The pilot reported that he had obtained a weather briefing from the Bureau of Meteorology at Cairns, prior to the flight. This information including early morning observations from Mareeba Airport. After selecting a launch site to the south-east of Mareeba, Winds in the area were again assessed using a weather balloon. The departure and flight were uneventful until north-east of Mareeba, when the pilot became aware that the surface wind was a southerly, gusting between 10 and 15 kts.

During the approach to land, at about 90 ft above ground level, the balloon was effected by a wind rotor near some trees. The rotor distorted the canopy and caused it to lose heat. As a result a high descent rate developed. The pilot estimated that about 50 ft of height was lost before he was able to arrest the descent using the burner. During the latter part of the descent, the basket and lower flying wires struck the branches of a tree, causing damage to lower panels of the canopy. A fast landing then ensued. After landing, the canopy was further damage when it became entangled in a barbed wire fence.

The pilot reported that a rain shower was experienced some minutes after the landing. He believed that the unusual localised wind during this accident was due to the approaching rain.

The pilot reported that during the take-off run the aircraft was not accelerating very well due to the soft wet surface.

At about 70 knots the pilot raised the nose in an attempt to get the main wheels off the runway to allow the aircraft to accelerate in ground effect. The pilot said that as soon as the aircraft lifted off it veered slightly left and was about to settle onto the ground again, so he closed the throttles and tried to maintain directional control on the ground. The aircraft entered mud and grass to the left of the runway for about 200 metres. The nosewheel then broke off, the propellers struck the ground, and the aircraft came to rest in about 8 metres.

The passenger who was an engineer, had previously run the left engine as it was suspected to not be producing full power. No fault was found with the engine. During the accident take-off the engineer had noted that the left engine was performing normally.

At Sydney, the aircraft had been released for service, prior to departure for Bangkok, with the number three engine fire detection 'B' loop inoperative, in accordance with the provisions of the minimum equipment list. The remaining 'A' loop would be used for fire detection and warning for the engine. The aircraft operated normally to Bangkok, where a transit service was performed before the next sector to Rome.

The subsequent take-off was rejected at 140 knots when the fire warning for number three engine activated. The aircraft returned to the gate where eleven of the sixteen mainwheels deflated due to overheating. The mainwheels were changed. Rectification of the fire warning problem consisted of repairing a broken wire at the 'B' fire detection loop connector, adjacent to number three engine starter motor. Both 'A' and 'B' loops then tested normally.

As the aircraft was rotated during the next take-off the number three engine fire warning activated again. The crew carried out the fire warning actions and shut down the engine. Fuel was jettisoned to bring the aircraft to maximum landing weight, prior to returning to Bangkok. An inspection of the engine revealed two holes burnt in the combustion case adjacent to the fire detection loops. The holes allowed hot gasses to escape and activate the fire warning system.

Investigation of the incident by the operator has resulted in a change to company procedures. Any rectification for a fire warning defect will now require a ten minute minimum high power ground run to verify the integrity of the engine. In addition, the inspection intervals for combustion cases have also been reduced.

The captain of VH-KDO gave taxiing calls on both MBZ and FS frequencies, advising they were taxiing for runway 09.  Shortly before commencing their take-off roll, the crew of KDO heard the pilot of VH-PRN advise he was taxiing for runway 36.  As they commenced their take-off roll, the captain made a call to "all stations Mildura and PRN - KDO is rolling runway 09".  The pilot of PRN acknowledged that call. After they had passed V1 and rotated, they saw PRN becoming airborne from runway 36.  The crew of KDO took avoiding action, passing approximately 300 ft above and 100 to 150 m behind PRN.

The pilot of PRN reported later that he had misinterpreted the "rolling" call from KDO, and believed when he heard that call, KDO was in fact commencing to taxi.  At Mildura there are aerodrome buildings located between the thresholds of runways 36 and 09 so that a pilot in an aircraft at one threshold cannot see an aircraft at the other threshold nor for the initial part of the take-off run.  There is a notice to this effect in the Enroute Supplement.

Circumstances

Both aircraft were outbound from Cairns on the same track and on climb to FL 330. VH-TJD was about 9 NM behind VH-CZI. When CZI was transferred to Cairns Arrivals frequency, the crew advised that the aircraft would be cruising at reduced Mach 0.65. The controller, who had not previously experienced such a situation, did not associate this information as having any influence on the climb performance of the aircraft. He believed that because the aircraft were approximately co-speed, separation was assured throughout the climb. As CZI climbed above about FL250, the Mach Number restriction to that aircraft began to take effect and a groundspeed differential developed between it and TJD. There was other traffic in the area at the time, with the labels for these aircraft reducing the information available to the controller concerning the separation of CZI and TJD.

The aircraft were transferred to the next sector (7V) when CZI was passing FL 280. By this time, the groundspeed of TJD was 425 kts, and of CZI, 368 kts. Horizontal separation was about 6 NM and reducing. The sector 7V controller instructed CZI to maintain FL280. The crew advised that they had passed that level but would return to it. TJD then reported leaving FL297.

Examination of the recorded radar data revealed that radar separation reduced to a minimum of 4.8 NM. At the time, CZI was at FL287 and TJD at FL297. The required separation standard was 5 NM laterally and 1,000 ft vertically.

Information from the Cairns Arrivals controller, and other experienced controllers, indicated that the effect of reduced Mach No climbs on aircraft performance was not fully appreciated. Local management reported that controllers had been rebriefed on this issue.

The pilot reported that he was engaged in moving cattle on a flooded property. On board the helicopter with the pilot was the property owner. While hovering at about 30-40 feet behind some cattle, the pilot's attention was diverted momentarily allowing the engine and main rotor RPM to decay. He was unable to regain rotor RPM and elected to attempt a landing onto a nearby dry patch of ground. In turning the helicopter towards the dry ground, the pilot inadvertently turned down wind, overpitching the main rotor blades. During the ensuing deep flare to land, the tail rotor contacted the water and the main rotor blades severed the tail boom. The helicopter then settled into the water and rolled over. Both the pilot and passenger were able to exit the helicopter safely.

The pilot reported that whilst flying at FL310 clear of cloud and avoiding a large build up, the aircraft was struck by lightning. The pilot was of the opinion that there was one strike on the left-wing tip and one near miss. There was a large flash, and a loud bang followed with an ozone smell but no smoke. The avionics and electrical systems were not affected. The flight continued to Perth.

After landing, the aircraft was inspected by ground staff who found damaged elevators and propellers.

The pilot reported that he was carrying out an inspection of the area to be treated when the engine made an unusual noise and began to vibrate. The pilot immediately turned the aircraft for a return to the departure airstrip and when power was reduced the engine began to run roughly. The engine then began to loose power and the pilot had to pump the throttle to keep the engine going. The pilot said he reached the end of the strip and on touchdown the right wheel struck soft ground. The right wingtip then struck the ground, and the aircraft nosed over. The pilot was suspended upside down by the seat harness and was drenched by organophosphate leaking from the hopper. The pilot could not open the door due to the cockpit roof being buried in mud. He was then forced to kick the window out to evacuate, and lost portion of his ring finger and broke bones in his left hand during his egress.

After selecting the landing gear down prior to landing, the gear unsafe warning light remained illuminated and there was no down and locked indication for the left main landing gear. After consultation with company engineering personnel, the pilot made a low flypast to enable an assessment from the ground as to whether the landing gear was down and locked. The pilot was advised that from the ground the landing gear appeared to be down and locked. Shortly after landing the left main landing gear collapsed.

An inspection after the accident failed to determine the reason for the collapse.

The pilot of VH-KWG called Essendon tower saying words to the effect that "he was just down from Mildura, a bit short on fuel and requesting an approach to the airstrip on the left". The Essendon tower controller checked his radar screen and noted a primary return on a left base for runway 16 at Melbourne. The return was confirmed as being KWG. At the same time a B727, VH-ANB, was joining final for runway 16 approximately three miles behind KWG. The Essendon tower controller coordinated with the Melbourne tower controller to divert ANB to avoid a serious conflict on final approach. KWG was retained on Essendon tower frequency and cleared to land on runway 16 at Melbourne.

Investigation revealed that the pilot was from another state and not familiar with the area. He had planned a flight from Mildura to Wangaratta. He was using a portable GPS but its battery went flat during the flight and its DC power supply system was not working. Having lost GPS information, he tuned the aircraft's ADF to Wangaratta but did not check the morse code identifier. Furthermore, there were isolated thunderstorms in the area and the pilot had been diverting around cloud en route. He did not have an Enroute Supplement or an ERC Low or a WAC chart. He was carrying an ONC chart. He reported that he followed the ADF needle until he saw Melbourne Airport where he finally landed.