A Boeing 767 had just departed from Sydney runway 16R when, at a height of about 100ft, the crew reported hearing a series of loud bangs and the right engine exhaust gas temperature indicator rose rapidly into the red range. The right thrust lever was retarded to idle, resulting in the temperature indications returning to normal. ATC had also observed a series of explosions from the right engine as the aircraft departed and had declared a local emergency.

The crew requested a return to the field for a landing. Because of local weather conditions the aircraft was radar vectored for an ILS approach to runway 16R, where it landed without further incident. After vacating the runway, the aircraft was stopped on the taxiway, and the right engine shut down, before being inspected by the waiting fire services. As there was no evidence of fire the aircraft was taxied back to the terminal where the passengers disembarked normally.

A ground inspection of the engine revealed no external damage, however, an internal borescope inspection revealed extensive damage to blades of the thirteenth compressor stage. The engine was subsequently removed for further inspection, resulting in a replaceable 'phillips' bit from a screwdriver being found in the core of the engine. The operator reported that the incident occurred on the first flight after the aircraft had undergone an 'A' maintenance check. The 'phillips' bit had probably entered the engine through the variable bleed valves which are open when the engine is not operating.

The operator is investigating ways to preclude foreign objects entering the engine in this manner during ground maintenance.

A Twin Squirrel helicopter was approaching Sydney Airport on a St Peters 2 Inbound helicopter route. As the helicopter approached the airport maintenance area, the pilot advised the aerodrome controller that he had a hydraulic problem and requested a fire tender to meet him on arrival. As this was being arranged, the pilot further advised that there was now a strong smell of hydraulic fluid in the cabin and requested confirmation that a fire tender was awaiting his arrival. However, as the helicopter passed over runway 25, the pilot advised that he had lost hydraulic power to the tail rotor and was landing immediately. The helicopter landed safely on helipad 03. There was no fire or reported damage to the helicopter.

A ground inspection of the helicopter revealed that the right hydraulic system fluid reservoir outlet flange had cracked, resulting in loss of contents and subsequent loss of tail rotor control. The operator has submitted a Major Defect Report to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.

The foreign Private Pilot was conducting a local flight in the Camden area, following a flight review three days earlier.

At the time of departure, the control tower was manned. Throughout the day the wind had been from the south-west, favouring runway 24. By the time aircraft returned for a landing the tower had closed down. The Camden ATIS, which had earlier nominated runway 24 for landing, had been changed on closedown to provide a standard message. This indicated that the control zone was reclassified as Class G airspace, and that Mandatory Broadcast Zone procedures applied. The preferred runway direction was 06. No wind information was provided.

The pilot said that he listened to the ATIS well before his return to Camden, to reduce his workload during the subsequent approach. He understood that runway 24 was still in use. Later, when he returned for a landing, he was unable to see the wind indicator and elected to make an approach to runway 24, using 10 degrees of flap.

Ground observers subsequently saw the aircraft travelling along runway 24 at a very low height, with the pilot apparently attempting to land. When it reached a position some 3/4 along the runway the observers saw the aircraft adopt a high nose attitude and attempt to climb away. The aircraft continued in a high nose attitude, at low forward speed, towards rising ground to the west of the aerodrome. It became apparent that the angle of climb was insufficient to overcome the terrain. The aircraft was then observed to strike trees and disappear.

The aircraft came to rest in the front yard of a house, after colliding with a number of trees. Both occupants were able to escape with minor injuries. A subsequent examination concluded that the aircraft had been capable of normal operation at the time of the accident.

An investigation found that in the 30 minutes after the tower closed down, there had been a significant wind shift. At 1600, the time of closedown, the recorded wind direction and velocity was 300/13 kt. The next reading at 1630 showed the wind had changed to 100/12 kt. The effect of that wind shift was to create a substantial downwind component on runway 24.

Witnesses indicated that the wind had changed shortly after 1600, just before the pilot attempted his landing approach. The description of the event provided by the pilot, and other observers, was consistent with the pilot attempting to land the aircraft on a runway with a substantial downwind component. The angle of climb during the subsequent go-around was also adversely affected by the downwind component, and was insufficient to overcome the rising terrain.

VH-NFD departed Jandakot WA at 1822 WST for Busselton WA as a medical priority flight. The pilot reported that at 1851 he made a straight in approach to runway 21 at Busselton Airport. After establishing the aircraft on final approach and lowering the undercarriage, approach flap was selected at approximately 700 ft. The pilot selected full flap with the speed at 120 knots.

Passing 500 feet, the pilot experienced yaw towards the left and a complete loss of engine power from the left engine, followed by a loud backfire. The pilot shut the engine down and continued to land on runway 21. After landing the pilot managed to clear the runway by using a series of large circles to work his way to the taxiway and to the tarmac area where he cancelled the SAR, and advised Perth FSE what had happened.

The military Lockheed C-130 aircraft was tracking to Pearce from Edinburgh via reporting points BADJA and PEPPA, whilst an Avro RJ-70 was tracking from Perth to Telfa via CLIFY and PEPPA.

The pilot of the C-130 had been cleared to descend to 8,000 ft by Perth ATC and the RJ-70 was on climb to FL290. However, the C-130 was observed on radar to drift south of track and then turn left prior to PEPPA. As a result of the early turn, the C-130 passed approximately 3 NM south of PEPPA. The C-130 crew could not recall why the aircraft had drifted south or turned early. However, it was reported that it was possible that the C-130's inertial navigation system (INS) may have experienced some drift. It was also reported that because the INS calculates an intercept to the next leg based on the aircraft's expected turn radius, it may have commanded a turn earlier than ATC expected.

Perth ATC directed the pilot of the RJ-70 to turn the aircraft right to pass behind the crossing C-130. Just after the RJ-70 pilot gave his read-back to the instruction, he advised Perth ATC that he had received a TCAS alert. Perth ATC passed traffic and the two aircraft passed abeam each other at 4 NM with no vertical separation. There was a breakdown in separation as the required standard was 5 NM.

Perth ATC reported that just prior to the incident, Pearce Control had experienced a radar failure. As a result, the Perth "Inner" air traffic controller, who was under training and being supervised at the time, experienced a substantial workload increase requiring him to scan a larger area than normal, thus changing his radar scan parameters. He also had 12 aircraft on frequency. The trainee air traffic controller's workload, whilst heavy, was not considered excessive because he had completed 4 weeks of the 6 week training course and was already an experienced procedural controller.

Perth ATC reported that at 15 NM inbound to PEPPA, the C-130 had a groundspeed of 330 kts and the trainee controller assessed that the separation between the aircraft would be adequate. However, abeam PEPPA, the C-130's groundspeed unexpectedly reduced to 220 kts before increasing again to 255 kts. The speed changes may have been associated with the aircraft accelerating in the descent and then slowing following the level off. The C-130's unexpected speed changes and early turn near PEPPA adversely affected the trainee controller's planned separation between the two aircraft.

The trainee had issued frequency transfer instructions to the pilot of the C-130 just before the impending breakdown in separation was noticed. Although the training officer assumed control of the position as the separation breakdown developed, he could only issue instructions to the pilot of the RJ-70. This limited the options available to the training officer when he was attempting to correct and avoid the separation breakdown.

It is probable that the workload increase caused by the non-operative Pearce radar associated with the C-130's unexpected deviation from the air route and groundspeed changes, were factors in allowing the breakdown in separation to develop. When the training officer noticed the developing separation breakdown, his options in ensuring the required separation were limited by the C-130 being on another frequency.

The helicopter was refuelled from a drum positioned approximately one metre from the left hand side of the aircraft. The helicopter was parked facing north with an approximate 15 knot wind from the east. Pilot and passenger then boarded the helicopter and commenced normal start procedures before lifting into the hover. The helicopter was close to maximum all up weight. After coming into the hover the helicopter was weather cocking and difficult to stabilise.

Due to the proximity of the fuel drum, out of sight on the left side of the aircraft, and the aircraft weather cocking in the cross wind, the pilot decided to do a hovering left hand circuit of the fuel drum to enter into wind. As the pilot looked to his right to check the area was clear the aircraft yawed to the right. The pilot pushed full left pedal and applied left cyclic to stop the yaw at the same time pushing forward cyclic to clear the drum. The rear of the left hand skid came into contact with the fuel drum and the helicopter rolled onto its left-hand side.

FACTUAL INFORMATION

The pilot of the Beech 55 Baron advised that he made a transmission to Avalon Tower while taxiing at Ceres. This transmission was neither heard nor recorded by Avalon, and no acknowledgment was received by the pilot.

Avalon Tower was staffed by a trainee air traffic controller under the supervision of a rated aerodrome controller. The trainee was performing the aerodrome control tasks at the time.

The Baron subsequently departed Ceres. The pilot remained clear of the Avalon control zone until radio communication was established with Avalon Tower, when he requested an airways clearance to Bairnsdale on climb to 9,000 ft. The reply from the Avalon controller was spoken in a soft voice and was intended only to confirm the details of the request but used the words "...cross the zone, confirming on climb to 9,000 to Bairnsdale ...". The pilot advised that he did not hear the full transmission. He interpreted the communication as an airways clearance and initiated a climb to 9,000 ft. The pilot only acknowledged this perceived clearance with the word "affirmative" and did not read back the full clearance.

This situation resulted in the pilot believing that he had a clearance to enter controlled airspace on track to Bairnsdale and on climb to 9,000 ft, whereas the controllers believed that no clearance had been issued.

The Avalon controllers then coordinated the details of the Baron's intended flight with Melbourne radar control which resulted in an agreed altitude limit of 2,000 ft for the Baron. The coordination included an assessment of the relative position of the Baron with a Boeing 767 conducting training in the Avalon airspace. The radar controller was unable to provide any radar separation between the two aircraft.

During the ensuing radio exchange between the Avalon controller and the pilot of the Baron, the controller did not mention the word "clearance" when instructing the pilot to maintain 2,000 ft and track to Portarlington. He did, however, specifically instruct the pilot to maintain his own separation with the Boeing 767. The pilot accepted both instructions and proceeded to Portarlington.

The pilot of the Baron now believed that the original (perceived) clearance was still current but that he had a temporary restriction to maintain 2,000 ft until reaching Portarlington. This belief was further validated in his mind when he was instructed to Squawk Code 3000, a code used to radar identify aircraft.

During the transit of the Avalon control zone, the pilot of the Baron made radio contact with Melbourne Flight Service and passed his position and departure time.

The Melbourne radar controller had expected the Baron to remain outside controlled airspace but observed the aircraft passing through 4,500 ft after passing Portarlington. He issued a different squawk code via Flight Service and made a positive identification. A violation of controlled airspace had occurred but there was no breakdown of separation standards.

The use of non-standard phraseology had resulted in confusion between the pilot of the Baron and Avalon Tower. Air traffic control had not specifically mentioned the word "clearance" at any time, leaving the pilot to misinterpret the transmissions as an airways clearance.

Had the pilot read back the perceived clearance in full, the controllers may have realised that the misinterpretation had occurred.

The student was briefed by his instructor for a solo flight as part of the CPL training Block. The published route is Merredin - Wagin - Hyden - Merredin. The planned landing point for this exercise is Wagin, which has an adequate runway for the purpose. To meet the operational requirement of a 2.5 hour flight, students are permitted to divert en route Wagin to Hyden, direct to Merreden, after considering such factors as ground speed and fuel remaining.

This student elected to divert in the Merredin to Wagin leg, and proceeded to Hyden where he then conducted an unauthroised landing at a private airfield to the North of the town, not the Shire strip as published in the WA Country Airfield Guide. The student later reported that on his final approach for a landing to the South he was distracted by something close to the threshold, possibly a fence, which prompted him to change his original aiming point.

This action lead to a bounce on touch down followed by an attempted go around, during which the aircraft departed the runway centreline to the left towards some trees. He then tried to manoeuvre the aircraft back to the runway and then could not remember hearing the stall warning prior to the impact of the nose and right wing into the ground. The aircraft came to rest 10m from the runway edge sustaining considerable damage to the propellor, engine, nose and right undercarriage plus sundry damage to the airframe including the tailplane.

The pilot reported that he discontinued take-off on runway 27 due to severe nosewheel aquaplaning. The departure was changed to runway 34 and during this time the inertial reference systems lost alignment. Re-alignment was not possible, and the aircraft was returned to the terminal.

As the aircraft commenced descent, the crew heard and felt a loud thump. On final approach, the crew heard and felt a second thump and concluded that a container in the forward hold was incorrectly restrained.

When the hold was opened at the ramp, an engineer confirmed that the aft restraint on one pallet was not engaged, permitting the pallet to move approximately 15 cm forward and rearward.