The pilot was a member of a group of Chinese ex-military pilots who were being trained to allow them to reach the equivalent of an Australian Agricultural rating. He had almost completed this course and was being checked on a simulated spraying exercise by an Examiner of Airmen watching from the ground. The pilot, who did not speak English, was being provided with instructions via an interpreter. At the completion of the check, the pilot intended to carry out a normal landing into the east. However as he was about to turn downwind, he was advised to "come back quickly". A steep turn was made to position the aircraft on a low and close base for landing into the west. The final approach turn was overshot, and during the attempt to line up with the strip the aircraft stalled, struck the ground heavily and overturned. The instructor supervising the training of the pilots had noticed that thunderstorms were developing about 20 kilometres south of the strip. He had asked the interpreter to advise the remaining pilots not to waste time during their respective flights, in case the storms moved closer. The interpreter, who did not have an aeronautical background, had misconstrued the message and had passed the instruction to return quickly to the pilot. During the modified approach the pilot had not monitored the airspeed and had insufficient height available to recover control when the aircraft stalled.

The pilot was approaching to land after a soaring flight of about 90 minutes. When about 300 metres short of the threshold he realised that the aircraft was undershooting and he was conscious of a loss of airspeed. He closed the airbrakes and lowered the nose but said that he got very little response. He then pushed the nose down further to try to regain speed. By this stage he was very close to the airfield boundary. The left wing clipped a fence and the aircraft struck the ground and skidded to a halt. The wind at the time of the accident was reported as a 15 knot northerly with occasional gusts to 20 knots. There was some evidence of wind shear on final approach. The investigation established that two days prior to the accident the pilot carried out a check flight with an instructor in an IS28B glider. Prior to that flight he had only made two sailplane flights in the previous 10 months both being under the supervision of an instructor. Between the check flight and the accident flight the pilot made two local soaring flights each of about 90 minutes duration. Of his 915 hours total flying experience 70 were in gliders. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation and the circumstances described above are based on the pilot's report.

Circumstances:

The pilot was guiding the balloon to a final approach for landing into a large clearing. He attempted to reduce a slight overshoot by operating the parachute vent, which is actuated by pulling on a line, of which the lower section is constructed of Kevlar material. When pulled, the lower parachute vent line became detached at a bowline joint, resulting in the balloon touching down near a large gum tree. After touchdown the envelope drifted onto the tree, sustaining substantial damage. The lower vent line was originally constructed from stainless steel but had been replaced with Kevlar in accordance with an engineering order from the manufacturer.

After a dual check, the student was authorised for his second solo flight. He was briefed to practice simple hover manoeuvres and landings on the grass. When he was confident with these, he was to practice landings on the hard-stand. By about 0935 hours, he had not practised any hard-stand landings, but as he had been briefed to return to the school by 0940, he commenced to taxy back along the taxiway. About halfway back, feeling tired, he decided to land on the taxiway to rest before continuing. He turned the aircraft into the gusty, westerly wind, and commenced a landing. He allowed the aircraft to drift backward off the taxiway and reverted to an earlier fault of landing quickly. The right skid heel dug into the grass and the left skid then hit firmly. The student allowed the aircraft to bounce, drift left, yaw and hit the ground again with the heels of both skids. The student was quite shaken and remained on the ground for about two minutes before hover taxiing the helicopter to the hangar. A subsequent inspection revealed substantial damage to the landing skid attachments. This accident was not the subject of a formal on scene investigation.

Circumstances:

The pilot was operating into a modified platform located in mountainous terrain and built on a steep slope. He had landed there about ten times in the previous forty eight hours, in support of a geological survey team. The weather at the time was fine, with occasional gusts of wind. The pilot held the helicopter skids lightly on the platform, parallel to the heavy loose planks making up the platform, and side on to the slope. It was estimated that the tips of the main rotor blades were about 1.5 metres vertically clear of the slope, with the cyclic control in the neutral position and the rotors at normal operating rpm. One man was present in the rear cabin to receive trays of core samples from four others who carried the trays to the helicopter. The pilot was unable to remember exactly what happened, but the man receiving the core trays into the cabin clearly remembers a very strong wind gust which caused the tail of the helicopter to suddenly swing towards the slope. He was also aware of the cabin moving slightly towards the slope because a core tray suddenly became harder to reach. He was also aware of the left side of the helicopter suddenly lifting slightly prior to massive vibrations consistent with rotor strikes. The main rotor blades clipped the tops of small stumps before striking the ground forward of the stumps. The rotor strikes were so severe that the main rotor and gearbox assembly were torn out of the helicopter and flung 10 metres down the slope. Sudden stoppage forces shattered the engine reduction gearbox and the free turbine, parts of which penetrated the rear luggage compartment. The rear of the engine caught fire briefly. Injuries sustained by ground personnel occurred as they ran for cover. The helicopter remained upright on the platform. The site did not meet the approved helicopter landing site standards prescribed by the Civil Aviation Authority.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The helicopter landing site contained obstructions likely to interfere with the manoeuvring of the helicopter.

2. The helicopter was affected by a strong gust of wind.

3. The pilot was unable to prevent the rotor blades striking obstructions at the site.

4. It is highly probable that the right side skid settled between the insecure planks of the platform.

The pilot had refuelled the aircraft to capacity with mogas, and then carried out two flights of about 20 minutes duration each. Takeoff for the third flight was into wind, and towards a rain shower. At about 20 feet above the ground the aircraft began to sink. The pilot lowered the nose and applied full power, but no change in engine note was detected and it appeared that full power was not being delivered. The sink continued, and the pilot commenced a gentle turn to the left to avoid a power line beyond the end of the strip. When ground contact was imminent the pilot closed the throttle and landed straight ahead into an open grass paddock. During the landing roll the aircraft collided with a mound of earth. The pilot later advised that he had not had time to dump the load before the aircraft was almost in ground contact, and he then anticipated that a safe landing was possible. He also stated that prior to this flight he had considered ceasing operations, but was influenced to continue because the weather at the treatment area was favourable, and because a further load of chemical had already been mixed. No defects were discovered with the engine, and a test carried out using mogas revealed that the engine was capable of developing full power. The quality of the fuel being used at the time of the accident could not be determined as the fuel tank was ruptured and the entire contents were lost. The engine is not approved for operation on mogas. It was possible the rain shower near the end of the strip may have generated a wind effect sufficient to degrade the climb performance of the aircraft.

The pilot was temporarily replacing the pilot who normally flew the aircraft. After arriving at Kidston he checked the fuel quantity gauge and decided that there was sufficient fuel on board for the return flight. As the aircraft approached top of climb, the pilot found that the fuel gauge indicated a lower fuel quantity than he had expected. He re-checked the indicated quantity after the aircraft was established in cruise and decided that sufficient fuel still remained to complete the planned flight. Shortly after passing Mt Garnet both engine fuel flow gauges began to fluctuate and the engines began to surge. The pilot immediately turned the aircraft towards the Mt Garnet strip, but shortly afterwards both engines failed. The pilot attempted to glide the aircraft to the strip, but it collided with trees and came to rest about one kilometre from the runway 27 threshold. Both engines had failed due to fuel exhaustion. The pilot normally flew a different type of aircraft, this aircraft only being used by the company to supplement its services. For company aircraft normal route fuel requirements are specified. As a result, there was little need for him to make significant fuel calculations. On this occasion, the pilot found he had little time between his arrival at Cairns and the scheduled DEPARTURE of his next flight. He ordered that only 80 litres of fuel be added to the aircraft tanks. The calculated fuel burn for the proposed return flight to Kidston was approximately 240 litres. However, on DEPARTURE from Cairns it was estimated that only about 220 litres of fuel was in the aircraft tanks. Refuelling facilities were available at Kidston but no fuel was added to the aircraft tanks.

Circumstances:

The pilot was supporting a survey team in the field and was positioning to pick up some team members. The landing site chosen had been used to drop off the team members and although level, it was situated on a rocky knob in a gully. The wind at the time was about twenty knots and gusting from the South-East. The pilot initiated an approach into wind but elected to fly the aircraft partially sideways to overcome what he described as restricted visibility from the cockpit. Just before touchdown the gusty wind caused the tail to swing, and the tail rotor struck a small cairn of rocks. The tail rotor, tail boom and drive train were damaged.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Operational hazard - confined landing area and gusty winds. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

Circumstances:

The pilot under check advised the tower controller that the pilot in command wished to demonstrate an engine failure after take-off from runway 33 and that they would land on runway 15. The controller gave approval for this sequence and issued a take-off clearance. Four minutes earlier, a Dash 8 aircraft had been cleared for take-off (this aircraft was making an intersection DEPARTURE) from the same runway. VH-CES was observed to turn back towards the runway and descend normally but contacted the ground adjacent to the runway right wing low and sideslipping to the right. The landing gear collapsed, and the aircraft came to rest facing north-east. Wind at the time was from 030` at 5-10 kts. The pilot reported that the aircraft had experienced a bump similar to that when encountering wake turbulence. The bump was encountered shortly after the aircraft commenced the turn back to the runway, and after the throttle was closed. The aircraft then experienced windshear and downdraft to the extent that the rate of descent could not be arrested before ground impact. VH-CES took off some 2-3 min after the Dash 8. Because the Dash 8 weighs less than 25,000 kg, no wake separation standard was required to be applied by the aerodrome controller. The wake produced by the Dash 8 right wing would, in nil wind conditions, travel away from the runway at about 5 kts. Under the crosswind conditions prevailing at the time, however, the wake could have remained in the vicinity of the runway. This, along with the significant weight difference between the two aircraft, could have led to the flight path of VH-CES being adversely affected.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident

1. Crosswind conditions prevailed.

2. Wake turbulence was generated by a departing aircraft.

3. The aircraft was probably affected by wake turbulence during approach.

The pilot reported that, following landing gear retraction after takeoff, the landing gear unsafe light remained on. He reselected the gear down and obtained three green lights but the unsafe light again remained illuminated when the gear was selected up again. Suspecting that the problem was related to a microswitch, the pilot continued the flight. However, the nose gear collapsed during the landing roll. The nose gear drag brace strut connected to the landing gear strut had failed, allowing the gear leg to hang free. There was evidence that the part had been cracked for some time until it failed on gear retraction on this flight. The initial crack was induced by excessive forward load on the gear leg. However, the actual source of this load was not established. No specific inspection of that part of the aircraft was required, nor was the area easy to see during maintenance or preflight inspections. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.