The student pilot was returning from his first solo trip to the training area where he had been practicing steep turns. He made a straight in approach for Runway 11 Left. The current Terminal Information (ATIS) reported the wind as 060 degrees 10 to 15 knots, crosswind mean 8 maximum 13 knots. As the aircraft touched down it started to drift to the right. The pilot attempted to correct this with rudder and started to apply power. The aircraft ground looped to the left through 45 degrees. The nose leg failed and the propeller contacted the runway. The aircraft came to rest on the grass to the left of Runway 11 Left. This accident was not the subject of a formal on-scene investigation.

The approach to land was made in light wind conditions and at an approximate rate of descent of 200 feet per minute. The landing was firm. When the basket impacted with the ground the pilot flying the balloon was thrown forward and fell onto the passenger. The passenger's leg was broken. The rate of descent was not excessive and should not have caused the occupants to be thrown about if they were correctly braced prior to touchdown. The pilot reported that he lost concentration at a critical moment and did not brace himself sufficiently for the landing.

During the landing approach the pilot became preoccupied with his proximity to the preceding aircraft approaching the same runway. On touchdown the aircraft bounced slightly and then the pilot lost directional control. He tried to regain control but was not successful in doing so. The aircraft ran off the runway, entered soft ground and overturned. The accident occurred on the pilot's first solo flight in the aircraft type and the landing was his first solo landing. He said that having done further training in the type since the accident, it had become evident to him that the aircraft felt quite different to land with one on board instead of two. He also felt that he should have done more circuits and landings prior to going solo.

The pilot also believed that his preoccupation with the preceding aircraft resulted in insufficient attention being paid to airspeed. With hindsight he should have made a go-around rather than persevere with the landing attempt. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation and this report is based on information supplied by the pilot.

Circumstances:

The pilot with considerable rotary wing but limited fixed wing experience, was conducting a flight to an airstrip which he had previously inspected by motor vehicle. The airstrip is aligned 080 degrees magnetic, approximately 870 metres long, and is located on the northern side of a tree enclosed paddock. On arrival, and without further assessment of the airstrip characteristics, the pilot joined the circuit for a landing to the east into a slight headwind. During final approach he lined-up to the right of the airstrip until alerted by the front seat passenger. The pilot then realigned the aircraft with the actual strip while continuing the approach. Despite being high he did not consider going around. Crossing the threshold the pilot estimated his height as 50 feet above ground level with an airspeed of 90 knots. The aircraft bounced on initial landing and did not settle until almost 400 metres beyond the threshold. During the landing roll and with only 250 metres remaining, the pilot considered but then disregarded going around. He applied heavy braking causing the main wheels to lock-up. The aircraft skidded and overran the strip before entering a three metre wide track of soft soil, with a slight rise of firm ground on the far side, which partially dislodged the landing gear. It then continued for a further nine metres before coming to rest ten metres to the right of the airstrip centreline, on a heading of 115 degrees magnetic. The aircraft Flight Manual landing weight chart indicates that the airstrip length was adequate.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot failed to perform an adequate pre-landing inspection of the airstrip.

2. The pilot carried out an inaccurate approach to land.

3. The pilot failed to carry out a go around.

4. Insufficient stopping distance remained following touchdown.

During routine fuel management enroute, the pilot had selected in turn the right TIP tank, the right MAIN tank and then the left MAIN tank. To complete his pre-descent checks, the pilot elected to leave the fuel selector on what he thought was the left MAIN tank. The pilot had previously notified a change of destination as Kingoonya due to the onset of last light. At about 1800 feet on descent, the engine coughed and stopped although the propeller kept turning. The pilot completed his trouble checks including changing the tank selection to the next position to the left on the selector panel which he thought was the left TIP tank. Engine power was not restored, so the pilot continued to concentrate on the forced landing. At a few hundred feet above the ground, the pilot recalled making a final check of the fuel selector position and found that it was in the OFF position. The left MAIN tank was reselected but the engine did not respond before the aircraft touched down. During the landing roll, the nosewheel struck a fallen branch and the noseleg folded under the nose cowl. The investigation established that the pilot had flown only five hours in the last three months, one hour in the last thirty days and had a total of only eleven hours on type.

Circumstances:

The pilot was familiar with the area and had been given instructions by the property owner that he was to fly spray runs parallel to rows in the crop. The pilot misinterpreted these instructions which resulted in him flying parallel to the eastern boundary of the area rather than the western boundary. He then became partly disoriented with respect to the position of a single wire power line. The right wing of the aircraft struck the wire and the outer 120cm of the leading edge of the wing was lost. The rudder was also damaged by the wire. The pilot was able to retain control of the aircraft and landed without further incident. The pilot reported that the early morning light conditions were less than ideal for seeing wires.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not clarify the instructions he was given.
2. Visibility was limited because of the early morning light conditions.
3. The pilot did not see or avoid the wire.

The pilot was contracted to spray three areas of sorghum of 160, 200, and 44 acres on adjacent properties. He was not familiar with the areas. The owner of the 44 acre area had arranged his spraying through his neighbour who owned the larger areas. The owner of the larger areas spoke to the pilot by telephone about his and the 44 acre areas. However, he spoke in detail only about his areas and the directions the pilot should follow to locate them from the air. The pilot was given a comprehensive briefing by radio by the property owner of the larger areas when he arrived overhead before he began spraying. This briefing included detailed information on power lines in the immediate vicinity of the areas. Mention also was made that one of the power lines continued through the property containing the 44 acre crop. The pilot completed spraying of the larger areas and was then told to follow a road to the property containing the 44 acre area. Radio communications between the owner of the 44 acre area and the pilot were difficult because of intermittent transmission problems with the property owner's radio. Nevertheless, the information about which contours were to be sprayed was passed to the pilot. There was no reference to power lines by either the pilot or the property owner during this exchange. The contours to be sprayed curved from a south-easterly through to a westerly direction. A single power line ran approximately east-west along the extreme southern edge of the contour area. Immediately beyond the power line was an area of tall trees. The pilot began spraying north-east/south-west and completed about three quarters of the task with runs in this direction. To spray the final southern-most section of the crop, the pilot changed the direction of his runs to approximately north-south. As the aircraft pulled up at the completion of the second run, it suddenly rotated to a near 90 degree nose-up attitude. The nose then pitched forward and the aircraft entered a steep dive to the ground, coming to rest inverted and bursting into flames. The power line across the southern edge of the crop had been severed. Marks were found on the right main landing gear leg of the aircraft indicating that the wire had contacted the leg some 30 cm above the wheel and then slid down the leg, possibly becoming entangled in the wheel before breaking. The aircraft impacted the ground 123 metres beyond the wire. No fault was found with the aircraft or its systems which might have contributed to the accident. The wire and poles were not hazards for the initial north-east/south-west runs. For the final run, the pilot would have had to pull up early, i.e. before the end of the crop, to avoid the wire. The pull-up appears to have been made in relation to the trees beyond the crop rather than the wire. The single pole which might have warned the pilot of the presence of the power line was of natural colour and against a background of tall trees. It was to the right of the flight path and therefore not in his direct field of view.

The pilot planned two flights from Tyabb to Melbourne Airport and return. Prior to DEPARTURE he refuelled the left tank of the aircraft to full and estimated that fuel onboard was then 88 litres. He nominated a fuel endurance of 150 minutes. The planned total flight time was 92 minutes. No problems were encountered on the first return flight which took a total flight time of 59 minutes. On the second flight to Melbourne the aircraft was held for about 15 minutes, due to other traffic. When taxying for DEPARTURE from Melbourne the pilot noticed the fuel gauges were reading empty, but because these do not read accurately in the ground attitude he did not accept the indications as reliable. After take off the aircraft was climbed to again cruise at 3000 feet. When in the vicinity of Williamstown the pilot noticed both fuel gauges were indicating near empty. The aircraft was rolled and the pilot noted the gauges moved, indicating to him that there was some fuel in each tank. The pilot decided that there was no need to declare an emergency. A decision was made to refuel at Moorabbin but a descent clearance was not available. After vacating controlled airspace, just south of Moorabbin, he advised that the aircraft would divert to Moorabbin. Just as he did so the engine failed and a forced landing was carried out onto a racetrack. The aircraft ran through a fence during the landing roll. Draining both fuel tanks produced about half a litre of fuel. The pilot stated that the mixture had been leaned for all the flights. The total flight time up until the time of engine failure was approximately 125 minutes. In doing his fuel consumption calculations the pilot did not allow for fuel used on taxy/takeoff and the higher consumption rate on climb. Instead he worked on a lean mixture consumption rate for cruise. Calculations using the manufacturers consumption figures found that all usable fuel would have been consumed at the time of the engine failure. There was no reason why the pilot could not have started the flights with full tanks or have refuelled in between them.

The pilot was making the return leg of a flight to his home base when the engine commenced to run roughly and a strong fuel odour was detected in the cabin. He immediately changed fuel tanks, returned the mixture control to rich and turned the fuel pump on. This aggravated the situation and caused the engine to rich cut. While preparing for the inevitable forced landing and carrying out the emergency checks, the pilot turned the fuel off. The engine immediately regained power before cutting again. By moving the fuel selector between the off and on positions he was able to keep the engine operating until he had positioned the aircraft over a more hospitable, but not ideal, area for a forced landing. During the approach the pilot turned all systems off and stopped the engine. The landing was towards the west into the setting sun, which obscured his vision and caused him to overshoot his selected landing area. He then had to land in the next paddock which was uphill with windrows built across it. During the landing, the pilot was able to dodge two windrows, but failed to see another one further up the hill and collided with it, causing damage to the nose area of the aircraft, and possibly dislodging the battery from the firewall. The pilot was able to exit the aircraft before a fierce fire broke out and consumed the aircraft. The Civil Aviation Authority has published material relating to the possibility of aromatics in low leaded Av gas and motor spirits affecting composite material carburettor floats, which can cause carburettor flooding. Although the aircraft's carburettor had been badly burnt it was possible to identify that the charred remains of the float had been of a composite material, but not if it had been affected by the fuel. These types of floats are no longer available as replacement items.

The pilot was making a landing on a dirt strip 822 metres in length. The conditions were calm and the temperature was 37 degrees Celsius. The aircraft floated for some distance before touchdown. Although heavy braking was commenced the pilot reported it was apparent the aircraft would not stop before the end of the strip. A ground loop was initiated during which the aircraft entered soft ground. The nose leg was bent as the aircraft tipped onto a wing tip.