The pilot was nearing the completion of 50 hours of flying under the supervision of the company chief pilot. For this flight the chief pilot decided to travel in the passenger section of the aircraft, to demonstrate his confidence in the pilot. The aircraft was rotated at 90 knots and just after liftoff, at about 50 feet above the runway, the pilot heard a loud bang and noticed smoke coming from the left engine. At about this time the chief pilot started to call instructions to the pilot. Power was increased on the right engine and the landing gear and flap retracted. However, the aircraft began to descend and veer to the left before touching down on its undersurface. It skidded for 103 metres and came to rest 155 metres to the left of the runway centreline abeam the upwind threshold. An inspection of the left engine revealed that the thread of a nut on one of the number 2 cylinder connecting rod big end bolts was stripped, causing the big end to become detached from the crankshaft and forcing the connecting rod through the crankcase. The reason for the stripping of the nut thread could not be established.

The aircraft owner was flying the aircraft under the supervision of the pilot-in-command. A landing was made on the grass to the south of the gravel strip. After a small bounce on initial touchdown, the aircraft landed firmly and the right wheel penetrated the ground to a depth of about 5 cm. The aircraft tipped forward, the propeller struck the ground and the aircraft overturned. The aircraft owner had elected to land on the grass adjacent to the gravel strip in order to prevent possible stone damage to the aircraft paintwork.

Circumstances:

During a short ferry flight to a property for the purpose of conducting shooting operations, the pilot noticed a burning smell in the cockpit and a glow beneath the rear seat. Following an emergency landing the pilot evacuated the aircraft before it was consumed by fire. The pilot reports that he had been carrying signal flares, fuel, oil, grease and dirty rags on and beneath the rear seat. He further reports he had been smoking prior to becoming aware of the burning smell. The Fire Officers Investigation report confirms that the fire had originated in the cockpit and that the source of ignition had probably been a lighted cigarette butt which had come to rest on the dirty rags.

During the flight the pilot encountered gradually deteriorating weather conditions, forcing him to reduce his cruising altitude from 5500 feet initially, to below 3500 feet. Cloud covered the tops of the adjacent ranges and there were showers and associated low cloud in the accident area. The aircraft struck the ground at 2140 feet amsl, while flying level, banked 20 degrees right, under control and on a heading 80 degrees to the right of the flight planned track. Shortly before the accident occurred the aircraft entered an extensive area of hill fog whilst being flown at low level and at cruising speed. The pilot was probably attempting to turn back when the aircraft collided with trees on higher ground than a valley he had just overflown.

The pilot intended to carry out a touch and go landing at the strip, from which he had operated on numerous occasions. He reported that the aircraft floated for some distance before touchdown, whereupon he immediately selected flaps up and applied full power. The aircraft started to swing towards the left, and suspecting an engine failure, the pilot shut down both engines and applied maximum braking. He slewed the aircraft to the right to avoid a dam at the end of the strip. The aircraft was arrested by a wire fence beyond the end of the strip, with the left maingear leg torn off. It was found that the left flap had not retracted, although the right flap had retracted normally and the cockpit indication was that the flaps were up. The strip was narrower than required for an ALA, and was bordered on each side by a one metre high oat crop. As the aircraft swung to the left, it is likely that retardation of the crop on the left wing added to the drag on that side. The aircraft had landed with a tailwind component. During the investigation, it was reported by several persons that asymmetric flap retraction was a known problem on this aircraft type, and was caused by dirt or other contamination of the flap tracks. The symptoms of the malfunction are similar to those associated with a loss of engine power on the particular side. The pilot had not been aware of the problem.

Circumstances:

The student pilot had been authorised to carry out a one-hour flight in the Bankstown Training Area for the purpose of practising steep turns and simulated forced landing approaches. The weather was fine and cool with light winds. Prior to DEPARTURE the student had been briefed by his instructor on the conduct of the flight. This had included specifying a minimum go-around height for forced landing approaches. The student was instructed to return to Bankstown by 1700 hours. The aircraft failed to return by the appointed time and, despite extensive efforts, was not located until the following morning. The wreckage was found in an open area and damage was consistent with the aircraft having struck the ground at a high rate of descent with a very low forward speed. Evidence was found to indicate that the engine was delivering little or no power at impact. Subsequent testing demonstrated the engine was capable of normal operation. A comparison of the actual weather conditions at the time of the accident and a carburettor icing probability chart, showed that serious carburettor icing was probable at descent power. The circumstances of the accident were consistent with the engine failing to respond to the opening of the throttle following a prolonged descent at idle power, following a practice forced landing approach. The student may have diverted his attention from flying the aircraft while attempting to restore power, resulting in a loss of control at low altitude. It was not possible to determine if the carburettor heat control had been operated in accordance with recommended procedures.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Weather conditions conducive to carburettor icing during descent

2. Probable prolonged descent at a low power setting.

3. Probable loss of power due to carburettor icing.

4. Student pilot may have diverted attention from the operation of the aircraft.

5. Loss of control at low level.

Circumstances:

The daily flying program authorised the instructor to fly with the student for a period of general flying revision in the training area. Prior to boarding VH-BUO the instructor discussed with the instructor from another Cessna aircraft, VH-HCE, his intention to proceed on a scenic flight to Lake Burragorang. The specific intention was to view an old telephone box located on an island of Kerswell Point. As the instructor from VH-HCE had not flown in this area it was agreed that both aircraft would proceed in company, with VH-BUO leading. Approaching Lake Burragorang, both instructors established radio communications on a VHF discrete frequency. When in the vicinity of the western extremity of the lake both aircraft descended and turned to take up a generally easterly track over the water. It was reported the aircraft levelled at a height of approximately 500 feet above water level. Approaching Kerswell Point from the west, VH-HCE gradually closed on VH-BUO. When the aircraft were about one kilometre east of Kerswell Point, VH-HCE passed to the right of VH-BUO with a lateral separation of 100 to 200 metres. The crew then lost sight of VH-BUO which appeared to be in a shallow climb and about 100 feet higher than VH-HCE. The instructor in VH-HCE attempted to call VH-BUO on the discrete frequency, but there was no response. There was no further contact with VH-BUO. Concerned by the sudden loss of contact, the instructor of VH-HCE turned back towards Kerswell Point. When there were no sighting of the Cessna and no radio contact, he set heading for Camden. However, about 10 kilometres from Camden, he again returned to the Kerswell Point area for another unsuccessful search. Upon returing to Camden the instructor reported that VH-BUO was overdue. A search was begun later in the afternoon but it was not until the following day that wreckage from the Cessna was found on the shoreline south of Kerswell Point. The aircraft was eventually located on the lake bed by sonar in 47 metres of water, approximately 3 kilometres east of Kerswell Point. The wreckage was subsequently recovered and an examination revealed the aircraft had collided with the water at a speed of about 100 knots, consistent with the aircraft being in a shallow descent and moderately banked to the left at the time of impact. No evidence was found to indicate the aircraft was other than airworthy immediately prior to the accident. Weather conditions over Lake Burragorang at the time of the accident were reported to be fine and clear with an easterly breeze of 5 to 10 knots, and scattered cloud at 3500 feet. The events which occurred immediately before the collision with the water, were not positively determined. However, the circumstances of the accident are consistent with the aircraft being operated at a very low height. During the course of the investigation, evidence was obtained concerning the conduct of operations by the training organisation which reflected adversely upon the level of supervision. These matters were bought to the attention of the appropriate authorities for separate investigation.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident

1. Unauthorised low flying in an environment conducive to visual illusions.

2. Inadequate level of supervision exercised over the conduct of flying training operations.

The ore carrier had departed from Port Hedland and was making about 10 knots in fine conditions and a slight sea swell. Arrangements had been made for the helicopter to fly from Port Hedland to pick up the marine pilot on-board the ship when it was about 8 miles off-shore. The on-board landing site selected for landing the helicopter was the starboard side of No 8 hatch cover, which had the letter H painted on it. The complete hatch cover was divided along the centreline of the ship by 6 pairs of walkway stanchions which could be positioned upright or lie flat, pointing outwards athwart the hatch cover. These stanchions were horizontal at the time of the accident but some had their ends sloped upwards. The approach was made to the No 8 hatch cover from the starboard side of the ship and resulted in a normal landing on the starboard side of that cover. After the marine pilot boarded the helicopter, it was brought into the hover and as it did so, it slid slightly forward on its floats towards the stanchions. When the helicopter pilot applied power and attempted to climb away, the aircraft tilted forward violently and the rotor blades struck the hatch cover. The helicopter came to rest on the port side of the hatch cover in an upright position. The helicopter was equipped with rubber floats, the lower portions of which were covered by loose fitting canvas soles to reduce wear on the floats. When the helicopter slid forward during the attempted take-off, one of the stanchions caught in the canvas sole of the starboard float without the knowledge of the helicopter pilot.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was refuelled by the pilot immediately prior to the accident flight. It was reportedly the first occasion on which he was able to fill the tanks to capacity due to weight considerations on previous legs. The pilot also conducted tyre inflation checks during which he confirmed that no drain cocks were left open after the water drain checks. Some 20 kilometres short of his destination, the engines malfunctioned which lead to a total loss of power from what the pilot believed to be complete fuel exhaustion. A MAYDAY call was made and the pilot reported descending through cloud and then sea mist. Fortunately, as the pilot regained visibility, he noticed a whitish track in the beam of the landing lights, and he was able to manoeuvre and select the landing gear down in the remaining height available. The landing gear did not have time to extend fully before the aircraft touched down on the dirt road. The aircraft slid some 50-60 metres on its under-surface before the left wing struck some roadside scrub which slewed the aircraft through about 150 degrees as it came to rest. The pilot had flight planned to allow the mandatory fuel reserves and was puzzled as to how the aircraft could have run out of fuel. The investigation was confined to this aspect of the operations as there were no reported aircraft anomalies. In examining the pilot's fuel management procedures, two anomalies were discovered. Contrary to the aircraft operating manual, he had run the aircraft engines on the main tanks for 90 minutes after engine start rather than 90 minutes after take-off. This practice would result in the main tanks containing more fuel than recommended when the subsequent selection of the auxiliary tanks is made. When the auxiliary tanks are selected, the fuel is fed directly to the engines. However, the fuel from the auxiliary tanks that is not used by the engines is pumped back into the main tanks. With the main tanks containing more fuel than is recommended and continually being topped up by the engine fuel return pumps, the main tanks will eventually fill up and start to overflow, thereby reducing the aircraft's overall endurance. The other anomaly related to the pilot's report that fuel transfer from the only nacelle tank to the main tanks was indicated as complete after some 34 minutes rather than nearly 60 minutes as reported in the operating manual. This anomaly would indicate that there was more fuel in the main tanks than recommended. The significance of this difference was not noted by the pilot. A witness reported that some 13 litres of fuel remained in the nacelle tank after the crash and other evidence suggested spillage during the crash. Notwithstanding, the amount of fuel lost from the nacelle tank and possible venting would not account for the magnitude of the fuel shortage experienced by the pilot. The aircraft had only been available for operations for a short time and the operator had reportedly not been aware of any fuel usage rates different from the manufacturer's recommended figures and they recommended the use of these rates to the pilot. The pilot stated that he was extremely attentive to fuel considerations and usually calibrated his own aircraft dipsticks, but he had not had time to do so for this aircraft. In addition, due to time constraints and fuel loads, he had not been able to establish an actual fuel usage rate. After the accident, evidence from other operators of the aircraft type suggested that a fuel planning figure as high as 240 pounds/hour should be used compared to the manufacturer's recommended figure of 182 pounds/hour. To compound the problems for the pilot, he had established that there was a significant error in the aircraft fuel gauges. Evidence points to the fact that the pilot was very meticulous in his approach to flight planning and operating procedures although he had only a limited experience on the aircraft type. Other evidence available to the investigation suggests, however, that the pilot was not as confident in his knowledge of aircraft systems and operations as he would like others to believe. Albeit in hindsight, the accident might have been avoided if the pilot had not placed implicit faith in his preflight fuel calculations and had had a more healthy scepticism over Whyalla at which point he had done a recalculation of his fuel reserves. A better knowledge of the aircraft's fuel system should have caused him to be more circumspect about his actual fuel remaining as evidenced by the nacelle fuel tank transfer anomaly. In addition, prudence should have engendered further caution in what was his first long range operation in a relatively unfamiliar aircraft for which he had no established fuel usage rates.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot was inexperienced on the long-range operation of the aircraft.

2. Accurate fuel usage rates were not available to the pilot.

3. Inaccurate calculations of fuel usage and/or fuel loss or mismanagement led to fuel starvation of the engines. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

The pilot had been mustering for 2.5 hours. He then landed to refuel the aircraft and collect the passengers. As the pilot subsequently attempted to climb the aircraft, out of ground effect, he noticed the rotor and engine rpm had decayed. The pilot attempted a run-on landing, however, the aircraft landed heavily, the main rotor struck the tail boom and the tail shaft was severed. The pilot did not report any engine or aircraft system defect which might have contributed to the accident. He had relatively limited experience on the aircraft type and in the type of operation being conducted. The pilot's description of a decay in rotor rpm accompanied by a decay in engine rpm indicates overpitching of the main rotor. The pilot's general experience coupled with the hot/heavy/high and relatively confined circumstances of this take-off would have contributed to his attempting to introduce more collective pitch than the power available was able to support. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.