The pilot reported that a recent cyclone had blown a tree branch onto the strip. The branch was lying so that the top of one section was at least two metres above the ground. When he carried out a landing area inspection the pilot did not see the branch. He landed into the rising sun and did not sight the branch until it was too late to avoid it. The branch collided with the left-wing leading edge about a third of a metre in from the tip.

The airfield at which the aircraft was operating had a north/south strip, reported to be 800 metres long and an east/west strip, reported to be 1000 metres long. The wind was easterly at 10 to 15 kts. After despatching a load of parachutists, the pilot decided to land into the north. This involved using the shorter strip with a crosswind rather than landing on the longer strip into wind. He said he did this for two reasons. There was mechanical turbulence on short final approach for a landing into the east and after despatching the parachutists he was well positioned for a landing into the north. The north/south strip was more than long enough for landing.

Approach was at 70 knots with 40 deg of flap. While on approach, the pilot noticed a parachutist just off the left side of, walking parallel to, and approximately one third of the way along, the strip he was approaching. He continued approach but on very short final the parachutist started to walk across the strip. The pilot revved the engine to get the attention of the parachutist but when the parachutist finally saw the aircraft approaching, instead of immediately clearing the strip, he ran down the strip away from the aircraft for 20 to 30 metres before moving clear.

The pilot said he did not want to attempt a go-around because of powerlines off the end of the strip so he persisted with the landing, aiming to touch down just past the parachutist. The pilot said that after the initial touchdown, the aircraft bounced two or three times. Once on the ground, he applied full braking. The aircraft skidded, turned to the right and continued to skid out of control through a fence, finally coming to rest at the base of a tree.

It was reported that the pilot was hovering the helicopter in a 12-15 kt headwind, 10-15 ft above trees. Consequently, a less than average power setting was required to maintain height. The wind strength suddenly reduced, and the helicopter descended towards the trees. The pilot increased collective pitch and power to stop the descent and re-establish the hover. Although the helicopter came close to the tree tops the pilot did not believe there had been any contact with them.

Shortly afterwards, the pilot heard an unusual noise coming from the main rotor blades. He landed to investigate and found dents and holes in all three main rotor blades.

The aircrafts propeller and right-wing tip contacted the ground when it was blown onto its side while taxiing behind a larger aircraft. The pilot said he was vacating the runway via taxiway A3 at Cairns, when the incident happened. He said it was necessary to hold aileron into wind while taxiing, as the crosswind was gusting at right angles at about 20 kts. After entering taxiway A3 the aircraft passed behind a larger multi engined aircraft which had several engines running. The pilot was not aware that engineering personnel were conducting high power engine checks on the larger aircraft at the time. The pilot said he believed the accident was caused by a combination of a "crosswind component and prop wash" from the large aircraft.

The pilot of VH-FZV contacted Avalon Tower, reporting his position as five miles north-east and requesting an airways clearance. This position placed the aircraft inside the control zone and a clearance had not been issued.

VH-ANF, operating in the Avalon circuit, had just departed from runway 36 and was turning onto a right crosswind when the controller advised the crew of the reported position of VH-FZV. In response the crew of VH-ANF said they had VH-FZV in sight and were taking avoiding action.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1 The pilot of VH-FZV did not contact Avalon Tower for a clearance before entering the control zone.

The pilot reported that the wind direction was varying between 180 and 270 degrees, up to 15 knots. He made an approach for runway 18, maintaining about 60 knots on final and with full flap set. As the throttle was closed for the landing flare the aircraft sank. The pilot applied full power to arrest the sink but said the aircraft did not seem to climb normally.

The aircraft then drifted to the left side of the runway. The pilot said he decided to end the sequence by closing the throttle and landing. The aircraft touched down heavily breaking the nose gear off.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1 The pilot probably mishandled the controls during the initial landing flare.

2 The pilot probably did not apply the appropriate procedures and control inputs during the attempted go around.

During a long final approach to the strip, the engine began to run rough. When the engine power dropped to idle the pilot elected to carry out a forced landing in a paddock. During the landing roll the aircraft ran through a fence and a ditch.

Examination of the engine by an engineering workshop did not find any defects.

The pilot reported that all indications were normal during the pre-landing checks. After landing, the brakes were applied but there was no pressure in the left brake. The pilot then initiated a ground loop to the right as speed and distance remaining were inadequate for a go-around.

During the ground loop as the aircraft was sliding sideways across the grass, the left main wheel entered a depression. The sudden stop caused damage to the left wing and main wheel, as well as the nose gear and propeller. All occupants exited the aircraft safely.

ZK-NBI was inbound to the Plenty locator from Wonthaggi on descent to 5,000 ft. VH-UWW departed Essendon runway 17 with departure instructions to turn left heading 090 deg with an unrestricted climb to 5,500 ft. These instructions were issued by the approach controller who was also controlling ZK-NBI.

Approximately four minutes after VH-UWW departed Essendon, the controller realised that the two aircraft were on conflicting tracks with no vertical separation. Both aircraft were given heading changes, but their tracks closed to approximately two miles at the same altitude before radar separation was re-established.

Investigation revealed that the approach controller failed to ensure maintenance of separation between the two aircraft because he was distracted by separation requirements for other traffic. He had intended to turn VH-UWW to the northeast earlier to maintain separation, but due to the distraction this did not occur.

Two other factors contributed to the failure. The first one was that when the approach controller issued the departure instructions for VH-UWW, ZK-NBI was not displayed on his radar screen. The second was that ZK-NBI maintained an unusually high speed on descent. Even though the aircraft had been issued with no speed restriction below 10000 ft, an unusually high groundspeed was maintained.

It was reported that the pilot made a normal, full flap landing at 70 kt. The aircraft bounced back into the air and touched down three more times before coming to a stop. The propeller struck the ground during the third touchdown. A post-landing inspection disclosed that the engine firewall was bent at the nosewheel leg attachment point. The sequence of events and the damage indicates that the pilot misjudged the landing flare and allowed the aircraft to touchdown, nosewheel first, on at least one occasion.