The pilot reported that the aircraft departed with eight imperial gallons (36 litres) of fuel indicated on the fuel gauge for a one hour aerobatic training flight. The aircraft had just been refuelled, with 20 litres being added to a calculated 25 litres remaining. The flight was authorised for one hour on a planned fuel burn of 24 litres/hour and a calculated quantity of 45 litres useable.

The aircraft departed the training area 55 minutes after engine start with the fuel gauge (believed to be inaccurate/completely unreliable below 5 imperial gallons) flickering around the empty position. The pilot rejoined the circuit on the upwind leg for runway 09. During the descent prior to turning crosswind, at about 1,200 ft above the ground, the engine failed. The pilot elected to land straight ahead on the runway remaining. During the descent the engine regained power momentarily, which resulted in a potential overshoot of the runway. The pilot commenced a series of 'S' turns to lose height in an attempt to touch down prior to the upwind threshold.

As he flared, the engine again regained power momentarily. The aircraft finally touched down in the grass overrun area where it ran through a ditch and then into a fence.

The pilot had planned to conduct a series of tourist flights from the helipad at the rear of the Lodge. A 20 m diameter pad had recently been cleared for the operation. The pad was covered with short grass however, it was surrounded by grass up to 0.5 m high. A shrub-like weed was also woven into the tall grass. Only one passenger was carried on the first of the tourist flights and the helicopter performed as expected. On the second tourist flight, this time with two passengers on board, the pilot flew the helicopter to a 1 m hover and then departed towards the east. As it moved through translational-lift the helicopter descended and the right skid entered the 0.5 m-high grass around the helipad. The grass retarded the helicopter, and the leading edge of the skid made contact with the ground. The helicopter started to roll to the right. The pilot attempted to stop the roll by reducing power. When this was unsuccessful, he increased power to the maximum and attempted to fly out of the roll. This was also unsuccessful, and the helicopter ended up rolling onto its right side.

The helicopter was loaded to just under its maximum weight. The pilot misjudged the amount of excess power that would be available under the prevailing conditions, and he was unable to keep the helicopter clear of the grass during the departure. The scrub-like weed provided sufficient retardation for the right skid to dig into the ground starting a roll to the right. The pilot's description indicates the helicopter had probably entered a condition known as dynamic rollover (Aviation Safety Digest No. 95, 1975, pg. 25) before he started recovery action. As a result, his actions did not work.

The pilot was conducting a routine food and medical supply flight to several outstation settlements. Visual meteorological condition (VMC) existed when he departed, but with storm activity observed along the route, and a cyclone in the area. Approximately 1.5 minutes from the destination a rapid deterioration in the weather conditions to below VMC prevented the pilot from landing so he decided to divert to Oenpelli.

He was again confronted by deteriorating weather conditions making further diversions necessary. He notified Adelaide Flight Service of the diversions and then attempted to return to his departure aerodrome, which also proved impossible.

After spending sometime dodging around storms and heavy rain in an attempt to find a suitable airstrip, then faced with the approach of evening and fading daylight, he decided his safest action would be to find a suitable area for a precautionary landing. He was unable to re-establish contact with Adelaide Flight Service to advise his intentions.

He found a relatively flat area on top of an escarpment, but during the landing roll the aircraft struck light timber causing the right wing to detach and the aircraft to roll onto its right side. The pilot and passenger evacuated the aircraft, then activated the ELT which was monitored by Airservices Australia SAR via satellite, and their location known. Because of the cyclone and adverse weather conditions a search could not be initiated until the next morning.

They spent the night in the aircraft to shelter from continuous heavy rain, then rescued next morning by helicopter.

The pilot was conducting a swath run parallel to a power line, when the tip of one of the main rotor blade made contact with a power pole. The helicopter was subsequently landed without further incident. This occurrence had not been reported.

After take-off the flight attendants seated at the rear of the aircraft reported a bang followed by abnormal noises from the area of the rear airstairs. Shortly afterwards the flight crew observed that the lower aft body overheat light had illuminated. The appropriate drills were carried out, and the warning light extinguished when all bleeds were closed. The aircraft returned for an immediate landing.

Maintenance investigation found that a titanium duct flange had ruptured upstream of the right-wing anti ice valve. Failure of the flange is a known problem. A special inspection for cracks in the weld zone had been introduced many years ago and, in 1990, after an evaluation of service history, the inspection period was increased from 1,000 cycles to 2,000 cycles. The failed flange was nearly at the 2,000-cycle threshold and had failed approximately 60 cycles and just 12 days before the inspection was scheduled.

The operator is continuing checks to confirm the mode of failure of the flange and is reassessing the compliance period.

VH-BWC departed from runway 17R and at 500 ft turned right to intercept the 195-degree track to King Island. The pilot elected to maintain an altitude of 700 ft until clear of the downwind leg of the runway 17R circuit and of any possible light aircraft traffic along the coast. Crossing the coast at 700 ft, VH-SGE passed in front of BWC from left to right approximately 200 metres distant and 100 ft higher than VH-BWC. The crew of BWC had not been given traffic advice on SGE and had not heard any inbound call from the aircraft. SGE was joining downwind for runway 17R.

The pilot of SGE said that he was unaware of BWC until he saw the aircraft when it was about 400 ft away. At the time of sighting, he said that he was at 1,000 ft and the other aircraft was about 200 ft lower and appeared to be climbing. Although close, there was no need for avoiding action as it was obvious BWC would pass behind SGE.

Recorded communications showed that the pilot of SGE made a standard inbound call at Carrum and then called again joining downwind. The pilot of BWC reported ready for take-off 25 seconds after SGE's inbound call so was most probably still on ground frequency at the time of that call and therefore did not monitor the call. The aerodrome controller did not pass traffic to BWC on SGE. Timings of calls recorded on tape would suggest there was a potential traffic conflict. The frequency was not busy during the period immediately leading up to the incident. The pilot of SGE did not recall hearing BWC reporting ready and being cleared for take-off.

The aircraft departed Parkes on a VFR flight to Coffs Harbour, tracking via Scone, Mount Seaview and Kempsey. The pilot reported that the weather enroute to Scone had been fine with clear skies and winds from the south at 10 kts, however, active storms were observed developing to the south of the intended track.

Shortly after the aircraft passed over Mount Seaview, the pilot assessed that the weather was unsuitable to continue flight on his planned track. He decided to follow the Macleay River valley to Kempsey, then continue coastal to Coffs Harbour.  However, about 5 NM before Kempsey the weather deteriorated rapidly, forcing the pilot to divert in order to remain in visual meteorological conditions.

An area of high ground, which he had overflown some minutes earlier, was chosen for a landing. The pilot made two precautionary passes over the area and believed that the surface was approximately level. He then approached to land toward the south but discovered upon landing that the surface had a considerable downslope. While attempting to stop the aircraft the wheels locked under braking and skidded on wet ground. The right main landing gear collided with a creek bank, slewing the aircraft at right angles to the landing direction, and resulting in substantial damage.

The pilot reported that after landing on runway 27, he turned off onto the gravel taxiway. As he did so a strong wind gust hit the aircraft from the right rear quarter. The aircraft went over initially onto its left wing and nose where it stayed for a few seconds before being hit by another gust which tipped the aircraft onto its back.

The wind was reported by a local operator to have been from the west-north-west, gusting from 20 to 45 knots.

The student pilot was carrying out his second solo flight, after a dual check. The aircraft was observed to bounce during landing and porpoise along runway 29 L for a short distance before the nose landing gear collapsed. The aircraft slid to a halt on the edge of the runway.

Marks from all wheels were evident from where the aircraft turned off the runway to where it finally came to a stop but the nosewheels left very significant black skid marks indicative of the aircraft going too fast to follow nosewheel steering input. In summary, the skid marks were indicative of an attempt to turn off the runway onto taxiway F at too high a speed. This is consistent with the evidence of the tower controller.