The pilot reported that the aircraft was departing empty from the Snake Creek Fish Farm after delivering a load of freight. The main fuel tanks were 3/4 full and the auxiliary tanks were full. 

After the aircraft speed had passed Vmca and the aircraft was becoming airborne, the right engine failed. The pilot closed the throttles, selected the right propeller to feather, landed the aircraft and commenced braking. He assessed that insufficient runway remained for a successful stop, so he initiated a ground loop to the left. Just before the aircraft stopped, the nose leg struck a mound of earth that had been hidden in the grass. This caused the nose gear leg to collapse, and both propellers were damaged.

No reason for the engine failure could be established. The grass on the airstrip was long. This may have resulted in lower acceleration performance than the pilot had anticipated.

The aircraft was engaged on a VFR pilot navigation training flight. One cadet pilot had flown the aircraft from Tamworth to Coolangatta via Coffs Harbour earlier in the day. A second cadet pilot was conducting the return leg to Tamworth, with a landing at Glen Innes, under the supervision of an instructor.

At about 80 feet after take-off from Glen Innes the instructor initiated a practice engine failure. The aircraft was about 10 knots below the glide speed for the flap setting in use at this point. The cadet pilot promptly lowered the nose, but not sufficiently to obtain the desired glide speed or maintain the take-off speed. The instructor pushed the controls forward to lower the nose to the attitude normally required to maintain a safe speed. The flap setting was not altered to a landing position. Shortly after this the instructor realised that a high sink rate had developed and took corrective action to reduce the sink rate, including the application of power. The sink rate could not be arrested in the distance available and the aircraft landed very heavily.

Both main landing gears were damaged, and the right wing was rotated nose down. The aircraft came to rest on the runway, after a ground run of 100 metres. The cadet pilot suffered a cut above his left eye when his head struck the transmit switch on the control yoke during the landing impact.

The company's operations manual for the aircraft type specifies that practice engine failures may be conducted at a minimum altitude of 500 feet above the aerodrome, and that the ensuing approach must be terminated at a minimum height of 200 feet. An obstacle clearance climb is to be terminated at 300 feet above the aerodrome and a normal climb profile adopted. The operator considers that a practice engine failure during an obstacle clearance climb phase is unsafe and does not include such a training exercise. In addition, with a temperature of 22 deg C, the density altitude of 4783 feet could be expected to exacerbate the problems.

Factors

A high-density altitude prevailed.

The instructor initiated a training manoeuvre at a height and speed from which recovery was difficult.

The optimum aircraft configuration was not adopted during the power-off approach.

Visual approaches to Sydney Airport were in progress, domestic arrivals being processed for runway 34R, and international arrivals for runway 34L. The arrival sequence was being handled by Approach South (APP-S) and Approach North (APP-N) radar controllers. Traffic density was described as light to medium.

To resolve a traffic management problem in his airspace, APP-S coordinated with APP-N for a Metro 23 to complete a right circuit for arrival to runway 34R. This involved radar vectoring the aircraft to pass overhead Sydney Airport onto a right downwind leg, east of the runway complex, an area which was normally under the jurisdiction of APP-N. However, as there was no traffic east of the runway at the time, it was agreed to keep the Metro 23 on the APP-S frequency.

A SAAB 340 (SF34) was also being processed by APP-S for a landing on runway 34R and was given radar vectors to join on left downwind. During the arrival sequence, the crews of both aircraft were given instructions to descend to 2,000 ft and were vectored onto opposing headings for their respective base legs. Some coordination concerning other aircraft took place at about this time. When the Metro 23 was passing through the final approach path of runway 34R, the crew questioned the controller as to whether they were to turn the aircraft right to intercept final approach. APP-S confirmed this, then vectored the SF34 to remain clear of the Metro 23. Recorded radar data indicated the aircraft passed within 2 NM of each other, with a minimum vertical separation of 200 ft. The required radar separation standard was 3 NM laterally or 1,000 ft vertically.

The decision to leave the Metro 23 on the APP-S frequency, whilst being vectored within APP-N, airspace was considered to be a significant factor in the development of this occurrence. Whilst the APP-S controller believed he had not forgotten to issue the crew of the Metro 23 with a clearance to turn onto final approach, it appeared he had a mind-set, or expectancy, that APP-N would process the aircraft, as would normally happen. This mind-set was experienced despite the fact that the colour of the Metro 23's radar symbol indicated it was under the jurisdiction of APP-S.

The student pilot was making an approach for a normal landing. During the landing flare he raised the nose too high, and the aircraft ballooned. The student attempted to correct the situation by adding power and lowering the nose. The aircraft was no longer aligned with the runway and the student used the rudder to turn the aircraft. As he was completing this action the stall warning sounded. The student opened the throttle to full power, to go around, but he did not stop the aircraft from pitching more nose-up nor did he centralise the rudders. The aircraft stalled, pitched nose down and rolled to the left. The left wing and propeller struck the ground before the student could take any further action. The student turned the magneto and power switches off before leaving the wreckage.

The student's inexperience was the major factor in his misjudgement of the approach and his use of incorrect recovery action.

Whilst being hover taxied between hangars, in strong gusty wind conditions, the helicopter rotated rapidly to the right, struck the ground, and rolled onto its side. Both occupants were able to evacuate the machine without injury. The instructor pilot reported that the helicopter was being flown by the student pilot at the time.

With the wind gusting from the south, the aircraft was lifted into the hover on an easterly heading, then rotated to the right through 180 degrees. As it approached a westerly heading it swung rapidly to the right. Full left pedal and power reduction failed to arrest the rotation which continued for two or three turns before the helicopter struck the ground and rolled onto its side.

No mechanical defects were reported that may have contributed to the accident. It was the opinion of both the instructor pilot, and the operator's chief pilot, that the accident was consistent with the loss of tail rotor authority.

The pilot reported that a recent cyclone had blown a tree branch onto the strip. The branch was lying so that the top of one section was at least two metres above the ground. When he carried out a landing area inspection the pilot did not see the branch. He landed into the rising sun and did not sight the branch until it was too late to avoid it. The branch collided with the left-wing leading edge about a third of a metre in from the tip.

The airfield at which the aircraft was operating had a north/south strip, reported to be 800 metres long and an east/west strip, reported to be 1000 metres long. The wind was easterly at 10 to 15 kts. After despatching a load of parachutists, the pilot decided to land into the north. This involved using the shorter strip with a crosswind rather than landing on the longer strip into wind. He said he did this for two reasons. There was mechanical turbulence on short final approach for a landing into the east and after despatching the parachutists he was well positioned for a landing into the north. The north/south strip was more than long enough for landing.

Approach was at 70 knots with 40 deg of flap. While on approach, the pilot noticed a parachutist just off the left side of, walking parallel to, and approximately one third of the way along, the strip he was approaching. He continued approach but on very short final the parachutist started to walk across the strip. The pilot revved the engine to get the attention of the parachutist but when the parachutist finally saw the aircraft approaching, instead of immediately clearing the strip, he ran down the strip away from the aircraft for 20 to 30 metres before moving clear.

The pilot said he did not want to attempt a go-around because of powerlines off the end of the strip so he persisted with the landing, aiming to touch down just past the parachutist. The pilot said that after the initial touchdown, the aircraft bounced two or three times. Once on the ground, he applied full braking. The aircraft skidded, turned to the right and continued to skid out of control through a fence, finally coming to rest at the base of a tree.

It was reported that the pilot was hovering the helicopter in a 12-15 kt headwind, 10-15 ft above trees. Consequently, a less than average power setting was required to maintain height. The wind strength suddenly reduced, and the helicopter descended towards the trees. The pilot increased collective pitch and power to stop the descent and re-establish the hover. Although the helicopter came close to the tree tops the pilot did not believe there had been any contact with them.

Shortly afterwards, the pilot heard an unusual noise coming from the main rotor blades. He landed to investigate and found dents and holes in all three main rotor blades.

The aircrafts propeller and right-wing tip contacted the ground when it was blown onto its side while taxiing behind a larger aircraft. The pilot said he was vacating the runway via taxiway A3 at Cairns, when the incident happened. He said it was necessary to hold aileron into wind while taxiing, as the crosswind was gusting at right angles at about 20 kts. After entering taxiway A3 the aircraft passed behind a larger multi engined aircraft which had several engines running. The pilot was not aware that engineering personnel were conducting high power engine checks on the larger aircraft at the time. The pilot said he believed the accident was caused by a combination of a "crosswind component and prop wash" from the large aircraft.

The pilot of VH-FZV contacted Avalon Tower, reporting his position as five miles north-east and requesting an airways clearance. This position placed the aircraft inside the control zone and a clearance had not been issued.

VH-ANF, operating in the Avalon circuit, had just departed from runway 36 and was turning onto a right crosswind when the controller advised the crew of the reported position of VH-FZV. In response the crew of VH-ANF said they had VH-FZV in sight and were taking avoiding action.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1 The pilot of VH-FZV did not contact Avalon Tower for a clearance before entering the control zone.