The aircraft had completed four uneventful take-offs and landings. A short field take-off was then carried out. The landing gear was retracted and a procedure turn executed at 500 feet. On completion of the turn, landing flap was selected and the prelanding checks initiated.

The pilot reported that he became preoccupied with flying the aircraft accurately and overlooked selecting and checking that the landing gear was down. This was not realised until the throttle was reduced to idle on entering the flare. The aircraft settled onto the runway with the landing gear retracted and the gear warning sounding.

The aircraft was departing runway 16R at Sydney on a Radar 5 departure, with a clearance instruction to turn right heading 170 degrees after take-off. On becoming airborne, the aircraft was observed to turn left onto a heading of about 125 degrees. The pilot was asked to confirm heading to which he replied, "170". The aircraft was subsequently seen to turn right, onto the correct heading.

The take-off had been flown by the first officer, with the pilot-in-command providing support functions. The pilot-in-command was resetting an incorrect radio frequency selection as the aircraft made its initial climb and initially failed to notice that the aircraft was turning left instead of right. At the time ATC contacted the aircraft the pilot-in-command was instructing the handling pilot to turn right, to comply with the clearance. There was no conflicting traffic at the time of the occurrence.

VH-JCH was cleared by Albury Tower on the direct track from Albury to Canberra at 9000 feet. VH-CSV was on the same track flying from Canberra to Albury and believed (by Albury Tower) to be at 8000 feet. Accordingly, the pilot of VH-JCH was given a requirement to reach 9000 feet in time to avoid a conflict. This was complied with.

The pilot of VH-CSV called Albury Tower at 45 miles from Albury (10 miles prior to controlled airspace) and was cleared to Albury and to descend to 7100 feet which is the applicable route lowest safe altitude. VH-CSV then reported leaving 9000 feet. This was the first the Albury Tower controller knew that VH-CSV was at 9000 feet. The pilot was instructed to descend immediately to 8000 feet. This altitude change was probably achieved before the aircraft entered the control area and hence a loss of separation, technically, probably did not occur.

VH-CSV had originally maintained an 8000 foot cruise altitude but had later climbed to 9000 feet and advised Melbourne Flight Service of this change. The flight service officer was the only person on duty for this area of the network and a busy complicated period of work was in progress. She attempted to contact Albury Tower to pass advice of the level change but was unable to get through.

Albury Tower was also operating with one person on shift and was in a busy period. Uncontrolled airspace between Canberra and Albury between 8000 feet and 10000 feet spans a track distance of only 39 miles. Aircraft of the type involved in this incident transit that distance in a fairly short period of time. Due to the workload imposed by other tasks at both Albury Tower and Melbourne Flight Service, the co-ordination on the altitude change for VH-CSV was not achieved, although every effort was made.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. Operation of air traffic service positions by one person during busy traffic periods.

2. Co-ordination on altitude change for VH-CSV, by the flight service officer, was not achieved.

The pilot of VH-LLY was cleared for descent in Darwin controlled airspace from FL330 to 5,000 ft, on a heading of 085, for radar vectoring to the ILS. VH-JPW had departed Darwin, and the pilot was cleared for climb to FL330, on a heading of 163.

During descent, as VH-LLY was passing through 8,000 ft with a 3,000 ft per minute rate of descent, the pilot heard Darwin Approach advise the pilot of VH-JPW of unidentified traffic in his 2 o'clock position, and to maintain 6,000 ft until clear. He looked out and sighted another aircraft rapidly approaching and realised that he must be the unidentified traffic. He resumed control from the co-pilot, made an immediate left turn and passed behind the other aircraft, with an estimated separation distance of 200m.

He then contacted the pilot of VH-JPW and Darwin Approach to advise them of the occurrence. The pilot of VH-JPW believed that if he had not maintained climb power when he levelled at 6,000ft, the passing distance would have probably been much less.

The Darwin Approach Controller admitted to misidentifying VH-LLY, contributing to the breakdown in separation standard.

A landing approach was made for runway 24 with the gear selected down and the cockpit gear lights indicating green. As the aircraft slowed on the landing roll the left main gear green light went out and the gear unsafe light came on. The aircraft was gently slowed and a left turn started when the left main gear leg collapsed.

Inspection of the main gear leg showed that the pin securing the top of the leg to the wing structure, had seized and then sheared. The pin then moved forward and allowed the top of the leg to detach from the wing support structure, and collapse.

Significant Factor

The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pin securing the top of the left main landing gear leg to the supporting structure seized and fractured. (The reason for the seizure was not determined.)

VH-EJM was being operated on dual circuit training on runway 30. A mixture of left and right circuits had previously been flown, with the last one being a right circuit. Stop and go landings were being made. On the last approach air traffic control had instructed the pilot to make the next circuit a left circuit.

VH-FNE was lined up on runway 35 and after VH-EJM had crossed the runway intersection the controller cleared VH-FNE for take-off. On climb the crew of VH-FNE observed VH-EJM to be approaching their flight path, on a right circuit. The climb of VH-FNE was stopped and VH-EJM passed about 200 feet above and slightly behind VH-FNE. The pilot of VH-EJM had seen VH-FNE.

At about the same time as the pilots of the two aircraft saw each other the air traffic controller, who had been looking in another direction at a third aircraft, looked back and saw VH-EJM flying a right circuit and in conflict with VH-FNE. Traffic information was given to VH-FNE and the pilot of VH-EJM was advised of the mistake and to continue with the right circuit.

Significant Factor

The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. Misunderstanding of the instruction to make a left circuit, by the pilot of VH-EJM.

The pilot reported that the aircraft accelerated normally during the take-off run and began a normal climb over tree covered rising ground. At about 100 feet above the tree tops a strong down draught was encountered, which the aircraft was unable to out climb. When it became evident that a collision was inevitable the pilot attempted to stall the aircraft into the trees. The aircraft collided with the treetops and nosed over, coming to rest inverted. Both occupants were able to vacate the aircraft with minor injuries.

Circumstances

The B737 was operating on airway B580 and had passed waypoint URGUS at 1234 EST maintaining FL350 and was estimating waypoint MULID at 1322. Flight plan estimates indicated that the B737 would cross airway A464 at approximately 1343 and the next waypoint APORA at 1424.

The B74F was operating on airway A464 and had passed waypoint RELIK at 1251 maintaining FL350 and was estimating over Lord Howe Island at 1323. Flight plan estimates indicated that the B74F would cross airway B580 at approximately 1331 and the next waypoint UDIKO at 1401.

At approximately 1254, Brisbane oceanic control sector 8 (Sect 8) relayed a level change requirement instruction through Sydney Flight Service International (FS INT) for the B737 to descend from FL350 to FL330. The instruction was intended to provide separation assurance between the B737 and the B747F.

The level change requirement was notated on the correct flight progress strip but entered in an incorrect information box relating to waypoint URGUS, the waypoint just passed.  The FS INT officer was provided with a temporary relief break at approximately 1310.  The level change requirement had still neither been passed to the B737 nor been included in the handover/takeover to the relieving officer.

At approximately 1328, the relieving FS INT provided Sect 8 with reports for the B737 passing MULID and the B74F passing Lord Howe Island. Both aircraft were still maintaining FL350. Sector 8 realised that the aircraft level change instruction had not been issued and that lateral separation standards had been infringed.

Due to the prevailing poor communications propagation conditions, FS INT was unable to re-establish contact with the B737 until approximately 1336. The B737 then descended to FL330 and crossed airway A464 approximately seven minutes later.

Although the prescribed separation standards were not maintained, there was no risk of collision.

No new safety deficiencies were identified during this investigation.

The aircraft landed into a very strong wind, and as the tail was being lowered during the landing roll a change in the wind direction violently lifted the left wing. The pilot used full corrective aileron and rudder but could not prevent the aircraft from veering off the right side of the strip or the right wingtip touching the ground. He then applied full asymmetric power to straighten the aircraft, and after regaining control took-off again, returning for a safe landing.

After taxiing to the terminal, the pilot-in-command and co-pilot inspected the wingtip and aileron for damage and checked the controls for full and free movement. They both believed that only superficial damage had occurred and that the aircraft was airworthy. Subsequent investigation revealed that the outboard aileron hinge mounting had been displaced.

The pilot refuelled the aircraft to full tanks on the evening prior to the accident. The aircraft remained parked at Griffith aerodrome overnight.

The next day, the pilot completed two tasks of 0.8 hours each. He then conferred with his chief pilot, about the fuel endurance of the aircraft, before commencing another 0.8 hour task.

After a flight time of 0.7 hours, while completing the "clean-up" run, the engine stopped. The pilot completed the emergency checks but was unable to restore engine power. He was then faced with a forced landing in a rice paddock. During the landing roll, the aircraft struck a dirt bank which bent the landing gear and damaged the fuselage and hopper.

The pilot was familiar with the fuel usage rate of the aircraft and planned on a rate of 100 litres per hour. The fuel capacity of the aircraft was 328 litres and at the expected usage rate should have allowed an endurance in excess of three hours. The pilot believes that the aircraft was tampered with overnight. The fuel contents were not checked prior to departure that morning.