute to separate. Once the chute separated, ignited incendiary balls were free to roll around inside the aircraft and set fire to the jacket.

The design of the incendiary machine did not include any means of restricting the movement of the incendiary balls should they fall out of the machine. It was believed that the balls, which were only armed after they had entered the delivery system, could not escape.

For the same reasons it was not believed that flammable material might be in danger if it was stored near the machine and consequently there were no restrictions and no placards prohibiting such storage.

Safety Action

Immediately following the accident, the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation advised the owner of the incendiary equipment that the following modifications would improve the safety of the system.

1. A clearly visible placard should be fitted to the incendiary machine indicating that objects should not be stored in its vicinity.

2. The chute attachment should be redesigned to make it more positive.

3. A fail-safe system be designed to catch loose incendiaries. It is suggested that a metal tray, with sides, located under the dispensing machine would probably meet all requirements.

The operator withdrew all similar incendiary dispensing devices from operations until the defects had been corrected. Redesign and modification of the devices has been completed, and the machines have been returned to service.

While conducting joy flights a misunderstanding made the pilot believe that a commercial requirement necessitated landing in the 25 direction, which had a 2 degree downhill slope. The first approach for landing was high, and a go-around was initiated from about 100 feet above ground level. The pilot reported that during the overshoot the aircraft performance was poor, failing to climb satisfactorily and passed close to the tops of a group of trees.

The next approach was still high and at a speed slightly faster than the published approach speed for the prevailing conditions. The aircraft floated for a distance after flaring and touched down late. Being reluctant to attempt another go-around, the pilot tried to stop the aircraft before the end of the airstrip, but it overran and continued down a steep slope, coming to rest in a ditch.

Witness reports indicate that although the wind at the time of the occurrence was described as a variable gusty crosswind, a certain amount of downwind component had previously been noticed.

Take-off was rejected when the pilot realised that the aircraft could only be turned to the left due to malfunction of the right brake assembly. Subsequent investigation revealed that the right brake torque plate had failed.

Metallurgical examination found that the torque plate had failed due to a fatigue fracture at one of the thru-bolt holes. The initiation and propagation of the fatigue crack had resulted from the lack of sufficient torque on the centre thru-bolt.

VH-IDZ was enroute Darwin to Kalkgurung, tracking via Victoria River Downs, tracking 174 degrees at the correct cruising level of 9500 feet. About 16km north of Victoria River Downs the pilot observed another aircraft pass directly under him in the opposite direction with a vertical separation of 100-200 feet.

The other aircraft, VH-AZO, was enroute from Tanami to Darwin via Victoria River Downs tracking 007 degrees and also cruising correctly at 9500 feet.

Changes made to Australian airspace, which replaced the quadrantal cruising levels with hemisphere cruising levels, allows opposing VFR traffic within the same hemisphere to operate at the same altitude.

The pilot reported that he made an approach to land on runway 32 at Corowa. He estimated the wind to be 320/20 with gusts to 35 kts. Final approach was made with full flap at 70-80 kts and wind gusts were encountered on final approach. The Pilot's Operating Handbook for the aircraft type recommends an approach speed of 65-75 kts with full flap and 70-80 kts with flaps up.

On touchdown the aircraft ballooned. The pilot advised that he continued to apply back pressure to the elevator and the aircraft landed again very heavily.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Gusting wind conditions.

2. Approach speed too high.

3. The pilot did not take appropriate corrective actions after the aircraft ballooned after initial touchdown.