The pilot was conducting a private pleasure flight combined with a navigation exercise. In the Shepparton circuit, he inadvertently missed extending the landing gear during the downwind checks and forgot to confirm that the gear was down on final. Consequently, he landed with the landing gear retracted.

In hindsight, the pilot suspects that he might have been preoccupied with business related matters after an extremely busy time at work during the past week.

The pilot requested taxi clearance for departure from runway 11, but as this runway was not available due to maintenance being carried out on the arrestor cable, he was instructed by air traffic control to taxi for runway 18 and advised of a 9-knot crosswind component.

During take-off the pilot lost directional control, and the aircraft ground looped to the left, collapsing the right landing gear leg. The aircraft came to a stop at the intersection of runways 36/18 and 29/11.

The pilot-in-command reported that during cruise at flight level 210 an intermittent acrid electrical burning smell was noted. Shortly afterwards a white flash occurred near the wiring terminals of the right forward windscreen. This was followed by a fire at the electrical terminals. Appropriate emergency drills were completed by the crew and a fire extinguisher was used to extinguish the fire. The windshield heat was switched off and a descent commenced. Passing flight level 130 on descent the outer windshield panels shattered. A safe landing was made into Melbourne.

Maintenance found that the windscreen integral bus bar had overheated and ignited. The window is to be returned to the manufacturer for analysis. The windshield temperature controller was also changed as a precautionary measure.

The pilot reported that he was manoeuvring the helicopter, during cattle mustering, at low altitude and slow speed when the aircraft flew out of translational lift. The helicopter, which was about 10 ft above the ground, descended rapidly and landed heavily. The rotor rpm, which had declined during the descent, recovered to normal after landing.

An inspection disclosed damage to one skid and the lower airframe as well as some rippling of fuselage panels.

The loss of height occurred too quickly for the pilot to take sufficient corrective action. The loss of rotor rpm indicates the pilot may have overpitched the main rotor system.

The pilot was demonstrating a short field landing to his instructor during a Biennial Flight Review. On late final approach, the instructor twice shouted at the pilot that the gear was not down and when the pilot reached for the throttle the instructor thought that they were about to go around. Instead, the pilot closed the throttle resulting in a wheels up landing.

The student pilot reported that he was hover taxiing along a taxiway, in a slight tailwind. As he passed through an S bend, the helicopter began to yaw to the left. He rapidly applied right pedal to counter the yaw but overcorrected. The helicopter then began to rotate to the right, causing the pilot to believe the aircraft had suffered a loss of tail rotor effectiveness. The pilot wound off the throttle, to reduce the torque effect of the main rotor, however the helicopter landed heavily, damaging the skids.

The pilot had minimal experience on this type of helicopter, having gained the majority of his flying experience on R22 helicopters.

During his pre-landing checks, the pilot found the landing gear manual extension handle was difficult to move toward the "gear extended" position. After returning the handle to the "gear retracted" position he was able to move it, with some difficulty, to the extended position. However, in order to reassure himself that the system was functioning correctly, the pilot carried out a missed approach to undertake further checks. He successfully completed a number of landing gear retractions and extensions, but still experienced the same difficulty as previously found. He then returned for a landing.

During final approach, the pilot recalled hearing a warning horn, but believed it was the stall warning horn and decided to apply more power to maintain what he considered a safe approach speed. The warning horn continued, distracting the pilot from his final approach checks. He continued to believe he was listening to the stall warning but was puzzled that he was still able to hear it, given the speed and configuration of the aircraft. He realised the landing gear was still retracted when he heard the underside of the fuselage scraping along the runway during the landing. The horn he had heard during the approach was the landing gear unsafe warning.

The pilot's pre-occupation with the warning horn on final approach, and his concern about the stiffness of movement of the landing gear handle, are considered to be factors contributing to the development of this occurrence.

Cargo handlers unloading an A330 aircraft in Perth reported a burning smell coming from part of the cargo. When the load was disassembled, evidence of a possible cargo fire was found. Three wooden load spreaders from two different pallets showed signs of scorching, and one aluminium pallet had a 100 mm X 120 mm hole worn through its base, with fused metal around the edges of the hole. Another pallet showed signs of scorching. The affected areas were still hot to touch.

The 16,000-kg load, comprising 16 wooden (pine) crates measuring 1500 mm X 1000 mm X 300 mm and several smaller items, and was divided evenly between four 3000 mm X 2000 mm X 10 mm aluminium pallets. Each of the crates was fitted with three 100 mm X 50 mm X 1000 mm wooden runners which were oriented longitudinally when loaded on the pallets. Each pallet load was positioned on load spreaders which were located transversely. Two pallets were loaded in the rear and two in the forward cargo hold of the A330. The load was prepared in the United Kingdom and transhipped in Kuala Lumpur. Nothing abnormal was reported during transhipment.

The size of the spreaders used, and the damage sustained on the four pallets differed significantly. The load spreaders on all four pallets exhibited evidence of movement between the spreaders and the pallets. Only the two rear pallets exhibited scorching with the rearmost pallet being the most damaged. Four 100 mm X 50 mm spreaders were used on the rearmost pallet.  The spreader located closest to the rear of the pallet was worn down to half its original thickness in the vicinity of the hole. A 300-mm length centred on the hole exhibited signs of significant scorching. No scorching was evident on the other three spreaders. On the next pallet four 130 mm X 20 mm spreaders were used. The front and rear spreaders and their corresponding positions on the pallet exhibited signs of scorching, but only on the starboard side. No scorching was evident on the other two spreaders. Four spreaders, each measuring 130 mm X 50 mm, were used on each of the two forward pallets. No scorching was evident. Witness marks on the pallets indicate that most of the movement between the spreaders and the pallets was longitudinal rather than lateral.

The cargo handlers reported that the load was secured to the pallets by nets and the pallets were secured in the aircraft by tie-down straps. They also reported that the straps appeared to be adequately tensioned. Actual tie-down arrangements could not be checked as the straps were removed prior to discovery of the scorching and their position was not noted. There was no evidence of damage from the aircraft's roller conveyor wheels.

An analysis of the timber used in the damaged spreaders indicated it was European Silver Fir. The samples contained no resin, which was considered unusual. The absence of resin reduced the flammability of the timber.

It is evident that the damage and scorching were the result of friction-generated heat caused by movement between the spreaders and the pallet. The movement apparently did not result in fire as any flame would have spread rapidly to the pine crates resting on the pallets. There was no evidence of this. The cargo hold overheat warning system did not activate, and the cargo hold fire suppression system was not used.

No additional evidence is available to determine why the load was able to move in the way that it did and cause the scorching.

The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation is not aware of any other similar occurrences.

Safety Action

When the timber had been identified, the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation issued a safety advisory notice, SAN960053, informing the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and operators of high-capacity regular public transport aircraft of the circumstances of the occurrence.

The aircraft with an instructor and student pilot on board, bounced heavily on landing. The instructor advised that he did not react quick enough to prevent the aircraft touching down again on the nose landing gear. The nose landing gear then broke off and the aircraft nosed over onto its back. Both occupants exited the aircraft safely.

A British Aerospace 146 (BA146) was established in the holding pattern at YANGO, 60 NM NNW of Sydney, maintaining Flight Level 190 (FL190). A Boeing 737 (B737) entered the holding pattern at FL200, and was given traffic information on the BA146, which was directly below.

Holding was cancelled for the BA146, which was cleared to descend to FL180. The Arrivals North radar controller subsequently observed the BA146 height readout indicating FL200, and was about to query the level of the aircraft, when the crew of the BA146 advised the aircraft had climbed to FL200 but was now on descent to FL190. The lateral separation between the two aircraft was reduced to 1.53 NM, with a vertical separation of 800 ft. The minimum required separation was 5 NM laterally, or 1,000 ft vertically.

The Captain of the BA146 subsequently reported that the aircraft was being controlled by the autopilot at the time of the occurrence. FL180 had been correctly set on the altitude controller, but the aircraft had inadvertently climbed without warning. The captain, who was the non-flying pilot, had earlier given permission to permit three children to stand near the flight deck door. As the aircraft commenced descent to FL180 he had turned around briefly to say goodbye. When he turned back, he saw the aircraft was climbing at about 1,500 fpm, approaching FL200. He immediately instructed the co-pilot to descend to FL190, and alerted ATC.