Following a normal landing onto a wet grass airstrip the pilot applied braking, but this had no effect on the wet slippery surface. As the aircraft approached the far end of the airstrip, which was fenced and adjacent to a steep gully, the pilot tried to turn the now slowing aircraft, but it continued straight ahead.

He was able to guide the aircraft to the edge of the airstrip, and when he attempted another turn it became sideways, ran off the airstrip into tussocky heavy grass which caused the main landing gear legs to collapse.

The pilot reported that during a steep approach to the landing area at Turtle Cove Resort, he heard a loud bang at approximately 250 feet followed by airframe vibration. A precautionary landing was made on the beach. Inspection of the aircraft revealed damage to two rotor blades, and after speaking to witnesses he realised that he had struck a power line.

The pilot said he had landed at the resort before but had not approached from this direction. He believed he had passed over the wires, but they were closer to the resort than he had anticipated. The pilot was not injured.

The operator advised that the aircraft had been hired for the purpose of a joy flight. While flying down wind, at reduced airspeed, over the northern end of South Stradbroke Island the pilot said that the aircraft's stall warning sounded. He immediately lowered the nose of the aircraft and increased power. At this point the aircraft was close to the ground, so the pilot decided to make an emergency landing. During the landing roll the nose wheel became bogged in soft sand and separated from the aircraft. The aircraft then swung to the right and the wing tip came into contact with a sand dune.

The pilot and three passengers were able to exit the aircraft safely.

The pilot diverted to Ballarat due to poor weather enroute. He noted smoke from a nearby chimney and estimated the wind was from 160 degrees. Runway 18 was selected for landing. On touchdown the aircraft bounced, touching down again near the right side of the runway. The pilot applied power to go around as the aircraft ran off the right side of the runway into a wet and boggy grass area. The aircraft did not become airborne. The nose leg collapsed on the soft surface and the aircraft quickly came to a stop.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1 The pilot probably misjudged the landing flare.

2 The pilot probably did not apply the appropriate technique to ensure that directional control was maintained during the attempted landing and go around sequence.

The pilot had been landing to the north on the agricultural strip. Because a 10 knot south-westerly wind had developed he decided to land to the south. On short final the aircraft landing gear caught in a power line which the pilot had not seen. The nose pitched down and the aircraft struck the ground very heavily and cartwheeled.

The aircraft was severely damaged. The pilot had sighted a power line, aligned east-north-east, from a house to a post. Another line, the one not seen, ran east-west from the same post, with the next pole out of sight among trees.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1 The procedures adopted by the pilot did not detect the presence of the power line.

2 During the landing approach the aircraft landing gear caught on a power line not seen by the pilot.

The pilot reported that the aircraft was landed downwind during agricultural rating pilot training. After a normal landing, as the aircraft slowed it suddenly swung left. The right wing and propeller struck the ground, and the right landing gear was torn off. The wind was gusting from the left rear quarter.

The Chieftain departed from runway 16R on a Radar 6 departure. After initial vectoring to avoid noise sensitive areas, the aircraft was vectored to intercept the planned track to Katoomba and instructed to climb to 5000 ft.

The SAAB was cleared to Sydney via the Oakdale 2 arrival and had been cleared for descent to 6000 ft. The departures controller reported that he observed the Chieftain climb through 5000 ft, in close proximity to the SAAB. He immediately instructed the pilot of the Chieftain to descend to 5000 ft and vectored the aircraft away from the SAAB, as well as passing traffic information on that aircraft. The approach controller notified the pilot of the SAAB, regarding the Chieftain, and vectored the SAAB away from the other aircraft.

Subsequent investigation revealed that the Chieftain had passed within 1.7 NM of the SAAB, with a vertical separation of 900 ft, resulting in a breakdown of separation. At the time of the occurrence the minimum required separation standard was either 3 NM laterally, or 1000 ft vertically.

The pilot said he had landed at the small grass strip a couple of times before. He flew to the area and made inspection runs over the strip at a height of about 100 feet. He then made a landing approach. The aircraft touched down about one quarter of the way in and bounced.

Because there was insufficient landing distance remaining, the pilot applied engine power and selected two stages of flap for a go-around. Lift off was made at 55 knots but the wheels struck a bank at the end of the strip. This impact severely damaged the undercarriage. The pilot turned the aircraft to the left towards a small clear paddock. However, in doing so the left wing struck a small tree and the aircraft cartwheeled.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1 Unsound decision by the pilot to land the aircraft at a strip of minimal dimensions.

2 Misjudged landing approach.

3 The flight was not authorised by a designated responsible person.

4 The operator's procedures did not require the flight to be so authorised.

The Sydney Approach (North) (APP(N)) radar controller observed a Cessna Citation infringe the Sydney control zone whilst departing Bankstown. At the same time, a Boeing 747 tracking towards Sydney on the runway 07 localiser had left 2,000 ft on descent. By the time the Citation was noticed by APP(N) the aircraft was approximately 2 NM abeam the 747, some 500 ft below, and travelling in the opposite direction. As APP(N) was about to inform the crew of the 747 of the conflicting traffic, the pilot of the 747 informed the controller that he had a TCAS Traffic Advisory of an aircraft 600 ft below and abeam. APP(N) advised the pilot of the 747 that the other aircraft was now clear of his track.

The pilot of the Citation later commented that, because the passenger charter flight was at night and in poor weather conditions, he was not prepared to undertake a steep turn after taking off in the 11 direction. He also believed his aircraft must have only just infringed the Sydney control zone as the DME indicated the aircraft had remained outside the zone.

A subsequent examination of recorded radar data indicated that the Citation had infringed the Sydney control zone, and that horizontal separation had been reduced to 1.26 NM, with a vertical separation of 800 ft. The required minimum separation standard was 3 NM horizontally or 1,000 ft vertically.

The pilot reported that he was spraying thistles on the eastern side of Mt Koang. The weather at the time was clear with a moderate easterly breeze blowing. Spray runs were made in a north south direction, starting at the base of the mount and progressing up the slope parallel to a ridge line at the top.

The pilot commenced the last run from the north, flying along the top of the ridge line. Approximately halfway along the ridge line the aircraft hit a wind gust. The pilot was unable to prevent the aircraft from hitting the ridge. The aircraft hit the ground heavily and was destroyed in a post impact fire. The pilot was wearing fire resistant overalls, gloves and a helmet. He received burns to his face which was the only exposed area of skin when the accident occurred.