A Boeing 767 aircraft, VH-RME, departed Hamilton Island for Sydney at 1348 EST and was assigned an initial flight level (FL) 270 due to crossing traffic over Hamilton Island, which was climbing through FL280. Further along the aircraft's intended route there was another possible confliction with another Boeing 767, VH-OGM, tracking from Cairns to Brisbane at FL370. The tracks of the two aircraft crossed at a point approximately 95 NM south of Mackay.

As RME approached Mackay from the north, the Sector 7S controller asked the pilot at what distance south of Mackay the aircraft would be on reaching FL390. The pilot advised that he would reach FL390 by 40 NM south of Mackay.

The two aircraft would not be in conflict until approximately 80 NM south of Mackay, and the controller therefore issued a clearance to the pilot of RME to climb to the planned level of FL 410, with a requirement to reach FL390 by 70 NM south of MacKay. The pilot read back the clearance correctly. The controller subsequently noticed the aircraft at approximately 67 NM south of Mackay, climbing through FL350.

The controller asked the pilot to confirm that the requirement would be met. The pilot replied in the affirmative, but shortly after advised that he could not meet the requirement. The controller instructed the pilot to turn left 30 degrees for separation, and issued traffic information on OGM. The aircraft came to within 10 NM on parallel tracks. When RME had left FL 390, the pilot was cleared to resume tracking via the flight planned route.

The pilot of a SAAB 340 aircraft which had been cruising at flight level 170, had been assigned flight level 130 for descent into Coffs Harbour, and was told to expect further descent at 45 miles. The aircraft was later observed on radar, 45 miles south of Coffs Harbour descending through flight level 127. Attempts were made to contact the pilot but there was no reply. After liaising with Coffs Harbour tower, the sector controller was informed that the pilot had reported on descent to flight level 110. The pilot had not been authorised for further descent nor had he received a frequency change instruction. There was no breakdown in separation.

The pilot reported that icing conditions were encountered during the climb after departure from Sydney. The anti-ice systems were then activated. The aircraft was above cloud after reaching top of climb, and the pilot turned off the anti-ice systems after ascertaining that the left engine intake was free of ice. Approximately 2 minutes later the aircraft re-entered cloud. The pilot said he shone his torch onto the centre unheated windscreen and it was white with ice. He then turned on the wing ice light and this revealed about 15 cm of ice on the leading edge of the wing. The pilot said he then selected right engine heat and the engine flamed out. He advised air traffic control that he had an engine failure and requested a clearance back to Sydney and a descent clearance. When the aircraft reached 8,000 ft. he was able to restart the engine. He then requested a clearance to Brisbane. The remainder of the flight was completed without further incident.

The sector 2E controller was given instructions by the flow controller for an Airbus aircraft enroute from Sydney to Brisbane to lose time to pass Coolangatta at time 0918 EST. The intention was for the aircraft speed to be reduced sufficiently to lose about 3 minutes. The aircraft was in the Point Lookout area when the instruction was passed to the sector controller. A short time later the flow controller noticed that the aircraft was on an easterly heading approximately 140 NM south of Brisbane. This was queried through the sector and the flow controller was advised that the aircraft was being vectored to meet the set course time. The easterly heading effectively gave the aircraft a tailwind of 120 kts. When the sector controller turned the aircraft inbound to Coolangatta, it had lost so much time that a following Boeing 767 aircraft that would have been processed without delay, required speed control then significant vectoring, to stay behind the preceding aircraft.

The pilot of an Airbus A340 aircraft had been given clearance for a runway 01 Laravale 5 standard instrument departure (SID). The SID requires a right turn at 3 miles DME. The aircraft was observed to turn right at less than 2 DME. The pilot was asked if he was flying a 01 Laravale 5 departure, to which he replied 'affirmative'. The aircraft's flight path was 1 NM west of Fishermans Island. At the northern tip of the island the aircraft turned sharply right, and crossed the coast at Manly boat harbour at 4,300 ft. This flight path was much closer in than that normally flown on the Laravale 5 SID and was due to a high rate of climb and a low ground speed. The normal flight path usually arcs around the Brisbane control zone boundary which is a 7 nm radius. A following departing aircraft had been given a right turn onto a heading of 150 which would have kept it inside the normal SID flight path. When it was noticed that the Airbus was turning sharper than normal, the following aircraft was given a heading to pass behind the Airbus.

The aircraft ahead of VH-MML had departed from runway 01 and was being vectored in a right turn over the aerodrome to intercept a departure track of 257 degrees. MML had been issued a departure instruction to maintain 015 degrees (the runway heading) and took off two minutes behind the other aircraft. MML called approach airborne, turning right onto heading 150 degrees. This could have led to a conflict with other aircraft, so instructions were issued to maintain vertical separation.

The operator advised that the company procedure was for the non-flying pilot to set the departure heading with the heading selector knob, and for both crew members to check the selection, before the departure instruction was acknowledged.

Shortly after the take-off roll commenced, the crew aborted the take-off. The aircraft departed normally eight minutes later.

The operator advised that the crew received a take-off configuration warning (stabiliser trim) at the commencement of the take-off roll. The trim was reset using the co-pilot's control and the subsequent take-off was normal.

The aerodrome controller had cleared one aircraft for take-off. The intention was to have the following aircraft cleared for take-off when the first aircraft had gained adequate distance and was turning away from the initial departure track. The second aircraft was allowed to depart about one minute after the first. This was too soon as the controller was unable to maintain visual separation due to both aircraft being on the same track, away from the controller's view. There was also insufficient distance between the two aircraft to provide the required radar separation standard. Separation was positively established after the first aircraft turned to a new heading.

A B737 pilot reported that the crew believed they were taxying behind an A300 aircraft and were surprised to observe a Metro aircraft between the A300 and their aircraft. The Metro appeared unlit except for its fin-mounted rotating beacon. The B737 taxi lights were on but these lights are comparatively low intensity. The Metro operator advised that the white position light on the tail of the aircraft was defective. This would have made the Metro less conspicuous to the B737 crew. The B737 operator is considering the use of inboard landing lights in addition to taxi lights during night taxiing operations.

During the approach to land, just prior to crossing the runway end, the right main gear struck an earth mound. The gear leg was damaged by the impact. The mound, about three metres short of the 800-metre runway, was about 25 cm high and not easily seen from the approach path. The wind was light and there were no gusts or turbulence.