The pilot of an amphibious Cessna 206 had been chartered to fly two passengers from an aircraft landing area at Warnervale to Berowa Waters on the Hawkesbury River.

A gusty 20 kt westerly wind was blowing in the Warnervale area at the time of aircraft departure. The pilot recalls being concerned about making an approach into Berowa Waters and encountered turbulent and uncomfortable weather conditions enroute.

After making a normal approach to the landing area, the pilot closed the throttle and flared the aircraft. As the floats touched the water, the aircraft tipped forward and the nose of the aircraft dived under water, which caused the windscreen to shatter. Water flooded the cabin and the aircraft came to rest inverted. The pilot and the two passengers were not seriously injured and evacuated the submerged cabin through the door on the left side of the aircraft.

Immediately following this occurrence, the pilot observed that the float mounted landing gear was in the extended position and not correctly positioned for a water landing. He cannot recall any actions specific to the landing gear following the departure from Warnervale or on arrival at Berowa Waters.

Following recovery of the aircraft to dry land, the landing gear selector was observed to be in the neutral position.

The pilot of an arriving aircraft requested that emergency services be placed on standby, as his aircraft was experiencing engine surging in the right engine and he did not expect to make a normal approach. A short time later the aircraft made an uneventful landing and taxied to the general aviation terminal accompanied by a fire tender. An investigation was subsequently carried out by a maintenance organisation with no fault found. This included draining and testing 20 litres of fuel from both main tanks. No contamination problem that may have attributed to the engine surging could be identified. After engine ground runs to verify operations were within limits, the aircraft was returned to service.

The pilot advised Flight Service (FS) that the engine had failed, and he was attempting a landing at the Mittagong airstrip. The aircraft subsequently landed approximately 2 km short of the airstrip damaging the left-wing tip and landing gear during the rollout. The pilot advised FS of the situation and that there were nil injuries. The initial maintenance investigation discovered that the crankshaft accessory drive gear positioning dowel had sheared. This in turn had ceased the drive to all the engine accessories and the camshaft, resulting in the engine stopping. The initial reason for the failure of the dowel could not be positively determined. 

Subsequent to the initial investigation, a detailed failure analysis of the failed engine components was carried out. This examination revealed that a significant factor in the failure of the crankshaft gear/crankshaft attachment had been a manufacturing irregularity on the bearing surface of the head of the attaching bolt. The manufacturing irregularity resulted in a reduced clamping force, between the gear and the crankshaft, being established during assembly. The loss of the clamping force had allowed relative movement between the gear and the crankshaft mounted gear positioning dowel. This eventually led to the fatigue failure of the dowel and the loss of integrity of the accessory gear drive assembly.

The pilot of FDP had been instructed to taxy to the holding point at taxiway A2 for departure. The Surface Movement Controller then diverted his attention to other traffic. The Aerodrome Controller then noticed that FDP was holding at the intersection of runway 15 and taxiway A3 , partially inside the holding point.

The pilot advised that the aircraft was slightly inside the holding point and asked for approval to conduct engine checks in that position. As there was no immediate traffic, the aircraft was cleared onto the runway. The pilot reported that he did not see the holding point marking until he had passed over it. He added that the marking did not extend across the full width of the taxiway, and felt that this contributed to the incident. In addition, he had not operated into Cairns for more than 2 years, so he was not completely familiar with the aerodrome layout.

The comments by the pilot on the holding point marking were discussed with the local Airservices manager and the airport owner. Both these agencies indicated that there had been other instances of pilot confusion concerning taxiway markings in the same area. It was agreed that Airservices would arrange for a 'Caution' note to be inserted in the En-route Supplement advising pilots to exercise caution when approaching the taxiway A3 holding point. The airport owner was completing arrangements to repaint the holding point marking to extend the full width of the taxiway, and to repaint the holding point and frequency information on the associated gable marker.

The aircraft was being prepared for a freight flight with newspapers included as part of a standard load for this service. Normally the newspaper publisher informed the operator of the weight of the consignment and the newspapers would arrive at the airport in sufficient time to ensure an on time departure. However, on this occasion, the consignment was delayed. The duty manager decided to delay the flight's departure to await the arrival of the newspapers.

The aircraft's upper deck and Compartment 1 of the lower deck had been loaded, and the manager intended to load the newspapers in the rear compartment of the lower deck in which 670 kg of weight allowance was available. The duty manager had the newspapers weighed and found them to be heavier than normal at a weight of 1,070 kg. He reported that he had informed the captain that the consignment was 400 kg overweight but the captain later stated that he had not been told of the discrepancy. The newspapers were loaded and the aircraft departed 20 minutes later than its scheduled departure time. The loading crew at the destination opened Compartment 1 and noted the Universal Loading Device (ULD) tag as showing the weight of an item of cargo as 87 kg.

The crew did not believe this figure and checked the weight at 277 kg. The loading crew then opened the rear compartment and noted a ULD tag showing a cargo weight of 607 kg. They again checked the weight and found 1,172 kg of newspapers and 78 kg of other freight. The net effect of these discrepancies was that the aircraft was heavier than its maximum zero fuel weight limit and that the centre of gravity was aft of its computed position, although within limits. The flight crew reported that the flight was normal and free from any noticeable abnormalities in aircraft performance or handling.

Since the occurrence, the operator has replaced the ULD tags with new "user friendly" tags designed to reduce the probability of error. The reason the crew were unaware of the excess load could not be determined.

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The pilot reported that he descended to approximately 150 ft AGL as he was approaching Bellburn airstrip, and decided to overfly the windsock. He noted that the wind was an easterly breeze of about 7 knots. The pilot then intended to carry out a left turn, fly a downwind leg, and terminate into wind. He then rolled on about 50 degrees of bank, and shortly afterwards the helicopter began shaking violently. The helicopter then rotated through 180 degrees and adopted a nose down attitude. The pilot said he applied full power and full collective control, but was unable to prevent the helicopter striking the ground.

A witness located near the parking area saw the helicopter bank steeply and then begin to descend. The tail rotor then hit a patio attached to an office building and the main rotor struck a tree just before the helicopter impacted the ground.

When the pilot entered the cockpit of the Fletcher, he observed the loading vehicle near the chemical dump. The pilot started the engine and allowed it to warm up for approximately four minutes. Unbeknown to the pilot, during this time, the loading vehicle moved to a position on the right side of the aft fuselage of the aircraft in preparation for loading. When the pilot commenced taxiing, the tailplane collided with the loading vehicle, causing substantial damage to the aft fuselage. No person was injured.

A significant factor in this accident was the driver positioning the loading vehicle near the aircraft without the approval of the pilot.

The airport and associated airspace were being operated in accordance with Mode 7 of the Sydney Long Term Operating Plan (LTOP), in that runway 25 was being used for departures while runways 34L and 34R were being used for arrivals.

A Boeing 737 (B737), registration VH-CZV (CZV), had departed runway 25 at Sydney. When the aircraft was 6 NM north-west of Sydney airport, the crew was cleared to climb to flight level (FL) 280. When it was 10 NM north of Sydney, the Departures North controller instructed the crew to turn right onto a heading of 060 degrees. Shortly after, the controller recognised that CZV was not going to reach 9,000 ft in sufficient time to maintain separation with another B737, VH-CZK (CZK), which was on a LETTI 3 Arrival, standard arrival route (STAR) for runway 34R and maintaining 8,000 ft. The required separation standard was either 1,000 ft vertically or 3 NM horizontally.

The aircraft were approximately 3 NM apart when traffic information was passed to the crew of CZV. Subsequently, the crew of CZV reported sighting CZK and advised the controller that visual separation could be maintained. Analysis of the radar data indicated that a breakdown of separation had occurred when the lateral separation standard was infringed while the vertical displacement of the aircraft was 500 ft. The aircraft subsequently closed to within 1 NM, at which point 1,400 ft of vertical separation existed. The investigation revealed that the controller cancelled restrictions for CZV that had been imposed for the departure. The speed restriction was cancelled first, followed by the altitude restriction of 5,000 ft.

The altitude restriction would have assured separation with the track of the inbound conflicting aircraft (CZK). When the altitude restriction was removed, the controller relied on monitoring the flight paths of the aircraft and his ability to implement any necessary action to maintain separation. The controller was undergoing a familiarisation period under the supervision of a suitably rated controller. The controllers were distracted, from the monitoring role, by coordination activities with flight service and the control tower. As a result of this investigation and a number of similar occurrences, the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation issued report B98/90 which covered the systemic investigation into factors underlying air safety occurrences in Sydney Terminal Area airspace.

After taking off from Scone, the pilot of an Embraer 820C aircraft reported that when retracting the landing gear, the landing gear selector failed to return to the neutral position, and the gear unsafe light remained on. The emergency checklist was actioned and the emergency hand pump was used by the pilot to extend the landing gear, however, the nose gear failed to lock down. The pilot requested emergency services to be in attendance prior to returning for a landing. When the aircraft subsequently landed, the nose gear collapsed during the landing roll. The pilot and passenger vacated the aircraft without injury.

An investigation revealed that the right engine driven hydraulic pump was leaking from a loose suction line fitting, and that most of the hydraulic fluid had been lost overboard. Inspection of the hydraulic hand pump found contamination of the check valve. This was probably enough to hold the valve off its seat so that insufficient pressure was available to lock the nose gear in the down position.

Further investigation determined that the right engine had been changed prior to the accident flight. As the engine had been supplied without a hydraulic pump, a serviceable pump was fitted. During engine ground running, the right hydraulic pump failed to pressurise the system and it was assumed that, because the left and right engines rotate in opposite directions, the pump was configured for left engine rotation. On completion of the engine run, the hydraulic pump lines were reconfigured for correct rotation. A very short engine run confirmed that the pump pressurised the system and that no leaks were apparent. However, the suction line had not been properly tightened, which was not detected. Sometime later, at about the time the aircraft departed, hydraulic fluid commenced to leak from the loose suction line fitting.

It is likely that whilst the pump was operating in the reverse rotation mode during the first engine run, the reversed hydraulic flow disturbed any sediment that was in the hydraulic system. The contamination then found its way into the hand pump when it was operated by the pilot during the emergency extension of the landing gear.