The aircraft was engaged in dropping parachutists. Prior to commencing the flight the pilot reported that he inspected the airstrip and calculated, from the performance charts for the aircraft, that adequate take-off distance was available. After lift off the aircraft did not climb as the pilot expected. He then turned the aircraft left to avoid trees at the end of the strip. In doing so the left wing struck a dead tree that the pilot had not seen.

A 10cm wide hole was torn in the undersurface of the wing from the leading edge to the aileron. As the aircraft continued to perform adequately the pilot decided to divert to the more suitable airfield at Coolangatta, 30 km to the north. The subsequent landing was without incident. The wind velocity was south-south-easterly at 10-15 knots and the take-off was conducted into wind. 

here is high ground to the north-west of the strip and under certain conditions downdraughts are present in the area of the strip. However, on this occasion the prevailing wind was not conducive to their formation. The reason for the lack of climb performance was not determined.

A Bandeirante aircraft, VH-XFL, was parked in the western run-up bay and facing into an 8 to 12kt wind. A maintenance engineer was at the controls conducting an engine run. A Tiger Moth aircraft, VH-BXF, landed on runway 33 and commenced taxiing via taxiways YANKEE and ALPHA. This entailed taxiing behind the Bandeirante. As BXF taxied behind XFL, it was blown over onto its nose and left wing tip.

The engineer did not respond, over a period of one minute and forty seconds, to radio calls from the Surface Movement Controller (SMC) telling him to shut down the engines. The engines were eventually shut down following signals from ground personnel. The pilot of the Tiger Moth aircraft later indicated that he was not aware that the area occupied by the Bandeirante aircraft was a designated run-up area and he assumed that the aircraft was waiting for a take-off clearance at a holding point.

He also indicated that he had taxied behind other turbo-prop aircraft which had their engines running, without problem. When the engineer in charge of the Bandeirante asked for taxi clearance to the run-up bay, there was no mention of an engine run. The SMC was thus unaware that an engine run was the purpose of entering the area. The engineer reported that power greater than 50 percent was not used and that he regarded this as low power.

However, the propeller wash was strong enough to drastically affect the Tiger Moth some 50m behind. The severity of the propeller wash was exacerbated by the local wind conditions.

The pilot decided to divert to Mudgee when deteriorating weather conditions were encountered near Narrabri. Upon arrival in the Mudgee circuit, he positioned the aircraft for a landing on runway 04. On the downwind leg, the before landing checks were completed by reference to a checklist. The aircraft was established on the final approach with all prelanding checks completed. At a height of about 200 feet, both engines lost power simultaneously. The aircraft touched down heavily in a field about 100 metres short of the threshold to runway 04 and was substantially damaged as a result of ground impact forces. The reason for the simultaneous double engine failure was not positively established. However, it is possible that when the pilot carried out the before landing checks, both auxiliary electric fuel pumps were inadvertently selected to the high setting rather than low. Consequently, when the throttles were moved towards the idle position on the final approach, both engines lost power due to an over rich mixture.

During an approach in mild crosswind conditions, the pilot misjudged the flare for landing by rounding out high. She held a level attitude until the aircraft sank onto the runway. This resulted in a heavy landing followed by a bounce. She held a level attitude again until the aircraft stalled, which resulted in the nose gear striking the runway first. The nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest on the runway. The pilot later said that she had not had any training in bounced landings.

SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

1. The pilot applied the incorrect recovery technique following a bounced landing.

2. Inadequate training of pilot by relevant flying school.

SAFETY ACTION

The information concerning her lack of training in bounced landing recovery was relayed to the Archerfield Flying Operations Inspectors of the Civil Aviation Authority.

The pilot reported that the circuit and landing were normal. After about 200 metres of ground roll the nosewheel began to shimmy and the nose gear collapsed. The aircraft came to a stop on the runway and all occupants evacuated without injury.

The maintenance organisation which recovered the aircraft advised that they have identified and changed an intermittently faulty down lock microswitch. A detailed rigging check was carried out and all dimensions and tolerance were found to be in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications. The maintenance organisation was unable to duplicate the unlock condition during multiple retractions on the ground.

After finishing four hours of commercial sling loading operations, the pilot loaded one passenger to conduct a brief non-commercial operation. He took off and flew past the helipad a couple of times so that photographs could be taken, after which he returned to the same helipad for a landing. The pilot advised that he performed a normal approach to land on the helipad. The helipad was 1300 feet above sea level. At the time the temperature was about 17 degrees Celsius, and the wind was almost calm. From about 15 feet the pilot was unable to fully stop the rate of descent despite the application of full power.

The helicopter landed heavily on the helipad. During the touchdown the tail rotor contacted a rock which was protruding slightly at the edge of the helipad. As the helicopter was quite capable of performing a safe landing in the prevailing conditions, it is probable that the pilot inadvertently approached the helipad too quickly; this is consistent with his inability to arrest the rate of descent. The tail rotor strike occurred as the pilot was pre-occupied trying to avoid an excessively heavy landing.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. It is probable that the pilot approached the helipad too fast to arrest the rate of descent.

2. The tail rotor strike was probably the result of the pilot being pre-occupied with the heavy landing.

The aircraft was engaged in mustering operations and was returning to refuel before continuing the task. At about 30 feet, with about 10 knots forward speed, the engine hesitated once and then stopped. The pilot had insufficient time to enter autorotation or significantly cushion the descent before the aircraft landed heavily.

Aircraft under the control of Brisbane Approach (North) in the period leading up to the occurrence included:

- VH-TNG which was on left downwind at 3000 feet for a runway 01 ILS approach.

- VH-CZL which was about 20 nm final for runway 01 ILS approach.

- VH-JEX, a VFR aircraft out of Brisbane, heading north-west on climb to 4500 feet.

- An Army helicopter transiting Approach (North) airspace south of the aerodrome.

- A number of aircraft inbound from the north-west.

As VH-JEX climbed, it experienced problems maintaining visual flight and required a number of clearance amendments with respect to both heading and altitude. During this process, the Approach (North) controller became aware of another aircraft, VH-CFQ orbiting Archerfield at 1000 feet awaiting clearance into Approach (North) airspace. The controller involved said that he was not sure how long VH-CFQ had been airborne at Archerfield but was aware of feeling under some pressure to issue a clearance.

He cleared VH-CFQ to enter controlled airspace on climb to 3000 feet west of the Mt Coot-tha TV towers and returned his attention to VH-JEX and the inbound traffic from the north. A short time later, he looked to check the progress of VH-CFQ and saw a conflict with VH-TNG developing. He instructed both aircraft to turn left. However, this resulted in VH-TNG conflicting with VH-CZL. The controller then told VH-TNG to turn right for separation with VH-CZL. The 5 nm separation standard was infringed in both instances, the radar recording indicating the minimum distance to have been 3.5 nm each time.

SIGIFICANT FACTORS

1. Controller workload was significantly increased by the clearance amendments necessary for VH-JEX.

2. The controller felt under pressure to clear VH-CFQ from Archerfield into controlled airspace.

3. The clearance given to VH-JEX was inappropriate and led to the losses of separation.

The aircraft departed Kununurra for Perth using rated take off power and 30 flap. Shortly after reducing power via the Thrust Management System to 800 degrees and raising the flap to 18 degrees, a fire warning for No 3 engine was indicated in the cockpit. As the captain commenced to move the power lever towards Flight Idle, the fire warning stopped. The captain analysed the indication and assessed the warning as false.

As the aircraft was too heavy to immediately land at Kununurra, he elected to continue the flight towards Perth, after having ensured that he had suitable landing points available enroute if required. Engineers discovered that a fire detector on the recently fitted engine had come into contact with the engine, and the prolonged, higher power setting on take-off had tripped the detector and triggered the warning.

The inexperienced pilot was on a solo visual flight rules (VFR) navigation exercise from Essendon, tracking via Moorabbin, Kyabram, Calivil, Melton South and returning to Essendon. After passing Kyabram the pilot observed cloud developing to the west and decided to amend his route. Before reaching Bendigo, he turned south and, as there was cloud ahead, the aircraft was climbed to 4,000 ft, on top of cloud. The pilot then established communications with Melbourne Radar Advisory Service (RAS) and requested navigation assistance.

A short time later, RAS advised the pilot that he had just passed Trentham. At about this stage the aircraft was inadvertently flown into cloud. The pilot experienced control difficulties, because of the turbulence in the area, and reported to RAS that he was "descending quite fast", but that he was trying to climb. Another pilot advised the pilot of VH-JAC to "just keep your wings level." Less than a minute later, the pilot of VH-JAC reported he was upside down and going to crash.

The aircraft broke out of cloud, below the cloud and close to the ground, in a steep nose-down attitude. The pilot managed to regain control and avoid trees. Visual flight was then continued, and the aircraft was diverted to Bacchus Marsh where a landing was made.