After a normal approach, the aircraft touched down harder than normal. The pilot was unable to arrest the ensuing bounce, and the nose gear collapsed.

The pilot was operating over his property on a stock spotting flight with his brother as passenger. He had departed with about 2.5 hours fuel on board but, after about 40 minutes, the aircraft fuel gauges seemed to indicate a loss of fuel. The pilot headed for the station airstrip, but the engine failed when the aircraft was about 4 km south of the strip. The pilot selected an area for a forced landing, but the aircraft struck a fence and some bushes before coming to a stop.

Substantial damage was caused to the left wing and flap, left hand lift strut, the landing gear was stressed and gouges cut in the propellor blades and hub. The left hand fuel cap was missing allowing fuel to escape from the tank by siphon action. The pilot made temporary repairs to this substantial damage and later flew the aircraft to Swan Hill for repairs, a distance of over 480 km.

VH-EBR was tracking from Bali to Sydney via route A576 to Curtin (CIN) and then via route T71 at FL330 (33,000 feet). A40GP was tracking from Melbourne to Singapore via T71 at FL350 and estimating Curtin at 1805 UTC. VH-EBR reported over Curtin at 1742 and requested FL370. The duty controller (on Perth Sector 2, the sector responsible for the section of airspace) checked the distance between VH-EBR and a preceding aircraft tracking on A576 (7 minutes ahead at FL370), because he thought they may be in conflict, and then told VH-EBR to standby while weather diversions were considered. At 1746.49, the controller instructed VH-EBR to climb to FL370.

A40GP was probably slightly to the right of track due to a previous weather diversion, but the aircraft were on opposite tracks with an estimated time of passing of 1753. VH-EBR reported maintaining FL370 at 1753.33 and at 1753.55 asked the controller what separation existed with the traffic that had just passed down their left side. The aircraft would have been at the same level and about 50 miles apart at approximately 3 minutes prior to the time of passing. Vertical separation did not exist until about the time the aircraft passed.

The required standard was vertical separation of 2000 feet 10 minutes prior to the time of passing. The controller did not recognise the confliction between VH-EBR and A40GP. He had been busy in the two hours prior to the incident. 15 aircraft had passed over Curtin and there were many diversions due to weather. However, in the 20 minutes prior to the incident the workload had decreased to a moderate level. The controller indicated that he did not feel fatigued at the time of the incident. He was on his fourth solo shift following three weeks recreation leave.

He had completed three familiarisation shifts immediately after the leave but had not been able to work Sector 2 with any more than light traffic prior to the day of the incident. The initial co-ordination received from Melbourne had A40GP at FL310 but there was a level change to FL350 prior to position T71B. The new level had been correctly carried through to all flight progress strips by the controller. The evidence indicates that the controller had a "mind set" that A40GP was at FL310 and therefore below the level of VH-EBR prior to the change of level to FL370 and would not be a consideration. It is possible that a lack of familiarisation in busy traffic conditions on Sector 2 contributed to the controller's error.

The pilot reported that during take-off the left wheel sank into a soft area on the side of the airstrip. He was unable to maintain directional control and the aircraft nosed over and came to rest inverted.

Early in the take-off run, while tow launching a glider, the aircraft veered and pulled the glider to the left. The glider pilot released the towline, but the tug continued to the left, ran off the airstrip and through the boundary fence.

Just after take-off, the crew felt an impact and noticed a slight airframe vibration. The captain decided to leave the landing gear extended until the serviceability of the aircraft could be verified as he believed that the impact had been near the nosewheel. He advised the aerodrome controller who despatched a vehicle to inspect the runway and found the remains of several birds. This information was passed to the captain who contacted the engineering department of his company for advice. As all engine indications were normal and the vibration had ceased, the captain decided to continue to Adelaide as scheduled.

During the flight the engine vibration indicators showed low readings until top of descent when the right hand engine indicator increased significantly although still within limits. Inspection of the aircraft after landing revealed that a number of right engine fan blades had been damaged. The nature of the damage was consistent with bird ingestion.

A readout of the FDR revealed that vibrations were far greater in the turbine section of the engine than at the compressor. As only compressor section vibration data is displayed on the cockpit engine vibration indicators, there was no way for the crew to be aware of the extent of the engine damage.

Circumstances

The pilot was undertaking a private flight with four people on board. The aircraft was en route from Flinders Island to Essendon when the right engine suddenly stopped. The pilot reported that he suspected that the right fuel tank was empty, even though both gauges were indicating full. The engine was restarted after switching to obtain fuel from the left tank. Some ten minutes later both engines stopped. The pilot feathered both propellers and diverted towards the landing strip at Yarrum.

The aircraft was landed just short of the strip breaking off the left landing gear and left engine. The four persons on board evacuated without injury. The aircraft fuel tanks were found to be essentially empty. There was no evidence of external leakage. The pilot regularly flew two return flights (four sectors) from Essendon to Flinders Island on a full tank of fuel and the accident flight was the last leg of such a sequence. It was determined that prior to the sequence of four flights the pilot's wife, also a licensed pilot but not rated on the type, had telephoned the maintenance organisation who prepared their aircraft requesting that the tanks only be filled to three quarters capacity.

This was to provide a lower weight for a possible intermediate landing. The maintenance personnel were not sure that they could accurately determine three quarters capacity and filled the tanks until both gauges read just in excess of three quarters and the fuel level at the tank filler was visually seen to be one inch above the bottom of the tank. The pilot said that prior to the first flight of the sequence he visually assessed the quantity and considered the tanks to be full. Accordingly, his conduct of the sequence of flights was based on this assessment, and on his calculations of fuel usage during the flights.

Due to the dihedral of the wings and the position of the fuel filler at the wing tip it is not possible to make a visual assessment of the fuel quantity once the fuel level has dropped below about three quarters capacity. Consequently, no visual assessments were made prior to the next three take-offs. The pilot did not add fuel prior to those take-offs even though fuel was available. Post accident calibration of the fuel flow system disclosed that the engines were consuming very slightly more fuel than shown by the fuel flow gauges.

A fuel tank quantity indication system calibration carried out in February 1992 showed that the indications were not linear. A calibration chart was provided which showed the correct quantities at each indicator division. There had been no deficiencies recorded on the maintenance release in relation to either the fuel quantity or fuel flow indication systems. After the accident the fuel quantity indication system for the right wing was found serviceable, the left wing system was unserviceable, most probably due to impact damage.

Calculations of fuel used over the four sectors flown until the aircraft ran out of fuel show that the tanks would have had to be approximately 80% full when the aircraft commenced the flight sequence. There was no evidence that fuel was pilfered while the aircraft was left unattended.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident.

1. The aircraft was fuelled to less than full tanks.

2. The pilot incorrectly believed that he had commenced the four sector sequence with full tanks.

3. No visual check of fuel quantity was possible once the quantity was below approximately 75% full.

4. The fuel flow indicating system was inaccurate.

5. The pilot assessed that there was sufficient fuel for the flight on the basis of:

a. a belief that he had commenced the four sector sequence with full tanks,

b. his knowledge of the fuel consumption rates of the engines,

c. the elapsed time of the first three sectors, and

d. fuel quantity gauge indications.

6. The aircraft fuel tanks did not contain sufficient fuel for the flight.

VH-FKI was tracking to Argyle via Fitzroy Crossing at Flight Level (FL) 250 and was approaching its descent point. VH-JJX had departed Kununurra, was on a climb to FL240 and was tracking via route T37. The aircrafts' tracks crossed to the west of Argyle creating the possibility for a traffic conflict. At the time of the potential conflict the duty Air Traffic Controller was working with the aircraft in his own sector (Sector 2) and supervising a trainee controller on another sector (Sector 1).

The rated ATC from Sector 1 was absent on a short-term break. Due to technical restrictions, it was not possible to combine the Sector 1 & 2 consoles during this period (the normal method of covering a short-term break). The controller, realising that the aircraft would probably be in conflict during their respective descent and climb, decided to calculate a minimum lateral separation point between the aircraft and issue VH-FKI with a clearance for its descent which, he believed, would maintain the minimum required separation. To calculate the lateral separation, point the controller had to leave his console and draw a lateral separation diagram on the wall chart display.

During this process he incorrectly used the Curtin to Argyle instead of the Fitzroy Crossing to Argyle track for VH-FKI. Consequently, the minimum lateral separation point calculated by the controller was incorrect and the clearance issued to VH-FKI did not ensure the aircraft would be separated by the required minimum standard (1000 ft vertical separation at least 10 minutes prior to crossing). Fortunately, prior to commencing descent the pilot of VH-FKI checked the position of VH-JJX and delayed his descent until the aircraft had passed.

Safety Action

1. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) will publish a lateral separation diagram for the tracks to alleviate the need to draw a diagram on the wall chart.

2. The CAA have taken action which will allow the Sector 1 and Sector 2 consoles to be combined should it be necessary.

While in cruise the pilot heard a bang, the engine started vibrating and suffered an almost total power loss. The pilot was able to carry out a successful forced landing onto a disused agricultural strip. A bulk strip of the engine found that the #1 cylinder connecting rod bolts had failed. The connecting rod cap had also failed. The engine was severely damaged, and further investigation was not possible. It is suspected that incorrect torque of the connecting rod bolts could have been a contributing factor to their failure.

Significant Factors

1. Engine power was lost when the #1 connecting rod detached.

The pilot reported that the glider collided with power lines during an outlanding, cartwheeled and landed inverted. The pilot was trapped for thirty minutes before being able to free himself. The accident occurred at the end of a 500km distance badge attempt. The pilot, who was visiting from England, had assessed his position over the Warby Hills as being satisfactory for a final glide into Benalla.

After leaving Warby Hills he encountered sink and diverted to land on a known emergency landing strip on the north shore of Lake Mokoan. The sink was heavier and more persistent than expected and the pilot had to manoeuvre to land in a field short of the emergency strip. The pilot noted power lines on the approach, however the sink was such that he was unable to avoid colliding with them.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot was forced to carry out an outlanding.

2. The pilot misjudged the approach.

3. The pilot was unable to avoid power lines on the approach.