The pilot of a Grob 115 aircraft was conducting solo circuits from runway 21L at Parafield. The pilot reported difficulty in maintaining directional control of the aircraft during the first landing flare and attempted to go around. However, the aircraft crash landed to the left of the runway and was substantially damaged. The pilot, who was uninjured, vacated the aircraft without assistance.

A Fletcher aircraft was being operated from an agricultural strip located on undulating terrain. During take-off, the pilot was unable to prevent the aircraft colliding with two sheep as it came over the blind crest of a hill. The pilot reported feeling the elevator move during the impact and the aircraft briefly became airborne, in a nose-up trimmed condition due to elevator damage.

The pilot closed the throttle and attempted to land in a paddock straight ahead. However, during the landing, the nose wheel separated from the aircraft, resulting in substantial damage being incurred during the ensuing ground roll.

A Bell 206 helicopter was returning from a fire mapping operation along the Colo River at low altitude. Both the pilot and passenger were reported to be looking for wires when the helicopter main rotor struck a single wire that was strung steeply between two poles. The helicopter was operating approximately 300 ft above ground level.

The helicopter immediately landed to conduct an inspection for damage, before returning to the operating base. A detailed examination by a LAME was conducted at the base before the helicopter was returned to operational service.

A SAAB 340 aircraft was conducting a right circuit for a landing on runway 34 right at Sydney, NSW. The aircraft subsequently positioned itself behind a Boeing 767 on final approach to runway 34 left, infringing wake turbulence separation standards.

The crew report that the controller had inquired while the aircraft was downwind if they would like a radar vector to slot them between to heavy aircraft inbound for runway 34 left. The subsequent vector for base leg was assumed by the crew to be a right base, for runway 34 left. The crew did not recall hearing the controller refer to the assigned runway at any stage of their approach. On being cleared for a visual approach at approximately 10 miles the crew dialled up the runway 34 left ILS.

The controller observed the SAAB flying through the centreline of runway 34 right at approximately 7 miles. The crew was cautioned about wake turbulence, taken out of the landing sequence and processed for a right-hand circuit for runway 34 right. The aircraft landed safely without further incident.

During an IFR pre-licence test the pilot of a Beech 76 aircraft, enroute from Maitland to Bankstown, made a MAYDAY call advising that both engines had failed. No location was given and the pilot did not respond to calls from Flight Service. A distress phase was declared and the appropriate authorities notified. A short time later a telephone call was received from the operator, advising that the aircraft had made a forced landing on the Galston sports oval. Both occupants were uninjured, although the aircraft was substantially damaged. Emergency services were in attendance. The distress phase was then cancelled.

The aircraft had touched down on a small sporting oval, but the pilot was unable to stop within the confines of the field. The aircraft struck the top of an embankment, where the left wingtip collided with a power pole, and the right main landing gear was torn off. The aircraft then collided with a chain mesh fence, coming to rest in a right wing low attitude.

The pilot subsequently reported that about ten minutes prior the event, whilst at 6,000 ft, the left engine had surged and stopped. The propeller was feathered and the fuel crossfeed was selected to the right tank. The engine was restarted and developed normal power. The aircraft was then descended to 1,500 ft, but shortly after, both engines began to surge, causing the aircraft to yaw violently. A MAYDAY call was transmitted but there was insufficient time to report position before the forced landing.

The investigation determined that only an unusable quantity of fuel remained on board the aircraft after the accident. Although both left and right fuel tanks had been holed during the accident sequence, testing determined that both tanks were capable of retaining substantial quantities of fuel whilst the aircraft remained in the right wing low attitude at the accident site. An examination of fuel records determined that the aircraft had not been refueled on the day of the accident. Calculations using the previous recorded flying times, and fuel uplifts on the day prior to the accident, determined there had been insufficient fuel on board, prior to takeoff, to complete the flight.

Two hot air balloons had departed from Archerfield in company at approximately 0615 EST and the pilots had been cleared to operate not above 2,500 ft by the terminal area controller. One of the balloons was operating a transponder but the transponder was not equipped with a mode C (height readout) function. The other balloon was not equipped with a transponder. The ATC radar display of the transponder return from the balloon was intermittent.

After initial identification of the balloon, radar contact was lost for a period of some minutes. At the same time, a Boeing 767 (B767) was inbound to Brisbane from the north and was being radar vectored for a left circuit for a runway 01 ILS approach. At about the same time, a light aircraft departed Archerfield for Brisbane, and the pilot requested airways clearance. The pilot was instructed to proceed outside controlled airspace towards the TV towers, and to expect clearance at that position. The pilot was advised of the presence of the balloons. The radar return of the balloons was not visible to the controller at this time. The B767 had by this time reached a position 5 NM south-west of Archerfield, was cleared to 3,000 ft and vectored onto a heading of 090 for the base leg. At about 1 NM west of Archerfield the B767 pilot requested a heading of 040 "due to balloon" and the aircraft was observed to climb by the controller. The heading requested was approved with a further clearance to descend to 2,500 ft and to commence the ILS approach. As the B767 intercepted the localiser, the radar return for one of the balloons reappeared on the radar, just south of the return for the B767. The controller then realised that there had been a breakdown of separation standards between the balloon(s) and the B767.

The balloon pilots had seen the approaching B767 and said that it had appeared from the west out of cloud. The aircraft was heading towards them but climbed and turned left. One of the balloon pilots estimated that the B767 passed 500 metres to the north and about 600 ft above.

During the time that the B767 was being radar vectored, the balloon transponder return had not been visible on the controller's radar screen, and the controller had temporarily forgotten their presence.

The balloon operator said it was not uncommon for radar contact with balloons to be lost, because the transponder antenna was sometimes masked by the gas installation in the basket. The operator has undertaken to improve the antenna installation to overcome this problem. The balloon operator was operating under a Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Permit. One of the conditions of the permit required the balloon to be fitted with a transponder capable of mode C operation, to be operated as directed, unless exempted by ATC. At the time of the occurrence, the balloon was operating under an exemption. As a result of the occurrence, Airservices Australia removed the exemption was removed and stated that, in future, no such exemptions for operations of this nature would be made.

A recommendation was made to the Archerfield District Flying Operations Manager that the words "unless exempted by ATC" be removed from the permit.

The left wing of the aircraft struck a powerline from below during a pull up from a clean-up run. The aircraft rolled along its longitudinal axis and struck the ground inverted in an adjacent paddock. The cabin of the aircraft remained intact, consequently the pilot was not injured.

The clean-up spray run was flown at about 90 degrees to the previous spray runs and parallel to a high-tension power line running north-south. Immediately south of the paddock the power line converged at about 20 degrees and joined a power line at approximately 80 degrees to the high-tension line. The pilot said that the converging wire had not been an obstruction for his spray runs as the convergence started outside the field. He said that he saw the converging power line too late to avoid it.

The pilot of VH-HMV had been advised by Sydney FS that there was no known IFR traffic for his descent. During descent between 3,000 ft and 2,500 ft AMSL the pilot saw a Piper Twin Comanchee aircraft pass head-on about 200 ft above, and 15 m left. The pilot of the descending aircraft made several radio transmissions to ascertain the registration of the other aircraft without success. The aircraft was later identified as VH-CVS when its pilot answered a third aircraft also inbound to Walgett.

The in-flight conditions were VMC with the visibility reduced in smoke haze.

The pilot of HMV had been monitoring the area and CTAF frequencies on two radios since before his descent. He had not heard any transmissions from the other aircraft.

The pilot of CVS later said that he had made the required CTAF transmissions but that he had not transmitted a departure message on the FS frequency because it was saturated with aircraft traffic employed in fighting the bush fires. He did not see the inbound aircraft.

The instructor pilot reported that the take-off roll, and climb were normal until the left crosswind turn at about 600 ft when the engine lost power and RPM decreased to between 1600 and 1900 RPM. Trouble checks were carried out and a turn towards the airfield as commenced. However, due to the distance from the airfield and bordering powerlines a glide approach was not possible. A 300 m long clearing was selected for a landing and the aircraft impacted with some small saplings. The aircraft was vacated once stationary, and no injuries were sustained by the crew.

At the time of the incident, Brisbane ATC Sector 11K Radar and Sector 11 Procedural were being operated as a combined control position. Tindal radar was out of service. A Sector 11K Radar trainee, who was already rated on Sector 11 Procedural, was operating the combined position under the supervision of a training officer.

A Westwind aircraft was tracking Darwin - Tindal - Alice Springs and climbing to Flight Level 330 (FL330), with an estimate for overhead Tindal of 1911 CST. A Boeing 747 (B747) was tracking in the opposite direction to the Westwind and estimating overhead Tindal at 1912. The Westwind was still displayed on radar, but the B747 was outside radar coverage.

Two other aircraft were also under the control of the trainee. The trainee initiated co-ordination with Melbourne ATC to amend the clearance for one of these aircraft. Before Melbourne ATC answered, the pilot of the Westwind requested an amended level of FL370. The trainee immediately cleared the Westwind to this level. Shortly afterwards, the crew of the B747 reported that there was traffic 1,000 feet below their aircraft. (The crew later advised that they had received a Traffic alerting and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) traffic alert on the other aircraft.) The Westwind was observed on radar to be climbing and approaching FL340. The controller instructed the Westwind pilot to maintain FL340 and, immediately afterwards, to descend to FL330. He informed the Westwind pilot of the relative position of the B747.

The investigation determined that the two aircraft had passed with approximately 1.5 NM lateral separation, as the Westwind descended through FL335 and the B747 maintained FL350. In the procedural control environment existing at the time, the required vertical separation standard was 2,000 ft. The required lateral separation standard was 10 minutes combined flight time.

Neither the trainee controller, nor the training officer, checked the flight progress strips for the two aircraft prior to the Westwind being cleared to climb to FL370. The training officer was checking lateral separation calculations for other traffic on a map at the time and was not closely monitoring the trainee.