The student pilot was conducting a series of stop and go landings. On the fourth approach, Tower instructed the pilot to carry out a touch and go landing due to a following RPT aircraft. The aircraft bounced on landing and the pilot lost directional control. During the subsequent ground loop, the propeller and right-wing tip struck the ground.

After suffering a complete electrical failure which resulted in a loss of communications, the aircraft was landed on runway 11C. The landing gears collapsed during the landing roll and the aircraft settled onto the runway.

Subsequent investigation determined that the starter contactor had failed in the start position, isolating the generator. The only available power was then provided by the battery which slowly discharged to the level that radio communications could not be maintained. Although the landing gear selection and locking is dependent on electrical power, there was sufficient power to unlock the gear from the UP position. The gear then extended under its own weight but failed to lock in the DOWN position and consequently collapsed under the landing loads.

Pilot reported that the aircraft encountered sink soon after take-off. The main wheels contacted the crop (tea) and the aircraft nosed over. The pilot indicated that there were no mechanical problems with the aircraft of which he was aware. The aircraft had been operating with similar loads throughout the day. The wind was gusting at the time of the accident, and there was a possibility of windshear being present. In addition, the pilot had conducted more than 80 flights on the day of the accident, for about 6 hours flying time. It is possible, therefore, that he was suffering some fatigue at the time of the accident.

The pilot assessed the wind as from 180 degrees at 10-15 kts. On the take-off roll on strip 09 the tail was raised, and the aircraft appeared to accelerate normally. It then encountered a wind gust. The right wing rose, and the aircraft diverted left. The left main wheel contacted a drain on the left side of the strip and the aircraft overturned and came to rest inverted.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Decision by the pilot to operate in a gusty crosswind.

2. Probable encounter with a wind gust.

3. The pilot was unable to maintain directional control.

The pilot reported that when he returned to the airfield after a short local flight, the windsock was indicating a strong southerly wind. He therefore elected to land on the 180 degree strip. The approach and flare were normal except for some turbulence. However, during the hold off the aircraft encountered a particularly strong gust. This resulted in the aircraft ballooning with the right wing low and substantial right drift.

The pilot said he immediately applied power to go around but was unable to stop the drift. As the aircraft was now tracking towards a nearby hangar, he turned further right to avoid it but was then confronted with trees and houses beyond. As he believed he would not clear the trees he closed the throttle and attempted to land in a clear area. The aircraft hit the ground heavily on the right wingtip and then cartwheeled, coming to rest after about 50 metres.

The pilot said that after he got out of the aircraft, he assessed the wind strength was 20 knots with gusts to 35 knots.

The pilot planned to visit a friend and land in a paddock at his property. He noticed the wind direction and speed from wind patterns on the sea, then commenced a survey of the property to find a suitable landing area.

He noticed three power lines across the selected paddock but failed to see a fourth. He then descended from 500 ft above ground level (AGL) to 100 ft AGL for a better look at the intended landing area, then continued the descent to about 25 ft AGL to check the surface conditions. The fourth power line suddenly appeared across the path of the aircraft, and with no time to take avoiding action the aircraft struck the wire with the propeller and windscreen, causing it to pitch nose down and impact the ground.

The emergency locator beacon (ELB) activated and was heard by an overflying regular public transport (RPT) aircraft.

VH-BVJ was doing circuits and landings on runway 36. Because the light wind slightly favoured runway 05, the last landing was made on that runway. In order to vacate the runway after landing it was necessary to turn the aircraft around and backtrack.

The crew of VH-BVJ then noticed that VH-AIR was lined up on runway 05. No radio calls had been received from VH-AIR. VH-AIR then commenced its take-off towards VH-BVJ. The instructor in VH-BJV turned his aircraft left to vacate the runway and called to the pilot of VH-AIR to cut his engine. There was no response from VH-AIR, which continued its take-off, passing abeam VH-BVJ about 10 feet above the ground. At this stage VH-BVJ had reached the edge of the bitumen runway but had not vacated onto the grass.

Subsequently it was established that the radio in VH-AIR had been tuned 0.02 Mhz above the correct frequency. The pilot of VH-AIR saw VH-BVJ, apparently stationary on the northern end of the runway. Thinking the pilot of VH-BVJ had pulled over to the side of the runway to let him take off, he commenced his take-off roll.

According to the pilot of VH-AIR, his aircraft passed abeam of VH-BVJ at a height of about 50 feet.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilot of VH-AIR had selected the incorrect radio frequency.

2. The pilot of VH-AIR took off on a runway that was occupied.

On arrival at Devonport the crew of VH-EKD decided to make an NDB approach. Cloud was present, at or close to the minimum NDB descent altitude. Radio contact was made with two other aircraft, VH-WZJ and VH-MKQ, both of which were departing the MTAF. Separation was established VH-WZJ, but no further contact could be made with VH-MKQ, after the initial contact, when the pilot advised he was climbing to 5500 feet. After turning inbound in the approach, separation with VH-WZJ was reaffirmed.

A call was then received from VH-NIT advising this aircraft was rolling on runway 32. In response the crew of VH-EKD advised they were established inbound. VH-EKD continued descent to the minima of 830 feet which was maintained until the aircraft was over the NDB. As the crew of VH-EKD was about to commence a missed approach, visual reference was established, and VH-NIT was observed approximately 200 feet away to the right and slightly low. A roll to the left was made to increase the separation. VH-EKD continued in visual flight and landed on runway 24.

VH-NIT, which was flown by a student pilot, landed on runway 32. The operator of VH-NIT reported that their estimate of the cloud base was 1200 feet.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. Ineffective communication between the crew of VH-EKD and the pilot of VH-NIT.

2. Inexperienced pilot in VH-NIT who did not comprehend the potential conflict when VH-EKD responded to his "rolling runway 32"call.

3. The NDB approach track at the minima took the aircraft through the circuit pattern.

4. Low cloud/cloud cover resulting in the crew of VH-EKD not having the opportunity to sight the other aircraft until they were in very close proximity to it.

The pilot reported he had commenced a take-off roll on runway 08, after completing pre-take-off checks and receiving a take-off clearance. At a speed of about 40 knots, as he pushed forward on the control column to raise the tail, his seat slid fully aft on the seat rails. Although his feet could no longer reach the rudder pedals to maintain directional control, he was able to close the throttle and abandon the take-off.

The aircraft subsequently ground looped to the left, collapsing the right landing gear, before coming to rest on the side of the runway.

It was reported that the aircraft was being used for endorsement training. On the second approach it was observed to land heavily and bounce back into the air. The aircraft then touched down again, nosewheel first, before the nosewheel collapsed and the aircraft slid to a stop.

It is probable that the pilot, who was undergoing endorsement training, misjudged the final part of the approach and allowed the aircraft to land heavily. His recovery action, following the bounce, was inappropriate as he allowed the aircraft to touch down nosewheel first. The instructor-pilot did not take over in time to prevent the bounced landing or the misjudged recovery.

A post-accident inspection indicated that whilst the nosewheel had folded back, following separation of the retraction/extension rod, neither of the main landing gear legs were locked down at the time of the final touchdown. The pilots reported that the gear lights were green, indicating that they were down and locked, prior to the first landing and that the landing gear warning horn had not sounded during the approach. The evidence indicates that the landing gear may have been inadvertently selected up during the attempted recovery from the bounced landing.