Circumstances:

As the aircraft was making an approach into a confined area, it was struck by a local wind condition known as "willy willy". The aircraft began to rotate in a clockwise direction, and the pilot was unable to obtain a response from any of the controls. The aircraft touched down heavily, causing damage to the right hand skid and the tail rotor.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot lost control of the helicopter when it was affected by a "willy willy".
2. The aircraft collided with the ground before the pilot was able to regain control.

The pilot had limited experience in night operations. Until this flight, all night take-offs since obtaining his Command instrument rating had been conducted from airports in well lit areas. This particular take-off was conducted into an area devoid of external visual cues. The aircraft become airborne at the normal speed, and the pilot reported that after lift-off the aircraft was held parallel to the runway until the two-engine best rate of climb speed was acquired. The aircraft was then rotated so that a nose up attitude and positive rate of climb were indicated, whereupon the landing gear was selected up and the landing lights were selected off. The pilot stated that he then checked that the airspeed was 120 knots, the desired climb speed, and was commencing to adjust the throttles when the aircraft struck the ground. The initial propeller strikes indicate that the aircraft had a groundspeed of approximately 136 knots at impact. No faults were found with the aircraft or the aircraft systems that may have contributed to the occurrence. It was likely that the pilot had hurried the after takeoff checks, and had not adequately monitored the attitude of the aircraft.

Circumstances:

After arrival at the destination aerodrome near the End-of-Daylight the pilot was making his second approach to land. The aircraft subsequently touched down with the undercarriage retracted and slid for 150 metres. The pilot initially reported that he had landed without selecting the landing gear down but later inferred that it had collapsed when landing. A subsequent examination and engineering report revealed that the landing gear had been selected down after the aircraft had come to rest on the runway.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot failed to select the landing gear down and confirm a down-and-locked indication prior to landing.

2. Pilot anxiety to be on the ground prior to End-of-Daylight. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

The pilot had flown that morning from Bringelly to Kincumber to visit his brother and family. The flight was reported as normal and the helicopter as serviceable. Following lunch the pilot agreed to take his nephew for a ride "to wave a cheerio to friends at Wamberal". After takeoff he climbed to 1200 feet and set heading over Empire Bay. When he had passed Terrigal he descended quickly to 200 feet, and then flew north along the beach towards Spoon Bay. He observed that the sea was very rough, with large waves breaking on the headland and a strong southerly wind blowing. When he arrived over the headland, abeam Wamberal, the pilot initiated a turn to the right away from the land, and commenced to climb using cyclic control. His intention was to gain sufficient height during the turn so as to recross the coast and a built up area. The pilot increased the angle of bank to approximately 40 degrees, which he maintained during the climbing turn, allowing the airspeed to decrease to best climb speed. When the helicopter had climbed about 50 feet and turned through 120 degrees the pilot increased the collective pitch and power to continue the climb. He reported that the machine then appeared to buck and tend to corkscrew, without any accompanying unusual noises. It then lurched violently to the right and assumed a steep nose down attitude. There was no apparent response from application of left pedal which made the pilot believe that he had suffered a tail rotor failure. He lowered the collective control and pulled back on the cyclic in an attempt to raise the nose, which slowly came up and the lurching stopped. The helicopter was now facing towards the land, but too low and not close enough for the pilot to make an auto-rotational landing on the beach. The helicopter descended rapidly, and the pilot moved the cyclic control full back in an attempt to flare the machine for a ditching in the sea. At the same time he raised the collective and applied some power. The helicopter touched down relatively gently on the water, but sank almost immediately. Both occupants were able to evacuate through the cabin bubble and stayed together for about half an hour. When help did not appear to be forthcoming, the pilot, who was the stronger swimmer, decided to to swim against the current and surf to the shore to find help. After assuring himself that his nephew was alright, and floating satisfactorily, he set off for the beach, where he was assisted by police and other people who had witnessed the accident. An immediate air search by helicopters failed to locate the passenger in the sea. His body was eventually washed up on the shore about a week later. Attempts to locate and salvage the wreckage of the helicopter were unsuccessful, except for the recovery of the tail rotor and part of the tail boom. An inspection found no evidence that these components had suffered any pre-impact malfunction or failure. As the helicopter was in a steep turn to the right the pilot may have failed to recognise and then compensate, by applying left pedal, for the yaw, also to the right, which would have occurred as he increased the collective pitch. It is likely that he did not apply left pedal until the roll was well developed. Recovery should have been possible by rolling the helicopter level with cyclic and balancing with the pedals. When the pilot decreased the collective pitch, torque to the main rotor was reduced, slowing the yawing motion. As he was still applying full left pedal the tail rotor would have now taken effect, slowing or stopping the turn just prior to the helicopter entering the sea. The wind would have been creating a considerable amount of turbulence over the headland, but not enough to cause loss of control. Mechanical and/or tail rotor failure was considered unlikely. Without the tail rotor anti-torque effect the fuselage should have rotated at a fast rate to the right, and still been rotating at impact, even with the collective lever lowered. This accident was not the subject of a formal on-scene investigation.

The pilot had decided to discontinue the flight due to deteriorating weather conditions. As he was approaching Port Douglas the visibility decreased to the extent that he was unable to maintain visual contact with the coastline. The pilot said that he decreased power to reduce forward speed in an attempt to maintain visual contact, and shortly after this he felt a bump and directional control was lost. The aircraft landed in about 1.5 metres of water some 600 metres from the shoreline. Damage to the tailrotor blades and gearbox, which had separated from the aircraft, indicated that the tailrotor had struck the water before separation.

Circumstances:

The pilot reported that, soon after completing the pre-landing checks during the descent to land, the engine lost power. After checking that the mixture was full rich, he called Hamilton Tower to advise of his situation and was cleared for a straight-in approach. The pilot then changed the fuel selector from the left to the right tank for a short time, but did not actuate the electric fuel boost pump. When the engine did not respond, he re-selected the left tank and again attempted unsuccessfully to restart the engine. Moments later the aircraft made a forced landing into the sea approximately 2 km short of the runway. No fault was found with the aircraft which might have contributed to the accident. Only minute quantities of fuel were found in the fuel system and both tanks contained only sea water. The pilot stated that the aircraft departed Maroochydore with full tanks (337 L) with the left tank selected, and that he changed tanks every 30 min during the flight. He said he had not personally refuelled the aircraft but had noted the fuel level in both tanks prior to DEPARTURE to be at the bottom of the filler tubes. These tubes extend downward into each fuel tank from the filler caps a distance of approximately 10-12 cm. The pilot advised that much of the flight was conducted below 2000 ft with the mixture full rich or only slightly lean. Investigation determined that the actual fuel quantity on board at DEPARTURE was 270-280 L (135-140 L per tank). This meant that 55-65 L remained on board at the time of the accident. Judging from the duration of the flight and the tank selection procedure used by the pilot, the left tank should have been selected for 120 min (4x30 min periods) and the right tank for 90 min. Total usage from the left tank should therefore have been 110-120 L, still leaving 20-30 L in the tank when the power loss occurred. However, had the pilot missed a tank change and had the left tank been selected for 150 min instead of 120, the fuel quantity used from the tank would have been around 150 L, close to the calculated quantity in the tank of 135-140 L. It is likely, therefore, that the pilot missed a tank change, thereby draining the left tank, and that the engine lost power as a result of fuel starvation. Because the electric boost pump was not actuated when the pilot selected the right tank after the power loss, it would have taken more time for the fuel to flow from the right tank to the engine. The left tank was probably reselected before this had time to take place.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident

1. The pilot did not have adequate knowledge of the aircraft fuel system.

2. The aircraft fuel tanks were not filled to capacity prior to DEPARTURE.

3. The pilot probably missed a tank change, thereby draining the left fuel tank.

4. The pilot did not actuate the electric fuel boost pump when attempting to restart the engine.

On arrival over the aerodrome the pilot noted that the wind sock was indicating a strong gusty wind from about 290 degrees and elected to land on runway 27. Final approach was made at about 70 knots, the aircraft being tracked to allow for the crosswind. The aircraft contacted the runway nosewheel first, then came to a stop. Upon inspection the pilot discovered that the nosegear had been damaged during the landing. This accident was not the subject of an on scene investigation.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was carrying out a short familiarisation flight before beginning the day's powerline inspection program. On board were the pilot and the owner of the property being used as a temporary base for operations. The aircraft took off toward the east over a flat paddock, the pilot's intention being to turn north from a point near the centre of the paddock then to intercept an east-west powerline and to follow that line westwards. While still tracking east, at about 20 feet altitude, the aircraft struck and snapped a north-south powerline crossing the take-off path. The aircraft then continued forward for about 60 metres before impacting the ground and coming to rest five metres beyond the impact point. An eyewitness to the accident stated that he was 'almost certain' that he had informed the pilot of the existence of the north-south powerline when the aircraft had first arrived at the property, seven days before the accident. The pilot stated that he had no prior knowledge of the line. The aircraft had taken off from the pad at least three times and had landed at the pad at least four times since first arrival. All prior movements had been to the west of the pad, and the pilot had not been reminded about the line. Prior to take-off on the day of the accident, the pilot briefed the passenger about the proposed profile of the flight and asked the passenger for any comments. The passenger agreed with the proposed profile but did not mention the north-south powerline. The pilot looked to the east to note any obstructions but did not see the line which was very difficult to see from the take-off point. In addition, due to the relatively low position of the sun in the north-eastern sky, glare may have adversely affected his vision. Further, the flat, open terrain did not provide any visual cues to alert him to the requirement for obstruction clearance. However, the pilot did not closely inspect the take-off path from the ground. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any defects in the aircraft which may have contributed to the accident. The performance capability of the aircraft was such that the climb gradient required to clear the powerline could have been easily achieved.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not closely inspect the proposed DEPARTURE path for obstructions prior to take-off.

2. The line was very difficult to see from the take-off point. Glare may have aggravated this problem.

3. The flat, open terrain, without obvious obstructions along the take-off path, provided no cues alerting the pilot to the need for obstruction clearance.

Circumstances:

The pilot was operating from an agricultural airstrip which was aligned north-south. A powerline, approximately 6 m above ground level and located 220 m from the northern threshold, crossed the approach path at an angle of 60 degrees. The pilot elected to take off into the light northerly breeze, flying under the powerline, and to approach over the wires, landing into the south. He determined his descent point by sighting along the run of the power poles, the nearest of which was partially obscured by trees. During his third approach to land, the pilot had forgotten the powerline until sighting it as it was about to pass under the aircraft nose. He applied full throttle and raised the aircraft nose too late to prevent the main landing gear from contacting the powerline. The aircraft impacted the ground in a near-level attitude, 108 m from the point of contact with the powerline and travelled a further 29 m before coming to rest. Both cables of the powerline were dislodged from 9 poles, 1 of which was broken. One cable was broken but remained caught in the left main landing gear. The pilot vacated the aircraft as a fire quickly spread from the engine area to the wings and fuselage.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident.

1. The pilot did not adopt an appropriate procedure for avoiding the powerline.

2. The pilot forgot the presence of the powerline. 3. The pilot saw the wires too late to avoid colliding with them.

Circumstances:

After completing a number of parachute dropping flights under supervision, the pilot refuelled the aircraft from drums using a hand pump which he understood delivered a specific volume of fuel per stroke. He then flew the aircraft on a short solo flight to drop parachutists from 3000 feet. On his return he was asked to conduct another flight ahead of an approaching rainstorm. On reaching jump height the jump coordinator decided that the descent would be conducted to the north of the strip, away from the drop zone, due to the rain. As the parachutists descended, the aircraft was observed to fly to the north west of the strip and shortly after was obscured from view by heavy rain. The aircraft failed to return and was subsequently located by search aircraft approximately six kilometres to the west of the strip. It had impacted the ground in a right wing low attitude at slow speed. The investigation revealed that the fuel on board prior to the last take off was less than statutory reserve requirements. The engine had lost power due to fuel exhaustion. The fuel pump being used for the refuelling operation was found to be delivering less fuel per stroke than stated and the pilot had not use the dipstick to check the aircraft fuel quantity prior to the accident flight. The times being used by the pilot to determine fuel quantity required were taken from the aircraft tachometer. These times were substantially less than real time. It is considered that the pilot's decision to rely on a predetermined fuel quantity and allow himself to be rushed into departing ahead of a rainstorm of unknown duration contributed to the development of this accident.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not adequately carry out pre-flight preparation and planning duties.

2. The pilot did not follow approved procedures.

3. The loss of engine power was due to fuel exhaustion.