Circumstances:

The aircraft had been involved in asymmetric training, and the landing gear had been cycled two or three times during the flight. On the final down selection, a green light was obtained for the mainwheels but not for the nosewheel. The landing gear was recycled with the same result. Emergency landing gear extension was carried out, again with the same result. The aircraft was landed with the nosewheel in the retracted position. Inspection of the nose landing gear system revealed that the forward pivot arms of the door operating mechanism had moved through the over-centre position. This condition, about which there is a warning in the Beech 76 Maintenance Manual, will cause the nose landing gear not to extend. Damage inside the nosewheel well indicated that, during the last retraction cycle, the landing gear drag brace pin became positioned outside the slot in the door actuating fork, forcing the forward pivot arms into the over-centre position. No fault was found with the rigging of the of the nose gear/door mechanism and extension/retraction of the landing gear was normal, apart from some stiffness in the nose gear door hinges. The fault could be duplicated during ground tests by applying side loads, such as might have occurred during unbalanced flight, to the nose landing gear doors. The stiffness in the door hinges might also have been of significance. In 1983 Beechcraft issued Service Instruction 1209 to reduce the possibility of binding in the door hinges or the landing gear linkage which could prevent nose landing gear extension. The records of VH-JKE indicated that the instruction had not been carried out.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Malfunction of the nose gear assembly may have been caused by aerodynamic side-loads on the nose landing gear doors, stiffness in the door hinges, or a combination of these influences.

2. The nose landing gear could not be extended.

Circumstances:

The pilot had borrowed the aircraft to fly to Medlow Bath to visit his brother who resided on the Blue Mountains. He was accompanied by his father and a friend. The pilot had not previously flown from the Medlow Bath airstrip but had inspected it from the ground. After landing, the pilot and his passengers spent about 90 minutes on the ground. The wind appeared to be light and variable, so the pilot decided to take off in the 24 direction. He said he lifted off at an indicated airspeed of 50 to 55 knots, but after the aircraft became airborne it did not accelerate or climb. The tailplane struck the branches of trees at the south-western end of the strip. Because the terrain fell away sharply at the end of the strip, the pilot said he lowered the nose of the aircraft in an attempt to increase airspeed. However, the left wing dropped, and the aircraft entered an uncontrollable descending turn to the left. The aircraft impacted scrub covered terrain about 300 metres from the end of the strip. A passenger suffered a fractured arm as a result of ground impact. The pilot did not have the owner's permission to operate into the airstrip.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot had not previously operated from the airstrip.
2. The pilot attempted to lift off at too low an airspeed and adopted an excessively high nose attitude.
3. The pilot used a flap 10 setting. The Flight manual specifies flaps up for take-off.
4. The pilot attempted a take-off in a direction where the overall slope is 1.5 degrees up.
5. The airstrip was surrounded by tall trees which, when combined with the undulating longitudinal surface of the strip, could create a visual illusion as the pilot was attempting to set pitch attitude.

Circumstances:

The pilot made one local flight and a short time later departed on another with a club student pilot as passenger. His intention was to go to the training area but soon after departing the circuit he became concerned by rain showers close to the aerodrome and decided to return. As on DEPARTURE, runway 18 was used and the surface wind was light and variable. Rain was encountered and on final approach it became heavy, significantly reducing forward visibility. The pilot's landing technique on the aircraft type was to flare fairly high on the approach and adjust power for the final descent. The aircraft suddenly dropped from about 40-50 feet above the runway, contacting the surface very heavily. Aircraft damage was sustained as a result of the heavy landing. It is considered probable that the heavy landing was the result of the aircraft stalling on final approach.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. A rain shower reduced forward visibility during the final approach.
2. The pilot used an incorrect technique for landing.

Normal landing gear down indications were obtained before landing. When the nosewheel was lowered late in the landing roll, the nosewheel leg collapsed, allowing the nose and propeller blades to contact the ground. The aft rod end fitting on the nose gear actuating rod had failed. The rod was apparently of outdated design. New rods are constructed of thicker gauge metal. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

The aircraft had an amphibious capability and began the flight via a water takeoff. The landing was to be made on a beach on the other side of the island. The aircraft was observed flying parallel to the beach a few hundred metres from the shoreline and at an estimated altitude of 200-400 feet, when it rolled right and suddenly spiralled into the water. Some witnesses indicated that they heard the engine noise interrupted just before the aircraft rolled while others said that the noise remained constant. No abnormality was found in the aircraft or its engine which might have contributed to the accident. There was positive evidence that the engine was delivering power when the aircraft struck the water. The pilot indicated that he was winding down the landing gear as he flew parallel to the beach. This may have distracted him, allowing the airspeed to decrease. The flightpath of the aircraft into the water was typical of the post-stall behaviour of Drifter aircraft.

The pilot took-off with the intention of completing a circuit of the airfield. Once airborne, the pilot observed that the wind was stronger than anticipated, and he decided to abandon the circuit and land immediately in a clear field below the aircraft. During the downwind approach and when the aircraft was about 15 to 20 feet above ground level, the nose dropped suddenly. The pilot endeavoured to correct the situation by opening the throttle and attempting to raise the nose, however, this was ineffective and the aircraft collided with the ground. The pilot had recently purchased the aircraft, and although he had been advised to obtain some training before attempting to operate the aircraft he had declined to do so. The aircraft was not fitted with an air speed indicator, and assessment of speed was based on aircraft attitude in flight and speed across the ground.

At the completion of a local flight, the pilot was about 300 feet above the ground on final approach, when the aircraft experienced a substantial power loss. He positioned the aircraft for a forced landing in a nearby paddock. However, the engine then returned to normal operation and a decision was made to continue to the strip. Shortly after power was applied to overshoot from the paddock, the engine again lost power. During the subsequent attempt to position for touchdown the aircraft stalled and struck the ground heavily. An on-site examination by the operator and the pilot established that there was only one litre of fuel left in the tank. There were no faults apparent with the engine and it was evident that the power loss was the result of fuel exhaustion. It was not possible for the pilot to visually check the fuel tank contents in flight, and he considered that the fuel quantity gauge was unreliable. Although the pilot was experienced on the type, this particular aircraft had an engine fitted with twin carburettors. The fuel consumption rate was higher than that for the single carburettor models. The pilot had attempted to establish a fuel consumption rate prior to DEPARTURE but the figure that he calculated and planned upon was incorrect. The pilot also advised that, in hindsight, his decision making processes on the day were probably adversely affected. He was preoccupied with a personal problem, and also realised after DEPARTURE that he had neglected to wear sufficient clothing for the flight. This resulted in him getting quite cold as the flight progressed.

When the pilot selected the gear lever to the down position, only the maingear responded. Attempts to lower the nosegear were unsuccessful and the aircraft was landed with the nosegear retracted. After touchdown both propellers were feathered. However, the right propeller did not stop in the horizontal position and as the nose of the aircraft was lowered the propeller dug into the runway. The right engine was torn from the aircraft and the aircraft slewed to the right, damaging the left wing and propeller. Investigation determined that the cause of the nose gear binding, was inadequate lubrication of the nose gear door hinges. This extra resistance resulted in the actuating mechanism coming out of alignment, which caused the gear to jam. After the engines had stopped rotating, there was insufficient time for the pilot to adjust the positions of the propellers prior to the nose of the aircraft dropping onto the runway.

The aircraft was engaged on a bank-run flight. On arrival in the circuit area at Maitland the pilot observed that the aerodrome was fogbound, and so elected to divert to Warkworth. The pilot reported that when on downwind in the circuit area at Warkworth, the landing gear extended normally and a safe gear indication was observed. Ground witnesses reported that the touchdown of the aircraft on the gravel strip appeared to be normal. At approximately one third of the ground roll distance, the left maingear retracted. The aircraft veered off the strip and slid sideways on wet grass. No fault was found with the landing gear system. The sequence of retraction suggested that the pilot had inadvertently retracted the gear instead of the flaps.

Following a 30 minute flight the pilot landed the balloon and the passengers waited in the basket for the retrieve vehicles to arrive to effect a passenger changeover. During this period a strong wind blew up, caught the balloon and dragged it towards trees. The pilot advised the passengers to adopt a crouch position and operated the burner to apply heat to raise the balloon. The balloon climbed steeply, cleared the trees then descended rapidly, bounced and the basket began oscillating about 30 degrees either side of vertical. The pilot was thrown out of the basket and 10 of the 11 passengers received injuries, although all remained in the basket. The balloon continued to be blown along the ground and one of the passengers climbed into the pilot's section of the basket and applied heat, this took the balloon aloft. The pilot chased the balloon and after one of the retrieve vehicles located him he was able to contact the balloon by radio and relay instructions on the use of the burner to the passenger. The balloon landed about 3.5 km from the position it had been waiting to changeover the passengers.