During the flight there were indications that the wind may increase in strength, so the pilot elected to cut short the trip and selected an area for landing. A low flat approach was made to a large grassed field and the balloon touched down with little rate of descent in an 8 to 10 knot wind. When the basket first touched the ground, one of the passengers let go of the hand rope and was thrown forward over other crouching passengers and out of the basket. The balloon lifted off again and finally came to rest after dragging for about six metres. The ejected passenger was found to have a broken left collar bone. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

Spraying operations were planned to be conducted on two paddocks. A briefing on the operation was passed to the pilot by telephone by one of the owners of the property the previous evening. The briefing indicated that a particular power line was strung outside the boundary of the smaller of the paddocks, clear of the likely swath run approach path. Based on the information supplied, the pilot drew a map of the area. In fact, the line cut across the corner of the paddock. Before commencing operations, the pilot carried out an aerial inspection of the area. However, he failed to detect the actual position of the power line. While descending for the first run over the paddock, the aircraft struck the line. The impact partially severed the left wing, and a fire broke out behind the engine firewall. The pilot was able to complete a semi-controlled landing in the adjacent paddock, and the fire was extinguished by the ground party.

During the final approach, the pilot observed kangaroos near the edge of the strip. He continued the approach, expecting the animals to take fright at the approaching aircraft and clear the strip. However, just prior to touchdown, one of the animals bounded towards the aircraft. The pilot attempted to carry out a go-around but the animal struck the right elevator causing substantial damage to the empennage and rear fuselage. The go-around attempt was abandoned and the aircraft was landed. No means was available to prevent animals from entering the flight strip. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

The maingear uplock assembly had just been fitted with a new seal and the aircraft was flown to ensure the correct operation of the system. The gear retracted normally but could not be lowered and a gear up landing was made. Inspection revealed that the unit had been incorrectly reassembled after the seal was changed. The maintenance had been performed by an unlicenced engineer who had not previously completed a similar task. When carrying out the work he did not refer to either the aircraft maintenance manual or a licenced engineer. On completion of the job no retraction tests were carried out. The engineer believed that the work he had performed would only effect the operation of the gear doors, and not the retraction and extension of the landing gear.

Just after takeoff, at about 40 feet above ground level, the engine began to misfire and run roughly, then failed completely. The pilot dumped the load and commenced a steep turn to the left in an attempt to land on a track behind the aircraft. During the turn he realised that the aircraft would not make the chosen area and the aircraft was stalled into the tops of the trees. After the impact it descended steeply to the ground. The pilot escaped with scratches and some bruising. Subsequent inspection of the engine found that the left magneto had become detached from its mountings because of the loss of the retaining nuts. The mount bolts of both magnetos were fitted with spring washers rather than being lockwired. When the left magneto detached it pulled and broke the right magneto switch lead. It appears that the broken lead then contacted part of the engine and grounded the right magneto, depriving the engine of an ignition source.

The pilot was directing cattle through a gate when a cow turned and began to walk back towards the helicopter. It stopped in front of the aircraft before charging. The pilot applied back cyclic and up collective in an attempt to avoid the animal but the tail rotor struck the ground. The helicopter began to yaw and the pilot landed the aircraft immediately. It continued to yaw after the landing and the landing skid assembly was substantially damaged. The pilot was relatively inexperienced on the helicopter type, having the majority of his recent experience on more powerful and responsive types. On this occasion, the rate of cyclic application was too great and not compensated for by the collective input. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

On arrival in the circuit area, the pilot noted that the wind was varying in direction by about 60 degrees and was gusting from about 5 to 20 knots. The strip in use was 500 metres in length and full flap was extended during the approach. Touchdown was made about 150 metres beyond the aiming point, and a series of bounces of increasing intensity occurred. The nosewheel separated from the strut and the aircraft came to rest 60 metres before the end of the strip. The approach to the strip was made in moderately turbulent conditions. The pilot, who had relatively limited experience in operating into short strips, had attempted to force the aircraft onto the ground.

The pilot was conducting a series of solo circuits and landings into a wind of 10 to 20 knots, with occasional gusts to 25 knots. On the third approach, the aircraft had been flared for landing when it suddenly ballooned and a wing dropped. Full power was applied, but the aircraft sank heavily to the strip and the nosegear collapsed. The student pilot had reacted correctly when a sudden wind gust was encountered, however he had been unable to prevent a heavy touchdown. This accident was not the subject of an on scene investigation.

The pilot intended to land the helicopter near a water tank so that he could free sheep bogged in the muddy ground. When the aircraft was at about 80 feet agl on descent, the pilot applied power and raised the collective to reduce the rate of descent. He heard a bang, followed by a noise he described as clutch growl and the helicopter began to vibrate severely. The collective was lowered momentarily and power was reapplied, however, the clutch growl and vibration continued. The pilot lowered the collective but the helicopter struck the ground firmly at a low forward speed and the main rotor severed the tail boom. Subsequent investigation revealed that the clutch had suffered an overload failure, however the reason for the failure was not determined. The associated loss of power occurred at a height and speed combination which precluded the pilot from establishing an autorotative descent.

On his previous two refuelling stops the pilot filled both the main and auxiliary tanks. At his final refuelling stop the pilot filled the main tank only as he expected to be airborne for no more than a further 30 minutes. The pilot normally used elapsed time in conjunction with the fuel gauge indications to determine his safe endurance. He did not note the time following his last refuel. The final flight lasted considerably longer than expected and the pilot forgot to monitor the fuel usage. Shortly before the accident the pilot noted that the fuel gauge was reading between empty and one quarter full. At that point the pilot had less than his minimum fuel reserve on board the aircraft. He was aware that the low fuel warning system was unserviceable and he could have established radio contact with his home base to arrange for fuel. Suitable areas existed in the vicinty where a precautionary landing could have been carried out. He decided, however, to continue flying towards a stock yard where fuel was located. Approximately 5 minutes later the engine stopped, from fuel exhaustion, with the helicopter at a low height above the ground.