Collision with terrain

The pilot was attempting to paraglide into an offshore wind from an area not generally used by local paraglider pilots in similar conditions.

The paraglider was seen to be effected by wind gusts resulting in a partial collapse of the canopy followed by a hard landing amongst rocks.

The pilot, who was a Swiss national on holiday, was not wearing a helmet and suffered fatal injuries.

The pilot had planned to fly his own aircraft, a Rockwell 114, to Moorabbin via Flinders Island. On the day prior to the flight his aircraft was found to be unserviceable. Over the years he had flown Piper PA 32 aircraft on several occasions. The local aero club agreed to hire a Piper PA 32R-301 Saratoga aircraft to the pilot for the flight.

On the day of the flight the weather in the morning at Launceston was poor with low cloud. At about 1000 hours the chief flying instructor gave the pilot a brief check flight, consisting of two circuits at a height of 800 feet. As the day progressed the weather at Launceston improved. A complex low-pressure trough was over the area moving east. The forecasts covering the route, together with the Flinders Island and Moorabbin terminal forecasts indicated that low cloud conditions could be expected.

A flight plan was not submitted for the flight. At 1342 hours the pilot called Launceston tower for taxy clearance for a flight to Moorabbin via Targa Gap at 3,000 feet. A clearance was given to track out of the control zone on this route, at not above 3,000 feet. The aircraft departed at 1348 hours on climb to 3,000 feet. The pilot was advised that the area QNH was 1006.

At 1352 hours the pilot advised the tower he was approaching Nunamara and that he would be at 2,500 feet due to cloud. In response the tower controller told the pilot to close on this frequency passing Targa Gap and that the area frequency was 126.5. This call was acknowledged by the pilot. No further calls were heard from him.

That evening the Melbourne Search and Rescue Centre was advised that the aircraft had not arrived at Moorabbin.

Initial checks and search activity did not find the aircraft. A full-scale search was started the following morning. Areas to the north-east of Launceston could not be searched that day due to low cloud. The following morning the wreckage was sighted from the air.

The aircraft had struck the ground at very high speed on a track of 106-108 degrees magnetic. The elevation of the initial impact area was approximately 1,870 feet. Prior to impact it passed through a plantation of young trees at a descent angle of 18 degrees and a bank angle of about 40 degrees right wing down.

Examination of the badly damaged wreckage did not reveal evidence of any pre-impact defects. The aircraft had been filled with fuel prior to departure.

There were no witnesses at the accident site. Two persons had seen the aircraft approaching Targa Gap. At that stage it was tracking north-north-east towards the gap. It was just below the cloud base which was at about 1,750-1,800 feet. Much of the terrain directly ahead of the aircraft from Targa Gap was at or above the height of the aircraft. It may not have been possible for the pilot to turn around in the valley which narrows approaching the gap.

The pilot's qualifications limited him to operating under visual flight rules only. The observations of bank angle and descent path at high speed strongly suggest that the pilot lost control of the aircraft while operating in cloud. The route via the Targa Gap is the shortest route to Flinders Island. An alternative but slightly longer route is via the Tamar River. This route would have enabled the aircraft to track over low terrain and almost certainly remain clear of cloud for the departure.

The aircraft was fitted with a Narco model ELT-10 emergency locator transmitter. During the severe impact, the beacon was damaged and hence no signal was transmitted to assist in the search for the aircraft. A second beacon was carried in the pilot's navigation bag. This was found to be unserviceable, with batteries that had leaked and corroded the internal case of the beacon. It was switched off.

The Narco ELT-10 beacon fitted was of a type required to be able to operate after a shock of 50 times the force of gravity (G). There are beacons available which are designed to withstand an impact shock of 500 G.

Significant Factor

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The route selected by the pilot was over hilly/mountainous terrain, covered by low cloud in the higher terrain areas.
2. The pilot, who was not qualified to operate in non-visual conditions, probably lost control of the aircraft after inadvertently entering low cloud.

Safety Action

Although there are no specific safety actions being formulated as a direct result of the investigation of this occurrence, the Bureau is conducting a research project on emergency locator transmitters. This research is based on information obtained from several investigations, of which this is one.

The project will continue into 1994 and will cover the effects of new legislation introduced by the Civil Aviation Authority in relation to the carriage of emergency locator transmitters.

The gyrocopter took off from Albion Park aerodrome and was subsequently seen flying very low over local houses before it departed the circuit area on an easterly heading. It was later observed flying low over Lake Illawarra towards a residential area on the eastern shore. After passing low over houses the gyrocopter was seen to enter a steep turn to the left. During the turn it descended and collided with a tree in a nearby reserve. The machine was destroyed by the impact and the pilot was fatally injured.

No defects were found with the gyrocopter that could have contributed to the accident. It is likely that the pilot attempted a manoeuvre beyond his ability on the aircraft type. The reason such a manoeuvre was attempted in the vicinity of a residential area was not determined.

The aircraft was observed to taxi from its hangar to the southern end of the airstrip, turn onto the runway and start to taxi north. After taxiing a short distance, the engine power increased and the aircraft took off to the north, becoming airborne about halfway along the strip. At a height of about 150 feet, above the northern end of the strip, the engine was heard to stop and start again. The aircraft turned left with the engine running intermittently. Soon after, it was seen in a steep nose down attitude which continued until it descended into trees.

An investigation failed to determine the reason for the intermittent operation of the engine. No defects were found with the aircraft which were likely to have contributed to the accident.

The left turn was consistent with the pilot attempting to turn back to the airfield for a landing, after the engine malfunctioned at a critical stage of flight over heavily timbered terrain, with no suitable areas for a forced landing. During the turn the aircraft apparently stalled and entered a steep nose down attitude at a height which was insufficient for the pilot to regain control.

Significant factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of this accident:

1. The engine malfunctioned at a critical stage of flight.

2. The aircraft was over terrain unsuitable for a safe forced landing.

3. The aircraft stalled during an attempted turnback with insufficient altitude for recovery.

The pilot had planned to carry out a period of circuit training. Following discussion with the operator it was decided, primarily at the pilot's request and because of apparent under-confidence and a concern she had about recency, that her circuit procedures would be checked by an instructor prior to conducting solo circuit training.

Two uneventful dual circuits were conducted. Following the dual check the pilot carried out one solo circuit which resulted in a normal landing, a second circuit which required an overshoot as the aircraft was too high over the threshold, and a third circuit which appeared normal. The accident occurred on the fourth solo circuit.

During the fourth circuit the aircraft was observed to be below the normal glide path and flying faster than normal as it turned on to the final approach. The aircraft continued to descend, with wing flaps retracted, until it became obvious to the ground observers that the aircraft would crash short of the runway unless the pilot took corrective action.

Just prior to impact the pilot radioed that she was "going round". However, the aircraft collided with a 15 metre high tree 300 metres short of the threshold, as the call was being made. The aircraft came to a stop inverted, in a drain, 30 metres beyond the tree.

Insufficient evidence was available to determine the precise factors which led to the accident. Weather and mechanical problems were eliminated as possible factors. It is apparent from the aircraft's final flight path and the timing and tenor of the "going round" call that the pilot was unaware of the danger until just prior to impact.

The pilot was conducting a short joy-flight with six passengers from the Sea World complex. About 4 km north of the complex, the helicopter was seen to climb steeply in a near-vertical nose-high attitude. As the helicopter fell backwards from the nose-high attitude, the tail boom was severed by the main rotor blades. The cabin and the separated tail boom fell to ground on the ocean beach of South Stradbroke Island; The main body of the helicopter exploded and caught fire, scattering debris over a wide area. All seven occupants received fatal injuries.

At about 2045 hours ESuT, Piper aircraft VH-MRQ crashed onto the northern face of a small tree-covered hill on Oxley Island. The accident site was located on a bearing of 098 degrees from Taree Airport, at a distance of 6.5 km. Both occupants were fatally injured in the accident.

The aircraft had departed Taree at 1849 for a return flight via Port Macquarie and Forster. The purpose of the flight was to conduct a Command Instrument Rating flight test. NDB aerial work was planned to be carried out at Port Macquarie, Forster and Taree. The last reported contact with the aircraft was at 2041, near the completion of the flight, while it was conducting aerial work at Taree.

The aircraft was seen and heard by witnesses located near the accident site. Some of these witnesses reported that the aircraft had appeared to be operating normally prior to it entering a sudden descent. However, others reported hearing the aircraft engine apparently operating erratically before seeing the lights of the aircraft descend rapidly from a relatively low altitude. A sudden increase in engine noise was followed almost immediately by the sounds of an impact. The accident was non-survivable.

The aircraft struck the tops of large trees at a height of 18 m before impacting heavily onto a 12 degree uphill slope. The left wing was torn off as it struck a tree adjacent to the ground impact point. The aircraft overturned and slid tail-first up the hill before coming to rest 80 m beyond the initial tree contact. Damage to the aircraft was extreme and was consistent with it having struck the ground at a relatively high speed, with the engine delivering substantial power.

Weather at the time of the accident was overcast and dark, with no low cloud or rain, and with a light wind from the north-east.

No evidence was found of any mechanical failure or pilot incapacity. The reported erratic operation of the engine shortly before the accident could be consistent with the exhaustion of fuel from one fuel tank, although more than sufficient fuel had been carried for the flight. The circumstances of the accident were consistent with a loss of control. However, there was insufficient evidence to establish the reason for the loss of control.

At 1144 hours Eastern Summer Time, on 22 December 1990, during a search for a missing aircraft, Cessna 210 aircraft VH-PLD crashed in inhospitable terrain following a complete loss of engine power. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces; the pilot, co-pilot, and two observers received fatal injuries, and two other observers suffered serious injury. The Bureau determined that a failure of a connecting rod bolt resulted in the loss of engine power. The connecting rod penetrated the crankcase, allowing engine oil to escape. The oil was blown back onto the windscreen, probably obscuring the pilots' vision during the forced landing approach.

Examination of the wreckage found no evidence of pre-existing defect or malfunction. The engine was not producing high power at the time of impact but no reason was found why it should not have been capable of normal operation. There was no fire.