The pilot reported that he had been flying over his farm for about 30 minutes inspecting his crops and livestock. When crossing a road, whilst proceeding to another section of the farm at a altitude of about 30 feet, he remembered the location of a powerline, which was then only 50 metres ahead. He banked the aircraft left to avoid the line, but the left wing hit the top of a tree. Control was lost and the aircraft impacted the ground, coming to rest inverted. The pilot stated that during the flight he had been preoccupied thinking about the several tasks he hoped to complete that day. Consequently he was not giving his full attention to the operation of the aircraft. During the impact sequence the insert plug in the fuel tank became dislodged. This allowed fuel to spill from the tank and drench the pilot.

The pilot was conducting her second solo flight. She reported that following a normal approach, the aicraft touched down and bounced. She was unable to correct the situation and a further two bounces occurred before the aircraft could be brought to rest. An inspection revealed damage to the nosegear assembly and the engine mounts.

During the course of the day's activities, the pilot had landed at the strip on 24 occasions. The surface was wet and landings had been made with a quartering tailwind. On each occasion the pilot had stopped the aircraft about 100 metres short of a cattle yard at the end of the strip. The pilot was making his first approach after changing operations to another paddock. The aircraft touched down about 100 metres beyond the previous touchdown area. However, the pilot continued with the landing and despite heavy braking he was unable to prevent the aircraft colliding with the fence of the cattle yard. It was reported that while the aircraft was on approach the wind strength increased to about 15 knots.

The pilot was stock-spotting with both side windows of the aircraft open. He noticed smoke trailing from the aircraft, and saw that some towelling material and a chamois were smouldering under the rear seat. He closed the windows to reduce the flow of air to these articles and proceeded to select a suitable landing area. In the meantime, smoke in the cabin forced him to open a side window again, resulting in the smouldering material bursting into flame. He attempted to douse the flames with water from his water bottle with little success. During the landing on a flat-topped hill, he had to keep his head out the window for visibility. The aircraft bounced several times and overturned. The pilot was knocked unconscious for a period of about five minutes. When he regained consciousness he released his harness and extinguished the remnants of the fire with the aircraft's extinguisher. He believes the loose extinguisher struck him on the head during the overturn sequence. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

When the pilot selected the landing gear up after takeoff, the gear unsafe light remained on. Recycling the gear had no effect. The pilot continued to his planned destination, with the aircraft performing at about 10 knots below the expected speed. On arrival, a visual inspection confirmed that the right maingear was trailing. The pilot then carried out a successful emergency landing, during which the right flap and propeller sustained damage as the gear collapsed. Subsequent investigation disclosed that the right gear strut had failed on takeoff from Mudgee. Examination of the failure indicated that corrosion fatigue had initiated on the inner surface of the strut. The strut had not been subjected to corrosion prevention methods. An inspection cycle recommended by the manufacturer had not been followed.

The student had about 75 hours experience in ultralight aircraft, and was undergoing a training programme to enable him to become an instructor. At about 100 feet above the ground after takeoff, the instructor closed the throttle to simulate an engine failure. The student was slow to react, and the airspeed rapidly decayed. The instructor took control and applied full power, but was unable to prevent the aircraft from contacting the ground heavily. This contact resulted in the lower fuselage striking the ground, and the throttle control became jammed. The aircraft became airborne again with full power applied, and the instructor turned off the ignition system. A second heavy touchdown occurred before the aircraft came to rest.

The pilot had completed a soaring flight of some two and a half hours duration. The aircraft was seen to make an apparently normal approach, but during the landing flare the tail cone contacted the ground and the glider pitched nose down. The forward fuselage area then struck the ground heavily. The glider received only minor damage, however the pilot suffered serious back injuries. The pilot was using three additional soft foam cushions on top of the seat to elevate his position in the cockpit. It is probable that during the hard landing the resilient cushions compressed rapidly and the pilot continued downward after the aircraft had started to rebound and then stopped abruptly as he hit the seat pan. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

Intensive gliding activities were taking place as part of a course in glider flying. Two tug aircraft were employed in towing operations, and most flights in the gliders did not exceed about 20 minutes duration. The pilot of VH-PXT towed VH-GVZ to about 3000 feet before releasing and returning for the next glider. This aircraft was then towed to 3000 feet and released, following which the pilot of VH-PXT descended to join the traffic circuit on the downwind leg. VH-GVZ had by this time descended and was also on downwind for landing. The pilot of VH-PXT manoeuvred to join in the latter portion of this leg, and witnesses observed the aircraft converging with VH-GVZ from above and behind. The left wing of the aircraft struck the right side of the glider, and about 75 centimetres of the left wing was seen to be hanging vertically as the aircraft entered a spin to the right. This spin continued until impact with the ground occurred. The instructor in the glider was able to retain control of his aircraft, and carried out a safe landing. It was evident that the pilot had not seen the glider until shortly before the impact. Witnesses had observed the aircraft commence a steep turn to the right immediately before the left wing struck the side of the glider. Weather conditions were good at the time, and the reason the pilot had failed to see the glider earlier could not be established. Both aircraft were equipped with suitable radios, but in common with the various other aircraft in the area, were not broadcasting their positions in the circuit.

The pilot was conducting spreading operations on a flat paddock, but about 800 metres from one boundary the ground rose sharply by about 200 feet. At the end of a run towards the rising ground a procedure turn was commenced. During the turn, the pilot realised that the aircraft was closer to the rising ground than intended. Despite corrective measures, the pilot was unable to prevent a collision with a tree. The aircraft then struck the ground and came to rest in a further clump of trees. Weather conditions at the time of the accident were overcast, with rain showers and a strong gusty wind. On the runs towards the rising terrain the aircraft was subjected to a substantial tailwind component and possible downdrafts. As the pilot commenced a procedure turn at the end of the last run, the aircraft had drifted further downwind than expected, leaving insufficient margin to complete the turn safely.

The crew was conducting a series of circuits and landings. The check pilot was sitting in the right hand control seat and was holding the checklist. During the circuit in question, the check pilot spent a considerable amount of time discussing various aspects of the aircraft operation. There was further cockpit talk during the final approach, and neither pilot realised that the landing gear had not been lowered. The aircraft slid on its belly for some 360 metres after touchdown. No fault was subsequently found with the aircraft or its systems. The gear warning horn was serviceable, but had probably been deactivated by the pilot when power was reduced in the early stages of the circuit. To re-arm the warning system, the power levers have to be advanced to about 30 torque. The particular circuit was being flown with the flaps up, and was probably conducted at a power setting lower than that required to effect re-arming. The pilot in the left seat had experienced minor difficulties in handling the aircraft as precisely as desired, and the check pilot had assumed an instructional role. Under these circumstances, the normal two-pilot challenge and response method of conducting the various pre-landing checks had broken down.