An unidentified Beechcraft Bonanza passed within 50 feet overhead Piper PA28, VH-JIO. At the time the PA28 was flying in a north westerly direction at 3500 feet, and the Bonanza was flying in a north easterly direction. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The two pilots in the PA28 did not see the other aircraft until it was too late for evasive action. It is possible that the Bonanza pilot did not see the PA28 because there was no obvious attempt to evade.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilots in the PA28 did not see the other aircraft until it was too late for evasive action.

2. It is possible that the pilot in the Bonanza did not see the PA28.

3. It is probable that pilot lookout was inadequate.

The aircraft was 4 miles southwest of Sydney turning right onto heading 160 for left downwind runway 34, and was assigned descent to 4000 feet. Radar information indicated that the aircraft had descended to 3000 feet and this was confirmed by the pilot. The aircraft was recleared to climb immediately to 4000 feet for separation with departing traffic on runway 25.

The crew reported that the cockpit workload at the time was high and the pilot not flying missed the "500 feet to go" call. The pilot flying continued the descent to 3000 feet, forgetting that he had been assigned 4000 feet.

The aircraft was engaged on a passenger charter flight to Hayman and Hamilton Islands. The first flight from Shute Harbour to Hayman Island was without incident and the aircraft carried out a water landing. The landing gear was then extended and the aircraft taxied via the boat ramp to the terminal area. After boarding a passenger, the pilot taxied the aircraft back onto the water and retracted the landing gear. At this stage, he noted that the aircraft electrical system voltage indication was low and that there was no charge rate indicated. He decided to take off and fly to Hamilton Island and land on the runway. Hamilton Island is the maintenance facility for the operator.

Approaching Hamilton Island, the pilot attempted to make radio contact with the company but received no reply. The Hamilton Island Control Tower was not manned as it was outside its hours of operation. The pilot was unable to ascertain the position of the landing gear as the normal position indicators were not illuminated. He decided to overfly the runway at low level to gain the attention of company ground staff so that they could check the position of the landing gear. There were rain showers and high humidity in the area and the pilot experienced difficulty in observing the gear position via the wingtip-mounted mirrors.

The ground staff blocked the runway with a vehicle, signalled with a red light from the control tower and waved their arms in a fashion which the pilot took to be an indication that he should not land on the runway but alight on the water. However, the signals were meant to convey the message that the landing gear was not fully extended.

After briefing the passengers to put on their life jackets and adjust their seat belts, the pilot made an approach to the water to the north of the runway. The approach was normal but immediately after touchdown the aircraft nosed over and floated inverted in a nose-down attitude. The pilot escaped from the aircraft, which was filling with water, and then assisted the passengers to escape. They were all rescued uninjured by watercraft.

When the aircraft was recovered, it was found that all the wheels were locked in the up position except the left mainwheel which was partially up. Subsequent testing of the landing gear system could not find any fault in the hydraulic-powered extension/retraction system. The electrical failure was traced to a faulty transistor in the voltage regulator

The manual hydraulic landing gear extension system is activated by selecting the gear down with the normal lever and then operating a handle to pump down the four legs of the gear. The action of the lever is light and, when the gear is down, the lever is difficult to move. The position is then checked in the mirrors and by observing the left nosewheel position from the cockpit through the side window. It is considered probable that on this occasion, the pilot, having initially failed to fully extend the gear, selected the gear position lever to the up position and continued pumping, while never achieving a fully up position on all gear legs.

The pilot was experienced on the aircraft type and had completed the required company flight checks. However, his last check on this aircraft type was six months previously, and that check did not include the operation of the emergency gear extension system.

SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

1. The voltage regulator suffered an internal failure which resulted in the battery failing and no electrical power being available to the aircraft.

2. The weather conditions resulted in the cabin windows fogging, making observation of the landing gear position mirrors difficult.

3. The pilot was not adequately familiar with the operation of the emergency landing gear extension system.

4. The signals given to the pilot were misinterpreted as an instruction to alight on the water.

Once airborne from the departure runway, the landing gear was selected up. However, the gear did not complete the up cycle and the in-transit light remained on. All subsequent attempts to cycle or extend the gear were unsuccessful. During the subsequent landing roll, the gear collapsed.

Examination of the landing gear found that gear teeth had broken off the left main actuator crown wheel. Parts of the teeth were imbedded in the pinion gear. A similar type aircraft type in the operator's fleet was also found to have cracking around teeth in one of the landing gear crown wheels.

The CAA Airworthiness section advise that the manufacturer is aware of similar problems elsewhere and is currently undertaking remedial action.

The captain complained of an instance where Brisbane Flight Service passed so much traffic to the aircraft during the taxiing phase and during the take-off that the crew could not monitor the mandatory traffic advisory frequency (MTAF) adequately. All the traffic was assessed by the flight crew on the basis of the planned track but an amended clearance requiring a different track was issued when the aircraft had reached 500 feet soon after take-off.

The pilot reported that he selected gear down when established inbound on the approach and noted three green lights. He stated that he rechecked the gear indications on short final and again confirmed three greens. After a normal touchdown was accomplished, the nosewheel was lowered onto the runway and braking was commenced. The right hand side of the aircraft dropped slightly, the aircraft veered right, and the pilot assumed that the right hand tyre had blown. The right hand gear then collapsed and the propellor hit the ground.

The gear collapse was due to mechanical failure of the bell crank fitting, which then allowed the side brace locking mechanism to become unlocked.

Cessna 150, VH-WXS, was conducting dual instructional circuits on runway 17 when Harvard, VH-OVO, gave an inbound call. Cessna VH-WXS was climbing through 300 feet having done a touch-and-go when the instructor in VH-WXS heard the inbound call; he considered there was ample time for the student to continue the circuit for another touch and go prior to the arrival of VH-OVO. VH-WXS touched down near the 17 threshold. The instructor was retracting the flaps, and the student was about to apply take-off power when the Harvard passed about 50 feet overhead and touched down about 40 metres in front of VH-WXS. The instructor in VH-WXS immediately transmitted on the radio that the Cessna was on the runway and rejected the take-off. VH-OVO applied power and took off.

Neither the pilot-in-command nor the student in the Harvard saw the Cessna. The Harvard had performed a fairly steep approach whereas the Cessna had made a normal approach. The Cessna was below and in front and hidden from the Harvard pilots' view during the final approach. The Harvard was probably in such a position on the final approach that it was also hidden from the view of the Cessna pilots.

Significant Factor

The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilots in the Harvard did not confirm the whereabouts of the Cessna before making an approach to land.

A report was received from the pilot of VH-SKB saying a Navajo type aircraft had passed about 100 feet above the top of his aircraft, on a reciprocal track. He expressed concern that although the other aircraft was on the radar advisory frequency it had not been passed advice on his aircraft which had the transponder on code 2000. VH-SKB was on a visual flight rules flight. The other aircraft, VH-KGN, was on an instrument flight rules flight. No report was received from the pilot of VH-KGN.

The close proximity took place 10 kilometres south of Moorabbin Airport. This area is in a buffer zone, which extends from 5.5 kilometres to 14.8 kilometres, around the Moorabbin control zone. Within this airspace radar advisory service traffic information is only passed to aircraft operating under instrument flight rules, about other aircraft operating under instrument flight rules.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilot of VH-SKB did not see the other aircraft in time to allow for an increase in separation.

2. The aircraft were operating in an area where the radar advisory service did not give advice to aircraft operating under instrument flight rules, about aircraft operating under visual flight rules.

The aircraft was being flown by a student conducting solo circuit practice. During the ground roll following the second landing the pilot lost directional control of the aircraft. The aircraft ran off the right of the runway into soft ground and turned through 90 degrees before coming to rest against a ditch. The propeller and nose gear received damage.

A number of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) aircraft, one at Devonport and two others inbound to Devonport, were unable to contact a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) aircraft, VH-CGH, which called seven miles inbound to Devonport. The weather was marginal with the cloud base at 600 feet. After two unsuccessful attempts to land, VH-CGH departed for Wynyard.

The pilot of VH-CGH had recently passed a biennial flight review. He had recently returned to flying after a considerable lapse. At the time of the incident, he was having trouble with selection switches on the VHF radio. He had selected audio to headphones instead of the speaker such that he could transmit but not hear any replies from other aircraft.

There was no known breakdown in separation between aircraft.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilot was unfamiliar with the radio selection switches installed in the aircraft.

2. The pilot operated at Devonport in non-visual meteorological weather conditions.