The pilot reported that the aircraft was landed downwind during agricultural rating pilot training. After a normal landing, as the aircraft slowed it suddenly swung left. The right wing and propeller struck the ground, and the right landing gear was torn off. The wind was gusting from the left rear quarter.

The Chieftain departed from runway 16R on a Radar 6 departure. After initial vectoring to avoid noise sensitive areas, the aircraft was vectored to intercept the planned track to Katoomba and instructed to climb to 5000 ft.

The SAAB was cleared to Sydney via the Oakdale 2 arrival and had been cleared for descent to 6000 ft. The departures controller reported that he observed the Chieftain climb through 5000 ft, in close proximity to the SAAB. He immediately instructed the pilot of the Chieftain to descend to 5000 ft and vectored the aircraft away from the SAAB, as well as passing traffic information on that aircraft. The approach controller notified the pilot of the SAAB, regarding the Chieftain, and vectored the SAAB away from the other aircraft.

Subsequent investigation revealed that the Chieftain had passed within 1.7 NM of the SAAB, with a vertical separation of 900 ft, resulting in a breakdown of separation. At the time of the occurrence the minimum required separation standard was either 3 NM laterally, or 1000 ft vertically.

The pilot said he had landed at the small grass strip a couple of times before. He flew to the area and made inspection runs over the strip at a height of about 100 feet. He then made a landing approach. The aircraft touched down about one quarter of the way in and bounced.

Because there was insufficient landing distance remaining, the pilot applied engine power and selected two stages of flap for a go-around. Lift off was made at 55 knots but the wheels struck a bank at the end of the strip. This impact severely damaged the undercarriage. The pilot turned the aircraft to the left towards a small clear paddock. However, in doing so the left wing struck a small tree and the aircraft cartwheeled.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1 Unsound decision by the pilot to land the aircraft at a strip of minimal dimensions.

2 Misjudged landing approach.

3 The flight was not authorised by a designated responsible person.

4 The operator's procedures did not require the flight to be so authorised.

The Sydney Approach (North) (APP(N)) radar controller observed a Cessna Citation infringe the Sydney control zone whilst departing Bankstown. At the same time, a Boeing 747 tracking towards Sydney on the runway 07 localiser had left 2,000 ft on descent. By the time the Citation was noticed by APP(N) the aircraft was approximately 2 NM abeam the 747, some 500 ft below, and travelling in the opposite direction. As APP(N) was about to inform the crew of the 747 of the conflicting traffic, the pilot of the 747 informed the controller that he had a TCAS Traffic Advisory of an aircraft 600 ft below and abeam. APP(N) advised the pilot of the 747 that the other aircraft was now clear of his track.

The pilot of the Citation later commented that, because the passenger charter flight was at night and in poor weather conditions, he was not prepared to undertake a steep turn after taking off in the 11 direction. He also believed his aircraft must have only just infringed the Sydney control zone as the DME indicated the aircraft had remained outside the zone.

A subsequent examination of recorded radar data indicated that the Citation had infringed the Sydney control zone, and that horizontal separation had been reduced to 1.26 NM, with a vertical separation of 800 ft. The required minimum separation standard was 3 NM horizontally or 1,000 ft vertically.

The pilot reported that he was spraying thistles on the eastern side of Mt Koang. The weather at the time was clear with a moderate easterly breeze blowing. Spray runs were made in a north south direction, starting at the base of the mount and progressing up the slope parallel to a ridge line at the top.

The pilot commenced the last run from the north, flying along the top of the ridge line. Approximately halfway along the ridge line the aircraft hit a wind gust. The pilot was unable to prevent the aircraft from hitting the ridge. The aircraft hit the ground heavily and was destroyed in a post impact fire. The pilot was wearing fire resistant overalls, gloves and a helmet. He received burns to his face which was the only exposed area of skin when the accident occurred.

While the aircraft was descending to land at Canberra the forward toilet smoke detector activated, the flight deck smoke annunciate light illuminated and a small amount of smoke was visible on the flight deck. The flight attendant confirmed there was no evidence of fire in the toilet. A slight haze was visible in the cabin with wisps emanating from the air-conditioning vents. The crew continued with the landing and a normal disembarkation ensued.

Oil was found to be dripping from the engine which was removed for rectification. The number 1 air/oil seal was found to have delaminated allowing engine oil to permeate into the air-conditioning ducts. The seal had previously been repaired at the manufacturer's facility. After this incident the operator determined to use only newly manufactured seals and introduced an in-situ pressure test of the seal.

As the aircraft was about to land at the property strip at night a car positioned at the end of the strip with its headlights shining along the strip.

During the landing the aircraft struck the car with the left main gear and crashed onto the runway with the gear collapsed. The pilot was aware that the car was parked near the end of the strip.

The pilot reported that the landing gear collapsed late in the landing roll. An inspection by a Licenced Aircraft Maintenance Engineer failed to find any pre-existing defects.

An accident diagram submitted by the pilot indicated that all the landing gear collapsed at about the same time.

A Boeing 747 aircraft was departing from runway 16R at Sydney whilst a DeHavilland DASH 8 aircraft was departing from runway 16L. As the Boeing 747 reached about 800 ft, the crew received a Traffic Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS) resolution advisory (RA) alert which advised them to monitor the aircraft's vertical speed.

The crew of the Boeing 747 were able to observe the DASH 8, airborne from the parallel runway, and ascertained that there was no danger of confliction. The TCAS alert was of very short duration. The Boeing 747 crew maintained their current rate of climb, monitored the TCAS and did not deviate laterally or vertically from their cleared route. The routes of the two aircraft were divergent and separation increased rapidly as the flight of both aircraft progressed.

A radar plot of the two aircraft confirmed the Boeing 747 crew's perception that there was no confliction with the other aircraft. The plot indicated an initial horizontal separation of 0.6 NM which reduced momentarily and then diverged in accordance with the cleared routes of both aircraft. Vertical separation of over 1,000 ft and lateral separation of 3 NM was achieved when the Boeing 747 was four miles from the aerodrome.

The radar plot showed that the DASH 8 became airborne just prior to the Boeing 747. Because the Boeing 747 was behind and had a significantly higher rate of climb in comparison to the DASH 8, it is likely that the TCAS assessed the DASH 8 as approaching the Boeing 747 and the system generated a preventative RA alert. Subsequently, as the Boeing 747 accelerated and passed abeam whilst climbing through the other aircraft's level, the TCAS reassessed the situation and cancelled the RA. There was no breakdown in separation.

It was reported that the pilot and passenger were conducting a stock survey at 200 ft above ground level when there was a loud noise and severe vibration from the area of the engine. The pilot immediately entered an autorotation descent and turned the helicopter into wind. A check indicated that no power was available from the engine. The terrain was rocky and covered in trees, so the pilot attempted to cushion the landing as much as possible. On touchdown one skid collided with a large rock causing the helicopter to roll over onto its side. It caught fire immediately and the passenger, who was the first to exit the wreck, assisted the pilot to escape. The helicopter, including the emergency locator beacon, was destroyed by fire.

The operator maintained its own search and rescue watch on its aircraft, and a search was commenced as soon as the aircraft was reported as overdue. The pilot and passenger were found the following day by search aircraft attracted by a signal fire lit by them.

Post accident inspection indicated that the engine problem was caused by the failure of a big-end bolt in the conrod of the no.1 cylinder which allowed the conrod to come loose and punch a hole in the crankcase. The engine had been overhauled by the manufacturer 300 hours (operating time in service) prior to the accident. The fire was probably started by oil that had leaked from the hole in the crankcase onto the exhaust system.