The aircrafts propeller and right-wing tip contacted the ground when it was blown onto its side while taxiing behind a larger aircraft. The pilot said he was vacating the runway via taxiway A3 at Cairns, when the incident happened. He said it was necessary to hold aileron into wind while taxiing, as the crosswind was gusting at right angles at about 20 kts. After entering taxiway A3 the aircraft passed behind a larger multi engined aircraft which had several engines running. The pilot was not aware that engineering personnel were conducting high power engine checks on the larger aircraft at the time. The pilot said he believed the accident was caused by a combination of a "crosswind component and prop wash" from the large aircraft.

The pilot of VH-FZV contacted Avalon Tower, reporting his position as five miles north-east and requesting an airways clearance. This position placed the aircraft inside the control zone and a clearance had not been issued.

VH-ANF, operating in the Avalon circuit, had just departed from runway 36 and was turning onto a right crosswind when the controller advised the crew of the reported position of VH-FZV. In response the crew of VH-ANF said they had VH-FZV in sight and were taking avoiding action.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1 The pilot of VH-FZV did not contact Avalon Tower for a clearance before entering the control zone.

The pilot reported that the wind direction was varying between 180 and 270 degrees, up to 15 knots. He made an approach for runway 18, maintaining about 60 knots on final and with full flap set. As the throttle was closed for the landing flare the aircraft sank. The pilot applied full power to arrest the sink but said the aircraft did not seem to climb normally.

The aircraft then drifted to the left side of the runway. The pilot said he decided to end the sequence by closing the throttle and landing. The aircraft touched down heavily breaking the nose gear off.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1 The pilot probably mishandled the controls during the initial landing flare.

2 The pilot probably did not apply the appropriate procedures and control inputs during the attempted go around.

During a long final approach to the strip, the engine began to run rough. When the engine power dropped to idle the pilot elected to carry out a forced landing in a paddock. During the landing roll the aircraft ran through a fence and a ditch.

Examination of the engine by an engineering workshop did not find any defects.

The pilot reported that all indications were normal during the pre-landing checks. After landing, the brakes were applied but there was no pressure in the left brake. The pilot then initiated a ground loop to the right as speed and distance remaining were inadequate for a go-around.

During the ground loop as the aircraft was sliding sideways across the grass, the left main wheel entered a depression. The sudden stop caused damage to the left wing and main wheel, as well as the nose gear and propeller. All occupants exited the aircraft safely.

ZK-NBI was inbound to the Plenty locator from Wonthaggi on descent to 5,000 ft. VH-UWW departed Essendon runway 17 with departure instructions to turn left heading 090 deg with an unrestricted climb to 5,500 ft. These instructions were issued by the approach controller who was also controlling ZK-NBI.

Approximately four minutes after VH-UWW departed Essendon, the controller realised that the two aircraft were on conflicting tracks with no vertical separation. Both aircraft were given heading changes, but their tracks closed to approximately two miles at the same altitude before radar separation was re-established.

Investigation revealed that the approach controller failed to ensure maintenance of separation between the two aircraft because he was distracted by separation requirements for other traffic. He had intended to turn VH-UWW to the northeast earlier to maintain separation, but due to the distraction this did not occur.

Two other factors contributed to the failure. The first one was that when the approach controller issued the departure instructions for VH-UWW, ZK-NBI was not displayed on his radar screen. The second was that ZK-NBI maintained an unusually high speed on descent. Even though the aircraft had been issued with no speed restriction below 10000 ft, an unusually high groundspeed was maintained.

It was reported that the pilot made a normal, full flap landing at 70 kt. The aircraft bounced back into the air and touched down three more times before coming to a stop. The propeller struck the ground during the third touchdown. A post-landing inspection disclosed that the engine firewall was bent at the nosewheel leg attachment point. The sequence of events and the damage indicates that the pilot misjudged the landing flare and allowed the aircraft to touchdown, nosewheel first, on at least one occasion.

The student was undergoing a flight check with the Chief Flying Instructor (CFI) and was asked to demonstrate a short field approach and landing onto the grass runway. A speed of 65 kts was maintained until the aircraft approached the runway threshold, at which point the stall warning horn sounded intermittently. The student reported that she closed the throttle at about this time and the aircraft landed heavily. The main landing gear oleo struts were heard to "bottom". A further circuit and landing was carried out without incident.

The CFI carried out a post-flight inspection of the aircraft but did not observe any damage. A subsequent inspection by an engineer revealed that the left forward wing attachment fitting had failed, and the left wing main spar was twisted.

A breakdown in separation occurred between two VFR aircraft, a twin Comanche cleared Station Pier for Essendon at 1,500 ft and a helicopter cleared World Trade Centre for Essendon on climb to not above 1,500 ft. Essendon Tower passed traffic to each aircraft, but the helicopter pilot claimed not to have heard advice on the Comanche.

The Comanche pilot never saw the helicopter whereas the helicopter pilot saw the Comanche pass about 200 ft overhead.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. Both aircraft were cleared at the same altitude.

2. The two pilots did not take adequate action to ensure separation was maintained.

3. Air traffic control did not provide sufficient information to the two pilots to assist them to sight each other's aircraft.

The pilot was undergoing an instructional flight as part of his training for a commercial pilot licence. When overhead Murray Bridge airfield the instructor simulated an engine power failure for the pilot to practice a forced landing.

Their attention was distracted by an ultralight aircraft operating in the circuit area, and as a result they forget to carry out the final landing checks and landed the aircraft with the landing gear still in the retracted position.