The pilot reported that he selected the landing gear down on the downwind leg. He did not complete his pre-landing checks because he was distracted by his attempt to identify the wind direction from a damaged windsock. He did not realise the landing gear was still retracted until the aircraft had touched down on its lower fuselage. The landing gear warning horn did not activate until it was too late to do anything about it. The aircraft slid to a stop on the runway. A passenger later observed that he did not see the orange unsafe landing gear light at any stage.

Investigation found that the landing gear selector was in the down position, the circuit breaker was popped and the main gear uplocks had been released

During cruise flight at 5,500 ft, about 30 minutes after departure, the engine began to run roughly. The RPM dropped to about 1,700 with full throttle and the pilot was obliged to allow the aircraft to descend at about 400 feet per minute. The pilot was able to select a suitable section of a nearby road and carried out an uneventful landing. Initial investigation found oil leaking from one of the cylinders on the engine.

Later detailed examination found that a valve had failed in the no. 2 cylinder.

The aircraft was not fitted with an ELT.

The pilot reported that when he selected the landing gear up, after departure, he heard a loud clunking noise. The mechanical landing gear indicator showed that the nose gear was not retracted. He also noticed a reduction in airspeed, and a wind noise from the front of the aircraft.

The pilot advised Flight Service of the problem and continued to Bankstown where he extended the landing gear. However, inspection by engineers from the ground revealed that the nose gear was not fully extended. Airport emergency procedures were implemented. The aircraft was landed on the mainwheels, but the nose gear collapsed as it contacted the runway.

An inspection of the aircraft subsequently revealed that an eye-end fitting, at the actuator end of the nose landing gear push-pull rod, had failed. The operator later reported that post accident landing gear rigging checks were normal, and the landing gear had operated normally after installing a replacement eye-end fitting. The reason for the failure was not determined.

Report not released due to no IP comment from the Indonesian agency on this joint investigation report. ASOR hard copy held on occurrence file. Report not to be released without the approval of the Director or a DD Signed Alan L Stray Deputy Director Investigations 6 July 1998

It was reported that the solo student pilot made a normal approach to runway 36 but elected to start a go-around because the aircraft was not aligned with the runway centreline. As the pilot applied full power the nose yawed to the left. At this point, and contrary to training, the pilot selected the flaps to the take-off position. The aircraft descended, touching down to the left of the strip. It then ran off the runway and flight strip and into a rough area suffering extensive damage in the process.

FACTUAL INFORMATION

The pilot of a Shorts (SD3-60) aircraft inbound to Mackay aerodrome from Proserpine at 5,000 ft, requested runway 14. Runway 32 was the duty runway being broadcast on the automatic terminal information service. The aerodrome controller (ADC) instructed the pilot to descend to 2,000 ft and advised him that the downwind on runway 14 was 13 kts. This exceeded the aircraft's downwind limitation of 10 kts and the pilot requested to be advised of the wind when the aircraft was closer to the aerodrome. The ADC advised the pilot to expect runway 14 and to report at 10 NM.

The pilot of a Piper (PA28) aircraft, having completed a session of circuit training, requested further circuits on runway 32. After the PA28 became airborne, the instructor in the aircraft discussed the conduct of a simulated radio failure with the ADC. The ADC cleared the pilot of the PA28 to make a touch and go, and instructed him to make a right circuit. The instructor then commenced the radio failure exercise.

The pilot of a Hughes (H369HS) helicopter requested a clearance to transit the control zone. The H369HS had departed Hay Point (8 NM south-east of Mackay) for Walkerston (7 NM west of Mackay). The pilot was instructed to track as requested at not above 1,000 ft. The intended track of the helicopter passed approximately 2.5 NM to the south-south-west of the aerodrome.

The pilot of the SD3-60 reported at 10 NM and the ADC advised him that runway 14 was not available due to circuit traffic and to track for a left downwind to runway 32. This required the aircraft to be tracked to the south-west of the aerodrome. The pilot maintained 2,000 ft and tracked for left downwind. The PA28 was on right base runway 32 and was approved to land using light signals in accordance with the "no radio" procedures. The tower co-ordinator operated the signal lamp to assist the ADC. After landing, the instructor of the PA28 advised the ADC that the training was finished.

The SD3-60 entered left downwind, and the ADC cleared the pilot to make a visual approach. The issue of a visual approach clearance enabled the pilot to descend, as required, from the last acknowledged level of 2,000 ft to the threshold of the assigned runway. The track and descent of the SD3-60 passed through the level, and close to the track, of the H369HS. While two or more aircraft are in conflict, air traffic control was required to ensure that one of the forms of separation was being applied. Separation can be applied by the use of either radar, visual, vertical, lateral or longitudinal standards. There was no radar display in the tower and the ADC was thus required to use one of the other forms of separation. The ADC did not have the H369HS in sight and there was no vertical, lateral of longitudinal separation being applied.

The ADC issued a landing clearance to the pilot of the SD3-60 when the aircraft was south of the aerodrome. The ADC requested the pilot of the H369HS to report position and was advised that the helicopter was approaching the mouth of a creek which was 2.5 NM south-east of the aerodrome; on final for runway 32. The ADC instructed the pilot of the SD3-6, which was on left base, to make a right orbit. The orbit was intended to maintain separation between the SD3-60 and the H369HS. The pilot of the helicopter reported sighting the SD3-60 and was then instructed by the ADC to pass behind that aircraft. There was a breakdown of separation.

ANALYSIS

The ADC became distracted by the request for additional circuits and the no radio exercise for the PA28. He did not sight the helicopter and did not apply visual separation prior to approving the pilot of the SD3-60 to make a visual approach. The ADC could have used the tower co-ordinator to assist in sighting the helicopter prior to the SD3-60 being cleared to make a visual approach. This may have enabled the helicopter to be sighted in sufficient time for the application of either a visual or an alternative separation procedure.

SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

1. The ADC did not sight the H369HS.

2. The ADC did not request assistance to sight the H369HS.

3. The ADC did not apply a separation standard between the SD3-60 and the H369HS.

The pilot reported that on arrival over the landing area he noted there was a south-easterly wind of about 30 knots. He therefore planned to land into the south-east. He conducted a low pass in the planned landing direction at about 50 ft above the ground and observed there was no turbulence. He then made an approach at 80 knots with 20 deg of flap selected. At approximately 40 to 50 ft above the ground the aircraft encountered a high rate of sink Despite the application of full power and backstick the aircraft hit the ground heavily, dislodging the nose gear. It then slid for about 25 metres before turning over and coming to rest inverted.

The pilot said there was a hill to the south of the landing area, and he was aware this hill could cause turbulence when there was a southerly wind blowing. However, on this occasion he encountered very strong shear which he now believes is unpredictable in that he did not encounter it when he made the low pass prior to his landing approach.

During a training flight the pilot noticed that the landing gear "in transit" light remained illuminated after the gear retracted. Recycling the gear rectified the problem.

When the aircraft returned to the circuit area air traffic control (ATC) queried the pilot as to whether he had a safe indication for the landing gear. The gear was in the retracted position, but the pilot extended it, and a safe indication was obtained.

Three circuits and landings were then carried out before the aircraft was taxied back to the parking area. The pilot reported having difficulty in maintaining directional control, and thought the aircraft may have suffered a flat tyre.

An inspection of the aircraft revealed that the nut had unscrewed from the right main landing gear leg rear attachment bolt, allowing the bolt to withdraw and the gear to droop. This prevented the gear from retracting completely, which ATC had mistaken for a partially extended landing gear.

The additional load placed on the forward attachment bolt during gear operation and landings caused severe distortion and bending of the front spar web adjacent to the gear attachment fitting.

The reason for the nut to unscrew off the bolt could not be determined. The pilot failed to notice the missing nut during the pre-flight inspection.

The pilot was conducting solo circuit training and had completed 8 normal landings with no problems. He reported that the weather conditions were fine with no noticeable crosswind component on the runway in use.

He stated that the last approach was normal, but as he flared for landing the aircraft continued descending and touched down hard and bounced. He attempted to raise the nose to cushion the landing, but there was no response from his elevator inputs. The aircraft again contacted the ground heavily in a nose low attitude, shearing the nose landing gear attachment frame from the forward fuselage bulkhead, pushing it upwards and shattering the windscreen. Both propellers suffered ground strikes bending the blades.

The pilot may have reduced engine power too soon prior to the landing flare, resulting in a reduction of propeller slipstream over the tailplane, with a subsequent loss of some elevator authority.

The balloon was conducting a passenger carrying flight from Picton to the Campbelltown area, with an intermediate landing at Menangle. The forecast wind was a 14-knot southerly at 1,000 ft. However, during the first flight the pilot determined the prevailing wind to be calm below 500 ft. During the second stage, the pilot noted that the wind above 500 ft was backing to the west although its speed was not increasing.

With the balloon now heading towards the Holsworthy Forest, the pilot decided to land early and made an approach to a large paddock beyond a small dam next to a road. The pilot subsequently reported that, late in the approach, the wind speed suddenly increased to about 15 kt accompanied by a strong wind shear. He also encountered strong downdraughts as the balloon crossed a tree line alongside the road. He attempted to overshoot from the approach, but the balloon continued to descend.

The balloon touched down firmly but was carried into the dam by the wind. A nearby powerline held up the balloon envelope as the basket drifted across the dam and grounded on the bank. Neither the pilot or any of the passengers were hurt.