Before he commenced spraying operations in the particular paddock, the pilot had been reminded of the presence of power lines in the area. There was also a group of trees in the paddock, and the pilot sprayed the clear area first, passing over the power lines on at least two occasions. He then advised the property owner by radio that he would spray in the vicinity of the trees "freehand", before resuming normal spraying runs. On the first pass near the trees, the aircraft struck the power lines. The cockpit to fin cable deflector failed and one power line struck the fin about 50 centimetres from the top. The resulting loads caused the rear fuselage to fail, and the entire empennage separated from the aircraft, which dived to the ground and came to rest inverted. The pilot was able to recall that he had the power lines in sight as he lowered the nose to pass under them. It was likely that he misjudged the height of the tail of the aircraft relative to the cockpit with the aircraft in a descending attitude. The injuries suffered by the pilot were made more severe by virtue of the fact that he was not wearing a helmet, and because the seat belt buckle had failed. It was determined that the seat belts fitted to the aircraft were not of a type approved for agricultural operations, but it was not established when or why these particular belts had been installed.

During a flying training sortie the instructor simulated an engine failure by moving the mixture control to the idle cut off position. The student closed the throttle and pulled the carburettor heat on, the instructor then moved the mixture control to rich. During the descent the throttle was opened twice. Prior to commencing a go-around, at about 100 feet above ground level, the student moved the carburettor heat control to cold. At about 200 feet, on climb, the instructor simulated another engine failure by again moving the mixture control to idle cut off. As soon as the student lowered the nose of the aircraft the instructor moved the mixture control to rich, with the throttle open. However, there was no response from the engine and the aircraft was subsequently landed in swampy terrain. No mechanical engine defect was found and tests carried out revealed that the engine should have been capable of operating normally. Atmospheric conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to moderate carburettor icing at cruise power and severe icing at descent power. The carburettor heat control was not operated in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

The pilot stated that the strip used for landing was aligned into the morning sun. On late final approach he noticed several kangaroos near the threshold of the strip and decided to land beyond the animals. He reported that just as the aircraft was about to touchdown he saw a small kangaroo and then heard a thump. An inspection of the aircraft revealed that the animal had been struck by the left tailplane. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

The deceased had been one of a group of four persons undertaking a one day parachute training course. None had any prior parachuting experience. They received about five hours of ground training in normal and emergency procedures, including the correct body position to adopt for a static-line deployment of the parachute. This method of deployment was to be used on their first descent. Each person then successfully completed both a written and an oral examinations of those procedures. The four students then boarded the aircraft along with their instructor and an experienced parachutist, who was to make a video recording of each jump. After takeoff the aircraft climbed to 2500 feet above the drop zone and the first two students completed safe exits and descents. The deceased was expected to jump as the aircraft made a third pass over the drop zone but did not do so and another circuit was made to allow her more time to prepare herself. On leaving the aircraft she was observed to be hunched forward with her arms and legs outstretched, instead of the correct position with the stomach and pelvis pushed forward and the arms and legs spread. She rapidly assumed a stable position on her back, facing upwards, with her body bent and her arms and legs raised. The pilot chute was observed to inflate and pass over her right shoulder until it began to flutter near her head. The main parachute opening sequence failed to continue beyond this point, and the deceased appeared to make no attempt to change her body posture, deploy her reserve parachute or interfere with her parachute equipment before she struck the ground. An examination of the equipment used by the deceased indicated that both the main and reserve parachutes were capable of normal operation. It is considered that the main parachute failed to deploy because of the incorrect body position adopted by the student after she left the aircraft. The reason she then failed to follow emergency procedures was not determined.

Just after take-off, at about 30 feet above ground level, a loud bang was heard and the helicopter started rotating rapidly. The pilot manoeuvred the helicopter clear of fuel drums but it landed heavily while moving rearward. Initial inspection of the helicopter revealed that the tail rotor drive forward short shaft had become disconnected after the failure of the top left longeron. The longeron had failed as a result of high cycle, low stress fatigue. The failure had been developing for some time and should have been noted by maintenance personnel. The decision to take-off over fuel drums restricted the pilot's choices of suitable landing areas and complicated the emergency landing attempt.

On the night prior to the accident heavy rain had fallen in the area. The pilot stated that he carried out an inspection of the centre section of the strip prior to DEPARTURE and found it to be suitable. This inspection did not include the last 150 metres of the strip, in the proposed direction of take-off. The area used for the take-off roll was to one side of the centre of the strip, where the grass cover varied substantially in length and density. Standing water along the strip inhibited acceleration with the result that the nosewheel was not raised off the ground. The aircraft entered large patches of water about 150 metres before the end of the strip, causing the airspeed to decay from 65 to 40 knots. The pilot elected to continue the take-off and the aircraft overran the strip. It then sank into thick vegetation below the strip.

The pilot was carrying out practice circuits for type familiarisation. Landings were being made into wind and on the first touchdown the aircraft bounced and the pilot carried out a go-around. On the next approach, the aircraft bounced on touchdown to about 10 feet above the ground, and the pilot held the elevator control back and opened the throttle rapidly, intending to go around. The engine failed to respond and the aircraft landed heavily, collapsing the left maingear. No defect was found with either the engine or the failed gear tubing that could have contributed to the accident. The misjudged landing flare was probably a result of the pilot's lack of familiarity with the aircraft type. The recovery was initiated too late and the lack of response from the engine was most likely due to the throttle being opened too rapidly.

The pilot was making a landing approach in 8 knot crosswind conditions. Witnesses reported that the aircraft was flared at a greater height above the ground than normal, and it subsequently landed heavily and bounced. The pilot elected to carry out a go-around, applied full power and raised the flaps. Shortly afterwards, the aircraft stalled and struck the ground in a left wing low attitude at about 90 degrees to the runway heading. The pilot had not flown for several weeks, and had evidently misjudged the height of the aircraft when he commenced the landing flare. After he applied full power to go-around, he had retracted the flaps while the airspeed was still relatively low.

On arrival in the destination area deteriorating weather conditions, including rain and turbulence, were encountered. The pilot reported that strong sink was experienced on the base leg of the circuit and he found it was necessary to increase power and raise the landing gear in order to maintain adequate control of the aircraft. The approach was continued but the gear was not lowered. The warning horn sounded just before ground contact and the aircraft slid to a halt on the strip.

The helicopter was being flown along a beach at 500 feet above ground level when the engine lost power without warning. The pilot turned the aircraft into wind and carried out an autorotation. The subsequent landing was heavy, in soft, uneven sand. Both occupants evacuated the helicopter while the rotor blades were still turning. The pilot stated that as he was about to return to the helicopter and turn off the fuel and switches the right skid broke through the sand and the helicopter lurched to the right rear causing the main rotor blade to sever the tail boom. The cause of the reported engine failure could not be determined. During subsequent testing, the engine functioned normally and no defects were found with the aircraft that may have contributed to the occurrence. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.