Soon after the helicopter had left Moomba on a charter flight to Whanto, the pilot reported hearing a loud bang and noticed that the rear left door of the aircraft, and associated pillar, were missing. The pilot reduced power, confirmed that his passengers were safe, and checked that the flight controls and systems were performing normally before turning to land at Innamincka Station homestead.

The helicopter landed without further incident. After shutdown, the missing door was found impaled upon the horizontal stabiliser. The helicopter was configured to carry a stretcher by incorporating an approved kit, in accordance with Bell Service Instruction No. 206-68. With the kit correctly fitted, the co-pilot door could not be closed unless the pillar-locking handle was in the locked position. An additional safeguard of the system was that when the co-pilot door was closed and locked, the pillar-locking handle could not be moved to the unlocked position.

Following the accident, the operator found that the stretcher pillar had unlatched in flight. An inspection revealed that the locking handle was in the unlocked position. However, the locking handle had been installed 180 degrees from the correct position, circumventing defences designed to prevent the helicopter departing with the pillar unlatched or being unlatched during flight.

LOCAL SAFETY ACTION

The operator has advised the Civil Aviation Safety Authority of possible shortcomings in the flight manual supplement, with regard to the correct operation of the litter kit. The operator has also incorporated a modification that includes a safety latch, preventing the pillar-locking handle from being incorrectly installed.

A Dash 8 aircraft, VH-TQP departed Sydney for Coffs Harbour on climb to FL190. Shortly after this aircraft departed, a second Dash 8, VH-TQG departed Sydney for Port Macquarie on climb to FL170. The second aircraft in the departure sequence was a later model Dash 8, capable of maintaining a high-speed cruise climb. To maintain separation between the two aircraft, both were restricted to 160 KIAS on climb.

As TQG approached top of climb (FL170), the controller observed TQP, the slower Dash 8 ahead, still well below FL170. To expedite the departure of the faster aircraft and achieve coordination with a southbound aircraft, the controller decided to restrict the climb of TQP to FL160. The crew understood their instruction was to FL170, selected this level with their assigned altitude indicator and read this altitude back to the controller. The controller did not detect the discrepancy between the assigned altitude and the crew's read back of the instruction.

The controller was then distracted for a short period of time with other sector controllers involved with an aircraft experiencing communication difficulties. During this period the mode C readout from TQP was noticed at FL168, in close proximity to TQG maintaining FL170.

TQP was instructed to immediately descend to FL160 and TQG initiated a turn to increase the separation between the two aircraft. The aircraft proceeded safely to their destinations following this occurrence.

The pilot reported that he was ferrying the helicopter back to the company base after maintenance via a helicopter landing site near Jacobs Well. At approximately 200 ft AGL during the approach, the cyclic control became restricted in that the pilot was unable to introduce any left cyclic control. The pilot said there was insufficient control available to conduct a safe landing. Eventually, he was able to force the cyclic control free and land safely.

After landing, the pilot consulted the maintenance organisation and confirmed that work had been carried out under the front seats. The pilot then removed the front seats and discovered that the cyclic control had been jammed by a radio control box. The box had not been re-installed correctly after maintenance. The matter has been referred to CASA airworthiness at Brisbane for further investigation.

FACTUAL INFORMATION

The aircraft was involved in aerial spraying operations. The pilot was preparing to do a clean-up run along the edge of a paddock on a heading of approximately 135 degrees. He initially flew due west alongside a powerline. He then turned right to fly under the powerline and return to begin the clean-up run. While approaching the start of the clean-up run, the pilot's attention was focussed on the east-west powerline which he was to again fly under. Before reaching that powerline, the pilot suddenly saw another wire immediately in front of him. He pushed the yoke hard forward to minimise the damage to the aircraft, but the powerline hit the tail area. The aircraft deviated towards the ground before he was able to regain control. The top third of the vertical stabiliser had been removed and the rudder destroyed. Even though directional control was severely affected, the pilot was able to fly the 10 NM back to the airstrip and land without further incident.

The pilot reported that the property owner had briefed him on the location of four powerlines in the area, including the powerline he had flown under. He did not brief the pilot on the powerline that was hit. The pilot stated that the property owner appeared to assume that he knew the location of all the relevant powerlines as he had sprayed in that area a few weeks prior to the accident.

The pilot reported that the powerline was difficult to see as it was not marked and the weather conditions were overcast. It was a clear span powerline between a post located amongst some trees and a shed.

ANALYSIS

The pilot was not aware of the location of the powerline which the aircraft impacted at the commencement of a spraying clean-up run. Although the pilot had been informed of four other powerlines in the area, he had not been briefed on, or noticed, this particular powerline. The clear span wire would have been difficult to detect as it was not marked, was observed against an overcast background, and the post was located amongst trees.

A Mig-15 aircraft was being flown on a series of touch and go circuits from runway 06 at Camden, NSW, for the purposes of type endorsement training. The aircraft was being flown by a student, under the supervision of an instructor pilot. During the final landing of the sequence the aircraft overran the runway at moderate speed, resulting in damage to the left hand undercarriage actuator assembly. The owner of the MIG-15 was observing the sortie from the ground, and reported that on each approach the aircraft had appeared to be fast and high on final.

During the final landing he observed the aircraft to touch down approximately 200 m in from the beginning of the runway, bounce slightly, and begin to float in ground effect. The next touchdown was about half way along the runway, after which a skid developed. He lost sight of the aircraft as it neared the end of the runway. The instructor pilot reported that the initial touchdown had been quite smooth, and gentle braking had been applied very soon after. Because the aircraft was bouncing on the nose landing gear, the instructor told the student to correct the nose attitude and progressively apply heavier braking.

However, the student pulled the control column back, resulting in the aircraft becoming briefly airborne. An instruction to the student to relax the brake pressure was apparently not heard. When the aircraft touched down again the left mainwheel tyre burst. The subsequent loss of braking and steering effectiveness resulted in the aircraft leaving the end of the runway. During a previous training sortie flown by the student earlier in the day, both mainwheel tyres had failed during landing.

The pilot was flying a Cessna 185 aircraft on a VFR charter flight from Moorabbin to Peterborough with 2 passengers. On arrival at Peterborough he overflew the strip and estimated the wind to be from 220 degrees at 5 to 7 kts. The strip has an uphill gradient to the east, and, even though this would result in a slight tailwind from the right quarter for the landing, the pilot elected to accept this and make use of the uphill gradient.

The landing was reported to have been smooth and light and was accomplished with a trickle of power and full flap (4 stages). During the roll out the aircraft diverged slightly left and then made a rapid and increasing swing to the right. Application of rudder and brake was not able to stop the developing ground loop. The aircraft left the mown strip with the group loop tightening until the left main landing gear collapsed. The aircraft came to rest pointing back down the strip towards the touchdown point.

After shutting down the engine the pilot and passengers evacuated without assistance or injury.

The pilot considered that he should have used a different technique when landing. A powered approach with 2 stages of flap, raising the flaps as soon as possible after landing, and using power to ensure adequate rudder authority during roll out would have result in control of the aircraft being maintained.

The pilot of the PA28 had departed Wallan for a flight to Coolangatta. At approximately 37 km southwest of Mudgee, the aircraft engine began to run rough following a sudden loss of engine oil pressure. A burning smell and an increase in indicated engine temperature was also evident. Due to the inhospitable terrain ahead to Mudgee, the pilot decided to conduct a forced landing in a nearby field.

The pilot broadcast a distress call to Sydney Flight Service (FS) and a Distress Phase was declared. Due to the field length and surface conditions, the pilot chose to carry out a 'wheels up' landing. This was successfully carried out and the pilot and passenger vacated the aircraft without injury. The ELT was automatically activated. Upon telephone confirmation of the situation of the pilot and passenger and deactivation of the ELT, FS cancelled the Distress Phase.

The aircraft had been tasked by police to provide assistance to two people in difficulty in Lake Munmorah. With the aircraft in the hover, the crewman stepped into the water with the intention of assisting the swimmers. As the water was shallow, the crewman's foot hit the bottom of the lake hard, breaking his ankle. People from the shore rescued the swimmers and the crewman in the water. The crewman was later flown to hospital for medical treatment.

The crew's actions were in accordance with their training and the company's operations manual. However, these procedures contain a latent failure in that they are not safe in shallow water or where there may be submerged objects. Since this occurrence, procedures have been changed so that crewman can only jump from the aircraft when it is out to sea. A crewman who needs to enter the water in a bay, lake or river has to be winched into the water. The operations manual has been amended to avoid a repeat of this occurrence. No further safety action is required.

Occurrence Summary

On four occasions in three months, pilots from the same local company have reported difficulties communicating on the Whyalla MBZ frequency with the flight crews of one particular RPT operator. Following these incidents, the local company raised the following concerns:

(1) crews of the RPT aircraft do not always provide an initial taxy call on the MBZ frequency when preparing for departure from Whyalla;

(2) crews of the RPT aircraft appear to change to the Whyalla MBZ frequency at approximately 10 NM rather than the required 15 NM; and,

(3) crews of the RPT aircraft are often not contactable on the MBZ frequency following an initial inbound broadcast at 25 NM from Whyalla.

The RPT operator's standard operating procedure required crews to monitor the MBZ frequency within 25 NM of Whyalla. Any company calls were to be completed during cruise and not during the approach and arrival phases. The aircraft were equipped with dual VHF radios so that a continuous listening watch was maintained on both the MBZ and flight service frequencies. The report to flight service that the crew were switching to the MBZ frequency was a formality and indicated that this was the prime frequency for communication during the arrival and departure.

The pilot of the RPT aircraft recalled that, on 19 December 1997, all the standard reports and broadcasts were given. He also recalled that a pilot of one aircraft in the area was referring to the company name and not the aircraft's specific identification. This did not immediately attract the pilot's attention because the flight number was not specifically mentioned and several aircraft of the same company were operating in the area at the time.

The airspace around Whyalla can be congested at certain times with the arrival and departure of several aircraft as well as local aircraft operating in the area. It is not uncommon for radio communications to be overtransmitted as appeared to have occurred in one of the reported incidents. There were also a number of nearby CTAFs which utilise the same frequency as the Whyalla MBZ, which adds to the communication congestion.

Safety Action 

Representatives from both the companies, as well as from CASA, met in order to clarify the circumstances of the incidents and to resolve any outstanding concerns about operations in the MBZ at Whyalla. The trial of flight numbers for aircraft callsigns was discussed. It was agreed that flight numbers did not provide any information as to the aircraft type, and therefore its performance and flight profile. It was later clarified that the RPT operator, as with all operators who participated in the trial, was no longer bound to continue to use flight numbers as callsigns.

It was proposed to change the Whyalla MBZ to a discrete frequency as many aerodromes in the local area used the same frequency (126.7 MHZ). The Adelaide office of CASA supported the proposal.

Both companies expressed a willingness to be flexible with aircraft tracking and aircraft operation during climb and descent to facilitate operations within the MBZ.

A Boeing 747 (B747), en route from Sydney to Hong Kong, was maintaining flight level 350 (FL350) and had been radar identified by Manila Air Traffic Control. The flight crew observed another aircraft maintaining the same level approximately 20 NM to the east displayed on their aircraft's traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS). The B747 crew sighted the other aircraft as it crossed their track from east to west. The crossing aircraft was en route from Manila to Kuala Lumpur and had initially been assigned FL280.

On first contact with radar control that crew had been instructed to climb to FL350. The controller noted the proximity of the two aircraft and instructed the crew of the B747 to climb immediately to FL370. At the same time the B747 TCAS announced a "Climb" resolution advisory (RA) instruction. The B747 crew complied with the climb instruction. The crew of the crossing aircraft advised the B747 crew that they had received a TCAS RA instruction to descend which they had followed. There was a breakdown of separation. Following an investigation of the occurrence the Republic of the Philippines, Department of Transport and Communications air traffic services investigator reported that all area control centre controllers would undergo radar simulator training to enhance their proficiency. The training was to commence in January 1998.